

THE PORTRAITVRE OF THE IMAGE OF GOD IN MAN.

Creation,
In his three estates, of Restoration.
Glorification.

Digested into two parts.

The first containing, the Image of God both in the Body and Soule of Man, and Immortality of both : with a description of the severall members of the Body, and the two principall faculties of the soule, the understanding and the Will; in which consisteth his knowledge, and liberty of his will.

The second containing, the passions of man in the concupiscible and irascible part of the soule : his dominion over the creatures ; also a description of his active and contemplative life ; with his conjunct or married estate.

Whereunto is annexed an explication of sundry naturall and morall Observations for the clearing of divers Scriptures.


All set downe by way of collation, and cleared by sundry distinctions, both out of the Schoolemen, and moderne Writers.

The Third Edition, corrected and enlarged.

By I. Weemse, of Lathocker in Scotland, Preacher of Christs Gospel.

L O N D O N,

Printed by T. C. for John Bellamie, and are to be sold at the signe of the three Golden Lyons in Cornhill, neere the Royall Exchange. 1636.





TO
THE RIGHT VVOR-
THY, S^r. DAVID FOVVLES
Knight and Baronet, one of his maje-
sties Councill established in
the North.



Here were two pillars
before Salomons Tem-
ple, (right worthy Sir)
Jachin, that is, *God will*
establisth; and *Bohaz*,
that is, *strength*. These
two pillars were set
up, to uphold the

1 King. 7. 21.
2 Chron. 3. 17.

porch of the Temple. So there are two pillars,
which uphold the Church, and this world,
Religion and *Justice*: true *Religion* upholds the
Church, and *Justice* the Common-wealth.

Of these two, *religion* stands upon the right
hand to uphold, (as *Jachin* did,) and *Justice*
upon the left hand (as *Bohaz* did.) *Religion*

The Epistle Dedicatorie.

Numb. 2.

2 Pet. 3. 10.

Prov. 16. 12.

hath the first place, and therefore the Iewes say well, that it is for *Jerusalems* cause the world stands; that is, the *Church*. All the tents were pitched about the *Tabernacle*; to teach us, that the world is but an *Inne* for the *Church* to lodge in for a while; and if the *Saints* were once gathered out of the world, the foure corners of the earth would scorne clap together, and the *Heavens* should goe away with a noyse.

The pillar which upholds the world upon the left hand is *Justice*; it upholds the earth, and the *Kings throne*. It is laid, *Habak. 1. 4.* *Iam defluit Lex; the Law failes*: This is a speech borrowed from the pulse of a man; for as we discern the estate of a man by his pulse; if it stirre not at all, then we know he is dead, if it stirre violently, then we take him to be in a Feaver; if it keepe an equall stroke, then wee know he is sound and hole. The pulse of the *Common-wealth* is *Justice*. If *Justice* bee violent and turned into wormewood, then the *Common-wealth* is in a bad estate; if it stirre not at all, then the *Common-wealth* is dead, and if it have an equall stroke, then it is sound and hole.

Now Sir, these two pillars, *Religion* and *Justice*

The Epistle Dedicatory.

Justice, have beene your maine study how to uphold them in your place, and that these two, might kisse one another, as the Psalmist speaks; For piety, your care hath beene still, that these Foxes which spoyle the Vines, should bee catcht, (that is, these Locusts and Seminaries, which come out of the bottomlesse pit, and goe about secretly to devour Widowes houses, and subvert these tender young Vines, and weake ones, under the colour of long prayers,) your whole labour is to discover them; and that these parts where ye live may be receptacles for the earth. Secondly Sir, what your care is for Iustice, that shée may flourish, all the Country about you can witnesse, from the highest to the lowest. Iethro said to Moses, *Why sit ye all the day long, from morning till night, judging the people?* Your care (I may say truely Sir) from morning to night, is to judge the people, and to give upright Justice to his Majesties subjects.

Psal. 85. 10.

Canr. 2. 15.

2 Tim. 3. 61

Exod. 18. 14.

There are foure Iudges most remarkeable in the Scripture, *Moses* for his mildnesse; *Salomon* for his wisdom, *Iob* for his pity, and *Samuel* for his equity: with the mildnesse of *Moses* ye can moderate in discretion your censures; and with *Salomon*, wisely Iudge what belongeth to every one; ye are, as *Iob* speaks,

Numb. 12. 3.

1 King. 4. 29.

Iob. 29.

1 Sam. 12. 3.

The Epistle Dedicatory.

The blessing of him that is ready to perish; yee are an eye to the blind, and a foot to the lame; ye see none perish for want of cloathing, nor the poore without a covering: so that the loynes of those that are warmed by you, blesse you; and yet in all this you may say with Samuel, Whose Oxe have I taken? or whose Asse have I taken? or whom have I defrauded? whom have I oppressed? or of whom have I received any bribe to blinde mine eyes therewith? so that the people where you dwell, may blesse God who hath seated you amongst them for their good. These my travels therefore Sir I offer to your Patrocinie, as to one most Worthy, and who hath greatest interest in them, if there were any thing in them answerable to your goodnesse; for still (Sir) yee have beene my greatest encourager, to set me forward in my studies. Yee have Iudgement to discern, what is said to the purpose here, and what seemes to be said amisse, to construe it to the best sense; and to defend it against the criticke censures of some not so wel affected. Now for all your care both for Religion and Iustice, the God of Mercy mete you againe. Jonadab, for his obedience to his Father Rechab, had a promise made to him, that he should not want a man to stand before the Lord for ever. So Sir, for your
obedi

The Epistle Dedicatory.

obedience and care, that ye have to doe service to your King and Country, I pray God that ye want not a man to stand before the Lord, to succede you, and to continue your family to all posterity. Thus craving Gods blessing to bee alwaies upon you, and your most Religious and Noble Lady and children, I bid you all farewell.

IOHN WEEMES,

Preacher of the Gospel.

Aa 4

1870

1870

1870

1870

1870

1870

1870

1870

1870

1870



An Advertisement to the Reader for the right using of School-divinitie.



It is a question that hath beene much ex-
agitated in the Schools, how farre
Philosophy should have place in the
Church of God and in *Divinity*. Some
have gone so farre upon the one ex-
tremitie, that they have advanced
her in the Church, above *Divinity*
it selfe, and they have framed the
whole platforme of their religion as
Philosophy hath taught them; others

again bending the sprig other way, would altogether have *Phi-
losophy* banished out of the Church. But wee are here to follow a
middle course, neither to seclude her out of the Church, neither
to suffer her to advance her selfe above *Divinity*; shee is but the
handmaid to her mistresse *Divinitie*: therefore shee must not take
upon her to rule in the house, and to over-rule her mistresse, as
Hagar would have usurped above *Sara*: if she have any charge, it
must be over those who are under her; she must then submit her-
selfe as a dutifull handmaid to her mistresse.

There is in a man *sense*, *imagination*, *reason* and *faith*: *sense* co-
rects *imagination*; as when the Disciples saw Christ they thought
he had beene a spirit: But Christ corrects this wrong *imagination*
by *sense*, saying, *Touch me, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones*. When
sense is deceived, *reason* corrects it; When one puts a staffe in the
water, to his sight the staffe seemes to be broken: but yet *reason*
corrects his sight, and teacheth him that the water cannot breake the
the

The Epistle to the Reader.

the staffe; so when a man is in a feaver, sweete things seeme bitter to his taste, yet this reason teacheth him that the fault is in his taste, and that the things are sweete in themselves.

When reason erres, shee cannot cure her selfe, but her mistress *Divinitie* must come in and teach her. *Sara*, when she was old the Lord promised that shee should have a childe, she did laugh at it, her *reason* thought it impossible, that a woman stricken in yeares should have a child: but her mistress *faith* corrected it, and shee beleevved by *faith*, that which her *reason* could not take up. Philosophy is but a hand-maide to Divinity, therefore shee must bee *ἐμμενέουσα* and not *ὑπερβαίνουσα*, that is, she must hold herselfe within her owne bounds and not transcend them. *Nicodemus* reasoning against regeneration failed in this point when he reasoned thus: He that is borne againe must enter into his mothers wombe againe. But no man can enter into his mothers wombe againe: This principle is wrong applyed by him in Divinity, for wee are borne againe as *Christ* teacheth, *Iohn 3*, by the water and the Spirit; and not by entring into our mothers wombe againe. This vaine excessse of reason and fleshly wisdom, is that which the Apostle condemnes, *2 Cor. 10. so 1 Cor. 3. 19.*

Againe, when by *naturall reason* and *Philosophy*, we take up a thing; and by *faith* wee beleevve the selfe same thing, if *reason* claime the first place here, then she is not a dutifull hand-maid.

There are some things in Divinity which are *mixtly divine*: there are other things *meerely divine*: these things which are *mixtly divine*, in such reason may serve but onely in the second place; *primo credantur, et postea intelliguntur*: as a man beleevves the immortality of the soule: then he begins to take up the same by *reason*; must reason here advance her selfe as farre as *faith*? or must *reason* come here before *faith*? God forbid: for that which I beleevve, I beleevve it, *ex autoritate dicentis*, relying upon the truth of him that saith it, and al the evidence which I get by *reason* is nothing to this certitude: if *reason* should goe before like an usher to make way to *faith*, we should never beleevve. The *School-men* say well, *Rationes precedentes minnuunt fidem; sed rationes subsequentes augent fidem* Reasons going before *faith* weaken *faith*, but reasons comming after *faith* strengthen it: *reason* makes not the matter more sure, *ex parte veritatis distantis, sed ex parte intellectus assentientis*: in respect of God the speaker, but in respect of the weakenesse of our understanding, for by this accessse of further

The Epistle to the Reader.

ther knowledge it is more confirmed. A gardiner when hee is about to plant a tree, first hee digs the earth and makes an empty roome in the bosom thereof for the planting of the tree: then after he takes the same earth (which if it had not beene digged up, had stayed the planting of the tree) and casts it about the roote of the tree againe, for the fastning of it: hee takes also the stones which he had digged up with the earth, and kills the mole which would have beene hurtfull to the tree: so, first the Lord empties our soule of all *naturall reason*; and this heavenly gardiner makes a roome, wherein hee plants this supernaturall grace of *faith* by his owne hand; but when he hath planted this heavenly plant *faith* in the soule, *reason* will serve for two uses; first, for the confirmation and establishing of our *faith* new planted: another for killing of all contrary heresies besides which might hurt our *faith*: But in things which are meerely divine, & *qua cadunt directè sub fide*, and fall directly under *faith*, as the myserie of the Trinitie and the incarnation; what can *reason* or *Philosophy* doe here; but admire these hid mysteries which she can never reach unto: if *reason* the hand-maid have alwaies her eyes towards her mistresse, then we may make good use of her in the Church.

The *Vine-tree* of it selfe bringeth forth the most comfortable grape for our nourishment, and chearing of our hearts; but yet if we set a *Mandrake* by it, and then drinke of that wine, that wine will make us sleepe the better. The knowledg of Divinity is the onely comfortable knowledg, but yet *Philosophy* as the *Mandrake* being set by it, may have the profitable use also. Schoole divinity hath most incroched upon the truth and obscured it; framing all religion according to the platforme of Philosophie. There was one *Demonides* a Schoolemaster in *Athens* having crooked feete, hee had his shooes made according to his feete: one stole his shooes from him; but he wisht that the feete of those who had stole his shooes, might become like unto the shooes. This was a foolish wish to desire the straight foot, to be made conforme to the crooked shooe, whereas the shooe should be made conforme to the straight foote. What is Schoole divinity, but a crooked shooe? therefore to conforme *divinity* to it, where to conforme the straight foot to the crooked shooe. *Divinity* must be the square to correct that which is not straight.

Although this schoole divinity hath beene mightily abused, yet the abuse takes not away the use. For the right using of the schoolmen wee must remember, that there is a threefold judgement, 1. the

The Epistle to the Reader.

1. the judgement of *verity*, the second is the judgement of *prudence*, the third is the judgement of *charity*.

The judgement of *verity* is onely to be found in the Scriptures, and all other writings should bee tryed by them, as the canon and touchstone : but the church of *Rome* would have the Scriptures to be tryed by the Fathers and Schoolemen.

Secondly, the judgement of *prudencie* is requisite in reading of them ; men should not dote upon them : for this is generally the fault of most of them, that yee shall finde little pietie or matter of holinesse in all their writings. *Bucer* said well, that there is more holinesse to be found in *Seneca* than in most of them : if men converse too much with them, they shall finde but little sanctification by them, but having their mindes inlightened by the holy Scriptures, and their affections sanctified, they may make use of them. Some of them we may reade distinctly and judiciously ; some of them we are to reade cursorily ; and some of them we are but to looke upon here and there : some meates we cut first, then we chew them, then we digest them ; other meates we swallow them ; and other meates wee taste onely of them. So wee should use these Schoolemen : some of them we should reade distinctly : others of them we should swallow as it were, and run over lightly : and others of them wee should tast and looke but upon them here and there.

Againe, *prudency* should teach us, what wee should observe as impertinent in them, and what to reject ; their questions for the most part are idle and curious, as the most of their hypothetical propositions, and the manner of their disputations ; for oftentimes they dispute *ex alienis principijs*, out of the grounds of other sciences : they confound *Divinity* and *Philosophy* : and the *Modes* which they use oftentimes are impertinent. They bring innumerable arguments and disputations oftentimes probable on both sides, and they trust too much to the testimonie of men ; they give very rashly many of them, and speake not soberly enough of the great mystery of the Trinity, and Incarnation ; bringing in philosophicall reasons : wheteas these mysteries should rather be adored than searched after : and herein *Athanasius* sayd well, *Etiam verade Deo loqui est periculosum*.

And last of al, they distinguish where the law distinguisheth not.

The third judgement is the judgement of *charity* ; when we reade them and finde many grosse errors in them ; wee are

The Epistle to the Reader.

for that to reject them, for we shall finde sometimes points notably well cleared in them. The Iewes have a proverbe, *Comede dactylos, & projice foras duritiem; Eat the Date, and cast away the Stone*; so should wee in reading of them, take that which is good, and cast away their errors. The *Toade*, although it bee a loathsome creature, yet we will take a stone out of the head of it, and use it: the *Muske-kat* is an ill-favoured creature, and yet we will take the muske of it to perfume things with: The *Raven* was an unclean creature under the Law, yet *Elias* was fed by it: so wee may get many profitable helps by these Schoolemen, although they have great errors: but we must take heed, that we fawningly flatter them not.

The flatterers of *Dionysius* were so grosse, that they would licke up the spittle of *Dionysius*, protesting that it was sweeter than *nectar*; we must not so doate upon them, as to licke up their excrements, but onely follow them in so farre as they follow Christ. We must not give to them glorious titles, for then as *Iob* saith, We must give titles to men, as *Jacobus de Voragine*, as though he had eaten up the whole Booke of God in reading it; and to *Thomas Aquinas*, they gave the name *doctor Seraphicus & angelicus*: to *Scotus*, *doctor subtilis*; to *Durandus*, *doctor irrefragabilis*; to another, *venerabilis inceptor*; to another, *doctor fundatissimus*; to another *illuminatus*; to another, *doctor resolutus*: and a thousand such.

Among the Iewes, when the holy Ghost was not revealed unto them, then they tooke glorious titles upon them, as one was called *אור העולם lux mundi*, *R. Iude*, his title was, *Rabbonus הקדוש doctor noster sanctus*; *Saddaas* was called, *הנאן illustris*; *Abenezra* was called, *lapis auxilij*; they were also called *פתחים* *aperti*, the men that saw; for they reckoned the people but blinde, *Rom. 1.* and the leaders of the blind: then they disdained the people, *Iob. 7. 49.* *this people who know not the Law*: they called also the people *populus terre*. So when these glorious titles were given to the Schoolemen, then the holy Ghost withdrew his presence mightily from his Church.

Wee should in charity judge their errors, for they lived in the houre of darkenesse, and few there were then to oppose against them, and what marvaile if they did oftentimes stumble: so that this was but infirmity in them, and not malice.

But if they could now behold from heaven the Church of *Rome* (who brags that shee succeeds to them) with her new plots, as her

equivoca

The Epistle to the Reader.

equivocations, mentall reservations, allowing the killing of Princes, absolving subjects from loyalty towards their Prince; wives from their husbands, children from their parents; and giving to images not onely *cultum respectivum*, which the schoolemen granted to them, but also *cultum conjunctum*, or coadoration; would they not bee ashamed of these their children, and blush if they could behold them?

A Cardinall upon a time caused a Painter to paint the twelve Apostles; the Painter painted them looking somewhat reddish; the Cardinall asked the Painter whether the Apostles looked so when they were here alive? no said the Painter: why dost thou then so paint them said the Cardinall? the Painter replied, They blush so now when they behold the corruptions of you who take upon you to bee leaders of the Church. If the Schoolemen could behold the grosse and innumerable corruptions which are maintained now in the Church of *Rome*, which were not then, would they not blush and be ashamed, and disclaime them for their children?

When *Moses* was upon the mount, hee brought a patterne of the whole frame of the tabernacle from the Lord, and erected it according to the patterne received, but the Church of *Rome* hath erected another patterne, framing religion by the mould of humane reason.

If ye will take a view of severall points professed in Poperie, ye may easily perceive whence they have taken the patterne of them, not from *Moses* on the mount, but from scholasticke speculations.

First, because the Mathematickes consider lines, figures, circles, points, abstracted from bodies, therefore they gather, that accidents may be in the Sacrament without the subject.

Secondly, because morall Phylosophy establisheth neyther punishment nor reward, unlesse the free will of man goe before; hence they inferre, that there is free will in man: againe, because morall Philosophy knoweth no vertues, but inherent habites and vertues; therefore it is that they set themselves so against the imputed righteousness of Christ: the morall Philosopher calls vice a voluntary evill, therefore they inferre, that concupiscence is not sin, because it is not altogether voluntary.

Thirdly, from the Politickes, in policie, the best sort of government is monarchicall, therefore the Popes government must be monarchicall. Againe, in Princes Courts, men use mediators

The Epistle to the Reader.

goe to their Prince, therefore they conclude, that we must use the intercession of the Saints to God. In policie, no lawes are given, but which the subjects may fulfill, therefore man is able to fulfill the law of God.

Fourthly, from the Physickes; Physicke teacheth us that the body turnes to corruption, and dissolves; upon this they inferre, that man before his fall his body should have dyed naturally, as it doth, if supernaturall righteousnesse had not kept backe corruption; so that they make God as well the author of death, as well as of nature, considering man here onely after the principles of nature, and not according to his first creation. Againe, Physicke teacheth us, that the blood alwaies followeth the body, therefore they have taken away the cup from the people in the Sacrament, because (say they) if they get his flesh, they get his blood, *per concomitantiam*.

Fifthly, the Metaphysickes teach us, that every positive thing is good, therefore they define originall sinne to be a meere privation.

Sixthly, the Platonickes were mightily deluded by the apparition of spirits, hence they have borrowed their apparition of spirits.

Seventhly, from the Poets fables they have taken their Purgatory.

Last, from the incantations of the Gentiles, they have borrowed their exorcismes. Thus wee see that they have not taken their platforme from above in the mount with *Moses*, but from below, from humane reason and Philosophie: and here they ought to have remembred that of the Apostle, *Take heede that no man spoile you with Philosophie*. Curteous Reader, if there bee any thing here that may serve for the good of the Church and your edification, give the glory to God, and reape you the fruits: if there bee any thing that seemeth not correspondent to reason or the word of God, reprove me for it, and it shall be like a pretious balme unto my head. So recommending you to the grace of God, I rest,

Your ever loving brother in Iesus Christ,

JOHN WHEEMSE.

A Table of the principall distinctions and chiefe points contained in this Booke.

A

A Bomination *what it is,*
pag. 166.

Action twofold, 109. Foure
active principles. 100

Adams knowledge how farre
it reached, 67. What he be-
leeved before the fall, 90
what principles were con-
create with him, 91. a dif-
ference betwixt his know-
ledge and ours. *ibid.* be-
twixt his knowledge and
Salomons, 93. what li-
berty he had before the fal,
110. how the creatures
were subject to him. 233.

Agent corporall different
from intellectuall, 95

Analogie twofold. 87

Angels cannot bee instru-
ments in creation. 3. our
soules and the Angels dif-
fer. 9. how they know
things, 84. they doe not
reason, *ibid.* they have two
instants. 107. they differ
foure waies from man, *ib.*
they have a twofold re-
ward 167. Of their mi-

nistrice, 254. 255

Anger, *what it is,* 223. *how*
it differeth from hatred.
ibid. foure sorts of anger,
224. a twofold anger, 22.
foure vertues moderate it,
226. three degrees of an-
ger, 227. three sort of un-
just anger, 228. remedies
to cure anger, 229. no-
thing opposite to it, 231.
Attributes, *how in God.* 88.

B.

Beasts, *their phantase*
moves onely the sensitive
appetite. 140

Beautie threefold. 38

Being, *the first effect in crea-*
tion. 3. creatures have
being three waies. 6

Body, an excellent creature,
13. how wee may conceive
the excellency of Adams
body. 12. mans body hath
three estates, 30. Adams
body not mortall, of it selfe
320. but naturally incor-
ruptible. *ibid.* mans body
three waies considered, 36
a glorified body hath foure
properties. 37. mans body

The Table.

was made perfect, 40
 Boldnesse, what it is. 223
 Bond mutuall betwixt God
 and man, 136. a threefold
 bond betwixt man and
 wife, 268

C.

Cause threefold, 74. 128. no-
 thing can interuene be-
 tweene the first cause and
 first effect, 3. The second
 causes have a twofold pro-
 ceeding, 75. God is the phy-
 sicall cause in our conver-
 sion, 129. there is a twofold
 cause. *ibid*

Christ knowne two waies, 80
 he is considered two waies,
ibid, a fourefold knowledg
 in him, *ibid*. a difference
 betwixt these knowledges,
 81. what ignorance was in
 Christ, 83. he is considered
 three waies. 176

Comprehension twofold, 89

Conceiving of God threefold
 87. a twofold conceiving
 of a thing, 88 three impe-
 diments hinder our concei-
 ving. *ibid*

Condition twofold, 105. dif-
 ference betwixt a cause
 and a condition, *ibid*. why
 God sets downe his threat-

nings conditionally. 123
 Children of God committing
 a sin are not quite cut off,
 137. 138. what they lose
 when they commit a sin. *ib*.

Concupiscence was not in
 man, before the fall, 148

Conjunction threefold, 278

Creation was from the nega-
 tion to the habite, 4. no-
 thing can be an instrumēt
 in creatiō, 3. Creatiō is not
 a miracle, 9. how the crea-
 tures were with God before
 creation, 6. God is the only
 cause in creation, 3. good-
 nesse is first manifested in
 creation, 2. God is distin-
 guished from the heathen
 gods by creation, 7. man
 hath superiority over all
 creatures, 231. 232. Gods
 wisdom manifested in
 creation, 128. God hath a
 twofold intention, 201.

D.

Delight, what it is, 196. de-
 light diversly distingui-
 shed, 198. 199. twofold
 order betwixt the delights
 and operations in beasts,
 200.

Desire what it is, 189. it is
 fourefold, 260. desire, love,

The Table.

and delight differ, 189. it is twofold, 190. 191. 200. there is a threefold desire, 190. In Christ there were 3. desires, <i>ibid.</i> A thing is desired two waies, 191. no contrariety in Christs desires, 192. the desires of the regenerate are moderate, 194. remedies to cure sinfull desires. 196.	is carried to the proper end 60
Despaire contrary to hope, 213. desperation is not a punishment, 214. difference between hatred and despaire, 215. remedies against despaire, 216. 217.	Evill twofold, 41. 219. 221
Determination threefold, 125.	Eyes, 15. their excellency, <i>ib.</i> the eye hath no colour in it, <i>ibid.</i> it hath five tunicles, 16.
Digamie twofold, 27. it is unlawfull. <i>ibid.</i>	F.
Divels cannot create, 4. what the sinne of the devils was, 184. he lost three things by his fall, <i>ibid</i>	Faculty, how it differs from a habit, 96. two principal faculties in the soule, <i>ibid.</i>
Divinitie and morall philosophie differ. 150.	Feare hath many branches, 144. what feare is, 217. Sundry sorts of feare, <i>ibid.</i> feare twofold, 220.
Dominion twofold. 239.	Formes different, 56. two things required in a forme 55. the more excellent forme, the stricter conjunction, <i>ibid.</i>
E.	Freedome is radically in the will, 105.
Eare, 17. the excellency thereof, <i>ibid.</i> faith comes by the eare, 18	G.
End more excellent than the meares, 256. every thing	Gifts twofold, 86. God gives his gifts two waies, 322.
	Glasse twofold, 77
	Glorification and transfiguration differ, 39. how a man may behold Gods glory, 87. the glorified have a twofold object, 213
	God communicates his goodness, 1. God hath five royall pre-

The Table.

prerogatives, 5. God, nature, and art, differ in operations, 6. God made all things in measure, number and weight, 12. the knowledge of God is naturally inbred, 67. the first principles of the knowledge of God and other sciences differ, *ibid.* we are led to take up God three waies, 72, 73. 74. we ascend by degrees to take up God, 75. we ascend by degrees to see him, 76. a twofold knowledge in God, 121. God opens the heart, 129. God is pleased with mans works two waies, 158. 284. God is to be loved only for himselfe, 164. 165. nothing to be loved above him, 167. notes to know the love of God, 170. 171. God the first object of the minde, 67. Goodnesse is either imperfect or perfect, 1. goodnesse twofold, 2. 284. 28. two conditions required to chiefe goodnesse, 199. Grace taken divers waies, 134. how grace concurs in mans conversion 117. grace considered three waies, 133. difference in

receiving grace, 134. there is but one sort of grace, *ibid.* grace once received cannot be lost, 135.

H.

Hand, 20. the properties thereof, *ibid.*

Hatred what it is, 183. God cannot be the object of hatred, *ibid.* love and hatred are opposite, 185. twofold hatred, 186. 187. how far the regenerate hate sinne, *ibid.* hatred, anger, & envy differ, 188. remedies to cure hatred, 189. hatred and presumption differ, 215.

Head, 14. the excellency thereof. 15.

Heart the first mover, 21. the excellency thereof, *ibid.* wherefore placed in the left side, 22. the fat of the heart, 25.

Hope, what it is, 211. how it differeth from desire, *ibid.* hope considered as a naturall or theologicall vertue 212

I.

Iesuites plead for nature, 127. they make a threefold know-

The Table.

knowledge in God, 120. they establish a threefold grace, 127. our different from them in mans conversion. 130, 131, 132.	Iustification twofold, 137. God doth three things in our justification, 117.
Ignorance diversly distinguished, 82. 102. 110. 185.	K
Injurie hath three things following it. 227	Kidneyes are in a secret place 25.
Image of God wherein it consists, 65. a twofold image of God, 60. wherein man beares the image of God, 64 man having Gods image all creatures are subject to him, 234. a twofold condition of Gods image, 247. it is taken up foure waies 63	Knowledge of the creatures shall evanish in the life to come, 78. 79, fulnesse of knowledge twofold, 80. 81 divers distinctions of knowledge, ibid. 82. 85. 86. 87. a twofold sort of knowledge, 84. how knowledge is in the Angels and mans mind. 85. a threefold knowledge in Angels, ib. a difference betwixt our knowledge and the Angels 91.
Immortality, how a thing is said to be immortall, 30. how Adams body was immortall before the fall, 31 reasons to prove the immortality of Adams body naturally, 33, 34, 35, 36. reasons to prove the immortality of the soule, 44. 45. the heathen knew of the soules immortality, 49	L
Infinite thing how apprehended, 90. a thing is infinite two waies, ibid. 195.	Libertie twofold, 108. Impediments hindering the wills liberty. 113
Iustice the most excellent vertue, 1.	Light, the greater it be, obscures the lesser, 71.
	Love what it is, 161. sundry distinctions of love, 162. 163, 164, 165, 166. things are loved two waies, 164. 169. degrees of love, 166. the perpetuallie of love, 166. love is an affection or deed, 175. a twofold cause of love ibid. How wee are to love our

The Table.

our parents, 176. 177. love
descends, 178. how farre an
unregenerate mans love
extends, 181. wee should
love our enemies, ib. true
love is one, 182. remedies
to cure sinfull love. ibid.
Life contemplative preferred
to the active, 278. Man
hath a threefold life, 222.
260. the Active in some
case is preferred, 257.
Mans life considered two
waies, ibid. whereto these
two lives are compared,
259. Mans life resembled
to sixe things, 260. 263.
Liver inclosed in a net. 23.
Lungs seated next the heart.
ibid.

M

Magistrates authority con-
sists in foure things, 172.
Man a little world, 41. hee is
considered 3. waies, 136.
the first part of mans supe-
rioritie over his children,
237. man diversly conside-
red, 150. he hath a passive
power to grace, 116. man
and wife one, 268
Matrimony hath two parts
in it, 269.
Members of the body placed
wisely by God, 13. the diffe-

rence of the members, 14.
Middles are often chosen as
evill, 114. all things are
joyned by middles, 39.
things are joyned two waies
113. wee see a thing by two
middles, 79. there is a
twofold middle, 152. 154.
no middle betwixt vertue
and vice, 153
Miracle, creation is not a mi-
racle, 9. when a worke is a
miracle, ibid. the resurre-
ction is a miracle, ibid. two
conditions required in a
miracle, 118. mans conver-
sion is not a miracle, 119.

N

Nature taken five waies, 250
Necessity diversly distin-
guished, 36. 109. 178.
Neighbour, how to be loved,
173. in what cases hee is to
bee preferred before our
selves, 380. wee are not to
love all our neighbours a-
like, 175. In what cases wee
are to preferre our selves
to our neighbours, 174. 175
Nothing, taken divers waies,
4. made of nothing, 6.

O

Oppositio twofold 185. 214.
Order twofold in discipline,
71.

The Table.

Originall righteousness was not supernatural to Adam 249. but naturall, 250. reasons to prove that it was naturall, 251. to make it supernaturall, draweth many errors with it, 253.

P

Passion, what it is, 139. 140 what seate they have in the soule, *ibid.* they are moved by the understanding, *ibid.* onely reason subdues the passions, 141. they have a threefold motion, *ibid.* they are only in the concupiscible & irascible faculties, 142. their number is in the divers respects of good and evill, *ibid.* the divisions of the passions, 143 where the passions are united, 144. Christ tooke our passions, 145. what passions hee tooke, *ibid.* how they were ruled in Christ, 146. no contrarietie amongst his passions, 148. what contradiction ariseth in our passions, *ibid.* it is a fearefull thing to be given over to them, 149. how the Moralists cure the pas-

sions, 151. the Stoicks roote out all passions, 158. foure waies Christ curreth the passions, 159. 160. 161. how farre the godly are renewed in their passions, 148.

Perfection diversly distinguished. 66. 186.

Philosophie, twofold. 95

Poligamic is unlawful, 310.

Power diversly distinguished. 116. 240. 241.

Poverty twofold. 243.

Proposition hypoteticke, when true. 121.

R

Recompence fourefold. 226

Reason hath a twofold act, 84.

Resistance diversly distinguished, 133. 134.

Renouncing of things twofold, 243.

Resurrection a miracle, 10.

Rib, what is meant by the first rib, 24. the rib taken out of Adams side, no superfluous thing, 266. it was one of his ordinary ribs, *ib.* how this rib became a woman, 267. what matter was added to it. *ibid.*

Right to a thing diversly distinguished, 241. 242. 244. what right Christ had

The Table.

to the creatures. 241. 242.

S

Sadnesse hath many branches. 144.

Sciences, how found out, 71. the first principles of sciences are not inbred. 68.

Seeing, three things required for it, 79. we see three waies, 75.

Senses, the common sense differeth from the particular senses, 27. wherein the five senses agree, 28 wherein they differ, *ibid.* which is the most excellent sense, 29. 30. whereunto they are compared. *ib.*

Similitude twofold, 61. one thing hath a similitude to another two waies, *ibid.* it differeth from an image, 63. similitude a great cause of love. 245.

Servile subjection, 236. five sorts of servants, *ibid.* it is contrary to the first estate. 237.

Sinne in a countrey fourefold 274. God doth three things to sinners, 276.

Sin three things follow sinne, 35. how it is in the under-standing, 101. a man finnes two waies, 102. how the

workes of the Gentiles are sinne. 157

Soule hath three faculties, 34. how they differ, 52. the rising of the body doth perfect the glory of the soule, 35. how the soule of man differeth from the life of beasts, 42. and from all other things, 43. the soule hath a twofold life, 50. how the soule is in the body, 53. the soule cannot animate two bodies, 54. what middle the soule keepeth, 57. our soules and the Angels differ, *ibid.* the soule hath a diverse operation in the body, *ibid.* three things proper to the soule. 139.

Spirits, that there are intellectuall spirits. 51.

T

Theologie differeth from other sciences. 10

Tongue, the properties thereof, 19.

Truth, three things concur that a man may speake a truth, 24

V

Vertues morrall and theologicall differ, 154.

Vertue twofold, 283.

Virginitie is not a vertue, 282.

The Table.

282. *The Papists make 3 crownes for Virgins, Martyrs, and Doctors of the people.* 285.
Vifage the bewrayer of the minde. 27.
Vnderstanding twofold, 67.
197. twofold act of the understanding, 99. sinne how in the understanding. 101
Vniversall twofold. 70.
Vfe of the creatures twofold, 239. 240. *to give to use, and in use differ, ibid, the use of a thing manifold.* ibid.

W

Will, three properties thereof, 97. it followeth the last determination of reason, ibi. why sometimes it doth not follow the understanding, 98. the will and understanding are reciprocal in action, ibid. whether we will a thing, or understand it first, 100. how

the will followeth the last determination of reason, 103. the understanding is not the cause of the wills liberty, 105. it hath a twofold liberty, 108. the essentiall property of the will, 113. what determinates the will, 112. two things considered in the will, 113, 114. it is not the cause of our predestination, 122. a mans wils a thing two waies. 231 the will hath a threefold motion. ib. it is considered three waies, 133. it hath neede of two things. 191.
Woman made out of the man, 264. why made of the rib, 266
Woman helps her husband in three things, 278
World considered two waies. 7. there should not be too great inequality between man and wife in marriage. 279.

1. Cor. 15. 49.

*As we have borne the image of the earthly Adam,
 so shall wee beare the image of the
 heavenly Adam.*

A Table of the places of Scripture cleared in this Booke.


<i>Genesis.</i>	28 26 14	<i>Psal.</i>	26 95
<i>Cap. Ver. pa.</i>	29 5 35	16 9 18	<i>Iere.</i>
1 2 164	<i>Iosh.</i>	17 8 16	7 13 132
16 11 237	2 1 274	31 9 43	10 11 4
26 6 120	<i>Iudg.</i>	45 1 19	12 2 26
25 10 49	13 22 89	49 3 83	50 20 215
30 37 3	14 15 77	12 46	<i>Dan.</i>
39 9 163	<i>1 Sam.</i>	80 11 40	8 23 27
50 19 225	6 14 184	81 14 133	<i>Hosea.</i>
<i>Exodus.</i>	23 11 121	104 29 7	2 21 75
5 2 185	25 21 197	121 4 70	7 3 153
13 17 120	<i>2 Sam.</i>	137 16 6	9 16 274
16 19 154	2 10 186	<i>Prov.</i>	10 11 114
21 22 52	12 8 273	3 3 22	<i>Jonas.</i>
32 32 180	19 22 <i>ibid</i>	16 20	3 3 73
34 1 95	23 20 73	27 141	5 123
<i>Levit.</i>	<i>1 King.</i>	6 8 162	<i>Matt.</i>
17 11 44	13 5 115	8 13 19	5 28 140
18 18 67	18 27 153	1 22 26	6 23 29
19 2 7	22 28 122	17 15 155	8 24 68
18 151	<i>2 King.</i>	21 1 111	12 4 13
<i>Numb.</i>	2 24 153	<i>Ecclef.</i>	8 240
10 33 73	3 14 47	6 7 18	19 33 10
23 14 119	<i>1 Chron.</i>	8 223	22 30 34
21 215	12 33 168	7 9 230	31 167
<i>Dent.</i>	<i>Iob.</i>	10 2 22	26 23 48
11 12 135	4 18 107	<i>Cant.</i>	38 206
23 24 241	21 27 20	1 4 155	39 190
25 4 114		<i>Esfay.</i>	<i>Mar.</i>
25 272		11 5 159	
		28 21 215	

A Table of the places of Scripture.

<i>Marke.</i>	7 24 160	<i>Ephes.</i>	<i>2. Tim.</i>
2 27 240	12 23 12	1 3 138	1 12 136
4 26 135	26 24 44	3 10 148	2 13 72
6 34 25	<i>Rom.</i>	18 216	
10 21 243	2 29 18	4 25 147	<i>Heb.</i>
24 <i>ibid</i>	6 18 108	5 23 15	1 15 15
11 13 4	9 3 180		11 12 13
12 31 168	10 17 17	<i>Philip.</i>	<i>Iam.</i>
<i>Luke.</i>	<i>1. Cor.</i>	1 23 179	2 25 274
3 11 166	6 16 169	2 21 176	
10 42 58	8 4 4	3 12 89	<i>2 Pet.</i>
22 196	12 15 14	17 129	1 9 75
12 47 140	15 35 2		2 14 16
33 34 16	42 37	<i>Collof.</i>	4 4 75
<i>Iohn.</i>	13 10 76	3 5 173	<i>1 Ioh.</i>
1 9 69	<i>2. Cor.</i>	10 61	2 4 24
4 36 40	4 4 61		3 2 38
1 33 145	6 4	<i>1 Thes.</i>	4 20 166
12 39 113	11 8 242	4 17 115	
1 9	12 14 177	5 23 52	<i>Iude.</i>
14 9 89	<i>Galat.</i>		3 188
15 15 125	2 9 120	<i>1. Tim.</i>	
19 34 25	26 170	3 1 153	<i>Rev.</i>
<i>Actes.</i>	4 6 148	5 4 17	6 10 54
3 48 125	24 219	33 173	9 22 255

A Delineation of this whole Booke.

It is a Position in the *Metaphysicks*, that *Omne bonum est sui communicativum*; Goodnesse cannot be contained within it selfe, but it manifests it selfe to others. So the *Moralists* say, *Amor non est unius*; Love must alwayes be betwixt two or more. So the love and goodnesse of Gods are manifested to the world divers wayes: but the first sight that we get in them, is in Creation, whereby God gave all things through them a being and substance, which no creature on earth can understand, except man because he beareth the Image of God (or at least some sparkles thereof) ingrafted in his heart. That we may conceive what this Image is, we must branch it out according as it hath the situation in the soule and body of man: These are lively described to us in this booke, which is divided into two parts. In the first is contained




The Analysis.

The second part containes

The affections or passions, are considered either in	generall, Chap. 1. Wherein is considered their	division which is in the part of the soule either	concupiscible, which containes	love.	under which two, all the passions may be reduced	chap 2.
			irascible, which containes			
		remedies either by	remedies either by	the morall vertues, 3. by the Stoicks, 4. by Christ, 5.		
	particular which are eleven.	Love, 6.				
		Hatred, 7.				
		Desire,	} 8			
		Abomination,				
		Ioy, 9.				
		Sadnesse, 10.				
		Hope.	} 11			
		Boldnesse,				
		Despaire, 12.				
		Feare, 13.				
		Anger, 14.				

The outward image of God in Adam, was in his superioritie over the creatures, 16. whereupon doe arise three questions,	1	Wherefore God placed his image in man, 15.
	2	Whether this image was naturall or supernaturall, 17.
	3	What society he had with the Angels, 18.

The Adjuncts of this image, were the two royall prerogatives which Adam had in innocencie.	1	In his contemplative and active life, 19.
	2	In his conjunct life or marriage, 20.



THE
PORTRAITVRE
 of the Image of GOD in MAN,
 in his Creation, Restauration,
 and glorification.



OD, who dwelleth in a Light inaccessible, 1. Tim. 6. 16. communicates his goodnesse to his creatures freely.

Every good thing communicates it selfe to another: the Sunne among the Planets communicates Heat and Light; it communicates Heat to all, and Light to many creatures, but yet the Heat is hurtfull to some. So justice amongst vertues is the most excellent vertue, and communicates it selfe to all Societies, and no Societie could subsist without it, not robbers and Theeves, unlesse some kinde of justice were amongst them: for if one should take all, the Societie would soone dissolve. Iustice communicates not her selfe perfectly to this Society, for in this sort of Society there is great injustice: but God communicates his goodnesse

C c

Proposition.

Illustration.

Duplex Bonitas imperfecta & perfecta.

Prov. 29. 28.

nesse to all his Creatures in a perfect measure, fit for their condition, and is hurtfull to none.

Prop.

God communicates his goodnesse to his Creatures fundry waies; by divers degrees and perfectiones.

Illust.

To some hee gives Being onely; to some hee gives Sense, and to some Reason; to some hee gives such a Matter and such a Forme, 1. Cor. 15. 39. *All flesh is not the same flesh, but there is one kind of flesh of men, another of beasts, and another of fishes, and another of birds: there are celestiall bodies, and terrestriall bodies.* A man when hee conceives a thing in his minde, he hath a simple conception of it, yet to make his hearers take it up the better, he utters it by sundry words. So that which is one in God is communicated diversly unto the creatures, as not being all capeable of a like goodnesse; although hee communicate not his goodnesse to all his creatures in a like degree, yet all are partakers of his goodnesse.

Duplex Bonitas, unita & dispersa.

God in communicating his goodnes with the creatures, intends onely his owne glory, and to shew his goodnes.

Prop.

Illust.

Other creatures, who worke but imperfectly, worke for their owne commoditie and profit, Eccles. 6. 7. *All the travile of a man, is for his mouth.* But God made all things not for his profit, but to shew his goodnesse to the creatures: therefore his goodnesse is specially and first seene in the creation, which is Gods first manifestation of himselfe.

CHAP. I.

Of the Creation in Generall.

Prop.

God by his goodnesse is the sole and onely cause of Creation.

Illust.

In all other of Gods workes hee useth meanes as in generation, corruption, dimunition: in these, hee is not the simple and sole cause; but in crea-
tion

tion hee is the onely cause, and useth no meanes. *Deus est causa simpliciter in creatione, at essendi in hoc in alijs: God is the onely simple cause in creation; but in his other workes, hee is onely the cause of beeing this or that.*

God is the first cause, and being is the first effect; but nothing can intervene betwixt the first cause and the first effect; and therefore there can be no instrumentall cause in the creation; if any thing should intervene betwixt the first cause and the first effect, it should be *Non ens*, that which is nothing: but an instrument cannot be *Non ens*; therefore no instrument can intervene betweene the first cause and the first effect.

God is the onely cause of creation, therefore the Angels can bee no instrument in creation, farre lesse can they create a thing, *Augustine* saith, *Damones non possunt quicquam creare, sed creata specie tenus mutare; The spirits can create nothing, but they may change in shew the things that are already created.* Secondly, the Angels may hasten the production of things, but not in an instant, as God made *Adam* a perfect man in an instant, and *Aarons Rod* to budde and to bring forth almonds in an instant, *Num. 17.* because it was a Creation and a Miracle. Thirdly, as they can hasten nature, so they can bring accidents into nature: for if *Iacob* by laying peeled rods before the sheepe, made them to conceive speckled Lambs, *Gen. 30. 37.* much more can an Angel worke such things in nature. *Augustine* in his booke called the *Citie of God*, giveth an example of this; the Oxe which they worshipped in *Egypt* was marked with many divers spots; when hee dyed, how could they finde another marked after the same manner? *Augustine* answers, that the divell represented to the Cow ingendring, a Bull with the like markes, and so the Cow brought forth the like. And thus the Divell continued Idolatry in *Egypt*. Here we see how they can bring acci-

*Duplex causa, simpliciter
& essendi in hoc.*

Illust. 2.

*Inter primam causam &
primum Effectum nihil
intervenit Thom. contra
Gentiles.*

Consequence,

I.

Consequence.

2.

Prop.

Illustr.

*Nihil est negativum,
comparativum, &
privativum.*

*Deus in creatione pro-
cessit a negatione ad ha-
bitum, a totali priva-
tione ad habitum, &
a partiali privatione ad
habitum.*

dents into nature, but the Devils could not create the Oxe of Egypt.

God only creates : this distinguisheth him from the heathen God, and the vanities of the Gentile. *Ier. 10. 11. So shalt thou say to them, Cursed be the gods that made not heaven and earth.* This verse is set downe in the Chaldee tongue, whereas all the rest of the prophecie is set downe in the Hebrew tongue : why did the Lord this ? to this effect, that when the Iewes should goe into *Babylon*, and there should bee solicited to worship their Idols, they should have this verse ready in their owne language; *Cursed be your gods, for they made neither heaven nor earth.*

God created the world of nothing.

Nothing is taken sundry wayes in the Scriptures: first *privatively*, as *1 Cor. 8. 4.* an Idol is *nothing*, that is, it hath no divinity in it ; it is *nothing privatively*, here, but not *negatively*, for it is of wood or stone. So *1. Cor. 7. 9.* *Circumcision is nothing*, that is, it hath no efficacy in it after the abolishing of it, yet it is not *simply nothing*, for it is the cutting of the fore-skin. Secondly, a thing is *nothing in comparison*, one thing being compared with another of greater excellencie. *Eesai. 48.* *All the world is nothing before him*; that is, all the world is *nothing*, being compared with God. Thirdly, a thing is *nothing negatively or simply*, *Marke 11. 13.* *There was no fruit upon the fig-tree.* When we say that God made the world of *nothing*, it is not meant of *nothing privatively or in comparison*, but of *nothing negatively and simply*. *Rom. 4.* *Hee calleth upon things that are not, as though they were.*

He proceeded in the Creation from the negation to the habite, when hee made the world of *nothing simply*; secondly, from a totall privation to the habite, when hee made *light to shine out of darkenesse*. *2. Cor. 4. 6.* thirdly, from a partiall privation to the habit; when he made the day to succede to the night.

God

God hath sundry royall prerogatives which onely belong to himsefe.

First God can create a thing of nothing ; therefore the Magicians of *Egypt*, who in shew had many things, yet could not truely make the basest *creeping things*, *Exod.* 8. 18. Secondly, it is Gods prerogative to turne a thing to nothing ; for there is as great a vastnesse of motion from that which is, to that which is not, as is from that which is not, to that which is. A man may dissolve a body into dust by burning it, but he cannot simply turne it to nothing, for onely God by his power must doe this; *Annihilatio est subtractio Divini influxus*, a thing is turned to nothing, when God withdrawes his influence from it. Thirdly, it is God that can in a moment without natural preparation turne one substance into another, as *water into wine*, *Iohn* 2. and *Lots wife into a pillar of salt*, *Gen.* 19. therefore the Divell when hee would take a proove of Christ whether he was God or not, bids him *change stones into bread*, *Mat.* 4. Fourthly, it is Gods prerogative, onely to adde formes to things, man cannot simply invent a forme, but compose, adde, or diminish from that which he hath seene already ; a man can make a mountaine of gold, because he hath seene both a mountaine and gold ; so he can make *Dagon* halfe man, and halfe fish, because he hath seene both fish and a man before, but hee cannot simply invent a forme. Fifthly, it is God that onely can put life into the creatures. Sixtly, to preserve and guide them continually.

Hee who needeth most helpes to his worke, is the most imperfect worker. There are three speciall workers considered in their place and decree ; *Art*, *Nature*, and *God*. *Art* needeth many helpes, *Nature* needeth few, but *God* none, for his working depends upon nothing, and he presupposeth nothing to worke upon. The perfection of *art* is to imitate *nature*, the perfection of *na-*

Prop.

Illust.

Tanta est distantia ab ente ad non ens, ut à non ente ad ens.

Solius Dei est creare de nihilo, convertere in nihilum, transformare, addere formas rebus, vivificare, & conservare.

Illust. 2.

Arts, Natura, Deus operimur. Est agens independens.

ture, is to imitate *God* in his first creation, when *Art* degenerates from *nature*; then shee is ashamed, and when *nature* degenerates from the first creation, shee bringeth forth but monsters.

Illust. 3.

The tradesman when he worketh, hee must have matter to worke upon, and his patterne before him; our minde when it worketh, hath not neede of matter to worke upon, but of a forme; but *God* when he worketh needeth neither matter to worke upon, nor patterne to worke by.

Ex inhabili subiecto.

Creatio in materia, sed non ex materia.

God when hee made the world of nothing. First, hee made it of nothing simply. Secondly, of a subject that had no hability to produce, as when hee made the plants out of the earth, there was no more power in the earth at the first to produce these plants, then there was in the rocke to give water, *Exod. 27*. Thirdly, he created man out of a subject that had no hability to produce the matter, and of nothing simply, touching the forme, as hee made his body out of the earth, which had no disposition in it for making of the body; so he created the soule of nothing, which is the forme of the body, hee produced the soule of beasts, both in the body, and of the body.

He made the world of nothing, *EX*, *hic non notat materiam sed ordinem*. *OF*. signifieth not here any matter, but order onely.

Quest. How were the creatures with *God* before the creation.

Esse in sua causa ideale, reale.

Answ. The creatures are said to bee three manner of waies. First in the cause, as the Rose in winter is in the roote, although it bee not spred. Secondly, when they are in the mind by representation. Thirdly, when they have a reall existence. The creatures were with *God* before their creation, as in the cause, so they were with *God* in his understanding before the creation: and of this sort of being, *David* speaketh, *Psal. 139. 16*. saying, *Thine*

Thine eyes did see my substance yet being imperfect, and in thy booke all my members were written, which in continuance were fashioned, when as yet there were none of them: but the creatures had not a reall existence with God, as after when they were created. The creatures, *eminenter sunt in Deo*, they are by way of excellency in God, but in themselves they have a finite being.

God is the exemplar of all things.

The creatures are but as the shaddow to the body, or as the reflex of the glasse presently vanisheth when the face is turned away; So when God turneth away his face from the creatures, they perish and turne to nothing *Psal. 104. 29. They die and returns to their dust.* God in the creation created some things actually, other things potentially, in their first principles; as Hony, Wine, Oyle, Balme, and such.

God in the creation kept this order; in the universe, he proceedeth from the imperfect, to the perfect, as the Elements were first created, and then the things made of the Elements; the things without life; before things with life; and of things with life, hee made man last, as most perfect; but in particular things, hee proceeded from the more perfect, to the more imperfect; as first he made the trees, and then hee made the seede; so hee made the Woman after the Man, as more imperfect and passive.

Quest. Whether could God have made the world better than he made it?

Ans. The world is considered either in respect of the whole, or in respect of the parts. In respect of the whole, the world is perfect, both in respect of *degrees* and *parts*: but respecting the parts severally, the world was not perfect in respect of *degrees*, for God by his power might have made particular things better than they were. This the Scripture sheweth us, *Gen. 1.* when it saith, *That eve-*

Prop.

Prop.

The order of the Creation.

Progressus ab imperfectis ad perfecta in universi creat. one, at in particularum creat. one a perfectis ad minus perfecta.

Duplex perfectio, graduum, & partium.

Thom. part. prim. quest.
 15. art. 6. *Essentia
 cuiusque rei consistit in
 indivisibile, Ergo nihil
 potest addi vel detrahi.
 Et natura est incommensa
 aut potentia inhibita
 non est creatio.*

ry dayes worke was good, but when it speakes of all together, it sayes, *They were very good; Propter ordinum universi, & hac est ultima & nobilissima perfectio in rebus;* This is the last and most excellent perfection of the creatures, and this could not be made better. In a Campe, there are Captaines, Souldiers, and a Generall, a Souldier considered by himselfe, might be in a better place than hee is in; for it were better for him that he were a Captaine, But consider him with the whole Campe, which consists as well of inferior members as superior, it is better for him to be a Souldier. So consider the severall workes of God by themselves, they might have beene made better; but consider them with the whole, they could not have been made better. Consider Christs humane by it nature selfe, it had beene better if it had not been passible; but consider it in order to our redemption, it was better that his body was made passible, and so could not have been made better, because it was better for the curing of our miserie, that his body should be mortall and passible. Secondly, it may be answered, God could have made these things which he made better *accidentally*, but not *essentially*, because hee could have made Man or Angel with more excellent gifts than hee made them with: but hee could not make them in essent better than they were. Thirdly, it is answered, by others: that God could not make the world with more wisdom, or after a better manner than he made it; but respecting the things which were made, he could have made them better, *Ad optimum non pertinet ut optima faciat, sed ut optimè & summa potentia & sapientia;* It belongs not to the chiefe good, to make things good in the highest measure of goodnesse, but by his powere and wisdom onely to make them good.

Quest. Whether are Miracles a Creation or not.

Answ. Where Nature is onely enlarged or hindred; they are not called a Creation, but a Miracle: but where the

the things are suddenly brought forth, or the Essentiall formes multiplyed, there is a Creation as well as a Miracle. Example of the first, when Nature is onely extended, it is not a Creation but a Miracle; as when the eye of *Stephen* saw to the third heaven, *Christ* standing at the right hand of God, *Act. 7.* or when *Sara* that was barren conceived, *Gen. 21.* or when the Sunne went backe ten degrees, *Esay 38.* or when it standeth still, *Iosh. 10.* these are Miracles, but not a Creation. But when the Virgin *Mary* conceiveth, and beareth a Sonne, here is both a Miracle, and a Creation. It was a miracle because a Virgin brought forth a Son, and yet remained still a Virgin. It was a Creation, because shee conceived a child without a naturall meanes, *Respectu cause efficientis non materia, In respect of the efficient, and not of the materiall cause:* Shee knew no man, for the holy Ghost over-shadowed her, *Luk. 1.* Manna made for the sustentation of the *Israelites*, is both a Miracle and a Creation, *Ex. 16. 22.* In respect of the place from whence it commeth (from Heaven) it is a Miracle; in respect of the quantitie that there fell so much to feede so many hundreth thousand people, it was a Creation; In the taste it was sweet like honey, a Miracle; in the colour transparent, a Miracle; in a quality that the heate of the Sun melted it, and the heate of the fire bak't it, a Miracle; but that their fell double of it on the evening before the Sabbath, both a Creation and a Miracle: that it fell not upon the Sabbath day, a Miracle; that it corrupted when it was gathered contrary to the command of God, a Miracle; that it fell onely about the campe of *Israel*, and in no place else, a Miracle; that it lasted till they came to *Canaan* a Miracle; that it was preserved for so many hundred yeares in the golden pot, a Miracle.

Quest. Whether shall the Resurrection of the Body be a Creation or not.

Basil

In epist. ad caesarienses.
Creatio ex nihilo, rege-
nerationis et resurrectio-
nis.

Basil answers, that it is a creation, & he shewes that there are three sorts of Creation, the first, when a thing is made of nothing, as in the first Creation. The second, when a thing of evill is made good; as in regeneration, *Psal.* 51. *Create in me a new heart.* The third, when the bodies shall be raised out of the dust, at the resurrection: the first is called *γενεσις*, and the resurrection is called *παλιγγενεσις*, or a new creation, *Matth.* 19. 3. 28

CHAP. I.

Of the Creation of Man.

Doctrine.

Differt theologia ab om-
nibus alijs scientijs.

Moses in the first of *Genesis* brings in God making man. Hence we learne a difference betwixt *Divinitie* and all other sciences: for although all other sciences be busied about man; as *Physick*, for the health of his body; *Ethickes*, for his civill conversation, &c. Yet none of them leads him to the conversation of his Maker, but *Divinity*, till *Moses* come in and shew this. The *Anatomist* will describe every member of his bodie, but never speake of his Maker. Here wee see the prophanenesse of man, for hee maketh lesse account of this science than of any other; hee accounts more of the painter that paints him, or of the tayler that makes his cloathes, than of him that sheweth him who made him. *Laertius* writes of one *Crates* who bestowed his goods very foolishly, for he gave to his flatterer ten talents, to his whore a talent, to his cook ten Mna's, to his Physician a Drachme, to his Philosopher three halfe penny's, to his Counsellor, *Fumum*, *Smoake*; in effect, men now count baseliest of the most worthiest sciences: but let men paint thee, dresse thee, cure thee, as they please; if *Moses* come not in and tell thee, that God made thee, they shall have all but shame of their handiwork. The Philosopher being asked, what was the cause that Phi-
losophers

Philosophers attended at the gates of rich men, & rich men attended not at the gates of Philosophers? he answer'd, because the Philosophers knew what they stood in need of, but the rich men knew not what need they had of Philosophie. So if men knew how much they stood in need of Divinity, to leade them to their Creator, they would make more of them that leade them to this knowledge.

Divinity passeth for the most part from the *materiall* and *formall cause*, and thinketh upon the *Efficient* and *finall*, the first and the last cause, and so while other sciences are either plunged in the baseness of the matter, or curiously searching into the formes of things (which can hardly bee knowne) the Divine is carried backe to the contemplation of the first cause, to *eternitie*, and to the last cause in *eternity*, which are the onely comfortable meditations.

Causa materialis, formalis, efficiens, finalis.

CHAP. III.

Of Mans Body.

THe body of man was created of the earth.

The Philosophers say, in respect of the substance of the bodie, it consists most of earth and water, but in respect of vertue and efficacie, it consists more of moyst and heate, than of cold and dry, that is, it consists more of fire and ayre, than of earth and water, and so the body is kept in equall temperature, in the operation of the elementarie qualities.

God made all things in weight, number, and measure *Wis. II. 17.* In *weight*, that the earth and water should bee heaviest in substance, and that the ayre and fire should be lightest. In *number* that a little fire should have a great efficacie and power, as a great quantitie of earth. In *measure* that they might keepe a proportion amongst themselves, if this harmonic bee broken, it bringeth destruction of the body, as if the heat prevaile then it bringeth

Prop. Illust. 1.

Illust. 2.

Omnia operatus est Dominus in pondere, numero et mensura.

eth fevers, if the cold prevaile then it bringeth lethargies: if the moyft prevaile then it bringeth Hydropfies: fo that the extreame qualities (according to the fituati- on of the Elements) heat and cold, muft bee temperate by the middle qualities of the middle Elements, moyft and dry.

It is to bee marked, how God hath shoven his wife- dome in creation: First in placing man here below up- on earth who had an earthly body. Secondly his pow- er, when he shall place the same body, (when it shall bee made a *spirituall Body*, in the heavens to dwell there. Thirdly, his justice in thrusting the bad angels, who are spirits, downe to the lower hells, who were created to enjoy the Heavens if they had stood in innocencie.

God created the Body of man of the dust of the earth, that it might be matter to humble him.

When *Herod* gave not glory to God, *Act. 12. 23.* The Text saith, that he *was eaten with vermine*; in the *Syriack* it is, *He was made a stable for wormes*. Since the fall, the body is nothing but a stable for wormes, and food for them: and the *Hebrewes* marke, that the flesh of man is called, *Lecham, Bread, Iob. 20. 23.* Because now it is indeed bread and food for the wormes.

Out of a base matter God made an excellent shape of man.

Pfal. 139. 15. *How wonderfully hast thou made me below in my mothers womb:* a speech borrowed from those who worke, *Opus Phrygionicum, Phrygian or Arras work.* The body of man is a peece of curious Tapestry or Arras worke, consisting of skin, bones, muscles, and sinewes.

The excellency of the body of man when he was first created, may bee shewen by the excellent gifts which have been found in the bodies of men since the fall; as one finding the length of *Hercules* foote, gathered by it, the proportion of his whole body; So may wee by the reliques

1. Cor. 14.

Prop.
Illust.

Abenezra. R. Salomon.

Prop.
Illust. I.

*Rukhamte, metaphera
ab acupictoribus.*

reliques found in sinfull man, gather what a goodly thing the body of man had beene before the fall. As the complexion of *David*, 1. *Sam.* 16. 12. The swiftnesse of *Hazacl* who was swift as a roe, 2. *Sam.* 2. The beauty of *Absalon*, in whom there was not a blemish from top to toe, 2. *Sam.* 14. All which being joyned together would make a most rare man: and if the miraculous wine changed by Christ, *Ioh.* 2. at the marriage in *Cana of Galile* exceeded farre the naturall Wine; how much more did the body of man in the first creation exceede our bodies now.

The members of the body of man, are applyed to other creatures, as the *Head of spices*, *Can.* 4. *Renes tritici*, the *Kidneys of the wheate*, *Deut.* 32. the *Heart of the earth*, *Matth.* 12. 40. the *Lippe of the sea*, *Heb.* 11. 12. the *mouth of the sword*, 11. 34. and such like; all which shew the excellencie of mans body.

The measures of every thing are taken from the body of man; as the *Inch*, the *Foot*, the *Palme* and the *Cubit*.

There are sundry members in the body of man which God ascribes to himselfe: as the *Head*, the *Heart*, the *Eares*, the *Feete*, to expresse his attributes to us.

God hath made the body of man a Temple for himselfe to dwell in, and the Sonne of God hath assumed the body of man in one person to his God-head; a dignitie which the Angels are not called unto, and after the making of man he left nothing, but to make himselfe man.

God hath placed wisely the members in the body.

There are some members that are called *Radicall members*, as the *liver*, the *heart*, and the *braine*; & in these, the Lord hath placed the *Naturall*, *vitall*, and *animall spirits*; these spirits are carried by the *Veines*, *Arteries*, & *Nerves*: the *Veines* carry the *vitall spirits* from the *Liver*; the *Arteries* carry the *naturall spirits* from the *Heart*: and the *Nerves* carry the *animall spirits* from the *Braine*.

There

3.

4.

5.

6.

Prop.

Illust. I.

Membra radicalia.

Officialia.

There are other members, which are serving members; as the *hands*, *feete*, and such.

2.

The members of the body helpe one another, the superiour rule the inferiour; as the eyes, the whole body: againe, the inferiour support and uphold the superiour; as the *feete*, the *legges*, and *thighes* support the whole body.

3.

The middle members of the body defend the body, and provide things necessary for it; as wee see in the *hands* and *armes*.

4.

The *Sympathie* amongst the members; if one bee in paine, the whole are grieved: againe, when one member is deficient, another supplyeth the defect of it; as when a man wants *feete*, hee walkes upon his hands; so when the head is in danger, the hand casts it selfe up to save it. Lastly, great griefe in one member, makes the paine of the other member seeme the lesse; which all shew the *sympathy* amongst the members.

5.

The variety of the members of the body sheweth also this wisdom of God: *If all were an eye, where were the seeing*, 1 Cor. 12. 15.

Of the severall outward members of the Body.

Of the Head.

THe *Head* is the most excellent part of the body. First, we uncover the *Head* when we doe homage to a man; to signifie, that our most excellent part, (wherein our reason and understanding dwells) reverenceth and acknowledgeth him. Secondly, because the *Head* is the most excellent thing; therefore the chiefeest part of any thing is called the *head*, Dent. 28. 24. *Thou shalt be*

be the head and not the tayle. So Christ is called the *Head* of the Church, *Ephes. 5. 23.* and the husband is called, the head of the wife, *1 Cor. 11. 23.* So the excellentest spices are called, the head of spices, *Exod. 30. 25.*

All the senses are placed in the *Head*, except the touch, which is spread thorow the whole body. Secondly, the *Head* is supereminent above the rest of the body. Thirdly, the *Head* giveth influence to the rest of body. Fourthly, there is a conformitie betwixt the *Head* and the rest of the body. Christ, the *Head* of his Church, he hath graces above the rest of his members; he giveth influence and grace to them, and hee is like to them. So the man is the womans *Head*, hee hath more gifts than the woman, he should instruct and teach her, she is of the same nature that he is, *Bone of his bone, and flesh of his flesh, Gen. 2. 23.*

Of the Eye.

First, the *Eye* is *speculum artis*, for men have learned by the *Eye* to make Looking glasses: if the Christalline humour were not backt with a blacke humour, the *Eye* would give no reflex: so if glasses were not backt with Steele, the glasse would give no reflex. Secondly, although a man have two eyes in his head, yet hee receiveth but one sight at once, because his optick nerves meet in one. So although hee have two eares, yet hee heares but one sound at once; because his acousticke nerves both meete in one. So although there bee many members in the mysticall body; yet all should bee of one minde, because *there is but one spirit*, *1 Cor. 12. 4.* Thirdly, the eye in it selfe hath no colour; for if it had any proper colour in it selfe, then the object should ever appeare in that colour which the *Eye* hath; as it is evident in *Ictericis*, in those whose eyes are so vitiate, that all

*Visu & oculo videmus,
sed visu effective & for-
maliter, oculo instru-
mentaliter.*

all colours seeme alike to them, and in those who have the yellow Jaundise, because the eye is vitiate with yellownesse, all things appeare yellow unto them. So when the minde of man is preoccupied with dangerous error. When Christ told his Disciples that hee must be whipt, crucified, and rise the third day; the Text saith, *They understood none of these things, beeing hid from them, Luk. 18. 33, 34.* Because they had drunke in a false principle before, that Christ behoved to be a worldly King, *Act. 1. 6.* and this is the reason why the Iewes interpreted the places concerning Christs Kingdome, literally, and not spiritually; of an earthly Kingdome, and not of a spirituall. Fourthly, there are five tunics in the Eye to keepe it from any hurt; the first is called *aranea tunica*, like a spiders webbe; the second, *retiformis*, woven like a net: the third, *uvea*, like a berry: the fourth, *Cornea*, like a horn: the fift, *adnata tunica*, the cover of the eye, or the eyelids. *David* to expresse the speciall care that God hath over his Saints, saith, *Thou keepest me as the apple of thine eye, Psal. 17. 8.* That is, thou hast a speciall care over me, thou guardest me many wayes, as the apple of the Eye is guarded with these five tunics.

A Collation betwixt
the Innocent and old
Adam.

The Eye before the fall, was the window to let in good instructions to the soule; but since the fall, it is *proxeneta peccati*, the broaker that goeth betwixt the heart and the object, to make up a sinfull bargaine; it is now *prom-bus ejus, cujus tactus est minister*, the spokesman of the wedding with sinne, and touch is his servant, and because it is now the most sinfull sence, God hath placed teares in it, which are the tokens of repentance.

The eye now is an adulterous eye, *2. Pet. 2. 14.* the eye now is *oculus nequam*, an evill eye, *Matth. 20. 15.* it is now a covetous eye, *Eccles. 37. 7.* Give the Lord his honour with a good eye, and diminish not his first frutes: Here hee alludes to the custome of the Iewes: for hee who had a

good eye, paid one of forty, when he payd his first fruits; he who was of a *mydle sort of eye* paid one of fiftie; but he who had a *coveteous eye*, paid one of sixtie; and they used to say, *There goeth the man with a good eye*, meaning the liberall; and, *There goeth the man with the evill eye*, meaning the covetous.

There was a contention upon a time, betwixt the heart and the eye, which of these two were the cause of sinne; which was decided by reason after this sort:

*Cordi causam imputans,
occasionem Oculo:*

The cause of sinne is in the heart, but the eye is the occasion.

Of the Eare.

The *Eare* is first and honourable part of the body; therefore of old they did hang Eare-rings and Jewels in their Eares, as a signe of honour, *Gen. 24.* so when men were discharged, their *Eare* was bored in token of infamie. *Exod. 22.*

Secondly, the *Eare* is an honorable part for instruction: the Philosophers call it *sensum disciplinae*, the sense for instruction.

Thirdly for delight, the *Eare*, is the most excellent sense; therefore Salomon calles the Eares, the daughters of Musicke, *Eccles. 12.*

Fourthly, the *Eare* is the most excellent member for grace; for faith commeth by hearing, *Rom. 10. 17.* The Apostle when he cited that verse of the 40. *Psalme* in the 9. of the *Hebrewes* he citeth it thus, *Thou hast fitted a body for me*; but David hath it thus, *Thou hast bored mine eare*; why? because his eare was one of the principall members whereby hee gave obedience to God his Father.

Dd

Fiftly,

5.

Fiftly, there is not a member in the body that God takes such paines about, as hee doth upon the eare; for first, *revelat aurem*, he uncovers the eare, or takes a veile off it. 2 Sam. 20. Secondly, *perforat aurem*, hee bores the eare, Psal. 40. as masters of old bored their servants eare, that they might dwel with them for ever, Exo. 22. The first was *ad intelligentiam*, for understanding; the second was *ad obedientiam*, for obedience. Thirdly, he circumcises the eare, Rom. 2. 29. which includes both the former.

6.

Sixtly, there is not a member the Divell envieth more than the eare, because it is *Ianua vitæ*, the gate of life, as we see in the man possessed with a deafe Devill, Marke 9. 25. he possessed that sence as the most excellent, to hinder him from hearing.

A collation betwixt the
innocent & old Adam.

Before the fall, the eare was the gate of life; but since the fall, in the corrupt man, it is the gate of destruction, *Evill speeches corrupt good manners*. 2 Cor. 15. and now hee is like vnto the deafe adder, *hee stoppes his eare and will not be enchanted*, Psal. 58.

Of the Mouth.

A collation betwixt the
innocent & old Adam.

Eccl. 6. 7. *All that a man laboureth, is for his mouth; the mouth, a little and a strait hole, is soone filled.*

Man before his fall was content with little, but since hee laboureth not to fill a mouth, but a gulfe, as it were the mouth of the Leviathan.

Of the Tongue.

17.

The Tongue of man is a most honorable member, wherefore it is called *mans honour and his glory*, Gen. 49. 6. Psal. 16. 9. *My glory rejoyceth*, because it is the instrument for to glorifie God.

Secondly,

Secondly, a man hath two earēs, and but one *Tongue*, to teach him to bee swift to heare and slow to speake, *Iam. 1. 19.*

2

Thirdly, there is but one *Tongue* in man, to teach him not to be *bilinguis*, of a double *Tongue*. God will not have a heart and a heart in a man, *Psal. 12.* so hee will not have a *Tongue* and a *Tongue* in him, *Pro. 8. 13*, that is, a double *Tongue*.

3.

Before the fall, the *Tongue* of man was like the pen of a swift writer, *Psal. 45. 1.* and uttered those things which his heart indited: but since the fall, it is a world of iniquity, and defileth the whole bodie, and setteth on fire the course of nature, and is set on fire of hell. *Iam. 3. 6.* now it is an unruly evill, and filled with deadly poyson, *Iam. 3. 8.*

A collation betwixt the innocent and old Adam

Before the fall, he spake but with one *Tongue*; but since the fall, he is *bilinguis*, hee speakes with a double tongue, *Prov. 8. 13.* and sometimes *trilinguis*, *Eccles. 33.* *Lingua tertia commovit multos*, a third tongue hath troubled many. The *Chalde paraphrase* calleth a backbiter, a man with a three fold *Tongue*, or a *Tongue* which hath three stings. The Iewes give an example of it in *Doeg*, who killed three at once with his evill report; *Saul*, to whom hee made the evill report; the *Priests*, of whom he made the evill report: and *Himselfe*, who made the evill report.

Coll. 2.

The Heathen in the dedication of the severall parts of mans body, gave the eares to *Minerva*, the tongue to *Mercurie*, the armes to *Neptune*, and the eye to *Cupid*, &c.

Of the Womans Dugges.

God hath placed the *Womans Dugge* in her brest, and not in her belly, as in beasts; and that for two causes: the first is a *Physicall* cause, the second is a *Morall* cause.

Duplex est causa physica & moralis.

The *Physicall* cause, God hath placed them so neere the liver, that the milke might be the better concocted, and the more wholsome for the child: The *Morall* cause, that the woman might impart her affection and love more to her child, by giving it sucke with her *Dugge*, which is so neere the heart. The giving of *Sucke* was one of the greatest bonds of obligation of old, betwixt the mother and the children: when they intreated any thing of their children, they would say, *By these Dugges which gave thee sucke, I request thee doe this.* Virgil.

Of the Hand.

By the Hand we promise, and threaten: it is the *right hand of fellowship*, Gal. 2. 9. We reckon by it, *Wisedome commeth with length of dayes upon her right hand*, Prov. 3. 16. The ancients reckoned upon their *left hand*, untill they came to an hundred yeeres, and then they began to reckon upon their *right hand*. So the meaning of *Salomon* is, that wisedome should make them to live a long age, even to a hundred yeeres. As wee reckon with the *hand*, so wee worship with the *hand*: *Iob* protests, that hee *blest not his hand when hee saw the new Moone*, *Iob* 31. 27. The Idolaters they used to kisse their Idols, *Ose* 13. 2. But because they could not reach to the Moone to kisse her, they kissed their *hand* in homage before the Moone: and *Iob* purged himselfe of this kinde of Idolatry. And the speciall providence of God is to bee marked in the hand of man, that hee hath made him to take his meate with his *hand*, and hath not left him to gather his meate with his lipps, as the beasts doe; for if man did so, his lippes, should become so thick, that he should not speake distinctly; wee see by experience, that those who have thicke lippes, speake not distinctly.

Of the internall members of Mans Bodie.

Of the Heart.

All the passions are seated in the *heart*, we see in *Feare*, such as are transported therewith, call backe the blood to the *heart*, as to the place where feare exerciseth her tyrannie, therewith to defend themselves; and therefore it is that those creatures, that have the greatest and largest *hearts*, are most fearefull, because the heat is more largely dispersed within their *Heart*: and consequently, they are lesse able to resist the assaults of feare.

Object. But it might seeme, that our anger is seated in the *Gall*, love in the *Liver*, and melancholy in the *Splene*, and so the rest; therefore the affections have not their seat in the *Heart*.

Answ. These foure humors, seated in the *Gall*, *Liver*, and *Splene*, are not the seate of the passions; but they are the occasion, whereby the passions are stirred up; as the abundance of blood in the *Liver*, stirreth up the passion of our love which is seated in the *heart*.

The *heart* is the first mover of all the actions of man; for as the first mover carryeth all the spheres of the Heaven with it, so doth the *heart* of man carry all the members of the body with it. In naturall generation, the *heart* is first framed; and in spirituall regeneration, it is first reformed.

The *heart* liveth first, and dyeth last. So in the spirituall life, the life of Grace begins in the *heart* first, and is last left there: hence it is, that *Michael* the Archangell and the Devill, *Ind. 9.* strove no faster about the body of *Moses*, than they doe about the *heart* of man: there-

fore the Lord saith, *Sonne give me thy heart, Prov. 23.*

The Iewes compared the *heart* of Man for the excellency of it, to three things. First, to the holiest of all, where the Lord gave his answers. So the Lord gives his answers, First out of the *heart*: Secondly, they compare it to *Salomons* throne, as the stateliest place where the King sits; So the Lord dwels in the *heart* of man, as in the throne. Thirdly, to *Moses* Tables, in which he wrote his Law. *Prov. 3. 3. Write Wisedome upon the Tables of the heart.*

A collation betwixt the
innocent and old Adam

God dwelt in the *heart* of Man before the fall; but since the fall there is a great change in the *heart*; for out of the *heart*, proceed *Murther, Adultery, evill speakings*, and such, *Math. 15.* It was a great curse which the Prophet denounced against the house of *Ahab*, *2. King. 10. 27.* That it should bee turned into a lake; but a farre greater change now unto the *heart* of a man, being now a receptacle of all uncleannesse.

Coll. 2.

The *heart* of man before the fall was a wise *heart*, and placed in his right side, *Eccles. 10. 2.* But the *heart* of a foole is now in the left side, *Eccles. 10. 2.* The Anatomists marke when the *heart* inclineth more to the right side; the spirits of these men are more lively, and are more apt for contemplation; the right hand is the stronger hand, because more heate proceeds from the *heart* to the right hand, then to the left: But when the heate equally disperseth it selfe to both the hands, then a man is *Ambidexter*, hee hath the use of both the hands equally alike. By the right hand wee doe things more easily, because motion proceeds first from the *heart* to it. The meaning then of *Salomo* is, that the *heart* of the wise man, is a strong *heart*, a courageous *heart*, apt to doe good, and a most honorable part, wherein the Lord hath set his residence; but the *heart* of man since the fall, is a weake *heart*, a faint *heart*, flow

flow to doe any good, as a base and ignorant heart.

Of the Liver.

The *Liver* is inclosed by a net called *Reticulum*, the severny translate it *as a huske*; for even as the huske incloseth the Corne, so doth this net compasse the *Liver*; and it is to be marked, that God hath fenced his noblest parts, as the braine, with *Pia mater*, and *Dura mater*; the Heart with *Pericardia*, and the *Liver* with *Reticulum*.

Of the Lungs.

The *Lungs*, the bellowses of the voyce, are seated so neere the heart, to teach us that speech is but the interpreter of the heart, against those who thinke one thing and speake another. To make a man speake truth, three things are necessary; first, there must bee veritie in the matter; secondly, in the conception of him who speaketh: thirdly in his speech. The first must be *in signato*, the second *in conceptu*, the third *in signo*. If the matter be not true, then the conception is false; if the conception bee false, then the speech is false. If a man should set the kings armes aright; first, there must bee such a thing as a Lyon: secondly, the Lyon must bee set right upon the seale: thirdly, the seale must be set right in the waxe: if any of these three be wanting, the Kings armes are not rightly set. So the matter which we speake of, must first be true in it selfe: secondly, we must conceive it rightly, & thirdly, we must utter it rightly. But in *Logicall* verity it is otherwise: for if there be an agreement betwixt the matter onely and the *Tongue*, it sufficeth, although it bee not rightly taken up by the minde. As when I say there are *Antipodes*; whether I beleeve this to bee true, or not, it

Veritas est in re ut in causa, in enunciatione ut symbo'o: in mente ut in subiecto; hec dicitur complexa veritas.

Veritas, theologica, logica.

Consequence.

*Mendacium materiale,
formale.*

A collation betwixt the
Innocent & old Adam.

makes not much; it is a *Logicall* truth, because there is an agreement betwixt the matter it selfe and the *Tongue*. But a *theologicall* truth will have an agreement in all the three.

Augustines notation then of a lie is not perfit: *mentiri est contra mentem ire*; to lie, is to speake contrary to the minde; for it expresseth not fully the nature of a lye; for a man may lye, speaking an untruth, taking it to bee truth; therefore *Iohn* maketh an untruth a lye, 1 *Iohn* 2. 4. He that saith *I know him, and keepeth not his Commandements, is a lyer, and the truth is not in him*; For if the matter be not true in it selfe, although hee take it to bee truth, and do utter it; yet it is a lye: it is a *materiall* lie, and an untruth, although it be not a *formall* lie. So *Hereticks* broaching their errors, which they take to bee truth, teach lyes.

Before the fall, man spake as he thought; but since the fall, he hath found out equivocations, and mentall reservations, and speaketh oftentimes contrary to that which he meanes.

Of the Ribbes.

There are two sorts of *Ribbes* in the body of man: the first, called by the *Anatomists*, *Costa legitima*; whereof there are seven, these defend the vitall parts: the second *Costa spuria*, whereof there are five lying to the belly.

Quest. When *Abner* stroke *Hazael* at the fift *Ribbe*, and *Ioab*, *Amaza*; which of the *Ribbes* is it meant of here?

Ans. It is meant of the inferiour *Ribbes*, which wee call the short *Ribbes*; and any of these five *Ribbes* is called the fift *Ribbe*. When *Abner* stricke *Hazael* at the fift *Rib*, he stricke him on the right side, because he was behinde him; but when *Ioab* stricke *Amaza*, hee stricke him

on the left side, because hee was embracing him. The stroke of *Abner* was deadly, because he stricke him through the liver; and the stroke of *Joab* was deadly, because he stricke him in at the *Pericardia*, that compasseth the heart round with water to refrigerate it; for the nether part of the heart reacheth down to the fift *Ribbe*. When the Souldier pierced Christs side, *Iohn 19. 34.* it is said, *Hee pierced his side, and there came forth water and blood*: the *Syriack Paraphrast* saith, *Hee pierced his Ribbe*: that is, the fift *Ribbe*, where the *Pericardia* lay.

Of the Intrailes.

The *Intrailes* are called by the Hebrewes, *Rechamim*, and by the Greekes *σπλᾱγχνῆς*, the bowels of compassion, *Luke 1. 78.* When a woman seeth her child in any danger, her bowels earne within her; which is attributed to Christ himselfe, when he saw the people scattered in the Wildernesse, *Marke 6. 34.* *ἐσπλᾱγχνισθῆναι*. He had compassion upon them: in the Greeke it is, *His bowels did earne within him*; he is a pitifull high Priest, who is touched with our infirmities, *Heb. 4. 15.*

Of the Intrailes called *Iejunum intestinum*.

When the meate is out of the stomacke, and the Hungry gut, called *Iejunum intestinum*, empirie; then man begins to be hungry; this gut by the Greekes is called *νῆστις*, and from it comes the Greeke word *νηστεύω*, to fast.

Of the Kidneyes.

The *Kidneyes* lie in a hid and secret part of the body; therefore *David* when hee would declare how God knoweth

knoweth hid and secret things, he saith, *Thou triest my Reynes, Psal. 139.* that is, *my secretest cogitations*; for although the affections be seated in the heart, as the cause; yet they are ascribed to the *Reines*, as the occasion: the cause of sinne is in the heart, the occasion in the Eye, *Ier. 12. 2. Thou art neere in their mouth, and farre from their Reines.*

A collation betwixt the
innocent and old Adam

Before the fall, all the members of mans body, were the weapons of righteousness; but since the fall, they are the weapons of sinne, *Rom. 6. 13. His throat is an open sepulchre, Psal. 5. 9. His feet swift to shed blood, Esay 59. 7. His right hand, a hand of falsehood, Psal. 26. 10.* In a Sheepe every thing is good; his wooll and his skinne to cloath us, his flesh to feede us, his dung to dung the land, his small guts to be Lute-strings; but in a man since the fall, every member is hurtfull. In the sacrifices under the Law, the caule and the fat about it, was commanded to be taken from the heart, the liver, and the kidneyes, *Exod. 29. 13. Levit. 3. 3, 4. Esay 6. 10.* It was to be taken from the heart, to signifie that the seate of our understanding (which is the heart) is corrupted; from the Liver, to signifie that our anger is corrupted; from the Kidneyes, to signifie that the seate of our concupiscence is corrupted.

Coll. 2.

Man before the fall had a beautifull body answerable to the holinesse of his soule, but since the fall, *Beauty in a woman without grace, is like a ring in a swines snout, Prov. 11. 22.* The Philosopher gave this counsell to his schollers, every morning to looke in a glasse, and finding their faces beautifull, they should labour to beautifie their minde accordingly. The ancients said, that beauty was the flower of goodnesse: that is, bodily beauty was the image of the soules goodnesse. But the Proverbe now go'th, *The properest man at the Gallies and the fairest woman in the Stewes;* those who

who belie their owne *Physiognomy*, are rather to bee punished than others; because they belie that good promise which God hath placed in the face. *Antiochus Epiphanes* by *Daniel* is called *Antiochus Hardface*, *Dan. 8. 23.* The impudent countenance of him, shewed his perverse minde. *Socrates* confessed, that the deformity of his body, did justly accause the naturall deformitie of his soule; but that by industry and learning hee had corrected that perversitie of his minde. One looking upon his deformed body: sayd unto him, *O excellens anima, quam deforme hospitium naeta es; O excellent soule, how basely art thou lodged in such a body.* The Schollers of *Hippocrates* carried upon a time, the picture of their master to one *Philomenes*, who was exquisite in *Physiognomie*, desiring his judgement what he thought of their master: who said, that hee was one much given to lechery. But the Schollers found fault with *Philomenes*, that he should so have judged of their master *Hippocrates*, and this they told their master; who confessed, that *Philomenes* had judged aright: but hee said, the love of Philosophie, and honesty, had overcome the corruption of his heart, and hee had gotten that by study which nature had denied him.

Of the five senses.

The spring and originall of the *five senses*, is in the common sense seated in the fore-part of the head: this sense differeth from the rest of the *senses*, as the roote from the branches, and as a line drawne from the point; the objects of the *senses* are laid up here as in a storehouse, it judgeth of all the objects but the particular sense considereth onely of the object, as it is present; this sense considereth the object, as absent. As all the *senses* have their beginning from this sense; so all the
senses

Senses, Terminantur in hoc sensu; they end in this sense.

All the *senses* agree in this; first, that their power is passive, by receiving in, and not by giving out; *Recipiunt sensilia per immissionem, sed discernunt sensilia per emissionem; They receive the objects by immission, but they discern them by emission, and looking on them;* As the sight which wee have is not by emission, but by immission, receiving in the light. Secondly, all the *senses* agree in this; that all receive singular things, and not universall. Thirdly, unto every *sense* there is required a double nerve; the first to take up the object without; the second workes according as the minde workes, and directs the intention of the minde to the outward organ: as in seeing there are two Nerves, one whereof makes the eye looke from without, to the object: the second Nerve is ruled according to the minde, and directs the intention of the minde to the organ. Fourthly, in every *sense* there must be a proportion betwixt the object and the *sense*, *Quia in medijs delectantur, & in extremis corrumpuntur, They are delighted in objects proportionable, but extremities corrupt them;* as if the object bee too little, wee cannot behold it, or if the sound bee too vehement, it spoyles us of hearing. Fifthly, to perceive a thing by *sense*, these things are requisite, the object must bee present, but neither too farre, nor too neere. Secondly, there must bee a middle to carry the object to the *sense*. Thirdly, the organ must bee sound and whole. Fourthly, the mind must be actually intended to the object.

Differunt sensus, objectis & medijs.

As the *senses* agree in many things, so they differ in many things. First, in their objects, for every one hath a severall object. Secondly, in their *Media*, middles, because the taste and the touch have no inward mids; but seeing and hearing have an outward mids; as the light

light, and the ayre. Thirdly, in their utilitie, for the taste is most profitable, *Ad conservationem individui*, for the preservation of our persons; the touch againe discerneth heate and cold, and other elementarie qualities: that the creature may eschew things hurtfull; and so it serveth also, *Ad conservationem speciei*, For the continuance of our kind; but seeing and hearing serve for our instructions. Fourthly, they differ in generality, because the touch is not determinate to one organ, (but is seated in all the members of the body) as the rest of the senses are. Fifthly, they differ in retaining of their impressions, for the grossest senses retaine most strongly.

If wee consider simply our *Being*, the touch is the most excellent sense, it includeth all the rest in it, and the privation of it, must bee most hurtfull to us; but if we consider our *Well-being*, and comfortable life, then other senses are more deare to us, as our seeing and hearing.

The touch in the beast, is the most excellent sense; for when a Dog senteth after a Hart, it is onely for the Touch, hee delights not in the smell for it selfe, as we do; to a naturall man, *Seeing* is a more excellent sense than the *Hearing*, it serveth more to invention than *Hearing*, it taketh up the object farther off, than the rest of the senses doe; it takes up the object presently, which hearing doth not so soone. The *Midales* whereby the eye seeth, are farre purer than the mids, by which wee heare; the eye more resembleth the understanding than the hearing doth, *Math. 6.23. If the eye be darke, how great is the darknesse of the body?* Here is meant the blindnesse of the minde, as well as the darknesse of the body: the eye mooves the imagination more than the hearing doth, therefore to the naturall man it must be the most excellent sense; but to the child of God, hearing is the most excellent sense;

Utilitate.

Generalitate.

Retentione.

For

A collation betwixt the
innocent and old Adam

For Faith commeth by hearing, Rome. 10. 17.

The senses of man before the fall were servants to reason, and to the affections. But since the fall they labour to pervert the affections, and to draw them from God: there is a fit allegorie, wherein reason is compared to a prudent mother; the affections to a young daughter, fit for marriage; and the five senses to five Sutors, the sight is compared to a Painter; the hearing to a Musitian; the smell to an Apothecary; the taste to a Cooke; and the touch to a Bawde: and every one of those five Sutors come by course to this young maide (the affections,) who gave her consent, and so did her wiser mother reason also: till a King (who was God the Father) sent Embassadors (his Ministers) to speake for his Sonne Christ, with whom at last the marriage is perfitted.

CHAP. IIII.

Of the immortality of the Body.

Prop.

Illust. 1.

*Immortale multiplex,
ἐκ τῶν δώδω, ἐκ δόξω creati-
onis, ἐκ ὑποθέσεως, ἐκ δό-
ξω novæ creationis.*

Illust. 2.

MAns body before the fall was immortall. A thing is said to bee immortall. First, *essentially*, thus God is onely immortall, 1 Tim. 6. 16. Secondly, *Ex dono creationis*, by creation, as the Angels and the soule of man. Thirdly, *Ex hypothesi*, by condition, as Adams body had beene immortall, if hee had stood in Innocencie. Fourthly, *Ex dono novæ creationis*, by the resurrection, as our bodies and the new Heavens shall last perpetually after the resurrection,

The Physitians observed three estates in man. First, *ἀνταρῆς*, Cum plus accedit quam decedit, when more nourishment remains with the body, than goeth from the body; this should have beene in Adams posterity, if hee

hee had not fallen. The second estate is ἀκμαία, *Cum quantum decedit per pugnam, nutritio tantum apponit*; When as much nourishment remaines as decayeth. The third estate is ὑπεγκλιδ, *Declinans atas, ubi accedit minus quam deficit*, this is the decaying estate of man, when lesse nourishment remaineth than decayeth; and this was not in *Adam* before his fall.

When wee put water into wine, at the first the wine converts the water into it; but put often water to it, then allturnes to water. The body of man before the fall should not have turned to corruption, but still should have turned the nourishment to wholesome food. It is true, there was some contrariety here; for otherwaies hee could not have beene nourished, but this was without the hurt of the whole, which remained whole and perfit; so that his body should have beene *equivalenter incorruptibile, licet non videretur eadem numero materia*. It should still have remained that selfe-same body, although in it there was some alteration: for even as *Thesens Shippe*, (after that he had scoured the Sea from Pirats by her) they hung her up as a memoriall to the posterity; and the *Athenians*, when any planke or board decayed in her, they put a new planke or board in place of it; so that she was still *eadem numero navis*, that selfe-same Shippe shee was before. So should the body of man have beene still the same body, by supplying new and equall strength for that which faileth.

The Church of *Rome* holds, that the body of man before the fall was mortall of it selfe, and that the immortality of it, came onely from without, from that supernaturall righteousness which God clothed *Adam* with, and that death is onely but by accident from sinne, because it removeth the bridle, *originall righteousness*, which held backe death: and (they say) that the soule required

Cibos assumimus, ut corruptio qua posset accedere ex consumptione naturalis humidi evitetur.

Plutarchi Moral.

The tenet of the Church of Rome, concerning the immortality of the body.

Bellarmin. de grad. primi hominis, cap. 9.

In sensu coniuncto non poterat mori, sed in sensu diviso poterat mori.

quired a fit body to exercise her functions ; but it could not have such a body, except made of contrary humours: hence it received a body joyned to it, by accident mortall ; which defect (they say) is supplied by that supernaturall righteousness.

Againe, they hold, that this necessity of death which was in nature before the fall, is now turned since the fall into a punishment of sinne. It was naturall before the fall (say they) for a woman to beare children, but after the fall it was painefull, and a punishment of sinne. It was naturall before the fall for the Serpent to glide upon her belly, but after the fall, she was to glide with paine upon her belly, this was the punishment of sin. So (say they) death was naturall to man before the fall in his *Pure naturals*, but now it is turned to him unto punishment of sinne; and as the beasts which sinne not, yet die; so should man in his *Pure naturals*, have died, although he had not sinned, if supernaturall righteousness had not restrained his death.

But wee hold, that *Adams* body in his innocent estate, was naturally incorruptible *ex hypothesi*; that is, so long as hee stood in holinesse, there was such a harmony amongst the qualities of his body, that they could breed no distemperature, or bring death to him; his body before the fall might have died, but this power should never have beene reduced into act, so long as he obeyed his maker: but it is otherwise mortall now, for now of necessity hee must die; then it was in *potentia remotissima*, in a most remote power to death, now it is in *potentia propinqua*, in a most neere power: *Angeli non poterant mori, neque necesse erat eis mori: Adam poterat mori, sed non necesse erat ei mori, sed Adam corrupt, necesse est ei mori; The Angels could not die, neither was it necessary that they should die: Adam might die, but it was not necessary that hee should die.*

Adam being corrupted it is necessary that he should die.

Our reasons to prove the immortalitie of *Adams* bodie before the fall, are these.

First, the soule desireth naturally alwayes to be in the body, therefore naturally it might attaine to this end; (for naturall desires before the fall were not frustrate) so that it behoved the body naturally to be immortal, and not supernaturally (as they hold) for the further clearing of this, we must consider the soule, either in the separation from the body, or as it exists after the separation: In the separation from the body, it is contrary to the desire of the soule to be separate from the body: therefore the naturall desire of it is to remaine in the body. Again, when the soule exists out of the body, *est prater naturam ejus*, it is beside the nature of the soule, although it be not contrary to it, therefore it must naturally long to be in the body againe. They answer, that the understanding creature desires naturally some things which it cannot attaine to but by supernaturall meanes; as the soules of the blessed naturally desire to be joyned to their bodies againe, yet they cannot attaine to this, but by a supernaturall power, to wit, by the resurrection. So (say they) the soule naturally desires the eternitie of the body, although by nature it cannot attaine to it; but there must be some supernaturall righteousness, to cause it attaine to this. Answer, The case is not alike, after hee hath sinned, and before; for after hee had sinned, and the soule separate from the body, naturally it cannot be joyned to it againe, but by the supernaturall power of God; but before the fall, the soule should naturally have attained to that desire, to have enjoyed an immortal body, for it had no desire in it before the fall, which it should shun and flee, as repugnant to the nature of it, to remaine a little while in the body,

Ee

and

Our reasons to prove that the body was naturally immortal, and not supernaturally.

Reason, I.

Aliquid est contra, aliquid prater naturam animæ.

Esth. lib. 2. dist. 19.

*De summo bono, lib. 1.
sect. 68.*

*Secundum vegetativam
& sensitivam faculta-
tem habuit actum natu-
ralem, sed secundum
superiorem facultatem,
habuit actum super na-
turalem.*

and afterward to remaine still without the bodie.

Secondly, *Lessius* the Iesuite answers after this manner, that there are three faculties in the soule; the vegetative, sensitive, and understanding facultie; he saith, that the soule should have had an inclination and desire to the body naturally, according to the vegetative and sensitive faculties, but not according to the understanding or supreme which required a supernaturall power to worke this desire. The soule (saith hee) being satisfied in her naturall desires, in her vegetative and sensitive faculties, cannot long for those againe, by a supernaturall desire; for it longeth now, *to be like the Angels of God; neither marrying, nor giving in marriage, Matth. 22. 30.* But supernaturally in the estate of blessednesse shee desireth such a body, which shall not hinder the body to attaine to her supreme and last end. *Answer.* It is true, that after the fall, the vegetative and sensitive faculties hinder the intellectuall facultie to attaine to the supreme end, God; but before the fall, and in the conjunction of the soule with the body againe, these inferiour faculties were subordinate, and shall be subordinate to the superior facultie, and did no wayes, hinder or shall hinder the superior facultie; therefore the soule naturally before the fall desired, according to all those faculties, the conjunction with the body, and so it shall in the resurrection. These be *Lessius* words, *Non abhorret a corpore nisi tale sit, quod libertati & functioni intelligentia officiat;* It abhorres not a body, but such a body which hindereth the libertie and function of the understanding. But so it was, that the body of man was such before the fall; therefore the soule desireth naturally the conjunction with the body, in the estate, and likewise shall doe in the life to come.

Consequence.

Hence wee may gather, that the soule after the resurrection

rection shall enjoy a greater measure of blessednesse, and joy, then it did before, and that the body shall not be a hinderence to it, as it is now; for now when it begins to thinke of God and spirituall things, it must be abstract from the senses, as the Prophets had their heavenly visions intellectuall, and not by sense; but after the resurrection, the senses shall not be a hinderance, but a furtherance to the soule.

Adam after his fall lived 930. yeares, *Gen. Methusalem* 960. yeares, wanting this supernaturall, & righteousnesse, what made this? nothing but the reliques of that naturall immortalitie, which was in man before the fall; Therefore it was not supernaturall righteousnesse that made him immortal.

God made the *Israelites* cloathes last forty yeares in the *Wildernesse*, *Deut. 29.5.* And *Manna* in the golden pot, *Heb. 9.4.* corruptible in it selfe, yet to last so many hundred yeares. And if *Iosephs* bones lasted 215. yeares, *Iosh. 24.31.* And if the *Egyptians* could embalme bodies artificially, that they could continue without corruption, for so many hundred yeares; how much more could God make *Adams* body to have continued without corruption naturally, if hee had stood in innocencie?

The fourth reason is taken from the cause of death, which is sinne; there was no sinne in his naturall body, and therefore no death. There are three things which follow sinne. First, *Dominium peccati*, the dominion of sinne. Secondly, *Sensus peccati*, the sense of sinne. Thirdly, *Ultimum consequens peccati*, the last consequent of sinne upon his body, when it is turned to dust. The dominion of sinne, is taken away by regeneration; the sense of sinne is taken away by death; the last consequent of sinne, when the body is turned to ashes (the body all this time being neither *Purum* nor *impurum*.

E c 2

but

Reason. 2.

Reason. 3.

Reason. 4.

*Corpus consideratur ut
est purum, impurum, non
purum.*

"

A collation betwixt
the innocent and old
Adam.

*Triplex necessitas, illata,
innata, assumpta.*

A collation betwixt
the innocent, old, and
glorified Adam.

but *non purum*) this is taken away by the resurrection. There was no dominion of sinne in Adam before the fall, therefore hee had no need of regeneration; there was no sense of sinne in him, therefore hee could not naturally die; the last consequent of sinne was not in him, therefore his body stood not in neede of the resurrection.

Man before the fall, his body was immortall naturally; Christ the second Adam his body was mortall willingly, but not necessarily, for he tooke our infirmities upon him, *Esa. 53. Ioh. 10.* therefore Augustine saith well, *Traxit quidem mortalitatem sed non contraxit, & non fuit necessitas in Christo respectu peccati, sed respectu pœna* Hee tooke our mortalitie upon him, but hee contracted it not by sinne: there was no necessitie whereby Christ should die in respect of sinne, but in respect of the punishment. But man now necessarily dieth, It is appointed for all men to die, *Est illata necessitas Adamo, est innata necessitas nobis, & est assumpta necessitas in Christo*: Necessitie of death was layd upon Adam for his sinne; necessitie of death is inbred in us; but death was willingly assumed by Christ. But yet when he had once willingly taken upon him our nature and infirmities; hee must die; for it is appointed for all who have taken our naturall infirmities, to die. A man gives his word willingly for such a summe for his friend, but when hee hath willingly given it, a necessitie is laid upon him to pay it. So Christ willingly tooke this debt upon him, and now must of necessitie pay it.

The first Adam before his fall, his body was immortall, *Ex hypothesi*, that is, if hee had stood in obedience to God, there should have beene no contrarietie betwixt the humors of his body to have bred corruption, there should have beene no deformity or defect in his body. But since the fall, the body is a mortall body,

a deformed body, and corruptible. But in the life to come, the soule shall be satisfied in all her desires, and all evill shall be removed from it, both actuall and potentiall; there shall be no actuall evill, because grace being consummate in them, it excludes all sinne; there shall be no potentiall evill in them, because they being confirmed in goodnesse, they cannot sinne. Now the body in the life to come, shall be fully subject to the soule, not onely in respect of the being of it, but also in respect of the actions and passions, the motions, and corporall qualities of it; and then it shall be free from corruption both actuall and potentiall: it shall be free from actuall corruption, because there shall be no deformitie or defect in it, and from potentiall corruption, because then they can suffer nothing, that can be hurtfull to them; therefore they shall be impassible; When we say the bodies shall be impassible, we meane of the hurtfull passions that may hurt the body, but other wayes the senses shall have their comfortable passions from the objects; *Passio sensus est perfectiva, passio naturæ est afflictiva vel corruptiva*; The passion of the sense, perfects the sense, (as Musicke doth our hearing) but the passions of the nature corrupts and afflicts nature, as sicknesses. We shall have small use of the sense of touch in the life to come, which onely serves for the continuation of our kind and persons; this sense is common with the beasts; but the seeing and hearing being more excellent senses, are more spirituall, receiving more immaterially their objects: these senses shall remaine, in the life to come, and suffer by their objects, 1 Cor. Chap. 15. verse 42. *The body is sowne in corruption, and is raised in incorruption.*

Adams body before the fall was a glorious body, and beautifull; but the body of man since the fall hath lost that glorious beauty, and hath many blemishes in

Ee 3

it.

Dos.

1 *Immortalitatis five impassibilitas.*
Duplex malum, actuale, & potentiale.

Dos.

2 *Claritatis five gloria.*

*Triplex pulchritudo, ex
terna forma, procedens
ab extrinseco, procedens
ab intrinseco.*

it. But the body in glory shall be most beautifull, having the glory of the soule transparent in it: as wee see the colour of the Wine in a glasse; so the glory of the soule shall be seene in the body; this glory in the body shall be a corporall glory, for this maxime holdeth, *Omne receptum in recipiente, est secundum modum recipientis & non recepti*; Every thing received, is in the thing receiving, according to the nature of the thing receiving, and not of the thing received. So the body being a corporall thing, receiveth the glory from the soule after a corporall manner. A body may be said to be beautifull three manner of wayes. First, because of the comely proportionable colour of it; as *Abolon* was beautifull, this is a naturall beauty. Secondly, when the light from without doth shine upon a cleare object, as the Sunne upon a Looking glasse, doth cast a reflex. The third ariseth from an internall light, as the light which is in the Sunne or Starres; The beauty which was in *Adam* before the fall, was that naturall beauty arising from the comlineesse and proportion of his body, wherein hee exceeded all the sonnes of men; The beauty in *Moses* and *Stephens* face, was like the beauty of the beames of the Sunne reflex't backe upon the glasse. But the beauty of the glorified bodies shall be like the beauty of the Sunne and the Starres, not from without, as the light of the glasse, but from the owne inward light: this is the light that is spoken of *Matth. 13. The just shall shine as the Sunne in the Kingdom of my Father*. Christs glorious transfiguration, was a forerunner of that glory that wee shall have in heaven: *Wee shall be made conformable to his glorious body, 1 Ioh. 3. 2*. This glory in Christs transfiguration, in respect of the Essence, was all one with the glory in the life to come, but it differeth in measure from that measure which hee hath in heaven, because it was not

permanent, but onely for a time, as the Sunne inlightens the Ayre. Againe, in the transfiguration it was onely in his face, but in glory it is through his whole body, therefore the Apostle calls it *His glorious body*. 1 Cor. 15. Thirdly, in the transfiguration his cloathes were made white; but in glory his body is not cloathed, 1 Cor. Chap. 15. ver. 43. *It is sown in dishonour, and riseth in glory.*

Adams body before the fall, was a nimble body and agile fit for the discharge of the functions of his soule; for if *Asahel* was swift as a Roe, 2 Sam. 2. much more was *Adams* body. Man since the fall, hath a heavy and a lumpish body, unapt to execute the functions of the soule; neither can it performe those actions which the soule requires of it. But in glory, the soule having attained to the fulnesse of the desires of it; the desires of the soule moving the body, the body must be most nimble to obey. In the first *Adam* there was no resistance in the body to the soule, but in the glorified *Adam* the soule shall communicate to the body such power, that it shall be most ready to obey it. Besides the glory that shall redound from the soule to the body, the soule and body both shall be replenished with the Spirit of God, which shall make the bodies nimble and agile, and not heavy and dull as they are now. One Egge before it is hatcht, is heavy and sinketh downe; but when it is hatcht, and full of spirits, then it fleeth: So these bodies which are heavy and dull now, being then replenished with the Spirit of God, shall be agile and nimble; therefore the Apostle saith, *We shall be taken up to meete Christ*, 1 Cor. 15. Our bodies then being agile, we shall shall meete Christ in the Ayre, 1 Cor. 15. 43. *It is sown in weaknesse, and raised in power.*

The first *Adams* body was a naturall body, and was to be entertained by food as our bodies to pre-

Dos.
3. Agilitatis.

Dos.
4 Subtilitatis, sive spiritualitatis.

serve it from corruption. The old *Adams* body, although it be entertained by food, yet cannot be preserved from corruption. But the soule of the glorified *Adam* enjoying God, adheres to him perfectly; therefore the body enjoying the soule, shall be perfectly subject to the soule, and shall be participant of the soules properties, so farre as possible it can, having the vegetative and sensitive facultie fully subject to the reasonable soule, *Then the meate and drinke of the soule shall be, to doe the will of the Father. Ioh. 4. 34.* And to live upon that *hid Manna, Rev. 2.* The nature of every thing is more perfect, the more it is subject to the forme; but then the body shall be most perfect, and therefore then most subject to the soule, *1 Cor. 15. 44. It is sown a naturall body, and riseth a spirituall body;* It is called a spirituall body, not that it is turned into a Spirit, but because it shall be altogether ruled by the Spirit.

CHAP. V.

Of the perfection of Mans Body.

Prop.
Iust. I.

MAN was created a middle, betwixt the Superiour and inferior creatures.

There is life in Angel and Man, but more excellently in the Angell than Man; so there is life in man and in the Beast, but more excellently in Man than in the Beast, and in this, Man may rejoyce, that there is no creature which disdaines to serve him; yea, *The Angels are ministring spirit for his good, Psal. 104. 4.* And no marvell that hee is beloved of all these, seeing all of these, in some sort, and every one of them, both earthly and heavenly things doe like him, because hee is a middle in which both agree; and as the

the Iewes said, 2 Sam. 19.43. Have wee not all a part in David the King? So all the creatures say, Have we not all a part in Man?

There are three worlds, and man is the fourth. First, the elementary world. Secondly, the celestiaall world. Thirdly, the angelicall or supercelestiaall. Fourthly, the little world, Man. And those things which are found in the inferior worlds, are likewise found in the superior; we have here below the elementary fire, here it is, *ignis urens*, burning fire: This same fire is in the heavens, and there it is *ignis fovens & vivificans*, it quickeneth and nourisheth all things. There is fire above in the celestiaall spirits, and there it is, *ignis ardens & amor Sera-phicus*, burning in love; Man the fourth world hath all these three sorts of fire in him. First, the elementary fire, in the composition of his body of the foure elements. Secondly, the celestiaall fire, the influence of the Planets in him. Thirdly, the supercelestiaall fire, the love of God heating and burning within him, Luk 24. Did not our hearts burne within us.

God hath joyned all things in the world, *per media*, by middles; as first, he coupled the earth and the water by *slime*; so the ayre and the water by *vapours*; the exhalations are a middle betwixt the ayre and the fire; *argilla*, or *marle*, a middle betwixt *slime* and *stones*; So the *christall* betwixt *water* and the *diamond*; *Mercurius* or *Quicksilver*, betwixt *water* and *metals*; *Pyrrhites* the *firestone* or *marcasie*, betwixt *stones* and *metals*; the *corall* betwixt *roots* and *stones*, which hath both a roote and branches; *Zoophita*, or plants resembling living creatures (as the *Mandrake* resembling a man, the hearbe called the *scythyen lamb*; resembling a lambe) or a middle betwixt *animals* and *plants*; So *amphibia*; as the *Seale* and such) betwixt the *beasts* living on earth, and in the Sea;

so

Illust. 2.

Quadruplex mundus, elementaris, celestis supermundanus, & microcosmus.

Illust. 3.

A collation of man betwixt the three states of his life.

1.

So *Struthiocamelus*, the *Ostrich* betwixt fowles and beasts; So the *fleeing fishes* are a middle, betwixt the fowles and the fishes; the *batt* betwixt creeping things and the fowles; the *hermaphrodite* betwixt man and woman; the *Ape* betwixt a man and a beast, and man betwixt the beast and Angels.

A collation betwixt the child in his mothers belly, and when he lives here after he is borne, and when he lived under the ceremoniall Law.

2.

In the mothers belly, the first seaven dayes it is seede onely, and then there is feare onely of effluitions, but if the mother retaine the seede the first seven dayes then there is hope that it will be *embryo*, this an imperfect child in the mothers belly; after the seventh day till the fortieth day, then there is danger that she is abort; if shee part not with this before the fortieth day, then it is *fetus vivens* a living child, till the birth.

3.

When the child is borne, if hee live till the seventh yeare, then there is hope that he shall be lively, and if he live till the fortieth yeare, that then he usually comes to his perfection and wisdom.

Answerable to these under the ceremoniall law, were the children passing the first seven dayes, who were circumcised the eight, and the fortieth day were to be presented before the Lord. *Levit. 12. 6.*

CHAP. VI.

Of the soule of Man.

Prop.
Illust. I.

That the lives of beasts are mortall.

I. Reason.

THe soule of man is an immortall substance. The opposition betwixt the life of the beast and the soule of man, sheweth that the soule of man is immortall. First, the life of the beast is mortall, and perisheth with the body, because there is no opera-

operation in the sensitive facultie without the organs of the body, but in the beast there is no operation found above the sensitive faculty, for they neither understand nor reason, *Psal 32.9. Be not like the horse or mule, in whom there is neither understanding nor reason.* That the beasts neither can understand nor reason, it is manifest thus, because all beasts and fowles of the same kinde worke alwayes alike, (being moved onely by nature, and not by art) as all the Swallows make their nests alike, and all the Spiders weave their webs alike; therefore the beast can worke nothing without the organs of the body: whereupon it followeth, that when the body of the beast perisheth, the life perisheth also.

In every thing which may attaine to any perfection, there is found a naturall desire to that perfection: that is good which every thing desireth; but every thing desireth the owne proper goodnesse; in beasts there is no desire found, but in their preservation of their kinde by generation; they have this desire *hic & nunc* at this time, and in this place; but their desire reacheth not to perpetuities, for the beast is not capable of perpetuities, therefore the life of the beast is mortall.

Delights perfect the operation, and as sawces give a good relish to the meate, so are delights to our workes: when any thing hath attained the owne proper end, it breeds delight: but all the delight in beasts, is onely for the preservation of their bodies; for they delight not in sounds, smells, or in colours; but so farre, as they serve onely to stirre up their appetite to meate or to provoke them to lust, as when the Elephant beholds red colours, it moves him not to fight, but stirres him up to lust; and being thus enflamed he fights, but simply his lust is stirred up by it; therefore the beasts have no delight but in bodily and sensuall things, and doe nothing but by the body: therefore, *Levit. 17. 11.*

The

2. Reason.

3. Reason.

Reason. 4.

The life of the beast is said to be in the bloud, which is not to be found so in the soule of man.

If the sense received things without a bodily organ, then any of the senses should receive in them both colours, sounds smells, and tastes, because an immortall substance doth apprehend all the formes alike; as wee see in the understanding using no bodily organ, it understands all sensible things alike. Therefore the sensitive facultie is still bound to the organs of the body.

Reason. 5.

The sense is corrupted by a vehement object, as the sight is dazled, and the eares are dulled, by too vehement objects of seeing and hearing: but the understanding, the more it apprehends, the more it is perfected; because it useth no bodily organ as the sense doth.

Object. But it may be objected against this out of *Act. 26. 24. Too much learning hath made thee madde;* then it may seeme that the understanding is dulled by learning, and not perfected.

Answ. when a man becomes madde through learning, it is not the understanding simply that is madde, but the distraction is in the sensitive part arising from the ill constitution of the body.

Consequence.

The soules of beasts are mortall, therefore *Plato* and *Pythagoras* erred, who held that they were immortall.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Immortalitie of the soule.

Reason. I.

THat the Soule of man is immortall, it is proved by these reasons.

First, the Soule when it understandeth any thing,

it abstracts from the things which it understands, all quantity, qualitie, place and time, changing it into a more immateriall and intelligible nature; which is universalitie, and loseth the particular and individuall nature: as our stomackes when they receive meate; change and alter the outward accidents of the nourishment to the owne nature, whereby it becomes flesh and bloud. So the Soule when it conceiveth of a thing, it separateth all these dregges of particular circumstances from the body, and conceives it universally in the minde. When a man looketh upon a horse, hee seeth him of such quantitie, of such a colour, and in such a place; but when hee is conceived in the minde, then it is an universall notion agreeing to all horses. As the thing conceived in the minde is not visible; because it hath no colours, it is not audible, because it hath no sound, it hath no quantitie, as bigge or little: So the soule it selfe must be of this nature, without all these; quantity, quality, time, and place; and therefore cannot be corruptible.

If the Soule were mortall, then it should follow, that the naturall desires should be frustrate, but the naturall desires (which are not sinfull in the Soule) cannot be frustrate, *Natura nihil facit frustra, Nature doth nothing in vaine*; it should be in vaine, if there were not something to content it, which being not found upon earth, must be sought for in heaven; therefore the soule is immortal. A sinfull desire cannot be fulfilled: as if one should desire to be an Angell; but naturall desires, (as the desire to be happy and to be free of misery) cannot be fulfilled in this life; therefore it must be fulfilled in the life to come: naturally every man desires to have a being after his body is dissolved; hence is that desire which men have to leave a good name behind them, and so the desire that they have that their posterity be well,

Reason. 2.

well, and that their friends agree, and such: and from this natural desire, come these ambitious desires in men who are desirous to erect monuments and sepulchers after their death, and, *to call their lands after their name*, *Psal.* 49. 12. So *Abolon* for a memoriall of himselfe, set up a pillar in the Kings dale, *2 Sam.* 18. 18. And the poorest tradesman hath his desire when he can reach no higher, hee will have a stone laid upon him, which his marke and name upon it; this very ambitious desire in man is a testimony in his minde that hee acknowledgeth the immortalitie of the Soule.

Dist. 44. 9 2.

Quest. *Scotus* moves the question here, how shall wee know that these naturall desires are agreeable to reason, and that they must be fulfilled because they are naturall.

Ans. He answers, that this desire of the immortalitie of the Soule is naturall, because it longeth to have man a perfect man; for man is not a perfect man, while he hath a Soule and a Body joyned together after they are separate, so that this desire cannot be a sinfull desire, because it is from the God of nature. Things without life seeke their preservation, *secundum numerum*, in their owne particular being, and resist those things which labour to dissolve them; beasts againe desire the continuance of their kinde *ut nunc*, onely for the present, they desire not the continuance of their kinde perpetually; but man naturally desireth *esse absolutum suum*, his perpetuall being, included within no bounds.

Reason. 3.

The Soule is no bodily thing, therefore it is not corruptible; if it be a body, it must be finite, and consequently cannot have an infinite power; but the power of the Soule is in a manner infinite in understanding, comprehending not onely singular things, but the kinds of all things, and universalitie; therefore the understanding

standing cannot be a Body, and consequently mortall.

Object. But it may seeme, that the Sunne and fire which are bodies, may multiply things to an infinite number; and therefore bodily things may have power in infinite things, as well as intellectuall.

Ans. The fire may consume singular things, by adding continuall fewell to it; it cannot *consumere species rerum*, the kinds of things. But this is the perfection of the understanding, that it conceiveth not onely singular things, but also all kinds of things, and universal things, (that in a manner are infinite) and so where the understanding receiveth these things, it is not corrupted by them, neither corrupts them, but is perfected by them.

Every corruptible thing is subject to time and motion; but the Soule is neither subject to time nor motion; therefore the Soule is not corruptible: that the Soule is not subject to motion, it is cleared thus; motion hindereth the Soule to attaine to the owne perfection, the Soule being free from motion and perturbation is most perfect, and then it is most fit to understand things; as the water the more cleare it is, it receives the similitude of the face more clearely. Therefore it was that *Elsha* when he was to receive the illumination of propheticie, he called for a Minstrell, 2 *King.* 3. 14. to play sad musicke to settle his affections.

These things that are true, have no neede of a lye to further them; but to use the immortalitie of the Soule as a middle to further us, to the duties which wee are bound to doe, were to use a lie, if the Soule were not immortal; for many religious duties which wee are bound to performe, require the contempt of this life, as the restraining of pleasures, which a man could not doe if hee had not hope of immortalitie, in which he

Reason. 4.

Reason. 5.

he findeth the recompence of his losses. This perswasion of immortalitie, made the heathen undergo death for the safetie of their countrey; and if our last end were onely in this life, then all that we doe should be for this last end, to ayme at it, to procure it, and never to crosse it: it were great madnesse in men, to undergoe so many hard things as they doe, if they had not a perswasion in their hearts of this immortalitie, if we hope onely in this life, *Then of all men wee are most miserable,* 1 Cor. 15. and if the Soule were not immortall, Christ would never have commended him, who hated his owne Soule in this world, that he may gaine it in the life to come. *Marke 8.35.*

Reason. 6.

The Soule is immortall because God is just; for God being the Iudge of all, *Gen. 18.23.* it behooveth him to punish the wicked, and to reward the just; but if God did not this in another life, he should never doe it; for in this life, *the wicked flourish, and the just are afflicted,* *Psal. 37.* therefore as God is just, there remains another life; wherein the soules of the godly are rewarded for wel-doing: the Prophet saith, *Ier. 12.* concerning every mans reward, *O Lord thou art just when I plead with thee, yet let me talke with thee of thy judgements, why doth the way of the wicked prosper, and why goeth it well with them that doe wickedly.* To the which objection he answereth; (that he may defend the justice of God) *Gather them together as a flocke to the sacrifice;* whereby hee signifieth that after this life, they shall smarte in the life to come, howsoever they have escaped in this life. So Christ in the parable, *Luk 16.* bringeth in *Abraham* defending the justice of God against the *rich glutton,* *Matth. Chap. 22. Vers. 32. 33.* *God is the God of the living and not the God of the dead.* As Christs proves out of this place, the resurrection of the body; so hence is clearly proved the immortalitie of the Soule

Reason. 7.

Soule : for when God makes a covenant with his owne, it is a perpetuall covenant, therefore it is called a covenant of salt, to note the perpetuity of it, *Num. 18. 19.* If these with whom God makes his covenant existe not, then the covenant must of necessity cease ; but the covenant of God indures for ever ; therefore these with whom he makes the covenant must live for ever. God calling himselfe the God of the Patriarches after their death, *Exod. 3. 6.* then the soules must be immortall after the separation from the body.

It is said of *Iosias*, although he was slaine in the battle, yet, *Hee was gathered in peace to his fathers*, then hee must be gathered to the spirits of his fathers who enjoy peace, for he was not gathered in peace in his body ; For hee was slaine, *2 Chron. 35.* it is said of *Abraham* onely that he was gathered to the body of *Sarah*, *Gen. 23. 19.* but of the rest simply it is said, they were gathered to their fathers ; that is, their Soules were bound up in the bundle of life, *2 Sam. 21. 26.* Which being well marked, is a good argument for the soules immortality, and that it was knowne under the old Testament ; by the fathers here, are meant, the spirits of the just men made perfect, *Heb. 12. 23.*

Reason. 8.

The heathen most of them were perswaded of the immortalitie of the Soule. *Cicero* cited out of *Socrates*, that the Swanne was dedicated to *Apollo*, because shee sang sweetly before her death, like the children of God, who sing sweetly before they dye ; being perswaded of this immortality, die pleasantly, singing their last most joyfull song. And the *Romans* when their great men died, and when their bodies were burnt to ashes, they caused an Eagle flee and mount on high, to signify that the soule was immortall, and perished not with the body.

Reason. 9.
Quest. 1. Tusc.

Duplex vita, absoluta
& ζηνν seu relativa.

Consequence.

A collation betwixt the
first Adam, and old
Adam.

Object. If the soule be immortall, how is it said to die:
Answ. The soule of man hath a twofold life, one *absolute*, another *relative*. The *absolute* or *essentiall* life of the soule is never loosed, for the essence of the soule is *Metaphysicall*, having a beginning but no end, having no corruption within it; the second sort of life which the soule hath is *relative*, having relation to God, and getting grace from him, this life may be lost, for it is not of the essence of the soule; this last sort of life in the soule, which to us is *relative*, to Christ is *personall* and cannot bee lost. Some perhaps may thinke that this distinction may be more shortly expressed, and more plainly by the life of nature, and the life of grace: but they are mistaken, for both these sorts of lives, as well *essentiall* as *relative*, were naturall to *Adam* before his fall.

Our soules are immortall substances, as the *Chaldeans* say, *in eodem cretere temperatas esse animas nostras cum cœlestibus*, our soules are tempered in the same mortar with the heavenly spirits; therefore wee should be their servants, neither should wee measure our condition by our weake bodies; but remember that we have spirits onely subject to him, *who is the Lord of our Spirits*, *Revel. 22.6.*

The soule is immortall; the *Sadduces* held, that the Soule was mortall, *Act. 23. 8.* and they sayd, *Let us eate, let us drinke, to morrow we shall die*; and the Apostle, *1 Cor. 15. 23.* hath it in the present tense, *morimur, we die*, to note the beastlinesse of these wretches, who thought they should be quite extinguished, both in soule and body presently, like beasts knockt on the head, and if any man aske them, why then study you to keepe the Commandements of God, seeing yee beleeve not the immortality of the Soule? they answered, that it might goe well with them in this life; but men
now

now, who professe the immortality of the soule, yet study not to keepe Gods Commandements, that it may goe well with them in the life to come. *Augustine* professed, if he were perswaded, that the soule were mortall, then of all sects hee would make choyse to bee an *Epicurean*.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the conjunction of the Soule with the Body.

THe Soule is joyned to the Body immediatly.

The forme is joyned to the matter without any middle, but the Soule is the forme to the Body: therefore the Soule is joyned to the Body without any middle.

The Soule is joyned to the body; hence wee may gather that there are intellectuall Spirits or Angels which have no bodies; for if two things be joyned together, the one perfect, the other more imperfect; if the more imperfect be found alone, much more is the more perfect: wee see that there are bodies without spirits; therefore there must be spirits without bodies. Secondly, those things that are inseparable, the one cannot bee found without the other, but those things that are accidentally joyned together, the one may bee found without the other, as whitenesse and sweetenesse are but accidentally found in Sugar, for whitenesse may be found, where there is no sweetnes; as in Snow; so sweetnesse may be found where there is no whitenesse, as in a Figge: therefore sweetnesse and whitenesse are but accidentally joyned together in the Sugar; so the body & the Spirit are but accidentally joyned together; there-

*Prop.
Illust. 1.*

Consequence.

*Duplex inseparabilitas,
logica & physica.*

*Inseparabile logicum
quod cogitatione potest
separari tantum ut vi-
sibilitas in homine. In-
separabile physicum cum
unum non dependeat ab
alio necessario ut a gre-
do in corvo.*

fore there are spirits that subsist by themselves without bodies.

Object. But how is the Soule joyned accidentally to the body, seeing the soule is the essentiall forme to the body which animates it?

Answ. The soule, as the soule, is the essentiall forme to the body, and so it is inseparable, but the Soule as it is an intellectuall Spirit is accidentally joyned to the body, and may be separate from it.

Object. But it might seeme that the Apostle puts the Spirit betwixt the soule and body, as a middle to joyne them together, therefore the soule and body are not joyned immediatly. *1 Theff. 5. 23.* He prayes, *that God would sanctifie them in their Spirits, Soule, and Bodies.*

Answ. By the *Spirit* is not meant here a third thing, which joynes the soule and body together; but by the *Spirit* hee meanes the gift of sanctification, which is through the whole man both in Soule and body opposite to the *Old man, Rom. 7.*

Conseq.

The soule is joyned immediately to the body, therefore *Averrois* erred, who held that the phantasies or imaginations were a middle to joyne the soule and the body together. So these who held that the soule was joyned to the Body, by corporall Spirits: and so these who held that they were joyned together by light.

Prop.

The soule being one, yet hath three distinct *Faculties*, the *Vegetative*, *Sensitive*, and *Reasonable faculties*.

Illust.

Anima vegetativa & sensitiva, est virtus feminis, preparans materiam ad recipiendam formam intellectualem.

In the conception the *Vegetative* and *Sensitive faculties* are virtually in the seede, untill the fortieth day, and after the fortieth day the reasonable soule is infused, they give place, and it animates the body. *Exod. 21. 22.* *If two strive together, if one of them strike a woman with child, that she part with her child, and there bee no hurt, neither to the mother nor to the child, then the striker shall*

shall not die; but if there fallow death of either of them, then the striker shall die. If shee part with the child before it bee quicke in her belly, then shee shall not die; but if it bee a quicke child, and shee part with it, then hee shall die. *Physitians* and *Canonists* hold, that before the forty dayes it is not a living child; it is then called *Golem*, *Psal.* 139. *vers.* 16. *Massa rudis, corpus imperfectum* before the members bee fashioned in it; The *sevantie* reade these words, *Exod.* 21. *verse.* 22. *ἐκγονισμένον, Non signatum*; which they referre to the imperfect child when the woman aborts, and the *Rabins* call it *Asiman*, which word they borrowed from the *Greekes*, as money not sealed or stamped; therefore the Law saith, *Si exierint jeladébha, nati ejus*, her sonnes the Law then meaneth of a perfect and a formed infant, when a reasonable soule quickens it; Why should one give life for life, when as yet the life is not perfect? *Adams* body perfectly fashioned, saith *Augustine*, received life and not before. So infants bodies perfectly fashioned receive the reasonable soule.

The soule is joyned to the body to make up one person.

The soule is not in the body, as a man dwelling in his house, or a Sayler in the shippe; for a house will stand without the man, but the body decayeth without the soule; shee is not in the body as the Spider in her web, as *Chalcidius* held, determinate to one part of the body, and from thence giving vertue and influence to the whole body; as the spider dwelling in the middle of her Cob-web, feeles the least touch in the webbe, either within or without. Neither dwels the soule in the body as water into a vessell; or as one liquor into another: or as the heate in the fire; but as the morning light imparts the beames here and there, and in an instant doth unite her selfe to the transparent ayre, in all and every part thereof, still resting whole when the ayre is divided,

ded, abiding pure when the ayre is corrupted. So the soule filleth the body, beeing all in all, and all in every part; and as the Sunne bringeth light from above, although we behold it in the ayre; so the soule springs from eternall light, although shee shew her powers in the body; and as the Sunne in diverse places worketh diverse effects, here Harvest, there Spring; here Evening, there Morning: so doth the soule in our little world worke diversely, upon diverse objects, here shee attracts, there shee decocts, here shee quickens, there shee makes to grow; the light shines by it selfe, without the ayre, but not the ayre without the light: so the soule lives by it selfe, but the body cannot live without the soule. But as in all comparisons there is some dissimilitude, so it is here; for the light is but a qualitie, but the Soule is a substance, the light comes from the substance of the Sunne, but the Soule is not of the Essence of God. This conjunction betwixt the soule and the body is so neere, that it makes up one Person, and this is the reason, why *the soules long for the bodies. Revel. 6.10. to bee joyned againe to them in the resurrection.*

Consequence.

The soule was joyned to the body to make up one Person, and to dwell perpetually in the body, but since the fall, the soule is from home in the body, and absent from the Lord, 2. Cor. 6.

Prop.

Illust.

*Anima non est utilis
omni corpori sed orga-
nino, & naturali ad sus-
ceptionem corporis apto.*

The Soule is appointed onely to animate one Body.

The body of a flee must onely have the life of a flee in it, the Soule of a man cannot animate the body of another Man, or an Elephant, *Materia individuales ejusdem speciei sunt ita determinate; ut nullam aliam formam ejusdem speciei recipere possant*, that is, Every body of that same kinde is so determinate, that it cannot receive any other forme of the same kind, but the owne.

The

The soule can animate no body but the owne body of it: therefore they erre who thinke that the Soule of Man may enter into the body of a beast and animate it, 2. The *Pythagareans* and the *Jewes* erre, who held that the soules went from one body to another. Marke 6. 16.

The soule was placed in the body, to animate and to rule it.

There are two things required in a forme. First, that it give a being to the matter. Secondly, that the forme and matter make up one thing; so doth the Soule of man give being to the body, and makes up one Person with the body.

Object. But seeing the soule is a spirituall thing, and the body corporall of two different natures, how can they make up one person?

Ans. The more excellent that the forme is, the more nearely it is joyned to the matter; and makes the neerer conjunction with it. So the soule of man joyned with his body makes a more stricter conjunction then the life of the beast joyned with his body. But if the body were of the same nature with the soule, it should not make up one person, as the life of the beast joyned with the body makes not up one Person, because of the baseness of the forme which is onely drawne out of the matter.

Wee beleve that Christ tooke upon him the nature of Man, and therefore a soule: which would not follow, if the soule were not an essentiall part of man, but onely a ruler of the body. Christs Divinity might have ruled his humanity; But *Apollinaris* was condemned for taking away of Christs Soule, and putting onely his Divinity in place of a soule to rule the body.

There are some formes which rule onely the body,

Consequence.

Prop.

Illust. 1.

Illust. 2.

but doe not animate them, as the Angels, when they tooke bodies upon them; *Angelorum operationes in corporibus non fuerunt vitales*, Those things which the Angels did in the Bodies were not vitall; They ruled the bodies, but they informed them not; and they onely moved the bodies. Secondly, there are some formes that inform things, but doe not rule them, as the formes of things without life. Thirdly, there are formes which inform and rule, as the Soule of man in the body.

Object. It is said that the Angels did eate and drinke, *Gen. 18.* Therefore they have exercised these vitall functions in the body.

Answer. Theodoret answers, *Metaphorice non proprie dicuntur edere*: They are said to eate by way of metaphor, but not properly, because of the manner of the true eating: and the Philosopher saith, that, *Vox est actus animati corporis*, The voyce is the act of the living creature: but when a Lute giveth a sound, it is but metaphorically a voyce (saith hee:) So the eating of the Angels was but metaphorically a eating, for they eate not to digest, or to nourish their bodies.

Aristot. 2. de anim.

Consequence.

In this that the Soule is joyned to the body as the forme, wee may admire the mervailous worke of God, for if *David* wondered at the mervailous fashioning of the body in his mothers wombe, *Psal. 139.* much more may wee admire the mervailous conjunction of the Soule with the body, for we may observe that the highest of the lowest kind, is joyned alwaies to the lowest of the highest kind, as the lowest of living creatures (which have life) is the shell-fish; as the Oyster differeth little from the life of the plant, is comes nearer in order to the beast then the plant doth, because it feelles; therefore it is well said by one, *Sapientia Dei conjungit fines superiorum principijs inferiorum*; the wisdom of God hath conjoynd the ends of the superiour with the beginning

Tho. Aquin. contra gent.

ning

ning of the inferiour; as the shel-fish to bee the basest amongst the sensitive, and more noble then the vegetative. So the body of man is the most excellent and highest in degree of the inferiour creatures; the soule (again) of man is the lowest of intellectual Spirits; mark the how these two are joyned together. Therefore fitly the soule of man hath beene compared by some to the horizon for as the horizon separates the upper parts of the world from the nether, to our sight, and yet the sphere is one; so doth the soule separate the intellectuall substances from the earthly bodies: and yet is one with them both. And as *Hercules* was said to be *Partim apud superos, partim apud inferos*; so is the Soule, partly with the Spirits above, and partly with the bodies below.

The body joyned to the soule, maketh the soule a compleate spirit.

The Angels without bodies are *spiritus completi*; but our soules without the bodies are incomplete spirits. The Angels when they assumed bodies, it was not to their perfection, but for their ministry, *Non quibus inventur, sed quibus inveniuntur*: Not that they were helped by these bodies, but that they might helpe us. They have a double action, one of contemplation, another of ministry; for contemplation, to behold the face of God continually, *Matth. 18. 10.* They tooke not bodies upon them; but onely for the ministry to us; but the soule of man is an incomplete Spirit, without the bodie.

The soule was joyned to the body, to goe upward to God, and not to be depressed by the body.

When water and oyle are put together, the oyle being more aeriall goeth above, and the water being heavie goeth under; so the soule being more celestiall went upward, and was not drawne by the body, when man stood in innocency.

Prop.

Illust.

Prop.

Illust.

The

Prop.

Illust.

*Anima est simplex in
essentia & multiplex in
potentia.*

The Soule hath sundry operations in the body.

When it groweth ; it is called *anima* ; when it contemplates, it is called a *spirit* ; when it seeth and heareth, it is called *sense* ; when it is wise, it is called *animus* ; when it discernes, it is called *reason* ; when it remembers, it is called *memory* ; when it assents lightly, it is called *opinion* : when she defineth a truth by certaine principles, then it is called *judgement*.

Prop.

Illust.

God hath wisely placed the faculties of the Soule and the Body.

Hee hath placed the *intellectuall facultie* in the *Braine*, as highest : the *affections* in the *Heart*, the *naturall part* in the *Liver* and *Stomacke* : hee hath placed the *understanding* in the *Head*, as in the throane ; in the *Heart* as in the chamber : but the rest of the *inferior faculties* hee hath placed below, as it were in the *Kitchen* : and as it were an unseemely thing for a Prince to be sitting in the *Kitchen*, and never to minde matters of estate : so it is a base thing for the soule to have minde of nothing but of eating and drinking, and to choose *Martha* her part, but never *Maries*, *Luke 10. 42.*

A collation betwixt the
innocent and old Adam

Man before his fall lived the life of God, but since the fall hee lives onely the naturall life, and few live the life of grace. There is so little life in the shell-fish, that wee cannot tell whether they live the life of the plant or the sensitive life. So the life of God is so weak in many men, that we cannot tell whether it be the naturall life or the spirituall life which they live. *Zenzes* the Painter painted grapes so lively, that hee deceived the birds, and made them come fleeing to them. *Dedalus* made *αὐτοκίνητο*, images mooving by themselves, hee made men beleve that they were living ; but *Pygmalion* made an image so lively, that he fell in love with it himselfe. So hypocrites which live onely the life of Nature, they will so counterfeit the actions of the faithfull,

full, that they make men beleve indeed that they live the life of God; and some times they deceive themselves, thinking that they are living when they indeede are dead: the quickning power of the soule desires onely *being*, and so it rests: the sense would not onely *bee*, but also *bee well*: but the understanding aspires above all these to eternall blisse: these three powers make three sorts of men, for some like plants doe fill their veines onely, some againe doe take their senses pleasure like beasts onely, and some doe contemplate like Angels: therefore the Poets in their fables doe faine, that some were turned into flowers, others into beasts, and others, into gods,

CHAP. IIII.

of the end of Mans Creation:

MAn was created to serve God.

A circle is more perfect than a line, for a circle returnes backe to the point whence it began: but a line is more imperfect, never returning to the place from whence it began. Man and Angels returne backe to God who made them, like a circle, but the beasts are like a line going straite forward, never looking backe to God againe, who made them. It is true, some make the circle of a small circumference, and returne to God soone after they came forth from him; others againe make it as large as the world, and run through all things, seeking blessednesse, but finding none, after a large and wearisome compasse, they returne to their maker at last, as *Salomon* did when he had proved all vanities. But the most part are like the beasts, comming from God as a streight

Prol.

Illust. I.

*Duplex est motus, rectus
& circularis.*

Consequence.

Illust. 2.

A collation betwixt the
innocent and old Adam

streight line, but never returne backe to him againe, and therefore are miserable eternally. The beasts content themselves with their owne proper objects, never looking to God.

Therefore when beasts in the Scriptures are brought in praying God, *Psalm 148*. It is onely to stirre up man that he may praise God.

All the creatures in some sort returne to God, in so farre as they resemble him in their being, but because God is a most wise and understanding Spirit, it was necessary that a visible Creature should bee made like to him in understanding, who should turne about againe, to praise and honour him: and not onely to bee an occasion of his praise (as the beasts are,) but should directly praise him.

Man before his fall was directly carried to the right end; but since the fall other visible creatures are carried to their proper ends: but man now neglecteth his proper end, wherefore hee was created, and is led forward by the inventions of his owne heart.

So much of the Soule and body of man, and their threefold estate, in Creation, Fall, and Restauration: wee come to the Image of God, by which hee comes to be participant of the nature of God.

CHAP. X.

Of the Image of God in Man.

Prop.

Illust. I.

MAN in his Creation was made in holinesse, to the Image of God, and to beare rule over the rest of the visible creatures.

God hath an *essentiall Image*, and a *personall Image*; his *essentiall Image* is holinesse and righteousnes, common to all the three persons; his *personall Image*, is Iesus Christ: When

When Man is said to be made to the *Image* of God, hee is to be understood to be made according to the *essentiall Image*, and not to his *Personall Image*: for if it were meant of his *Personall Image*, then as *Augustine* markes well, he would have said, *Let us make Man to my Image and not to our Image*; But Man being restored to the Image of God againe, is restored both to the *essentiall Image*, and is confirmed to the Image of his Sonne Christ Iesus, *Rom. 8. Those whom he foreknew, he predestinated to be made like to the Image of his Sonne.*

The similitude of one thing is found in another two manner of wayes. First, when one thing is like to another in nature; as when the fire burnes the wood, the heate in the wood is like in essence with the heate in the fire. Secondly, one thing is like to another in knowledge and understanding, as when we feele or see the fire burning. Now the goodnes of God is communicated to his creatures, not onely by the giving them *being*, but also in giving them *holy knowledge* in some measure like unto himselfe, & in this principally consists the image of God.

There is a twofold *similitude*; the first is *naturall*, the second by *representation*; the *naturall similitude* is when one thing is like to another by nature, as one egge is like another: and this is twofold; eyther *perfect* or *imperfect*; *perfect* as betwixt these things that are of the same kind, as the Sonne is the perfect Image of the Father, *2 Cor. 4. 4. Imperfect* is that which is somewhat like in nature, & by way of *Analogie* to that which is *perfect*, as created wisdom in Man hath some *Analogie* with the increated wisdom in God, *Coloss. 3. 10.* A *similitude by representation*, is when things are represented to the minde, and this *representation* is eyther *objective* or *formall*. *Objective* when one maketh a similitude, according to the patterne which he hath before his eyes; and this is seene in artificiall things,

Duplex imago, essentialis, & personalis.

Illust. 2.

Duplex est similitudo, secundum naturam & in cognitione.

Illust. 3.

Duplex est similitudo, naturalis, & representativa.

Duplex est similitudo naturalis perfecta aut imperfecta seu analogica.

Duplex similitudo, representativa, objectiva, & formalis.

things, as when *Ahaz*, 2 *King*. 16. made an Altar, according to the patterne of the Altar which hee saw at *Damascus*. A *formall representation* of a *similitude* is, when the minde formes the *similitude* of a thing; and this kinde of *similitude* in the minde, is more abstractive and perfect then the former; and the *objective* dependeth upon this, for every externall *representation*, proceeds from a formall and inward representation in the minde, as when they made the golden Calfe, *Exod*. 32. First, they carried the *formall representation* of this Calfe with them out of *Egypt*; and they made the *objective similitude* of it in the wilderness. So when *Moses* received the patterne of the Tabernacle from God on the mount hee kept the *formall representation* of it in his minde: but when hee erected it and set it up according to the patterne, *Exod*. 39. 42. this was the *objective representation*. Now when it is sayd, that man was made according to the Image of God, *Gen*. 2. It is not to bee understood that hee was made according to the perfect Image of God, for Christ is onely the perfect naturall Image of the Father, *Heb*. 1. but he was made to his Image by way of *Analogie*, not expressing his Image fully and naturally. Man was not made to the Image of God *objective*, because God had no patterne without himselfe to make him by; he was made to the Image of God *formally*, when hee was made to the *exemplar* that was in the minde of God.

A *similitude* differeth much from an *Image*.

An egge is like to another egge, yet it is not the image of another egge; for the one is not of the other, neither can wee know in particular this egge from that egge: for that which is the *Image* of a thing; first, it must bee like it; secondly, it must bee from it, either *naturally*, as the reflex of the countenance in the glasse; or *artificially*, as the seale in the waxe from the seale it selfe.

When

Prop.
Illust. I.

*Ut aliquid sit imago rei
tria requiruntur, 1. ut
sit simile, 1. ut procedat
inde aut naturaliter aut
artificialiter.*

When it is the image of a thing made by *Art*, it representeth not the thing *artificially*, but *naturally*; for the image of *Cesar* is not *ex instituto*, the image of *Cesar*, at the appointment or pleasure of the Painter; for then any signe which the Painter should make; should bee the image of *Cesar*; but *Art* must imitate *nature* as neare as shee can: so that the image is the image in so farre, as it naturally represents. Thirdly, it must represent in particular the thing it selfe.

There are foure wayes to take up the Image of God in man. First, we know a man *in vestigio*, by the print of his foote; Secondly, we know him, *in umbra*, by his shadow; Thirdly, wee know, *in speculo*, in a glasse; Fourthly, wee know him, *in filio*, in his Sonne. Wee know a man *in vestigio*, by the print of his foote, *Speciem hic cognoscimus sed non individuum*. Wee know that a man hath beene there and not a beast, but wee know not this or that man by the print of the foote. Wee know a man, *in umbra*, by his shadow; here we take up somewhat more of man then hee did by the print of his foote, as wee know it is the shadow of a man, and besides this, his qualitie how tall hee is, but wee know not in particular by the shadow this or that man. The creatures they are but the shadow of God, they demonstrate to us that there is a God, and they shew to us his greatnesse and power but no more. Wee know a man *in speculo*, in a glasse, when wee see the image of his face in a glasse, here wee discern and know him more particularly. Man in his first Creation was like to this image: When wee see a mans sonne that is begotten of his Father, that is the most lively representation of a man, when he presents his person, manners and all, and so Christ is the personall and naturall image of the Father: and man renewed, is the image of Christ.

Man

3. ut illud ipsum ad vivum representet.

In imagine sunt exemplar & exemplatum, 2. naturaliter representat, 3. particulariter.

Illust. 2.

Quatuor modis, deum cognoscimus, 1. *in vestigio* 2. *in umbra*, 3. *in speculo*, 4. *in filio*.

Conseq. 1.
Epith. h. ref. 70.

Man was made in holinesse to the Image of God; therefore the *Anthropomorphite* (who thought man was made to the Image of God according to his Body, thinking that God had had also a Body) were in a grosse error; for when as in the Scripture there are feete, hands, and eyes, attributed to God, it is but by way of metaphore or borrowed speech; otherwayes as *Theodoret* marketh well, we should bee forced to ascribe a monstrous body to God because hee is said to have wings, to have pennes, *Psal. 18.* and to have seven eyes, *Zach. 4.*

Conseq. 2.
Hieron. Olearter, in Gen. 1.

The Image of God is not properly in the body but by reflex, therefore these also are mistaken who thinke that God in the Creation tooke upon him the visible shape of a Man, and according to that shape made Man, for man was made according to the image of God in the Soule, and not according to the shape of his Body.

Conseq. 3.

These who thinke that man was made to the image of God (that is, according to the humane nature of Christ which he was to assume of the *Virgin Mary*) erre also, for God saith not, *Let us make man to thy Image*, but, *to our Image*. Secondly the Sonne of God according to his humane nature, is said rather to be made according to the likenesse of other men, *Phil. 2. 7.* It is true that by grace *these whom he foreknew he predistinate to be like the Image of his Sonne, Rom. 8.*

A collation betwixt the
 innocent, old, and re-
 newed Adam.

Adam when hee was made to the Image of God in his first Creation, was like to the Moone in the full; Man fallen, before regeneration is like the Moone in the conjunction, altogether obscured by the Sunne, the Image of God then is defaced and blotted out in man by sinne: the image of God in Man restored, is like the Moone waxing and growing by degrees till shee come to her perfection. But as in every similitude there is some dissimilitude, so it is here, for when the Moone is in the con-

conjunction shee is nearest to the Sunne, her light and life, and is more illuminate by his beames, than in the opposition, although it seeme not so to us; and therefore the Church is well compared in her perfection, to the Moone in her conjunction. Againe, the dissimilitude would be marked, because the Moone in her fullness is in opposition, furthest from the Sunne; but the Church in her *Plenilunio* of grace, shee is nearest the Sunne of righteousness. The Moone in her conjunction is nearest to the Sunne; but the Church in her conjunction being darkened by sinne, is farthest from her Spouse the Sonne of righteousness.

The first Adam was made a living Soule, but the second Adam was made a quickning spirit, 1 Cor. 15. that is, the first Adam in his Creation could have begotten children to his owne image, in holiness and righteousness; but could not have given them perseverance, and continuance in grace; but the second Adam, that quickning spirit; as hee begets children to his owne image, so he gives them perseverance in grace, that they fall not away againe.

Of this we may gather, if Adam had not sinned, his children might have sinned; for his posterity by generation, could have gotten nothing from him, but that which hee had himselfe: but Adam had not this gift of confirmation to continue; therefore he could not propagate this to his children, *Effectus non potest esse perfectior causa*, For the effect cannot be more perfect than the cause.

The Image of God consisted in perfect holiness and knowledge.

Man was not to grow in holiness, as he was to grow in knowledge; for hee was fully holy, and had all the perfection of it, which was requisite in a Man.

The first, Adam was holy, ὁλως, fully; but not ὁλοτελως,

G g

he

A collation betwixt the Innocent and second Adam.

Consequence.

Prop.

Illust.

A collation betwixt the innocent, second, and renewed Adam.

hee had not the gift of confirmation in holinesse, to make him continue to the end. Iesus Christ the second *Adam* was holy ὁλῶς & ὁλοτελῶς, hee was full of grace and holinesse, and could not fall from his holinesse: but the renewed *Adam* is holy, ὁλοκληρῶς & ὁλοτελῶς, hee is but renewed in holinesse in part, and through Christ hee cannot fall from his holinesse.

CHAP. XI.

Of the knowledge of Adam in his first creation.

Prop.

Illust. 1.

Illust. 2.

THis Image of God made *Adam* to have perfect knowledge both of God and his creatures.

There is a perfection in parts, and a perfection in degrees: hee had all perfection in parts of knowledge before his fall, but hee had not then attained to the perfection of degrees in his knowledge, because he was not confirmed in grace.

His knowledge was obscure, comparing it with the light which should afterward have beene revealed to him; for these principles of knowledge which he had; were both common and imperfect: if they had beene singular, they had not beene principles but conclusions; if they had beene cleare, they had not beene principles but meanes.

The Image of God in *Adam* was either inward or outward, his inward Image was either in his understanding, will, and affections or passions. His outward Image was in his dominion over the creatures (spoken of in the second part.) In his understanding consisted his knowledge.

Adam had knowledge both of God, and of his creatures; his knowledge of God was either his inbred know-

knowledge which was naturall, or his acquired knowledge, by the creature ; or his revealed knowledge, either of God or of his creatures: of every one of these in order, and first of *Adams* inbred knowledge.

CHAP. XII.

Of Adams inbred knowledge of God.

MAN before his fall, had an inbred knowledge of God, before he knew him by his creatures, or any other teacher.

As light is the first object of the eye, and not the light of the Sunne or Candle . So God is the first object of the mind, but not this or that way revealed, by his creatures, or by his word.

The principles of things, are either manifest in themselves onely, or, they are manifest to us ; that *there is a God*, is a principle manifest in it selfe, because there is no neede of a middle to proove it. But it is not a principle knowne in it selfe to us, because we must use middles, that this principles may be stirred up in us.

The first principles which we have of God, are naturally inbred within us ; but the first principles of other sciences arise without from the senses. *Principia de Deo, & principia scientiarum ex opposito differunt ; cognoscimus deum per extromissionem, cognoscimus scientias per intromissionem.* The knowledge of God wee have it by extromission ; but the knowledge of the first principles wee have by intermission. The understanding at the first is voide of all formes, yet it is capable of all formes ; as the eye being void of all colours, yet is capable of all colours ; the way how the understanding receives these formes into it is thus, the

Gg 2

sense

Prop.

Illust. I.

Principia de deo vel sunt per se nota vel secundum nos.

Illust. 2.

Duplex est intellectus, agens, & possibilis.

sense lets in the particular objects to the imagination where they are more refined, than they were in the sense; and by the light of the intellectuall agent, the possible faculty now actually understands. As the woman in the Gospel who lost her groat, could not have found it againe untill the candle was lighted: so this possible power in the understanding, could receive no objects from the imagination, unlesse this light intervened, and thus the first principles of sciences are bred in the minde; For if I had never seene with my eyes, *totum, the whole*, I could never lay up this first principle in my minde, that, *the whole is more than the parts*. So that all this knowledge comes from the sense first, and that maxime holds true, *Quicquid est in intellectu, prius fuerat in sensu*.

κοινὸν ἐννοια.

Object. If all our knowlege comes from the senses, how are these principles said to be naturally in man.

Answ. They are said to be naturally in him, because they are framed in the minde, without any reasoning or discourse; but the conclusions drawne from these, are made up by discourse, and are not alike amongst all men, as the first principles are.

Ob. If all our knowledge of things come by the sense, how is it then that the man in the Gospel, who was borne blind, when he began to see, said that, *he saw men walking a farre off like trees*, *Matth. 8. 24*. If hee had not had some notion of trees in his minde without helpe of the senses, how could hee compare men to trees?

Answ. This notion which he had of trees was by other senses, as by feeling and hearing; but if hee had beene both deafe and blind, &c. He could have had no notion of trees, as no blind man can judge of colours.

Consequence.

The principles of sciences, are not naturally inbred in us, therefore *Plato*, *Origen*, and *Averrois*, erred who held

held that the soules were from eternall, and the principles of all sciences, were from all eternitie, inbred with them; and *to learne* was onely *to remember*, and an actuall knowledge of those imprinted notions. This comparison then, clears not the purpose well, if a master were to seeke his fugitive servant in a multitude, it were in vaine for him to seeke him, unlesse he had some pre-notions of him, in his shape and favour; or carried some picture drawne by others. So unlesse something were drawne within us, wee could never take up those things without; but there is no such principles drawn in our minde at the first, untill they be formed out of the imagination, and laid up in the minde; and by these we may enquire, after that which we understand not.

Wee understand nothing by intromission through the senses to the understanding; then *Adams* knowledge which he had of all the creatures when he awaked out of his sleepe, was an extraordinary infused knowledge, and was not naturall to him: But the first knowledge of God, is inbred with us, and is inlightened with that first light, *which enlightens all men comming in to the world, Ioh. 1. 9.*

This inbred knowledge, which man had of God before the fall, is most obscure now since the fall; as hee who writes with the juyce of an onyon, the letters can not be read at the first, unlesse the paper be holden to the fire to dry the letters, and then they appeare legible. So this is written with the point of a diamont (as it were) in the hearts of all men, that (*there is God*) although they cannot reade it at the first, untill they begin to consider the creatures more nearely, and to waken that which is lurking within them; The Poets say, that *Oedipus* knew that hee had a father, but hee knew not, that *Laius* was his father; So man by nature

G g 3 know-

Conseq. 2.

A collation betwixt the innocent and old *Adam*.

Rom. 1. 20. *deum negant, non ex habitu naturae, sed ex affectu malitiae.*

knoweth that there is a God, but he knoweth not the true God.

Quest. Whether is this imbred knowledge which we have of God; or the knowledge which he have of him by the creatures more cleare?

Ans. This inbred knowledge is more obscure, than the knowledge which wee get by creatures. The first sort of knowledge which we have of God now, is *universale confusum*. Example, when we behold a man a farre off: first, we take him up to be a creature, then wee take him up to be a living creature, and then to be a man, and at last to be *Peter* or *Iohn*: here wee proceed, from the universall to the particular, from that which is confused, to that which is more cleare and distinct. So the first sight, which our minde doth get of God now, is but an obscure and confused sight, as that which the *Athenians* had of God, *Act. 17*. When they worshipped the unknowne God; so that of the *Samaritans*, *Ioh. 4*. They worshipped they knew not what. Then we are led by the creatures some what more clearely to take them up, which is called *universale abstractum*. So first we learne particular things by sense, and then universall things by our understanding; The Philosophers found out a sort of reasoning by induction, ascending from the particulars to the generall, as *Socrates* is a living creature; therefore all men are living creatures; *Plato* is a living creature, therefore all men are living creatures. Here we goe from the particular to the generall, and so we proceede thus from the creatures to take up what God is. There is a twofold order in discipline; first, the *order of invention*, as those who finde out Arts, begin at those things that are most knowne to our sense, and most familiar to them; the second is the *order of hearing*, as when a master proceeds in teaching his schollers from the cause

Duplex est universale, confusum & abstractum

Cognoscimus particularia per sensum, ut universalia per intellectum.

Duplex ordo, inventionis, & ascensionis.

Fonseca. lib. 1 q. 2 s. 8.

to the effect. In the first, wee proceed from the *compounds* to the *simple*, from the *particulars* to the *generall*; but in the last, we proceede from the *simple* to the *compound*, and from the *universall* to the *particular*; in the first wee compound, in the second we divide. When we learne by the creatures to take up God, it is *ordo inventionis*; but when God teacheth us in his schoole, and instructs us by the eare, this is a more perfect kinde of learning, this is called *ordo auscultationis*.

Man by nature, hath sought out and polished all other sorts of Arts and Sciences since the fall; but the knowledge of God, they have detained captive, and more and more obscured it, *Rom. I. 18.*

First, they found out *Physicke*, and *necessitie* bred this; then they found out *morall Philosophy*, *civilitie* bred this; then they found out *Mythologie* or fabulous theologie, and *delight* bred this. This *Mythologie* againe, they divided three manner of wayes, first, *Physically*, as *Homer* brings in the gods fighting, thereby hee meant the fighting of the Elements, winds and raine. Secondly, *morally* when they placed, *Virgo Iustitia* the daughter of *Iupiter* betwixt *Leo* and *libra*; they signified that Iustice had a hand both in fortitude and equitie. Thirdly, *Theologically*, as *Iupiter* begat *Venus* upon the froth of the Sea; whereby they signified, when the gods begat any good motions in the hearts of men, there is nothing but vacuitie and froth in them, no preparation nor disposition to goodnesse; but the knowledge of God is more and more obscured in Man since the fall.

Ordo compositionis & resolutionis, seu ab universalis, ad particulare, & contra.

Prop.

Ilust. I.

Necessitas peperit Physicam, civilitas, moralem philosophiam; delectatio, mythologiam. Triplex mythologia. physica, moralis, & theologica.

CHAP. XIII

Of Adams acquired knowledge of God by the creatures.

Prop.

Illust. 2.

*Tribus modis pervenitur
ad cognitionem Dei. 1.
per viam negationis.*

MAN before his fall, knew God by the creatures. We are led to take up God sundry ways. First, *Per viam negationis*, as God is not this, nor this; therefore he is this; the Scriptures proceede thus in describing God, as, *God cannot denie himselfe*, 2 Tim. 2. 13. *God dwels not in houses made with hands*, Act. 17. *God neither sleepes nor slumbers*, Psa. 121. 4. Here we proceede as the carver of an image doth, he cuts off this and this, to make it thus: and for this purpose they apply that of *Seneca*, *Deus est id quod vides, & quod non vides*; God is that which thou seest, and which thou seest not; by affirmation we know what a thing is, and how it is distinguished from other things; but when we proceed by way of deniall, we distinguish a thing from other things, but know not what it is. *Anselmus* sheweth this way of negation very excellently; *Circumspicit anima mea, & non videt pulchritudinem tuam; auscultat & non audit harmoniam tuam; olfacit & non percipit odorem tuum, palpat & non sentit levitatem tuam, habes enim hac in te domine Deus, modo ineffabili*: that is, *My soule looketh round about and seeth not thy beauty, it hearkneth, and heares not thy harmony, it smells but smells not thy savour, it feesles but feesles not thy lightnesse, for thou hast these things in thee O Lord after an inspeakeable manner.*

But here wee must marke that wee must not still proceede in deniall, for then our mindes would evanish to nothing; but at last wee must rest in some positive thing, which carrieth some resemblance of God; he is not a body, because a body is composed, hee is not like to other Spirits mutable: but

a Spirit immutable, most simple, and of himselfe.

Secondly, we proceed, *per viam eminentia*, good and evill are said to be comparatively with that which is best; amongst the creatures a Body is good, a Spirit is better, which notwithstanding hath not his goodnesse of himselfe; therefore hee must have it of him, who is absolutely good; The Scriptures teach us how to take up God thus, the excellent things, it calles them Gods things or belonging to God; as high mountaines it calls them *Gods mountaines*, Num. 10. 33. tall Cedars it calles them, *Gods Cedars*, Psal. 80. 11. great wrestlings it calls them *Gods wrestlings*, Gen. 30. 8. So it is said, *Ninive was great to God*, that is, very great. *Ionas* 3. 3. So, *Moses was faire to God*; that is, very faire, Act. 7. 20. So when the Scripture will expresse great things, it compounds them with the name of God, *Iah*, so with the name of God, *El*, 2 Sam. 23. 20. *Arriel*, that is, as yee would say, *A very strong Lyon*, to teach us that when we see any excellent thing in the creatures, wee should elevate our mindes to the infinite beauty and greatnesse which is in God, Gen. 33. 10. therefore *Iacob* when hee saw *Esaus* loving countenance, it was as though he had seene the face of God.

When the beames of the Sunne strike upon a watry cloude, the beames are reflected backe againe to the Sunne, and leave behind them in appearance to our sight imaginary colours, which is the Rainebow. All the creatures should be reflexed backe againe to God; the beauty in the creatures is but a shadow, untill we come backe to the beauty in God; and as we count little children foolish, who come to catch the Rainebow by the two ends, so are they foolish who are bewitched with the beauty in the creatures, and ascend not to the beauty in God.

Thirdly,

2. *per viam eminentia*.

Cant. 8. 6. *Flamma Iah*.

3. *Per viam causationis.*

Thirdly, we proceede to take up God, *Per viam causationis*, from the effects to take up the cause; as first, to that first matter, which the Philosophers call *Materia prima*, or that *Tohu vabohu*, voide of all forme, *Gen. 1.* Secondly to the Elements; thirdly, to that which is composed of two of the Elements, as the vapours of Water and Ayre, the exhalations of Aire and Fire. Fourthly, to those that are made of three Elements, as the meteors. Fifthly, to those that are made of all the Elements, as the inferior creatures. Sixtly, to those that have vegetative life onely, as Plants and Hearbs. Seventhly, to those that have sense, as the Beasts. Eighthly, to those who have reason, as men. Ninthly, to those that are intellectuall Spirits, as the Angels. Lastly, to God himselfe. Thus we proceed from the lower steppe of *Iacobs* ladder, *Gen. 28. 12.* and ascend up to God himselfe.

Illust. 2.

Triplex causa, particularis, universalis, & supereminens.

There are three sorts of causes, the particular cause, the universall cause, and the supereminent cause. *Adam* could not be led by the effect, to take up the particular cause; as here is an Image; therefore *Polycletus* made it; here is a Picture; therefore *Apelles* painted it. Secondly, from the effect, he could not be led, to take up the universall cause alone; as, here is a man, therefore the Sunne hath begotten him; but this, here is a man, therefore the Sunne hath furthered his generation; *Nam sol & homo generant hominem; the Sunne and a Man beget a Man*; But from the effect he was led to take up the supereminent cause, as here is a world, therefore God hath made it.

A collation betwixt the Innocent and old *Adam*.

Man before the fall, could clearely make up this conclusion; here is a world, therefore God hath made it, but since the fall he maketh not this conclusion clearely, for the greatest Philosophers thought the world to be eternall with God, and here they stucke as mice in pitch.

There

There is a twofold disposition of the causes of all things in their operations; *Series causarum*, an order of causes, and *circulus causarum*, a circle of causes, *Hof.* 2.21. *I will heare the Heavens, and the heavens shall heare the earth, and the earth shall heare the corne and the wine, and they shall heare Israel*, this is *series causarum*. Secondly, this is the circle of causes, as dew breeds cloudes, cloudes breedes raine, raine breeds deaw, and so about againe, 2 *Pet.* 4. 4. *This yeare as the last yeare, all things continue alike since the beginning*: from the effects here we may be led to take up the first cause, and so ascend to God.

Man before the fall went by the order of causes, either from the cause to the effect, or from the effect to the cause. From the cause to the effect; God must heare the Heavens, that the Heavens may heare the Earth, and the Earth must heare the Corne and Wine, that they may heare *Israel*. From the effects to the cause, as the Wine and the Corne heare *Israel*, therefore the Earth hath heard the Corne and Wine, and the Heavens have heard the Earth, and God hath heard the Heavens. But Man after his fall goeth like a blind horse in the milne, round about in the circle of second causes, *Psal.* 12.9. *Impij ambulant in circuitu*, and never elevate their minde to the first cause God.

Adam before his fall, saw God clearely in the creatures as in a glasse.

We see three wayes. First, *ὀπλῆως*, streight out thirty or forty miles. Secondly, when we see *ἀντὶπλῆως* streight up, then we see so many thousand miles up to the Stars. Thirdly, if we looke *κατωπλῆως*, downeward, then we see but hard before us.

Man before the fall saw streight out, beholding God; but now hee lookes downeward onely; now hee is *μυωφ*, 2 *Pet.* Chap. 1. Vers. 9. *A pur-blind Man* seeth

Duplex processus causarum, in serie, & in circulo.

A collation betwixt the innocent and old Adam.

Duplex ordo in cognitione rerum, in συνθετικῷ & ἀναλυτικῷ.

Prop.

Illust.

A collation betwixt the innocent and old Adam.

seeth nothing but that which is hard before him.

Object. The effects cannot demonstrate the cause, unlesse they be proportioned to the cause, but there is no proportion betwixt the creatures and God; therefore no creature can shew that there is a God.

Ans. We may demonstrate that there is a God by his creatures, although we cannot have a perfect knowledge of him by them.

Wee ascend by degrees to the knowledge of God.

First, wee see him in his creatures: Secondly, by some visible signe; as *Esay* saw him, *Esa. 5. In creata gloria*: Thirdly, *in umbris*, as the Iewes saw him: Fourthly, *in carne*, as the Apostle saw him: Fifthly, *per fidem*, as the beleivers see him: Sixtly, *in gloria*, as the glorified see him. *Adam* had a more cleare sight of God than that which hee had by the creatures; he had a more cleare sight than that which *Esay* had; hee had a more cleare sight than that which the Iewes had; he had a more cleare sight than that which is by Faith: but he had not so cleare a sight, as the glorified have in heaven of God.

The knowledge which man hath by the creatures shall vanish in the life to come.

1 Cor. 13. 10. Prophecie and knowledge shall be abolished in the life to come; because of their imperfection; this imperfection the Apostle noted in these words, *1 Cor. 12. 9. We know in part, and we prophecy in part, we know in part by the creatures, and so wee apprehend. So we know imperfectly by prophecie, 1 Cor. 13. by* *ἡμεῖς* here the Apostle understands that knowledge which we have of God by the creatures, *Rom. chap. 1. verse 19. τὸ γνωστὸν τῷ Θεῷ*, that is, which wee naturally know of God by the creatures: and by *prophecy* here, he meanes, not onely the foretelling of things to come,

Prop.

Illust.

Gradus perveniendi ad visionem Dei sunt hi. 1. in creaturis 2. visibili signo 3. in umbris 4. in carne 5. per fidem 6. in gloria.

Prop.

Illust. 1.

but also the interpretation of the Scriptures, 1 Cor. 14. but when that which is perfect shall come, both these sorts of imperfect knowledge shall be abolished; this the Apostle declares by the example of little children, 1 Cor. 13. 11. whose knowledge groweth daily by experience, then their former weake knowledge is abolished. So he declares this by the similitude of a glasse, and of a darke speech, Vers. 12. There is a twofold glasse by the which we know God; the first, is the Scriptures; the second, is the booke of nature; but by both these we get but an obscure sort of knowledge of God; and as in an enigmaticall or darke speech we apprehend certaine signes, but wee come not to the full meaning of the things signified, as Sampson proposed to the Philistims this Riddle, *Out of the eater came meate, and out of the bitter came sweet*, Iudg. 14. 15. The Philistims could understand, what was bitter, and what was sweet; but they could not understand the meaning of the Riddle. So it is but an obscure sight we get here and enigmaticall, comparing it with the sight which we shall have of God, in the life to come.

A greater light obscures alwayes the lesser, as the Moone giveth no shadow when the Sunne shineth; but shee casteth a shadow when the Sunne shineth not; So the Planet Venus casteth no shadow when the Moone shineth, but shee casteth a shadow when the Moone shineth not; Here the greater light, obscureth alwayes the lesser. So in the life to come, the glory that shall be there, shall obscure all the light that wee get by the creatures now; for if it shall abolish the preaching of the Law and the Gospel, and the knowledge that wee get thereby, 1 Corin. Then hee shall give up the Kingdome to the Father; What Kingdome? his personall Kingdome (preaching of the Word, administering

Duplex speculum, scripturarum, & nature.

Illust. 2.

ministrating of the Sacraments such;) if that knowledge shall cease in the life to come, why shall not the knowledge which wee get by the creatures cease.

Illust. 3.

In a dimme light wee can perceive a thing which a greater light doth obscure, as the light of the Starres obscures not the light of a Glow-worme; but yet the light of the Sunne obscures both. So the knowledge which *Adam* had by the voyce of God, and that *θεωραία*, the sight of God which he saw, obscured not the knowledge which he had by the creatures. But in the life to come, the bright light in glory shall obscure both.

Prop.

The sight which we have now of God, farre differeth from the sight which *Adam* had in his estate of innocencie.

Illust.

Duo sunt media, propinquius, & remotius ea-que vel obscura vel clara.

When we looke upon a thing by two *media* middles, if the nearest middle be perspicuous and more cleare, and the furthest or remotest middle, be thicker or more obscure, then things appeare more cleare and evident unto us; but if the nearest middle be obscure and grosse, and the remotest clearer, then things appeare lesse to us. A man when hee beholds a Fish in the water, he seeth her by two middles. First, by the Aire the clearer middle, therefore the Fish seemeth greater to him and nearer: but the Fish being in the water, and beholding a man upon the banke: (first through the water the grosser middle, and then through the aire the clearer middle) the man standing upon the banke seemeth but little, and a farre off to the Fish. So we see the Starres by two middles; first, by the Aire which is the grossest middle, then by the heaven, which is the purer and remoter; therefore the Starres seeme but little to us and a farre off.

A collation betwixt the innocent and old *Adam*.

Man before his fall did looke upon the clearer and more perspicuous middle, hearing Gods voyce, and

law that *θεοφανεία* the sight of God: then he looked upon the more obscure middle, which is the creatures; therefore hee got a more cleare sight of God and nearer. But after his fall he lookes first upon the creatures, and then hee heares his word; therefore the sight which hee gets of God here, is more obscure and remote.

The diversitie of the sight arising three manner of wayes. First, from the object. Secondly, from the organ. Thirdly, from the middle. First, if the object be clearer or obscurer, then the sight differeth. Secondly, if the middle be clearer or obscurer, then the sight differeth; as if a Christall glasse be interposed, the sight is clearer; but if a greene glasse be interposed, the sight is obscured. Thirdly, if the organ be hurt, or when the spirits of the Eye are disturbed, as we see in drunken and mad men, to whom one thing appears two, and in these who runne till their heads be giddy.

The diversitie which wee have of the sight of God in the life to come, and in this life, arising not in respect of the object *God*, for he remaines *One* still to all; the diversitie then ariseth, partly from the diversity of the meanes, for God doth not manifest himselfe, by the like meanes to all, and partly from the diversity of our apprehension, for all apprehend him not in a like manner, but in the life to come the diversitie shall not arise from the diversitie of the meanes, being to some clearer, and to some obscurer; but onely according to the diversitie of our capacitie, as a pint cannot containe a pottle, and this shall make the degrees in glory, 1 Cor. 15.

A collation betwixt the first *Adams* knowledge and the second *Adam* Iesus Christ.

First, the *fulnesse of knowledge* is of two sorts. First, in

Illust. 2.

Tria requiruntur ad videndum, objectum, organum, & medium.

A collation betwixt the innocent, old, renewed and glorified *Adam*.

A collation betwixt the innocent and second *Adam*.

Duplex est plenitudo scientiae. 1. respectu scientiae. 2. respectu eius in quo est.

Duplex plenitudo scientiae respectu obiecti, intensiva, & extensiva.

The second collation betwixt the first Adams knowledge, and Christs.

Thom part. 3. q. 5. art. 10. Christus consideratur, ut viator, & ut comprehensor.

Quadruplex cognitio fuit in Christo, divina, facialis, infusa, & experimentalis.

Duplex consideratio Christi, ut Deus, velut homo.

in respect of knowledge it selfe. Secondly, in respect of him that hath the fulnesse of knowledge; The fulnesse, of knowledge, in respect of knowledge it selfe, is then, when one attained to the highest and uttermost of knowledge, both *Quoad essentiam*, & *virtutem intensivè*, & *extensivè*, that is, when hee hath it so farre forth, as it may be had, and to all the effects and purposes, whereunto knowledge doth or can extend it selfe; this kinde of fulnesse of knowledge was proper to the second Adam Christ, of whose fulnesse we receive, *Ioh. 1. 16*. The first Adam had fulnesse of knowledge, in respect of the subject or him that had it, according to his estate or condition, both *intensivè* to the uttermost bounds that God had prefixed, and *extensivè* in the vertue of it, in that it extended to the performing of these things, that hee was to performe in that place and condition that God had set him in.

Secondly, Christ the second Adam was both *viator* and *comprehensor*, (the Apostle toucheth both these estates, *Phil. 3. So runne that yee may comprehend*;) Christ when hee was *viator* tasted of all our three estates; for first, he was free from sinne, that was our estate in innocency; secondly, hee felt the punishment of our sinnes, which is the condition of man fallen; thirdly, he saw God face to face, when he was here *viator* upon the earth, which shall be our estate in glory. So Christ being both *viator* and *comprehensor*, his knowledge differed farre from the first Adams; for as hee was *comprehensor*, he had beside his divine knowledge, his blessed knowledge, which they call *facialem cognitionem*; and besides that he had *inditam* or *infusam cognitionem*; and thirdly, *acquired* or *experimental* knowledge. Christs knowledge then was either as hee was God, or as hee was Man: as hee was Man hee was either *comprehensor* or *viator*; as hee was

comprehensor he had that blessed knowledge, called *facialis*; as hee was *viator*, his knowledge was either *infused*, or *experimental*; his *infused* knowledge, was either knowledge of naturall things, in which hee excelled Adam in his first estate; or his knowledge in spirituall things, and herein hee excelled the Apostles and Angels themselves, in the knowledge of the mysteries of our salvation. His *experimental* knowledge, was that whereby hee learned things by experience as we doe. In his *infused* knowledge he grew in the *habites*. In his *experimental* knowledge hee grew from the *privation* to the *habite*, as he was comprehensor hee grew not in the *habite*, as hee was *viator*, hee grew in the *habites* of things which were infused into him; as he was *viator* hee grew from the *privation* to the *habite*, in these things which he learned by experience.

Christs *infused* knowledge differed from his blessed knowledge; for by his blessed knowledge he saw things in *verbo* in the word, but by his *infused* knowledge hee knew things in *genere proprio*, & *per species rerum*; by the formes of things as they are here below. Secondly, his blessed knowledge, *semper est in actu*, it is ever in act; but by his *infused* knowledge, hee goeth from the *habite* to the *act*, turning himselfe to the view of things here below actually: as when Christ asked of Peter, *Matt. 17. 25. Whether or no doe the Kings Children pay tribute*; Christ had the *habite* here, and knew well enough that the Kings sonnes pay no tribute; now hee turnes this *habite* to the *act*, when hee propounds this question to Peter. Againe, there is a twofold knowledge, *abstractiva*, and *intuitiva*: I have the *abstractiva* knowledge of a rose in winter in my minde; I have the *intuitive* knowledge in my minde whē I see the rose grow in Iune. Christs *abstractiva* knowledge is the *habite*; and his *intuitive* knowledge is the *act*. Christ he excelled the Angels, in this *infused* knowledge,

Hh

for

Differentia inter Christi infusam, & beatam cognitionem.

Duplex cognitio, habitualis, & actualis.

Cognitio duplex, abstractiva & intuitiva.

for although they have *species connatas rerum*, naturally bred with them, yet this *infused knowledge* farre surpassed theirs; so it farre surpassed the knowledge of all the Prophets, for his Body and Soule being *hypostatically* united to the God-head, he must have a more perfect *knowledge* than any other man could have infused in him. Thirdly, he had *experimentall knowledge*, and herein hee grew from the *privation* to the *habite*; as in his *infused knowledge* he grew but from the *habite* to the *act*. When a Doctor goeth to the Schooles to teach, he proceedes from the *habite* to the *act*, and hee growes in the *habite*: Christ grew thus in his *infused knowledge*, but hee grew not so in his *blessed knowledge*. When a boy goeth to the Schooles to learne, he goeth from the *privation* to the *habite*, and so did our Saviour Christ, in this third sort of knowledge *experimental*; and hee knew more when hee was *thirty yeeres* old, than when hee was *twelve*; hee could not tell what woman touched him in the multitude (when they crowded about him,) untill the woman with the bloody-flux, fell downe before him and acknowledged it was shee, *Luk. 8. 45.* So he could not tell whether there were figges upon the figge-tree by this sort of knowledge, *Marke 11. 13.* and in this sense hee was ignorant of the day of judgement, *Math. 24. 36.* this ignorance in Christ was not sinfull ignorance, it was *ignorantia pura negationis*, but not *prava dispositionis*, for hee was ignorant of nothing of that which hee was bound to know; when hee was here upon the earth hee was ignorant of this day of judgement as Man, *Math. 24. 36.* both in his *infused* and *experimentall knowledge*; first, in his *infused knowledge*, for a l *infused knowledge* proceedes from the *habite* to the *act*, for by exercising the *habite* wee come to the *act*, but Christ by his *infused knowledge* could not come to the *act*, to know

ἀγνοῖα καὶ ἀπειρία,
καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν.

of this day in particular. Hee knew that God should judge the world, and that he should judge it on a certaine day, here he proceeded from the *habite* to the *act*; but from the *habite* hee could not proceede to this particular day, for this is, *superioris scientia*; farre lesse could he know this particular day, by his *experimentall knowledge*. But now being in glory and having received all power, and being appointed judge of the Church, it is most probable that now as man hee knoweth this day.

In his *experimentall knowledge* hee farre excelled *Adam*; for *Adam non pernoctavit in honore* (as the Jewes say) *Psal. 49. 3.* Hee lodged not one night in honour; they gather hence that *Adam* fell in the day of his Creation; and consequently could not have such *experimentall knowledge* of things as Christ had. This his *experimentall knowledge*, hee learned it not of any teacher as we doe, neither from any Angel: hee was taught by no man, for when he was *twelve yeeres* of age he could reason with the Doctors, *Luke. 2.* So *Iohn 7.* they *marvailed whence he had such learning*, seeing he was not taught. Secondly, hee had it not from an Angel; an Angel in his agony came and comforted him, *Luke 22.* that it might evidently appeare that hee was Man, and stood in neede of comfort; but they never came to instruct him.

Origin in tract. 3. in
Matth.

We and the Church of *Rome* differ about this ignorance of Christ, for they hold that Christ is said to be ignorant of the day of judgement, because he would not reveile it to others; the Scriptures say hee grew in knowledge as hee grew in stature, *Luke 2.* but he truly grew in stature: therefore hee truly grew in knowledge. Secondly, the Scriptures say, *Luke 2.* that *hee grew in grace with God a. d. Man*; but hee cannot be said to seeme to grow in grace with God; therefore

A collation betwix the
church of Rome and us,
concerning Christs
knowledge and ignor-
rance.

H h 2

he

*Duplex actus rationis
primus, & secundus: ita
& duplex actus scientie,
primus & secundus.*

A collation betwixt the
knowledge of Adam
and the Angels.

hee cannot bee said to seeme to grow in grace with Men, but verily and truely to grow. There is in an Infant, the *first act* of reason, when hee beginneth to speake; and the *second act*, when hee beginneth to learne; and the *first act* of knowledge, is the *second act* of reason; an Infant hath the *first act* of Reason, but not the *second*. A learned Man when he is sleeping hath the *first act* of knowledge, but not the *second*.

The Iesuites will have Christ, when hee was an Infant, to have the *first act* of knowledge, as the learned man when hee is sleeping: and they make him onely to proceede from the *habite* to the *act* in knowledge. But we hold that in his *experimentall knowledge*, hee was like other children, who have onely the *act* of reason, and proceeded from the *privation* to the *habite*.

A collation betwixt the knowledge of the *first Adam*, and the knowledge of the *Angels*.

First, the *Angels* take up things by *one act*, they neither discover nor reason; they learne not *hoc ex hoc: sed hoc post hoc; this of this, but, this after this*; they proceed not by way of *Syllogisme*, *enthymeme*, or *induction* as wee doe; they are *intelligentes creatura*, but not *ratiocinantes*, understanding creatures, but not reasoning; so shall the knowledge of Man, which hee shall have of God in the life to come, bee intellectuall and not by discourse; the Apostle *Ephes. 3. 10.* faith *The Angells learne by the Church*, they take up in an instant the cause with the effect; but Man before the fall tooke up the cause by the effect in time: in thunder there is lightning and the cracke, these two goe in an instant together: and thus the Angels take up the knowledge of things; but Man cannot in an instant take them up together because of the organs of the body.

Object. But it may seeme that they goe from the
signe

signe to the thing signified, *Exo. 12. the blood was sprinkled upon the lintels of the doores, that the Angel might not destroy their houses.*

Ans. The Angel reasoned not thus as we doe; here is the signe, therefore here is the house; but this blood was sprinkled upon the lintels of the doores, to confirme and assure the doubting Israelites, that the Angel should not destroy them.

The Sacraments are not instituted for Angels, or for men angelicall like unto Angels, but for poore and doubting sinners.

Adams experimentall knowledge, was gotten from formes drawne from their singular objects, as the face in the glasse, differeth from the face it selfe, and the print in the waxe from the seale; so that which *Adam* abstracted from the creature, differed from the creatures themselves; but the *knowledge* of the Angels is not *abstractive*, they behold the essence of things, and take them up. The Angels have three sorts of *knowledge*. First, their *morning knowledge*, which is the *knowledge* they have of the mystery of the incarnation, *1. Pet. 2. They desire to looke into this mystery.* Secondly, their *midday knowledge*, which is the *knowledge* they have in beholding the God-head. Thirdly, their *evening knowledge*, which is the *knowledge* they have in beholding the creatures below here. *Adam* before his fall, had not this their *morning knowledge*, nor their *midday knowledge*, but he had their *evening knowledge*.

Quest. How should *Adams* children have come to his knowledge if he had stood in innocency?

Ans. Some thinke they should have had the vse of reason, and perfect *knowledge* at the very first; and that they should afterward have growne to more *experimental knowledge*. Secondly, others hold that so

Hh 3

soone

Consequence.

The second collation betwixt the first *Adams* knowledge and the Ang Is.

Scientia est absoluta & essentialis in Deo, in mente humana est abstractiva species, in phantasia humana est concreta, sed angeli ignuntur ipsas essentias.

Coll. 3.

Triplex angelorum cognitio, matutina, meridiana, Vespertina.

Duplicia dona, 1. respectu nature, 2. respectu persone.

Duplex cognitio actualis & potentialis.

soone as they had beene borne, they should have had the use of reason, so farre forth as to discern outward things good or evill; as the little Lambes by natures instinct, doe know the Wolfe, and flee from him, and seeke the dugges of their dammes,) but not to discern things concerning morrall vertue and the worship of God Thir dly, others hold that they should have had no use of reason at the first, and this seemeth to be the foundest; for the gifts bestowed upon *Adam* were of two sorts. First, the gifts that were bestowed upon him, *secundum naturam specificam*, as hee was the roote, out of which all mankind proceeded, and these gifts all his children should have beene partakers of. Secondly, the gifts which were bestowed upon him *personally*; such were these, presently to know after his Creation, and to be immediately created of God, and to be created a perfect Man in full stature; these he was not to communicate to his posterity: they should not so easily have come to this knowledge as *Adam* did, to whom he could not propagate his *actuell knowledge*, but his *potentiall*; for they were to be borne, as in weakenesse of body, so without *actuell knowledge*; so not having universall notions in their mindes, but being appointed by God to seeke for *knowledge*, by inward light and outward meanes: yet they should have farre more easily attained to the meanes than wee doe now and more certainly. For the Soule of man is like a Prince that useth spies: if they bring no newes hee knoweth nothing; if they advertise lyes, then the counsell goeth awry. So if a man bee blinde and deafe, then hath hee no understanding. So if phrensies possesse the braine, it blots the formes of things, and the phantasie proves vaine and brings no true relation to the Soule: But *Adams* senses arising of the exact temperature of the Body, gave full information to the phanta-

phantasie, and so it should have been in his posterity, as they grew in time, they should have received without any error, the impression of any object. Thus should they have attained to the knowledge of humane things and so much the more easily should they have come to the knowledge of God, than man doth know.

Man before his fall tooke up God by way of Analogie, or proportion, and not fully as he is.

There is a full taking up of God whereby onely hee taketh up himselfe, neither Man nor Angel can thus conceive him. Secondly, there is a conception, and taking up of God by way of Analogie, as Adam seeing such goodnesse and beautie in the Creatures, gathered by way of Analogie, what goodnesse and beauty must be in God. The creatures are not like God *univocè*, that is, simply like unto God, neither *equivocè*, having onely a resemblance in name to him: but they are like to him by way of Analogie. Thirdly, there is a false conception of God when we take him up falsely.

There is an *Analogie of similitude*, and an *Analogie of proportion*. *Analogie of similitude*, as when it is said, *Be ye holy as I am holy*, Levit. 19. 2. but there is no *Analogie of proportion* betwixt God and man, *Esay. 40. 18.* Adam tooke up God by *Analogie of similitude*, but not by way of *proportion*.

Man tooke up God by way of *Analogie*, but since the fall he hath a false conception of God: as when the Jewes resembled him to a Calf eating hay; and the Papists paint him like an old Man: So they conceive not God by *Analogie of similitude*, when they resemble him by an Idoll.

Object. Seeing Gods attributes and essence are one in themselves, how can we take them up as distinguished without error? Makes not this a false conception in our understanding?

Prop.

Illust. 1.

Triplex conceptus dei, adequatus, analogicus, & falsus.

Analogia realis, est primam in deo, sed secundum rationem nominis est prius in nobis.

Illust. 2.

Duplex analogia, similitudinis & proportionis.

A collation betwixt the innocent and old Adam

Attributa uniuntur in Deo, disperguntur in creaturis, ut radij solis.

Ans. Although these attributes be one in God, yet in operation towards us, they are distinguished when our understanding conceives them, *Est inadequatus conceptus sed non falsus*, it is an unequal conception but not false. The matter may be cleared by these examples.

First, the powers of the Soule which are dispersed in the organs of the Body, (in the Eye it is seeing, in the Eare it is hearing,) yet in the Soule it selfe they are united, *purè & eminenter*, simply and eminently. So although justice and mercy be divers in operation toward us, (for he punisheth not by his mercy, nor sheweth mercy by his justice) yet in God they are one, *purè & eminenter*.

Secondly, the thunder when it breakes upon a tree, it bores the hard, it burnes the dry, it scatters the leaves, and peeles the barke, yet the thunder is one in it selfe. So the attributes of God, although they have divers operations upon the creatures, yet they are one in themselves; when I conceive these operations distinctly in my understanding, this is not error in my conception of God.

Thirdly, the light is one in it selfe, yet as this light is reflex upon the creatures, we take it up diversly. So the attributes of God being one in him, yet when they are dispersed amongst the creatures, wee take them up distinctly.

Man before his fall could not take up that fully, which was in God; this was no sinne in him, for it was but a *negative conception*: it was more than his nature could reach unto. But Man after his fall conceives of God *privatively*, that is, hee takes up lesse of him than hee is bound to take up.

There are three things that hinder us to take up a thing. First, *summa formositas*, the great beauty in it. Secondly,

A collation betwixt the innocent & old Adam.

Duplex conceptio, negativa & privativa.

Tria impedimenta in conceptu. summa formositas, summa deformitas, & summa infirmitas.

condly,

condly, *summa informitas*, the great informitie in it. Thirdly, *summa deformitas*, the great deformitie in it. Wee cannot take up God for the great beauty that is in him; hence is that saying, *Wee have scene God, therefore wee shall die*, Iudg. 13. 22. Wee cannot take up the first dayes worke, for the great informity in it, being without all fashion or shape. We cannot take up sinne for the great deformitie that is in it.

Quest. What should a man doe, seeing he cannot behold the glory of God, or take him up?

Answ. Wee must looke upon the Man Christ, for, *he who seeth the Sonne, seeth the Father*, Ioh. 14. 9. A Man cannot behold the Sunne in the Eclipse, it so dazeleth his eyes; what doth hee then? hee sets downe a basen full of water; and seeth the Image of the Sun Eclipsed in the water. So, seeing we cannot behold the infinite God, nor comprehend him; wee must then cast the eyes of our Faith upon his Image Christ; when wee looke into a cleare glasse it casteth no shadow to us, but put Steele upon the backe, then it casteth a reflex: So when wee cannot see God himselfe, wee must put the Manhood of our Lord Iesus Christ, (as it were a backe to his Godhead,) and then hee will cast a comfortable reflex to us.

Quest. Shall wee comprehend God in the life to come?

Answ. Wee shall not simply be *comprehensores*, but, rather *apprehensores*; that is, our understanding cannot comprehend him, but it shall take hold of him.

Object. But the Apostle saith; 1. Cor. 9. 24. *So run that ye may comprehend*; so, Philip. 3. 12. then it may seeme that wee shall bee comprehenders of God in the life to come.

Answ. There is a double sort of comprehending the

Duplex comprehensio, visu, & manu.

the first is *visu*, in the vision; the second, *manu*: in the life to come we shall comprehend him and lay hold on him: but wee shall not see him totally and fully: and so wee shall apprehend rather than comprehend in the life to come.

Object. If wee comprehend him not infinitelie in the life to come, it may seeme that we cannot bee blessed then; for no finite thing can make a man blessed.

Answ. *Apprehendimus infinitum sub ratione infiniti, sed non infinite; We apprehend an infinite thing, as being infinite, but not by an infinite apprehension, for wee apprehend him who is infinite, but finitely: and it is a true axiome, Omne receptum est in recipiente, non per modum recepti, sed per modum recipientis; that is, every thing is received by the receiver, not according to the thing received, but according to the measure of the receiver.*

Quest. Is not our apprehension infinite then?

Answ. It followeth not; the thing is infinite *extrinsecè*, in it selfe; but not *intrinsecè & formaliter*, in the intellect. So wee say, sin is infinite *objectivè*, because it is committed against the infinite God, and not *intrinsecè*, respecting the forme of it. But that which we apprehend of God is *extrinsecè finitum*, but *intrinsecè & formaliter infinitum*.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Adams revealed knowledge of God.

Prop.

MAN in his estate of innocencie knew the true God in his attributes, naturally, but he knew not that there was a trinity of persons in one true God but by revelation.

Quest. Whether beleevd Adam before his fall the in-
carna-

carnation, as hee beleev'd the trinitie of persons?

Ans. Hee could not beleve the incarnation, for then hee should have understood of his owne fall, and consequently, hee would have beene in a perpetuall feare before the fall.

Object. But it may bee said, that *Adam* might have knowne the end not knowing the meanes, as *Ioseph* knew that he should bee ruler over his brethren, but hee knew not the meanes how that should bee effected, as that hee should bee sold to the *Madianites*, and be a slave in *Egypt*; So *Adam* before his fall might have knowne of Christs incarnation, and yet not know his owne fall.

Ans. *Ioseph* knew by revelation that hee should bee Lord over his brethren; but *Adam* before his fall (for ought we finde,) had no such revelation, and therefore could not know Christs incarnation, for it was not knowne till God revealed it to him after his fall: That the seede of the Woman should tread downe the head of the Serpent, *Gen. 3.*

CHAP. XV.

Of the knowledge which Adam had of the Creatures.

MAN in his first estate had the first principles, created in him of all sciences and liberall arts, whereby he might understand the nature of the creatures here below, and so learne by them.

As hee was *Pater viventium*, the Father of all living, so hee was *Pater scientium*; for as hee was able to beget children, so hee was able to teach his posterity.

Adams knowledge, the Angels and ours, differ foure manner of waies. First, hee had his knowledge *per species infusas*, and not *per species connatas* as the Angels have

Prop.

Illust.

A collation betwix the innocent, old, and renewed Adam.

*Scientia velet infusa,
connata, acquisita, vel
experimentalis.*

have ; we have our *knowledge* now, *per species acquisitas*, he had not his *knowledge* by experience as we have, yet he should have had his *experimental knowledge* of sciences and arts if he had stood.

Quest. Whether was his *knowledge* one sort of *knowledge* with ours, or different ?

Answ. It was not a different sort of *knowledge* from ours, although his was *infused*, and ours *acquired*. The sight which we have naturally, and that which was miraculously restored by Christ to the blinde, was one sort of sight, though the one was *supernaturall*, and the other *naturall*: so although *Adams knowledge* was *infused* and ours *acquired*, yet it is one sort of *knowledge*, because they are both set upon the same objects.

In amplitudine scientiæ.

Secondly, *Adams knowledge* and ours differed in extent of *knowledge*, for hee had the *knowledge* of all things which might bee knowne ; that befalls to no man now, for he knoweth not that which he should know.

*He knew Nōtt, we
know ōtt.*

Thirdly, his *knowledge* and ours differed, for he knew the cause of every thing, wee for the most part take up onely the effects of nothing, but know not the causes. The load-stone draweth the yron to it, yet being rub'd with garlike it cannot draw the yron to it ; here he could understand the cause, but we perceive onely the effect, that the yron is drawne up, but know not the cause ; *Tripolium*, *tripoli* or *turbet*, changeth the colour of it three times in a day ; for in the morning it is white, at the middle of the day it is of a purple colour ; and in the evening it is light, red, of a scarlet colour ; hee knew the reason of it, wee know onely the effects. God knoweth the cause and the effects of things more excellently then they are in themselves ; *Adam* knew as much as was in the creatures, but we know lesse than is in them. There are some colours

Peucer. de divin.

Cognitio triplex, supereminens, adequata, & deficiens.

qua

qua exaquant visum, as the greene colour is equall with our sight; there are some colours *qua superant visum*, that exceede our sight, as the snow scatters our sight; there are some colours that are deficient and lesse than our sight, as the tawnie colour: these colours which scatter the sight, the Greekes call *διαχετινὰ*, these which gather the sight, they call *συνχετινὰ*, the creatures they are lesse than Gods knowledge, they are equall with *Adams* knowledge, but they exceede our knowledge now. The knowledge that man had before the fall of the creaturs and since is illustrate by this Apologe, the Wolfe desired the Crane upon a time to suppe with her, and powred thinne pottage upon a table which the Crane could not picke up, because they were so thinne; the next night the Crane desired the Wolfe to supper, and brought a long narrow glasse with pottage in it, which shee could easily put her beake into and eate of it, but the Wolfe could not put his head into it, but lickt onely the glasse without. Man before his fall was like the Crane, who could dive easily into the glasse, hee could easily take up the nature of the creatures; but since the fall hee is like to the Wolfe, licking without the glasse, never putting his head within, to attaine to the secrets of nature; therefore it was that antiquity fained veritie to bee hid in a deepe well.

Fourthly, his knowledge and ours differed in the sure retaining, for man in his whole estate could not forget things taught him; but man now doth forget the things that are taught him: wee are now like to the houre glasse, for that which wee receive in at the one eare goeth out at the other; or like to a sieve, which keepeth the branne and letteth the floure goe: so now wee forget the good, and retaine the bad.

A collation betwixt that knowledge which *Salomon* had

Differnat retentione.

A collation betwixt
Salomons knowledge
and Adam in innocency

had of naturall things, and that which *Adam* had before his fall. Man in his innocent estate excelled all that ever were in the knowledge of naturall things.

But it may be sayd, 1. *King.* 3. 12. that, *there was never none like Salomon*, in knowledge, before him, or shall be after him, therefore *Salomon* excelled *Adam* in knowledge. Some answer, that the comparison is here onely of Kings; there was never such a King in *Israel*, that had such wisdom as *Salomon*; but in divine things *Adam* excelled him. But we must not grant this, for in the knowledge of naturall things *Adam* excelled all; then the comparison must onely be betweene *Salomon* and other sinfull men since the fall, hee excelled all sinfull men in knowledge, but not *Adam* in his innocent estate.

Quest. How did *Adam* understand all sorts of trades and sciences before the fall, seeing his posterity is said to finde out many after the fall, *Gen.* 4. As some of *Cains* posteritie found out the Art to worke in brasse, some to make tents; so *Noah* after he came out of the Arke planted the first vineyard, *Gen.* 9. 20.

Answ. He had the knowledge of all the liberall sciences before the fall, but the mechanicke and servile trades that serve for mans use after the fall he knew them not, for he was not to *eate bread by the sweat of his face*: his worke should have onely beene a recreation to him.

A c illation betwixt the
innocent and old Adam

The first *Adam* had knowledge of the liberall sciences, but since the fall hee poreth onely in the earth; and delights onely his senses, as the finding out of musicke; and for his profit, as folding of cattle, *Gen.* 4. But before the fall hee had his mind elevated higher to God, and to the knowledge of the liberall sciences; and as the sciences followed *Adam* (the Divine;) so when the Gospell was restored, all liberall sciences follow it,

it, as the shadow doth the body, and was restored with it.

Adam knew all Arts and sciences before his fall, therefore Philosophy is not an invention of the heathen, for it came first from *Adam* to the Patriarches, and so hath continued still; the ancientest of the Philosophers are but of late, and they did learne the most of it out of *Egypt*; the exemplar of Philosophy was from God; that which was framed to the exemplar was from man.

Consequence.

Duplex Philosophia exemplaris & exemplata.

Quest. Whence commeth it that some men excell others so farre now in Arts and liberall sciences?

Answ. It comes from a new gift of God; it is a new gift of God to excell even in these mechanike things and liberall sciences: as the Lord gave to *Bezaleel* and *Aholiab* a speciall gift to worke in gold and silver, curious worke for the Tabernacle *Exod. 34.1. Esa. 28.26.* For his God doth instruct him to discretion, and doth teach him. God giveth a new gift to the husbandman to excell in husbandry. It is true that after the fall Man lost not altogether this naturall knowledge; *Vulneratus est in naturalibus, & spoliatus est in spiritualibus*; that is, he was wounded in his naturall knowledge, and spoyled of his supernaturall, for if he had altogether lost this naturall knowledge, the life of man could not have beene entertained; but to excell in this knowledge, this must bee a supernaturall gift.

So much of *Adams* understanding wherein his knowledge consisted, both inbred and acquired. Wee come now to his Will, wherein chiefly consisteth the consent to these things which his understanding hath discerned, and here standeth the power that the Will hath over all the actions of men.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the Will of Man.

THere are two principall faculties in the soule; the *understanding* and the *will*, which continually accompany it, both in the body, and out of the body.

Prop.

The understanding, is an essentiall facultie in the soule, whereby it knoweth, judgeth, and discerneth naturally truth from falsehood.

Illust.

The will, is an essentiall facultie in the soule working freely, having liberty to chuse, refuse, or suspend, not determinate to one thing.

It is called a *facultie*, and not a *habite*; because a *habite* is determinate to one thing; but a *facultie* may make choyce of moe. Secondly it is said; *to worke freely*, to put a difference betwixt it and naturall agents, which still worke after the same manner, and are alwaies carried to the same object: as the Sunne naturally cannot but heate, and it is but by accident if it breede cold: againe, it is said, *to worke freely*, to put a difference betweene it and the actions of the beasts, which are but *semilibera actiones*, for the beasts cannot but chuse still the selfe same thing, being alike affected; as being hungry they cannot chuse but eate, as the stone being heavy cannot but goe to the center. Creatures without life, have neither *liberum motum*, a free motion, (because they are moved by another) neither have they *liberum iudicium*, free judgement, because they are not moved by reason: the beasts have a *free motion*, because they move themselves, according to the natural instinct which God hath indued them with; but they have not a *free judgement*, for they are not directed by reason. Man hath both

Agens naturale movetur ad finem, agens per intellectum movetur in finem.

both *free motion*, and *free judgement*; whereby he worketh *freely*. *Naturall agents* determinate no end to themselves; but reasonable creatures propound and determinate an end to themselves: therefore no *naturall agent* hath *freedom*, but *instinct*.

There are three properties of the *Will*. First, the *conformity* of the *will* with the *understanding*. Secondly, the *liberty* of the *will*; for when it followeth the *last judgement* of the *understanding*, it followeth it *freely*. Thirdly, the *power* of the *will*, whereby the *will* after the election, (which now it hath gotten by the direction of the *understanding*) applieth it selfe to the attaining of the object.

The first property of the *will* is, that in the operation it dependeth upon the *understanding*, and followeth the direction of the mind.

The *will* followes the direction of the *understanding*, either in *choosing*, *suspending*, or *refusing*; this is called, *sequacitas voluntatis*; the *will* of it selfe is but *caca potentia*, and hath nothing but a *desire*; which yet hath not desire to any particular object, except it be led by the light of the mind: hence come these sayings, *nihil in voluntate quod non prius fuerat in intellectu*; *error in notitia parit errorem in voluntate*, *quod intellectus male iudicat, voluntas male appetit*; & *tantum diligimus quantum cognoscimus*; that is, *there is nothing in the will which was not first in the understanding*: So, *error, in knowledge breeds error in the will*: so a *false judging of a thing, breeds a false desire of a thing*: so, *the more wee love, the more wee know*.

There is in the *understanding*, *intellection*, or *ratio speculativa*, which is of things to be known by Man; and *intellectus*, or *ratio practica*; of things used to be done by Man, and fall under his election. Againe in Mans *practicall reason*, there is *reason* going before, say-

Tres Proprietates voluntatis, conformitas, libertas & potestas.

The first property of the will.

Illust. I.

Duplex intellectus, speculativus, & practicus in intellectu practico duplex ratio, precedens & subsequens. Voluntas sequitur ultimum iudicium practici intellectus.

ing, *this may be done*; and another following the *practicall understanding*, saying, *this shall be done*; and this last judgement, of *practicall understanding*, the Will followeth, and saith, *this will I doe*, she is in suspence before shee heare this last conclusion.

Quest. What is the reason that the will doth not alway follow the last judgement of the *understanding*: for oftentimes it goeth a plaine contrary course in that which the understanding hath discerned, as *Medea* said, *Videō meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*; I see the good, but I follow the bad.

Answ. The ground of this proceeds from the *understanding*: for the *understanding* having discerned a thing to be good, the *affections* draw the minde to a new resolution, as wee see in that complaint of the Apostle, *Rom. 7. The good that I would doe, that I doe not; and the evill that I would not doe, that I doe*; but still the Will followeth the last resolution of the *understanding*; otherwise of it selfe it is but *cacapotentia*.

Prop.

The *understanding* hath a mutuall dependance from the Will, and is set on worke by it.

Illust.

The Will, wils the end without any deliberation, *appetitu innato*; and before any deliberation, there goeth an act of the Will still, whereby wee will deliberate upon such a purpose, and it saith *volo deliberere*, before the *minde* enter in deliberation: when the will is set earnestly upon a thing, it stirreth up the *minde* to thinke upon it, and upon the meanes whereby it may attaine unto it, that it may have the appetite satisfied; therefore the understanding cannot discern a thing to be true or false, before the will appoint the end, and so set the minde on worke.

There is a reciprocall dependance then betwixt these two, the Will dependeth upon the deliberation of

of the *minde*; both particularly setting downe the object, and how it should exercise it selfe about the object; but the mind dependeth upon the will, *quoad exercitium*, but not, *quoad specificationem*, for when the minde hath given out her last determination concerning any particular object, the will must chuse that particular and not another, and neither refuse it nor suspend it; and it must chuse it in that measure of earnestnesse, as it is knowne to be good; *tantum quisque vult quantum intelligit se velle debere*, every man desireth so much as he understands. But upon the other side the will sets onely the minde on worke, and conveneth the councell to deliberate, but telleth them not what to conclude, and attendeth their deliberation, and promiseth to follow their conclusion. *Example*, when a controversie ariseth in the Church the supream magistrate conveneth a Synode, and commandeth them to give out their determination and Canon; but commandeth them not to incline more to one side than to the other; here he commands *exercitium*, and leaves *specificationem* free: but when hee hath heard their determination, according the Word of God, hee taketh him to that side which they conclude to be best, without either suspending or refusing; and so followeth them both, *quoad exercitium & specificationem*: Yet in this similitude there is some dissimilitude; for the magistrate, yea every private man hath *judicium discretionis*; but the will hath no judgement in it selfe, for it meereley depends upon the judgement of the minde, which maketh the necessity of the dependance of the will upon the minde, to be greater than the dependance of the King upon his Councell, or of any private man, upon a Synods determination.

This naturall reciprocation of the *minde* and the *Will*, is sensibly perceived, by the instruments of the

Duplex actus intellectus
(specificationis & exercitij).

Voluntas sequitur intellectum quoad specificationem & exercitium actus; intellectus sequitur voluntatem quoad exercitium actus tantum.

understanding and the *will* in the body, whereby they exercise their functions, to wit, the heart and the braine: the spirits are carried from the heart to the braine, and when the heart waxeth hoate with an earnest desire of the *will*, then the braine is more busied, and intended to finde out the way how the heart may be satisfied; and againe when there is a cleare and a full knowledge in the braine, then the spirits runne from the braine to the heart, and stirre up the heart to pursue for the obtaining of the knowen good) which reciprocation bringeth foorth a happy worke when the unruly affections, and sinful appetites, mixe not themselves with the businesse to marre all.

Quest. Whether *will* we a thing first, or *understand* we it first, and then *will* it?

Answ. We *will* a thing before wee *understand* it, by an inbred desire and blinde appetite, but we cannot *will* a thing in respect of the meanes, untill the *understanding* give light first. In all our actions there concurre foure things. First, the *Object* which is the thing we apprehend. Secondly, the *apprehending power* or the *understanding*, judging this to be good or evill. Thirdly, the *will* which is mooved by the *understanding*. Fourthly, the *members* mooved by the *will*; here the *understanding* considering the object giveth light to the *will*.

Quest. Where begins sinne first, whether in the *will*, or in the *understanding*?

Answ. The *habite* of sinne is first in the *understanding*, because all sinne comes from error which is in the *understanding*. Again, when the *understanding* is considered by it selfe without any operation, then sinne is first, in it; but when the *understanding* and the *will* worke together, then sinne is first in the *will*.

Here wee may gather that the sinne in the *will* is greater

Quatuor sunt activa principia, res apprehensa, apprehensiva vis, voluntas, & vis executiva.

In actu absoluto peccatum est prius in intellectu, in actu composito & prius in voluntate.

greater than the sinne in the *understanding*, because in the *understanding* there is onely a habite of sinne, but in the *will* there is both the *habite* and the *Act* of sinne, and therefore we see that the *Will* is punished with greater rebellion than the *understanding* is with darkenesse; Pharaohs heart was hardned, he knew the judgements of God, but yet his *Will* continually rebelled.

Quest. Whether is there a sinne in the will without error in the understanding or no?

Ans. Sinne is in the *understanding* two ways. First, originally when the *understanding* is so blinded, that it can give no direction to the *Will*. Secondly, *interpretatively*, when the *understanding* hath shewen the truth to the *will*, and the sinne is committed first by the *Will*; yet for lacke of consideration, the *understanding* approveth the act of the *Will*, and so followeth it in the same sinne, which is by reason of the dependance of the *understanding* from the *will*: as a man going to murder, the *Will* sets downe the wicked end that the *understanding* may devise the cruell meanes: yet the *understanding* had shewen the truth to the *will* before, that it was good not to murder.

Quest. Whether doth ignorance in the *understanding* make the *will*, willing or not willing in the actions?

Ans. There is a threefold ignorance. The first is called *ignorantia antecedens*, when a man is ignorant of that which hee is not bound to know, nor could not know, which if he had knowne he would not have done it; here, ignorance is the cause of the fact; as a man cutting wood his axe head flees off and kills a man ignorantly, he doth the thing ignorantly; which if hee had knowne he would not have done; here the ignorance in the *understanding*, makes not the *will*, willing, because he sinnes *ex ignorantia*.

Pecatum est in obiecto occasionaliter, in intellectu originaliter, in voluntate formaliter, in membris qua odusum.

Duplex ignorantia, originalis, & interpretativa.

Triplex ignorantia, antecedens, concomitans, consequens.

Triplex ignorantia, volens, nolens, non volens.

At quis peccat dupliciter, ex ignorantia, & ignoranter.

Prop.

The second propertie of the will.

Duplex libertas, originalis & formalis.

That freedome is not originally in the understanding.

The second is called *ignorantia concomitans* when a man doth that thing ignorantly, which if hee had knowen hee would not have done, but would have done another thing as bad, and is sorry that hee hath not done it. A man conceives a hatred against such a man, he mistaking the man, kil les another in place of him ignorantly; when this is told him, hee is sorry that he hath not killed his enemy; when hee kills the other man, his *ignorance* is not *willing ignorance*, neither is it *unwilling ignorance*: It is not *willing ignorance*; because he would not have killed the man whom he killed; it is not *unwilling ignorance*, because hee would have killed his enemy, and was sorry that he killed him not, so that his ignorance was partly willing, and partly not willing; here he sinnes *ignoranter*, but not *ex ignorantia*: Ignorantly he killed the man, although ignorance was not the cause, for hee did it of set purpose.

The third is called *ignorantia consequens*, when a man is wilfully ignorant, and drawes on the ignorance upon himselfe, and then excuseth his sinne; a man in his drunkenesse, kills a child ignorantly; this ignorance, is a willing ignorance, because the man willingly was drunk, and contracted this ignorance; and therefore he should be punished both for his drunkenesse, and for his murder; this is called an *affectate ignorance* and willing.

The second propertie of the will, is the liberty of the will, whereby it chuseth freely.

Some of the *Schoolemen* hold that *freedome* is originally in the *understanding*, and *formally* in the *will*, as *Aquinas*: others hold that this *freedome* is *formally* both in the *understanding*, and the *will*; but first in the *understanding*, and then in the *will*, as *Durandus*; but we hold that *freedome* is onely in the *will*.

Wee will show that this freedome cannot be originally

nally in the *understanding*, by these two reasons.

First, the *understanding* is neither free from *coaction*, nor naturall necessitie: it is not free from coaction; for the *understanding* is forced to know a thing which it would not know, *contra inclinationem totius suppositi*, contrary to the inclination of the whole person, as the Devils are forced to beleeve that there is a God; so, a man that is sicke unto death is forced to beleeve that he shall die, contrary to the inclination of the whole man who would live; but the *will* can no wayes be thus inforced to *will*. Again, the *understanding* is not free from naturall necessitie; for if arguments which necessarily conclude be proposed to it, it cannot chuse but beleeve them: if probable arguments be proposed to it, then it hath but a conceipt or opinion, with a feare to the contrary: but if arguments of like probabilitie on both sides be proposed to it, here it is *necessitate* to doubt, unlesse the inclination of the *will*, come in, to incline it rather the one way than the other? we may imagine any thing that we please, but we cannot give our lightest assent unto a thing, unlesse there be some colour of reason at least to induce.

All the powers of the Soule, are determinate by the *will* in their actions, and that necessarily, without any *freedom* in them; as the seeing eye, cannot but necessarily see colours, if they be laid before it, so the *understanding* is forced to *understand*, when truth is laid before it; but the *will* although it be determinate by the *understanding*, yet this determination takes not away the *liberty* of the *will* and places it in the *understanding* originally; againe, the *understanding* is determinate by the object, necessarily and naturally: but the *will* is determinate by the *understanding*, necessarily yet freely.

Freedom is radically and originally in the *will*; therefore

Reason. 1.

Voluntas sequitur rationem, ut indicatum, non ut impulsivum.

Reason. 2.

Conseq.

fore Bellarmine halts here, both contrary to himselfe and to others of his owne coate; he is plainly contrary to himselfe, as Benius the Iesuite markes well; for first (saith Benius) he placeth libertie radically in the understanding, whereby the will is determinate by the last judgement of reason; and yet in the third Booke and eight Chapter, of freewill and grace, Bellarmine saith, *Voluntas in eligendo libera est, non quod non determinetur necessario a iudicio ultimo & practico rationis; sed quod istud ipsum ultimum & practicum iudicium rationis in potestate voluntatis est*, that is, The will is free in chusing, not that it is determinate necessarily by the last judgement of reason, but because this same last judgement of reason, is in the power of the will. Benius saith, that he cannot see how these two can stand together, that the understanding in the last Iudgement should determinate the will, and that the same last Iudgement of reason should be in the power of the will: so that the patrons of free will in Man, doe not agree among themselves concerning the originall of freedom, sometimes placing it in the understanding, and sometimes in the will. Here we conclude, that freedom is originally in the will, for when the understanding hath demonstrate the truth unto the will: although the understanding necessitate the will to chuse; yet it doth not inforce it; but it chuseth that which it chuseth freely.

That free dome is not formally both in the understanding and the will.

Secondly, we will shew that this libertie is not both in the understanding and the will, formally; for if it were formally in both, then it should follow that there were two free wills in man, one in the understanding, and another in the will; and consequently a double election, and a double cause of sinne; but the formall cause of sinne is in the will; therefore Bernard saith *Cesset voluntas propria, & infernus non erit*, that is, Let the will cease from sinning, and there shall not be

a hell, therefore there cannot be a formall cause of freedom in the *understanding*.

It rests then that *freedom* is both *originally* and *formally* in the *will*. Wee must not thinke this an idle schoole distinction, and so let it passe; for covertly under this, (that they make the *understanding* to be radically and *originally free*,) they cover their poyson of *free-will*, and so vent it to the world: for *freedom* being originally in the *understanding* since the fall (unto good;) it directs the *will* in every action; and the *will* being determinate by the *understanding*, then there must be yet *free-will* in Man since the fall, naturally to embrace good, as well as evill.

Quest. What is the *understanding* to the *will* then, when the *will* chuseth, seeing it is not the originall of the liberty thereof?

Ans. It is the *cause* of the *determination* of the *will*, but not of the *liberty* thereof: It cannot be the *efficient cause* of the *liberty* of the *will* although it might seeme so to be; as for example: remission of sinnes is promised and given, if we forgive men their trespasses: yet our forgiving of men their trespasses, is not the *cause* why God remits our sinnes, but a *condition*; so, the fire heateth not, unlesse there be a mutuall touch betwixt the *agent* and the *patient*, but yet this mutuall touch of the *agent* and the *patient*, is not the *cause* why the fire burneth but a *condition*; So, although the *will* chuse not without the light of the *understanding*, yet the *understanding* is not the *cause*, why the *will* chuseth freely, but a *condition* without which it could not chuse; the *cause* is one thing, but the *condition* is another.

Object. A *condition* never precedeth an effect; as ye cannot see unlesse the window be opened, and yet it

Intellectus est causa determinationis, non libertatis.

Aliud est conditio, aliud causa.

Bellarmin. de grat. & lib. arbit.

it will not follow, that if the window be opened (which is the *condition*) that yee will streight see, unlesse the light come in; (which is the cause why wee see:) but when the *understanding* sheweth the light to the *will*, it is not as *condition*, but a *cause*, why the *will* chuseth this thing, and not that; as the light makes the coloures actually visibible, which were but potentially visibible, before the light did shine.

Conditio duplex. causalis, & conditionalis.

Answ. There is a twofold condition. First, when the condition includes a cause: as if a man breath, hee hath lungs; here the *condition* of breathing is his lungs; which is also the *cause* of his breathing. Secondly, there is *condition*, which is onely a *condition*, and includeth no cause in it; as the opening of the window is the *condition* without which we cannot see: if the window be not opened, the light cannot come in; and yet the opening of the window is not the cause of the light, for the cause is in the light it selfe, why the object is visibible. Againe, the light shining upon the object is not the *cause* of our seeing the object, for the cause is the eye, and the light is the condition without which we cannot see the object. So, the *understanding* is onely but a *condition* to the *will*, and not a *cause*, why it chuseth freely, because the *freedome* of the *will*, is onely in it selfe, embracing the object *freely*, without any externall cause moving it.

A collation betweene the will of the Angels, God and man.

Coll. 2.

Betwixt the will of the Angels, in nocent, second, old, and renewed Adam.

The will of God neither turnes nor returnes; it is like the pole which stands immoveably in the firmament: the will of the Angell turnes, but returnes not; it is like the winde, which being settled in one ayreth stands still there: but the will of man both turnes and returnes; it is like the winde, sometimes in this ayreth, and sometimes in that.

In the Angels there was *primum instans*, & *secundum instans*; the Angels, in *primo instanti*, were incomplete

completè liberi, they were then but *viatores*; for although they did at the first onely actually chuse good, in the first moment of their creation, yet they were not confirmed in good, *Iob 4. 18. he found not constancy in his Angels*: but in the second instant, the good Angels, were *completè liberi* and confirmed in good; as the bad Angels were settled in evill, the good Angels confirmed in good, were *comprehensores*, but not *viatores*; and the bad were confirmed onely in evill, and are continually *viatores*. So the first *Adam* was *incompletè liber* and *viator*, and therefore might chuse either good or evill; so the renewed *Adam* is *incompletè liber & viator*, because naturally he chuseth evill, and by grace he may chuse good; but, the *second Adam* Iesus Christ, being both *comprehensor* and *viator* is *completè liber* and cannot chuse evill; the *old Adam* is *viator* onely, and chuseth onely evill.

When the Divels and wicked men are said to be determinate to evill, it is not so to be understood that they are determinate to one sort of evill onely, for they may goe from one sort of evill to another; as the Di- vell inticed the *Jewes* to kill Christ, and yet he inticed *peter* to dissuade Christ from going to *Ierusalem*, that he might be saved; and yet they are stil determinate to evil.

An Angell differeth from the Soule of Man foure wayes. First, *naturally*, for the Soule doth animate the Body, but an Angell animates not a Body Secondly, they differ in their *definition*, for the Soule is a reasonable creature, but an Angell is an intellectuall creature. Thirdly, the Soule may be moved by the inferior faculties, but the Angell is onely mooved by God. Fourthly, the Soule makes choice either of good or evill, but an Angell of good onely, or of evill onely.

Willingnesse is the most absolute perfection of the will, and therefore when the Saints ayme at this, it is

Duplex instans angelorum, primus, & secundus.

Coll. 3.

Betwixt the Angels and Man.

Quatuor modis differt angelus ab homine, 1. naturaliter, 2. logice, 3. metaphysice, 4. theologice.

Conseq.

Duplex libertas voluntatis, contrarietatis & contradictionis.

The second property of the will.

is noted as one of the highest degrees of perfection in this life to be willing to doe good, *Psal. 110. My people are a willing people.*

The liberty of the will is twofold, the liberty of contrariety and the liberty of contradiction: Man had liberty of contrariety before his fall to chuse good or evill, and liberty of contradiction, to doe, or not to doe: these two sorts of liberties are not the perfectest estate of the will, for when it hath power to chuse or not to chuse, it imports a weakenesse in it, but when it is determinate to the good, then it is fully satisfied, this is reserved for Man in glory. The Apostle, *Rom. 6. 18.* used this word liberty, more improperly, when hee saith, *free from Iustice, and servant to sinne*; when hee calleth this freedome, it is most improperly freedome; for, *if the Sonne make us free, then wee are free, Ioh. 8. 36.* so wee say to serve God, this service is not properly service, but freedome.

The essentiall property of the will, is freedome, that it cannot be compelled by no externall agent in the free chusing; although in the externall action thereof it may be forced.

God worketh diversly upon the will; sometimes hee changeth the will, and converts it; as when hee changed and converted the will of *Saul*, and made him an Apostle. Secondly, sometimes he changeth the will, but converts it not; as when *Esaue* came against his brother *Iacob*, hee changed his will, and made him fall upon his necke and weepe, *Gen. 33. 4.* But yet converted him not; so when *Alexander the great*, came against *Ierusalem*, minding to destroy it, the Lord changed his minde, and made him courteous to the Iewes, by granting them sundry priviledges, and bestowing gifts upon them; here his minde was changed, but not converted. Thirdly, sometimes God nei-

ther

ther changeth nor converts the *will*, but restraineth it; as the will of *Laban* when hee came against *Jacob*, *Gen.* 31.24. and *Attila* when he came against *Rome*. Fourthly, sometimes God neither changeth, nor converteth, nor restraines the will, but he over-rules it, as he did the will of the Iewes who crucified Christ: all these wayes God workes upon the will, but he never compels it.

Although the *will* cannot be compelled in *actu elicito*, in the owne free choyce; yet in *actu imperato*, in the commanding act, it may be compelled; as when they drew the Martyrs against their *will* before their idols, putting frankincence in their hands to burne it before them: So *Ioh. 21*. Christ, saith to *Peter*, they shall draw thee whether thou would'st not.

As the *will*, in the commanding act may be compelled; so the *will* in the free chusing act may be necessitate.

There is a threefold *necessitie*. First when the *necessitie* ariseth from *within*; this is called, *necessitas ab intrinseco*, as the blessed in heaven are mooved, by the proper inclination of their *will* to love God necessarily. Secondly, when the *necessity* ariseth from without; as when the will is indifferent in it selfe, to doe or not to doe, to goe this way or that way. When *Nebuchadnezzar* stood in the parting of two wayes, *Ezech. 21*. doubtfull whither to goe, towards *Ierusalem* or *Rabbath*; the Lord determinates his will to goe towards *Ierusalem*. Thirdly, in respect, of the end; as a man is to passe over a water, but he cannot goe to the other side without a boate. These three sorts of *necessities* take not away the liberty of the will, although they necessitate it; the first sort of *necessity* takes not away the liberty of the will, although it necessitate it; for this *will* is *internum principium sui motus*, and this liberty cannot be taken from it, unlesse it be destroyed: the

Duplex actus, elicitus
& imperatus.

Prop.
Illust.

Triples necessitas, ab
intrinseco, ab
extrinseco, & ratione
finis.

the second sort of *necessity* takes not away the *freedome* from it; for the will cannot be both *inforced*, and yet *free*; as heate cannot be made cold: but yet the *will* may be *necessitate*; for as the water which is cold may be made hoate, so the will which is *free* may be *necessitate*: and the third sort of *necessitie* establissheth the freedome of the will.

The first collation betwixt the innocent, renewed, old, and glorified *Adam*.

Man in his first estate had free choyce of good or evil, but was *necessitate* to neither of them: in his second estate, he is a servant to sinne and *necessitate* to it; in his third estate, hee is free from the servitude of sinne, but not from the *necessitie* of it: in his fourth estate hee is voluntarily good, and necessarily good, but hee is not free *libertate indifferentia*; as man was before the fall, for that includes a weakenesse in it.

Coll. I.

In *Adam's* first estate his will was *free* from sinne, and necessity of sinne, because he had neither *internum*, nor *externum principium*, to move him to sinne; so he was *free* from misery but not from mutability. In his second estate he is subject to the *necessity* of sinning to misery, and to the servitude of sinne; but free from coaction. In his third estate, hee is free from the dominion of sinne, from the servitude of sinne, and from compulsion, but not from the *necessitie* of sinning. In his fourth he shall be free from misery, servitude mutability, and necessity of sinning; but not from necessity and willingnesse to love God. In his first estate he was *liber*, free; in his second estate he was *servus*, a servant to sinne; In his third estate hee is *liberatus*, freed from sinne; but in his fourth estate hee shall be *liberrimus*, most freed from sinne.

Prop.

The *will* working *freely*, hath power to determinate it selfe as it is directed by the *understanding*, in civill and morall actions, and in indifferent things; but in actions spirituall it is onely determinate by God.

The

The *will* hath power by the light of the understanding to determinate it selfe, in civill, and morall actions ; and God in these likewise doth determinate the will, *Prov.* 21.1. *The Kings heart is in the hands of the Lord, and hee turnes it as the rivers of water* ; when the King determinates his owne heart, the Lord also determinates it ; for every particular agent, determinates his owne instrument to his worke ; but the will is the instrument of God, (for onely the uncreated will hath an independant power) therefore the *will* being but a second cause, is determinate by God. When God determinates the will in civill things, he doth it by changing, restraining, or over-ruling it, but when he determinates the will (which cannot determinate it selfe) in spirituall things, then he converts the will and inclines it, and here he is the sole and onely cause.

Object. That which is moved from a cause without it selfe, is said to be *compelled*; but the will cannot be *compelled*, therefore it may seeme that it cannot be determinate by God.

Ans. That which is moved by an *externall cause*, is said to be *compelled*, if the *externall cause* take away the proper inclination of the *second cause* ; but if it leave the *second cause* to the owne proper inclination, then it is not said to be *compelled*, but to worke *freely*.

Object. But the motion is rather ascribed to him who mooves, than to that which is mooved, as wee say not that the stone killed the man, but the man who threw the stone ; if God then moove the *will*, it might seeme that the will were free and not to be blamed in the action.

Ans. If the *will* were so mooved by God that it mooved not it selfe, then the *will* were neither to be praised nor to be blamed : but seeing it is both

illust.

Sola increata voluntas est independens.

both mooved and moves it selfe, and is not like a stone in a mans hand, which is moved and moves not it selfe; therefore it is to be blamed in the sinfull action.

The *Will*, in morall and civill actions, is not determinate, in the meanes, which leade to the end: (for that the understanding doth onely) but respecting the end, it, both determinates it selfe *naturally*, and is determinate by God; but in spirituall things, it is onely determinate by God, both in the means and in the end, *Philip. 2. 13. It is God who worketh both the will and the deed in us.*

Consequence.

Corvinus c. .43. pag. 642. fo Fonseca.

The grace of God determinates the *will* onely to good: therefore these extenuate mightily the grace of God, who grant, that God in the *conversion* of Man doth powre in a *supernaturall* grace in his heart; but yet this grace doth not determinate the heart of man, for that the *will* doth *naturally* and *freely*; and to draw out the act of Faith (say they) there needs no concurrence of the grace of God, but only moral perswasions. So *Fonseca*, who holds that God onely sets the will on worke, but leaves the will to worke by it selfe, he determinates (saith he) onely *in specificatione*, but not *in exercitio*; in inclining the will to embrace such an object, but the operation about that object is left free unto the *will* it selfe, this it may performe freely without Gods grace.

Object. But it may seeme that God determinates the sinfull actions of men as well as their morall, both in the meanes and in the end, and is the cause of the one as well as of the other, as God knoweth certainly that the *Antichrist* will sinne, therefore the *will* of the *Antichrist* is determinate to sinne, by the decree of God.

Eternum decretum Dei ponit infallibilitatem consequentis, sed non consequentie.

Answ. This followeth not, because putting the decree of God, the *Antichrist* will sinne; these two go not together as the cause and the effect, for Gods decree is not

not the cause why the *Antichrist* sinnes; but it onely followes Gods foreknowledge and is not an effect of it, for there is a twofold connexion of things; first, of the cause with the effect, and so the effect necessarily followeth the cause. Secondly, of the antecedent with the consequent: the sinne of the Antichrist is the consequent of Gods decree infallibly, but not productively, because the decree is not the cause of it.

Duplex connectio rerum.
1. causa cum effectu, 2.
antecedentis cum conse-
quente.

Object. But it may seeme that Gods decree is the cause of sinne, *Ioh. 12. 39. They could not beleeve, for Esay said, he blinded their eyes, and hardened their hearts.* Here it might seeme that the Prophets prediction was the cause of the hardning of their hearts, and not the antecedent of it onely.

Answer. These evill things God foreseeeth to fall out, because they are to fall out; and they fall not out because hee foreseeeth them to fall out: when I see a man writing, he writes not because I see him writing, but because he is writing therefore I see him write; so, the *Antichrist* sinneth not because God foresaw him to sinne, but because the *Antichrist* was to sinne therefore God foresaw him to sinne. God foreseeeth other waies good actions, for he decreeth them, and they fall out as effects of his decree: but it is farre otherwaies in mans sinfull actions, for they are not the effects of Gods decree, but a necessary consequent of it.

The essentiall property of the *Will* (which is *libertie*) cannot be changed, but the equalitie of the *Will* (which is good or evill) may be changed.

There are two things to be considered in the *will*. First, *id est* or the *essence* of it. Secondly, *exercitium* or the operation of the *Will*: the *essence* of the *Will* cannot be changed but the operation may be changed: it may lose holinesse and sanctification in the choyce, but not the *essence*

of it : a clocke when it is out of frame sheweth the time but not the true time of the day, and as the saylers compasse stricken with thunder, the point of the needle stands alwayes at some ayrt, but not at the right ayrt, and so when Wine is turned into Vinegar it keepeth still the colour and quantitie, but it hath lost the right relish : so the Will of man after the fall, *freely chuseth* that which it chuseth, *Non corrumpitur quoad agendi radicem sed terminum.*

A collation berwixt
the innocent and old
Adam.

τελος qua' τελος
αγαθον ; sed media
eleguntur plerunque ut
mala, ut finem assequa-
mur.

Man in his first estate, *willed* onely good, both in the *end*, and in the *meanes* : but man in his corrupt estate *wils* the *end*, either as good or apparant good ; but he maketh choise of the *meanes* often as evill : the will respects the end, and election the meanes ; no man wils the end as it is evill ; but the meanes leading to this end are oftentimes chosen as evill. The adulterer and the theefe, they will the proper *ends* of their adultery and theft (which are pleasure and gaine) as good or at the least good in show ; but the meanes they know are oftentimes evill, and chuse them as *evill* that they may attaine to their *ends*. Againe, the unregenerate man sometimes *wils* the end but not the meanes, *Prov. 13. 4. The sluggard wils, and he wils not; he wils the end because it is good ; but he wils not the meanes because they are painfull and laborious ; so Hos. 10. 11. Ephraim as an ox delighted in threshing but not in plowing ; hee delighted in threshing, because the ox might not bee muzzled when hee did thresh ; Deut. 25. 4. but hee delighted not in plowing ; that is, to take the paines to plow up his heart, and mortifie his finnes ; Balaam wished, that he might die the death of the righteous, Numb. 23. 14. but hee endeavoured not to live the life of the righteous.*

Prop.

Man after his fall had *liberty* in civill and morall actions.

This

This *libertie* which man hath now in his corrupte-
state, unto any good hath sundry impediments both
outward and inward; and although our election be *free*
yet the execution thereof is not in our hands. There
be three external impediments in our *libertie*; first,
Gods overuling of the *will* of Man, who although hee
take not away the libertie of the will from us, yet he of-
tentimes furthers us in good, and hinders us in evill; and
bridles so the fury of the wicked that they cannot come
to the ends which they ayme at; as wee see in *Ieroboam*,
1 *King*. 13. 5. and *Sennacherib*, *Esa*. 37. 29. For the wayes
of man are not in his owne power, *Pro*. 16. 9. The se-
cond inpediment of our libertie is *Sathans seducing*, who
oftentimes seduceth the will when it is inclyned to
good and perswades it to evill, *Ephe*. 2. 2. which per-
swasion is effectuell in the sonnes of infidelitie: some-
times Sathan hindreth the children of God, as hee
hindered the Apostle that hee should not come to the
Thessalonians, 1 *Thess*. 4. 17. 18. The third outward impē-
diment is, the *multitude of objects* laid before us, which
partly allure the minde if they be pleasant, and terrifie
the minde in they be fearefull.

The inward impediments which hinder the *wills liber-*
tie, are. First, the *want of Gods image*. Secondly, the
blindnesse of the understanding. Thirdly, *the infirmitie*
of the will. Fourthly, a *naturall violence*; Fifthly, a
pronenesse to evill. Sixtly, *the vehemencie of the affecti-*
ons, which draw the *will* after them, and trouble the
iudgement.

Illust.

*Impedimenta libertatis
humana sunt, vel extra
se, vel in se.*

*Impedimenta externa
sunt deus, diabolus, &
externa objecta.*

*Impedimenta interna
sunt, destitutio imaginis
Dei, cecitas intellectus,
infirmitas, vio-
luntatis, naturalis vio-
lencia, pronitas ad malū
& vehementia affectio-
num.*

CHAP. XVII.

Of Mans Will in his conversion.

Prop.
The third property of
the Will.

Illust.

Illust.
Potentia, vel est pro-
pinqua, vel remota, pas-
siva, vel mere passiva.

IN the first point of Mans *Conversion*, God infuseth a new habite of grace.

The *conversion* of Man is not wrought, first by stirring up of his *Will*, or by alluring or perswading him, but by powring grace into the heart. *Socrates* said that hee was but to his schollers like a midwife; for a midwife doth nothing but helpeth forth the birth already conceived: so he said, that he onely but drew forth the wit, which was naturally within the schollers. But it is not so in the first point of a man conversion, for the Preacher doth not helpe forth the graces in a man; but he is like a father, begetting him a new a gaine through the Gospel, 1. Cor. 4. 15

Man before his *conversion* to grace is *passive*.

There is in some *patient* a *neere power*, as when powder is laid to the fire it hath a *neere power* to bee kindled by the fire. Secondly, there is in some *patient* a *remote power* as when greene wood is laid to the fire, it may bee kindled although it be long ere it burne. Thirdly, there is in a *patient* a *passive* or *obedientiall power*, or that which they call *potentia* δεκτική, or *susceptiva*, as when the potter makes a vessell of clay. Fourthly, there is a *meere passive power*; as a stone hath no aptnes to bee made a *living creature*. Man before his *conversion*, is not like powder, which had a *neere power* to take fire; he is not like greene wood wch. hath a *remote power* to take fire; he is not like the stone that is *meere passive*; but he is like the clay in the potters hand that is *passive* and capable to bee formed according to the will of the potter; and in this sence is that of *Augustine* to be understood, *Velle credere est gratia, sed posse credere est natura*, to be willing to beleve is of grace, but to be able to beleve is of nature; wch *Cajetan* expounds wel, *posse credere* is meant of the *potential* or *obedientiall power*.

God

God hath three sorts of workes which hee workes in our *justification*. First, such workes as are onely proper to God, as to stand at the doore and knocke, *Revel. 3. 10.* to open the heart, and to inspire, &c. In which our will, giveth neither concourse nor co-operation; therefore in these we are onely passive; and the will is *actived*, not being as yet *active* it selfe; *Non habet activum concursum hic, sed solum modo recipit*, the will hath no active concourse unto grace here, it hath onely an aptnesse to receive, faith being wrought in it. Secondly, the begetting of new qualities in the habite: as Faith, Hope, and Charity, for to the bringing forth of such excellent qualities, nature can doe nothing; Man here also is passive, as the ayre when it is illuminate by the light. Thirdly, such workes in the act, as to beleieve, repent, &c. which God workes not in us without us; unto which purpose is applied that of *Paul, 1 Cor. 15. The grace of God with me*; and that of *Augustine, cooperando perficit, quod operando incepit*; so the will of man, by this concurring grace is made, *pedissequa*, and a subordinate agent unto grace, grace being *comes* and *dux*; and the will being *pedissequa, sed non pravia*, attending grace, but no wayes going before.

In the point of Mans *conversion* the will being moved, afterwards moves it selfe.

This action of the will is, first from *grace*; and secondly from the will it selfe; in both these acts God concurs as the first agent, and the will as the secondary. In the state of corruption, the *Will* is the true *efficient cause* of sinne, in the estate of *justification*, the *will* is truly indued with grace; but in both these estates the *Will* is a true *efficient*, but differently: for in the sinfull estate the will is the *principall efficient*; but in the estate of grace it is subordinate to the grace of God, and not collaterall; the holy Ghost quickning it and reviv-

Illustr. 2.

*Tria genera operam
Deus operatur in nostra
justificatione.*

August. Epist. 406.

Prop.

Illustr.

*Voluntas consideratur
ut est natura quadam,
& ut est principium su-
arum actionum.*

*Thom. cont. gentil. de
miraculis.*

*Duae conditiones requi-
runtur ut aliquid sit
miraculum, 1. ut causa
sit occulta; 2. ut sit in re,
unde aliter videatur
debere evenire.*

ving it to worke, and so by the grace of God wee are that we are, 1 Cor. 15. 10.

Quest. Whether is the *conversion* of man, with his *Will*, or against his *Will*?

Ans. The *Will* is considered two wayes. First, *Vt est natura quadam*, as it is a creature ready to obey God, who rules the universe. Secondly, *Vt est principium suarum actionum*, whereby it *freely wills*, or *nls*; in the first sence it is not against the *will* that it is converted; in the second sence, as it is corrupted, *willing sinne freely*, (before sinne be expelled) it is against the *Will*. The water hath the proper inclination to goe downward to the center, yet when it ascends upward and keepes another course, *ne detur vacuum*, lest there should be any emptinesse in nature, it runnes a course contrary to the own proper inclination: so when the *will* obeyeth God (in the *first act* of mans *conversion*,) it is not against the *Will*, if ye respect the *will* as it followeth the direction of God; but if yee respect the *will*, as it is corrupt and sinfull, it is against the will to obey God.

Quest. Whether is the *conversion* of man, a *miracle*, or not?

Ans. We cannot call it a *miracle*; for there are two conditions required in a *miracle*. First, that the cause which produceth the effect, be altogether unknowne to any creature; for if it be knowne to some, and not to others, it is not a *miracle*; the eclipse of the Sunne, seemes to the country man a *miracle*, yet a *Mathematician* knoweth the reason of it, therefore it is not a *miracle*. The second condition required in a *maracle* is, that it be wrought in a thing which had an inclination to the contrary effect: as when God raiseth the dead by his power, this is a *miracle*, because it is not according to the nature of the dead that ever they should rise againe: So when Christ cured the blind, this was a *miracle*, for nature would

would never make a blinde man to see; so when Christ cured *Peters* mother in law of a feaver on a sudden, this was a *miracle*, for nature could not doe this in an instant. If any of these two former conditions be lacking it is not a *Miracle*. Therefore in the defect of the second condition, the creation of the world is not a *miracle*, because such a great effect is proper to the nature of so glorious a cause: but if Man or Angel could create, it were a *miracle*, for it is contrary to their finite nature to produce such an infinite effect. So, the creation of the Soule is not a *miracle*, because God worketh ordinarily here, nature preparing the body, then God infuseth the Soule. But if God should create a Soule without this preparation of nature, this should bee a *miracle* in respect of the second condition: as when he created *Eve* without the helpe of *Adam*, and Christs manhood in the wombe of the Virgin, without the Virgine. So the conversion of Man is not a *miracle*, because the reasonable Soule was once created to the Image of God, and is againe capable of the grace of God. When wee heate cold water by fire, although it be contrary to the inclination of the forme of the water to bee hote, yet it may receive heate, and when it receives heate it is not a *miracle*. But improperly the *conversion* of Man may be said to bee a *miracle*, in respect of the first condition required in a *miracle*, because it is done by God who is an unknowne cause to us, and although it bee not properly a *miracle*, because the second condition is deficient, yet it is a greater worke than a *miracle*, Nam *aliquid est majus opus, sed minus miraculum, ut creatio.*

Creatio est opus magnum, sed non miraculum.

In Mans *conversion* we must not take from grace, and give to nature.

It was a *maxime* received amongst the Iewes, *Satis est addere de profano ad sacrum, quam demere de sacro*

Prop.

Illust.

¶ *addere ad profanum* ; they had rather take from the prophane day, and adde to the Sabbath, than to take from the holy Sabbath, and adde to the prophane day: but men now had rather take from grace and give to nature, than take from nature and give to grace.

When the Fathers laboured to overthrow one error, they fell in another: as a gardner when hee goeth to make straight a crooked sprigge, he bends it some times too farre the other way: so they, that they might absolutely defend the grace of God against the maintainers of *freewill*, they rooted out *freewill*, and gave man *freedom* in no actions, but concluded all under the necessity of Gods predestination as did the *Stoickes* among the heathen. But wee must not so stand in the defence of grace that we overthrow *free-will*, neither must wee ascribe that to *free-will*, which is due to grace onely.

The *Iesuites* that they may pleade for *free-will* in man, have found out a new platforme of mans salvation; for first, they establisth a *middle sort of knowledg in God*; by which hee knoweth things that are to come, (not absolutely but conditionally) what man or Angell may be able to doe by the freedome of their wills, no decree of God going before,) considering them in such or such a condition, with such or such circumstances. But there is no such *middle sort of knowledge in God*, for God knoweth all his workes from the beginning, *Acts* 15. 18. God knoweth all these things that are conditionall, although they never take effect, absolutely and perfectly: as for example, he foresaw that *Abimelech* the King of *Gerar* wou'd have defiled *Abrahams* wife, nevertheless he hindred him that he finned not with her by his restraining grace, *Gen.* 20. 6. *I know that thou didst this in the simplicity of thine heart, therefore I have kept thee that thou shouldest not sinne against me, neither touch her.* So, *Exod.* 13. 17. *God would not bring the Israelites*

Iesuita triplicem scientiam statuunt in Deo, 1. simplicis intelligentie, 2. visionis, 3. media.

Israelites directly to the land of Canaan, but hee led them about by a large circuite, lest perhaps (saith God) it forethinke them, when they see the enemy come against them, and they returne backe to Egypt; this word perhaps is not a doubting in God, or a middle sort of knowledge, but certainly hee foresaw it would have come to passe, therefore he prevented it by a sure remedy. There is no sort of knowledge in God, but either, *simplicis intelligentia*, or *visionis*; *simplicis intelligentia*, is of things possible, *scientia visionis* is of things that certainly come to passe.

Object. But they alledge that place, 1 Sam. 23. 11. 12. when David consults with God, what would become of him if hee stayed at Keilah, whether the Keilites would deliver him into the hands of Saul or not: it was answered conditionally in this sence, *if ye stay, Saul will come, & if he come, the Keilites will deliver you up into his hands*: hence they reason thus: God foretold this future condition: therefore he foreknew it. But hee foreknew it not by the first sort of knowledge, because that is of things possible, which may come to passe, or not come to passe; neither doth God foreknow this by the second sort of knowledge, because that is of things that will certainly come to passe; but it is a third sort of knowledge of things that may come to passe conditionally. Therefore say they, there is a middle sort of knowledge in God.

Ans. This sort of Knowledge, that is proposed conditionally, is absolute in God, and depends not vpon the uncertaintie of the condition, for an hipotheticall or conditionall proposition may be true in the connexion, and yet in the parts it may bee false; and so God knoweth it to be false. The Apostle saith, *If an Angell come from heaven and teach another Gospel than that which we have taught, let him be accursed*, Gal. 1. 8. But an Angel cannot come from heaven to teach another Gospel, So,

*Duplex scientia in Deo
simplicis intelligentie
visionis.*

*Hypothetica propositio,
potest esse vera in con-
nexionem, & falsa in
partibus.*

So, 1 Kings 22.28. *If thou returne againe in peace, the Lord hath not spoken by me.* But the Lord spake by the Prophet *Micajah*, and the King was never to returne in peace. Although these speeches bee conditionally set downe, yet God knowes them absolutely that they shall either come to passe, or not come to passe: and so there is not a middle sort of knowledge in God.

Quest. How did God force *David* betraying by the *Keilites* unto *Saul*, whether *contingently* or *necessarily*?

Ans. When God looks *ad opposita*, hee produceth his effects freely, and contingently, because it must either be or not be; as the *Keilites* might have delivered or not delivered, *David* into the hands of *Saul*; but when God determinates himselfe to one of the opposites, then he absolutely and necessarily foreknowes it; as hee knew absolutely that *David* should flee and not be betrayed: That which is contingent conditionally in the cause, may be infallibly necessary in the effect, as, if *Peter* runne, hee mooves; here hee mooves necessarily because hee runnes, and yet hee runnes not necessarily; for hee may either runne or not runne: so this betraying of *David* was necessary in the effect if hee had stayed at *Keilah*, but it was contingent in the cause, for he might either have stayed there or not stayed. *Act.* 28. *Paul* saith *If any of you goe out of the shippe ye shall all perish*; but if yee stay in the shippe yee shall all bee saved: they might have stayed in the shippe or gone out of her, but respecting the event, they behooved to stay in the shippe and bee saved: So that, contingent things fall vnder the providence of God, and Gods providence takes not away their contingency, no more then it did alter the nature of the bones of *Christ*, when hee foresaw that a bone of him should not be broken, *Ioh.* 19.36. but necessarily the events of them follow and are foreseene of God. When God wils a thing, it comes

*Conditionale in causa,
poteſt eſſe neceſſarium
in effectu.*

not

not necessarily to passe; but when God wils a thing necessarily, then it must come to passe: God wils the eclipse of the Sunne, he wils but this contingently, because it may either be or not be; but when he wils the eclipse necessarily, then it must come to passe; *in sensu conjuncto*, that which he wils it must come to passe; but *in sensu diuiso*, that which hee will, may not come to passe; for hee needed not to have willed it: for as *Thomas* in his Booke, *contra gentiles* saith, *Quadam eveniunt ex necessitate suppositionis & immutabilitatis, eo modo quo provisum sunt, scilicet contingenter & liberè; ea qua Deus determinavit liberè & contingenter eventura, ea contingenter evenient; & necessariò qua determinavit necessariò.* That is, some things fall out by necessitie of supposition and immutabilitie, that same way whereby they are foreseene: to wit, contingently and freely; but those things which God hath determinated to fall out contingently and freely, they shall fall out contingently; and those things that he hath determinate necessarily to come to passe, shall of necessity be.

Quest. Seeing the purposes of God are but absolute, why are his promises and threatnings set downe conditionally?

Answ. He sets them downe conditionally to move sinners more earnestly to repent, *Ion. 3. 5. Yet fortie dayes and Nineve shall be destroyed.* But hee keeps up the condition here, to move the *Ninivites* the more earnestly to repentance; and the event sheweth, that this was Gods purpose not to destroy the *Ninivites*, because they repented, here by degrees he manifests his counsell unto them.

Example, when a towne is beleaguered, the Counsaile of warre ordaines that whosoever goes upon the walles shall die the death, this is to terrifie souldiers, that they goe not upon the wals; the enemy make a sudden assault
in

in the night, a souldier runnes up upon the walles, and repells the enemy; whether shall this man die for it or not? the Counsell of warre explains themselves, and that which they set out absolutely before, they interpret it now this way; our meaning was that no souldier should goe up upon the walles that hee might not give intelligence to the enemy: but this souldier hath repelled the enemy; therefore hee hath not violated our Law, neither is he culpable of death. See the example of *Iona- than*, 1 *Sam.* 13. So when God saith fortie dayes, and *Ninive* shall be destroyed, keeping up the condition, *if they repented not*; when they repent, he explains his former sentence, and shewes that it was not absolutely his meaning they should die, but onely to terrifie them, and to moove them to repentance.

The *Iesuites*, when they subordinate the *Will* of man, to the conditionall knowledge of God; they leave mans *will* indifferent here, to chuse or not to chuse; and upon this *freedom* of mans *will*, they ground the decree of God, to predestinate this man, and to reject that man. But if this platforme hold, then it will follow, that when the *will* of this man imbraceth grace, and the *will* of that refuseth it, it must either be the *cause* of predestination or the *condition*; but no Christian ever said that the *will* of man was the *cause* of predestination, except the *Pelagians* and their followers; if they make this act of the *will* the condition of mans election, then they jumpe with the *Arminians*, who measure the efficacie of grace from the event of the *will*, which notwithstanding some of the *Iesuits* strongly denie?

Quest. If the *will* be neither the *cause* nor *condition* of our predestination, which is it then?

Ans. It is but a meane, for the fulfilling of mans predestination; for a mans name is not written in the Booke of life because hee assents willingly, to the promises of

*Voluntas neque est causa
neque conditio predesti-
nationis ut Iesuite sta-
tuunt.*

of the Gospel, and beleeves them : but because his name is written in the booke of life, therefore hee beleeves, *Act. 13.48. As many as were ordained unto eternall life beleeved.* If a King should discern that none should be courtiers with him, unlesse they were trained first up in the warres; this trianing up in the warres is neither the *cause* not yet the *condition*, which mooves the King to make choise of them; it is a meane whereby they are received into the Court, but no motive which mooved the King. So, Faith whereby a man is adopted to be the Sonne of God, is neither the *cause* nor yet the *condition* which mooves God to elect Man, but whom he electeth freely, them he gives to beleeve.

If it be asked of *Bellermin*, wherfore this man is saved and not that man? hee will answere that there is no other cause but the good pleasure and *will* of God.

Secondly, if it bee asked of him; why he gives this man *gratiam congruam*, or fitting grace, and not that man? hee will answer: because his will is to save this man, and not that man.

Thirdly, if it be asked of him, wherfore this man receives grace and not that man? he will answere: because grace is fitting for this man and not for that man: hee calleth this *fitting grace*, not when the will is determinate by grace (as wee hold,) *Physica determinatione*, or *Hyperphysica* rather; neither will he make it to depend *ab eventu*, as the *Arminians* doe from the *Will* of man; but hee findes out a middle betwixt these two, placing it onely in *morall perswasions*, and the efficacy of the willes determination to depend upon Gods grace: for God (saith hee) foreseeth, that the will cannot refuse, because hee hath fitted it so to the will, at this time and in this place; so that he cannot now *absolutely* reject the grace of God, but *conditionally*: and he saith in *sensu diviso* hee may reject the grace of God; but not in *sensu*

*Triplex determinatio,
physica, eventus, &
moralis.*

*Duplex sensus, divisus
& compositus.*

*Dupliciter aliquis vult,
infallibiliter, & necessa-
rio.*

*Trip' ex gratia, sufficiens
abundans, & efficax.*

sensu composito. Example, when I see a man writing, he cannot but write; and yet considering this act of writing by it selfe, he writes freely; so joyning Mans Will with Gods Decree, a man cannot but Will; and yet respecting the Will in it selfe, he may Will grace or not Will it when it is offered to him, because grace doth determine his Will (saith he) here he wills infallibiliter, sed non necessario.

But the *Arminians* hold that the conversion of man altogether depends from his Will, and that there is no other cause why this man chuseth and that man refuseth grace, but onely the will.

Fourthly, if it be asked, whether or no this man may resist the grace of God or not? he will answer; by the absolute freedome of his will, hee may resist it; by this it followeth that they will establish a reall act in the will, which is neither subject to Gods providence, nor predestination; but if they acknowledged the consent of the will, to be a meane for the fulfilling of predestination, in this we would agree with them.

Secondly, the *Iesuites* that they may pleade for free will make three sorts of grace, sufficient, abundant, and effectuell grace, and they make abundant grace a higher degree than sufficient grace; as that grace which was offered to *Corazin* and *Bethsaida*, *Matth. 11.* because they had a more effectuell calling than *Tyre* and *Sidon*: they make that effectuell grace, when one actually receiveth the grace offered, and applyeth it to himselfe.

But this distinction of grace cannot hold, for how can that be sufficient grace, which never taketh effect, seeing none was ever saved, or ever shall be saved, by this sufficient grace, which is not effectuell; sufficient grace hath ever the owne effect, for whom God will have converted, they cannot but be converted, *Rom. 9. 19.* *Vvho can resist the will of God?* Againie those that are not converted

converted, they of themselves cannot be converted, God gives them neither willingnesse nor *sufficient grace* (to whom is he debter?) for if God gave them this willingnesse, then it should be both *sufficient* and *effectuall grace* to them.

But we hold that both *sufficient* and *effectuall grace* are the free gifts of God, because, *without me* (saith Christ) *ye can do nothing*, *Ioh. 15.5*. Neither in *sufficient*, nor in *effectuall grace*. Again, we hold that *abundant* and *effectuall grace*, are onely offered to the Elect; and that which was offered to *Chorazin* and *Bethsaida* was onely *sufficient* to leave them inexcusable and not to convert them.

Thirdly, the *Iesuites* plead for nature, holding that God concurs generally onely with the second causes, in giving them a naturall power to worke; but not by mooving and applying them to their operations, as the Carpenter applyeth his axe to cut. Neither (say they) hath hee any influence in the action it selfe; ascribing nothing to God, but the conservation of the second causes; and if hee worke with the second causes, they make not man subordinate to God, but as two causes working together, as a weake and a strong man carrying a load.

Becan. traſſ. de deo.

But we hold, that God not onely concurs generally with the second causes, but applies and mooves the second cause to worke; not as the second causes are *co-ordinate* with God, but as *subordinate*; so that when God works upon his *Will*, he giveth not only a generall influence, whereby he sustaines the *Will*; but also he hath a particular influence into it: neither is the will his fellow helper in the action, but subordinate to him, for in producing of the effect God likewise concurs particularly.

To conclude this point, that the will of man separates from it selfe, *1 Cor. 4.7*. it is manifest thus; if equall grace be offered to two, and an inequall effect follow, the one

one of them embracing grace, and the other of them refusing; one of these two absurdities must necessarily follow, either that the grace of God was not an equall remedy for both, because it cured them not both, which is blasphemy; or else that there was not a like corruption in both, which is flat *Pelagianisme*; If mans will make the separation, then the Apostles question, 1. Cor. 4. 7. (*who hath separated thee*) is easily answered; and man then should have wherein to boast, Rom. 11. 18.

Prop.

Illust.

*Triplic causa, Physica,
moralis, & miraculosa.*

God is onely the effectuall cause of mans conversion.

There are three sorts of causes. First, a *Physicall cause*. Secondly, a *morall cause*. Thirdly, a *miraculous cause*. A *Physicall cause*, is that which really and truly produceth the effect, and is called an *effectuall cause* in the Schooles. A *morall cause*, is improperly and metaphorically a *cause*, because it produceth not properly an effect, onely it proposeth arguments to induce or to perswade. A *miraculous cause* is that which worketh above the course of nature.

God in mans conversion, is not only the *morall cause*; because *morall* perswasions suffice not to produce a *supernatuall effect*, it onely proposeth arguments, counsels, and commands, but cannot incline the heart directly. When a Father holds up an apple to his child; or when the master of the game, sets up *βραβειον*, a reward to the runners; hee doth nothing but allure or perswade them, he makes them not able to runne.

Secondly, God is not onely the *morall cause* of mans conversion; for then hee should have no greater stroke in mans conversion, than the Divell hath, in perverting the children of disobedience, to their destruction: for the Devill in mans destruction, onely inticeth, allureth, and seduceth, but hee changeth not his *Will*; and worketh onely *per illicitum*, inticing him onely to sinne; but

but the man himselfe changeth not his will: God doth not onely worke upon our wills by *morall perswasions*, proposing rewards to us, exhorting and commanding us; but changeth and directly workes upon the will, therefore the Apostle saith, *Philip. 2. 13. Both the will and the deed are from him.*

God is the *Physicall cause* of mans conversion, or rather like a *Physicall cause*, by drawing, inclining, and mooving the heart. A man is put in the fetters, one gets him out of the fetters by one of two meanes. First, he useth *morall perswasions* to him to come forth, then hee comes as a *Physicall cause* by breaking his bolts and taking him forth: if God did nothing in mans conversion, but by *morall perswasions*, then hee should never come out of the fetters; for by nature he is like the deafe Adder that stoppeth his eare at the voyce of the enchanter, *Psa. 58.* God is not the *miraculous cause* of mans conversion; because the conversion of man is not a miracle, as we have shoven before.

When God converts a man to grace; first, he opens the heart, and then he enters; the heart all this time being dead, untill God awake it.

In order of causes, God first he opens the heart, and then he enters; but in order of time, when he opens, he enters, The *Iesuites* make God when he enters, the *efficient cause* of mans conversion; and they make the heart when it opens, the *materiall, or dispositive cause* of mans conversion; and one of them goeth about to cleare the matter by this comparison out of *Dominicus a Soto*, thus. When the winde beates upon a window, by entring in, it opens the window, and by opening the window it enters in; in respect of the *efficient cause* it enters in by motion, but in respect of the *dispositive cause*, it first opens, and then enters.

But his comparison is false, for God must first open the

Deus non tantum est causa moralis aut miraculosa conversionis humane; physica, aut quasi physica.

Prop.

Illust.

Greg. de Valen. dis. 8. g. 3. p. 4.

Duplex causa; efficiens & dispositiva.

the heart, and enter; before ever the heart open and we receive grace; so that the second act of God, and our opening, are *simul tempore*; for when we receive, he opens; and when hee hath entred, and opened, wee receive; although Gods opening goe before in order of causes, yet in time it goeth with our receiving, as the fish takes the hooke, and the hooke the fish, at the same time; but in order of causes, the hooke is presented first to the fish.

Bellarmino, in his *sixt Book, of Free-will and Grace, Chap. 15.* summes up the co-working of the Grace of God with *Free-will* in man, in these conclusions following.

Conclus. 1.

Man hath a *remote power* before hee get grace, to the workes of holinesse.

Our diff.

Man hath not a *remote power* to do good as the greene wood hath a *remote power* to take fire, but only a *passive* or *obedientiall power*, whereby grace makes him able, to the workes of holinesse.

Conclus. 2.

Man before his conversion, hath not a *neere* and a *perfect power*, (before grace be offered,) to the workes of holinesse: and therefore in the workes of pietie he can doe nothing of himselfe.

Our cons.

This proposition we willingly grant, for mans will is not like powder ready presently to take fire.

Conclus. 3.

Stirring up grace, must necessarily goe before mans conversion, whether it be from infidelity to faith, or from sinne to righteousness; neither is *helping grace* sufficient to mans conversion.

Our cons.

This proposition might be granted, first against the *Pelagians*, who denied all grace, and against the *sem-Pelagians*, who acknowledged *preventing grace*, but not *stirring up grace*; and we would grant to it, if by *stirring up grace*, he meant *infused grace*, which after that it is infused into the heart of man it stirs him up to do good.

Conclus. 4.

This *stirring up grace*, is given to man without any preparation to grace.

We

Wee agree to this proposition, if by *stirring up grace*, he meant *infused grace*.

Stirring up grace is not granted to man, without his working, although it be given to him without the *co-operation of free-will*: this proposition he goeth about to cleare thus; *stirring up grace* (saith he) comprehends two things in it. First, *initium bonæ cogitationis*. Secondly, *initium boni desiderij*; but, *to thinke*, and *desire*, are the actions of the *mind* and *will*; wherefore a man cannot *desire* and *thinke* any thing, without his owne action. Yet because there are some sudden motions, which antevvert all deliberation of reason; therefore they cannot be the acts of *free-will*, such are these impure thoughts, that are cast into the heart by the Divell, against our *will* these are the free motions of the *will*; therefore the Apostle, *Rom. 7.* saith, *I doe not these things, but sinne that dwels in me*; so it may be said of these first good thoughts because they proceed not from the *will*, I doe not these, but the grace of God which prevents me.

These *primoprimum motus*, which antevvert the use of reason, are partly with the *will*; and partly against the *will*; they are not with the *will*, because they arise before the consent of the *will*; neither are they against the *will*, for then the heart should not delight it selfe in them when then arise. So the first motions of the spirit in the heart, are not altogether with the *will*, because it is sinful; neither altogether against the *will*, because the *will* is subordinate to God, and begins to take some delight in them. Wee must distinguish these three motions of the *will*, *involuntarium*, *voluntarium*, *non voluntarium*: *involuntarium*, when the *will* no wayes wils a thing; *voluntarium* when the *will* wils it altogether; *non voluntarium*, when it partly wils it, and partly wils it not: in this last sense it is, that our will consents to the working of Gods Spirit in our conversion.

Our conf.

Conclus. 5.

Our diff.

ἀκρίτως.
ἐκρίτως.
ἢ ἐκρίτως.

Conclus. 6.

That we may assent to *stirring up grace*, or to Gods internall calling, *helping grace* is necessary.

Our cons.

Wee agree to this proposition, if this grace be taken for *infused grace*.

Conclus. 7.

Neither *stirring up grace*, nor *helping grace*, impose any necessity to man, but that he may either chuse or refuse Gods calling.

Our diss.

Wee hold that after *grace* is infused in the heart, although it compell not the *will* to doe good, yet it *necessitates* it.

Conclus. 8.

It may be that two having the same internall motion, the one may be called and not the other.

Our diss.

Wee hold, that the *will* of the man called inwardly, is so determinate by grace, that he cannot but chuse his conversion; but the *will* of the other not being determinate by grace cannot chuse it.

Conclus. 9.

The conversion of man to God, as it is a *worke*, it proceeds from *free will* onely, and Gods generall helpe assisting; as it is *good*, it is onely from grace; as it is a *good worke*, it is partly from the *will* and partly from grace; and hee goeth about to proove this; because (saith he) the efficient cause of humane actions (as they are *actions*) is the *will* of man; and as they are *free actions*, they proceed from the *freedom* of the *will*; and as they are *godly actions*, they proceed of grace; therefore grace makes the action good and supernaturall.

Our diss.

Wee hold that the action, not onely considering it, as it is *good*, but considering it, as it is an *action* proceeding from the *will*, is *necessitate* by God.

Conclus. 10.

These actions which a man doth after his conversion, he needes not to these actions a new grace, but onely a continuall direction, protecting and keeping the seed already sown in the heart.

Our diss.

Man after his conversion hath neede of a continuall influence of grace, as the Organs have neede continually.

naturally of one to blow them, otherwise they will make no sound; they would make the grace of God in man (being once infused,) to be like a clocke, if the peses be drawne up in the morning, it will goe right all the day.

The habite of grace is infused into the heart, but not without the preparation of mans owne will.

Wee hold that before grace be infused in the heart, there is no preparation in man. And thus farre Bellarmine goeth about to prove that there is *free-will* in man naturally yet unto good, and would extenuate the grace of God.

The *efficacious* grace of God, being offered to man, he cannot resist it.

We are to marke, what the *will* of man can doe before his conversion to God; secondly, what it can doe in the first point of his conversion: thirdly, what hee doth after his conversion. And there is a threefold grace answerable to these three estates: first, there is *vocans*, an *externall calling*: secondly, *working grace* internally, answering to the third estate. The first grace is oftentimes resisted; *Ier. 7. 13. When I call upon you early in the morning, yee answer mee not, Psal. 81. 14. Oh that my people had hearkned unto me. So Matth. 23. 37. How often would I have gathered thee under my wings, but thou wouldst not.* The *working grace* answering to our third estate, may be said to be resisted, not simply, but *secundum quid*; for this resistance is not betwixt the *will* and the grace of God, but *betwixt the flesh and the spirit, Rom. 7.* The *working grace* answering to our second estate, cannot be resisted in the first point of mans conversion: when God gives a man a *will* to convert, he must first take away the resistance that hindred his conversion, before that ever he give him the will to convert; if hee first take not away the impediments he cannot convert: God gives not *grace* to a man that

Concl. II.
Our diff.

Prop.

Illust.

Triplex consideratio voluntatis, ante conversionem; in primo puncto conversionis; & post conversionem.

Triplex consideratio gratiae, in vocando, in operando, & in co-operando.

Duplex resistantia, simplex, & secundum quid.

Duplex sensus gratiae
& resistentiae, divisus,
& compositus.

Illustr. 2.

Triplex resistentia; aequalis, completa, & incompleta.

Consequence.

Lib. 6. de grat. & lib. 1. a. b.
Quidam dei gratiam
reijciunt; quidam neque
recipiunt neque reijci-
unt; quidam neque reijci-
unt, neque recipiunt sed
delectantur in ea: qui-
dam apperiuunt corda ut
gratiam recipiant.

resist in the *compound sense* (as they speake in the schooles,) that is, so long as he remaines unwilling hee gives him not grace, but in a *divided sense*, when he gets grace, resistance is taken from him.

Resistance is, when two strive together: if they be of equall strength, then the one of them prevailes not against the other, if they be not of equall strength, then the weaker succumbs, and the stronger prevailes; if the agent be hindred by the patient, and yet prevaile at the last, it is called *incompleta resistentia*, an imperfect resistance, but if the patient be of such strength, that is frustrates the agent of his purpose, then it is called *completa resistentia*, a perfect resistance. When *Michael* the archangell, and the devill, strove about the body of *Moses*, *Iude 9*. if the devill had gotten the body of *Moses*, and had set it up and made an Idoll of it, then it had beene a perfect resistance; but *Michael* prevailing against the devil it was an imperfect resistance. So when the *will* of man striveth against the *grace* of God; if these two were of equall force, then the one of them should not prevaile against the other; but because they are not of equall force, although the *will* resist for a time, yet he yeeldes to the stronger, the grace of God: and so it is but an imperfect resistance, for at last it yelds to the grace of God.

Man in his conversion cannot resist the grace of God; therefore that division of *Bellarmines* is false. First, he saith, that some who are called inwardly by the spirit, may reject the calling together. Secondly, some neither receive the grace of God nor reject it, but suffer God to knocke at the heart, and is no wayes moved by it to open. Thirdly, some neither receive nor reject grace, but they begin to be delighted with it. Fourthly, some open their hearts, and suffer themselves to be drawne by the grace of God: this is false, for it is the Lord only, that hath the key of the heart to open or shut.

Man

Man in his first estate, had not neede of *preventing grace*, yet he had neede of *stirring up*, or *preparing grace*, to stirre him up not from sinne or sluggishnesse, but from the intermission of his action: but man regenerate hath neede of *preventing grace*, *preparing grace*, *working grace*, and *perfecting grace*; and as the Lord promised, *Deut. 11. 12. Mine eye shall be upon this land from the beginning of the yeare to the end*: so unlesse God looke upon man, from the beginning to the end of his conversion, all is in vaine. Wee see, *Numb. 17.* when *Aarons rod* was laid before the Lord. First, he made it to bud, although it had no roote. Secondly, to blossome. Thirdly, to bring forth ripe almonds: So although there be no grace in us, yet the Lord stirres up good motions in our hearts; then he seconds these with new desires, then at last he make us to bring forth good fruite: so that the beginning, progresse and end of all good workes come of God; when wee acknowledge this from our heart, then we offer a burnt offering to the Lord.

A collation betwixt the innocent, and renewed *Adam*.

But it is said in *Mark. 4. 26.* that the Kingdome of God is like a husbandman, who when hee had sown his seede, hee lyes downe and sleepest; and in the meane time it growes and shoots forth into the blade, and then to the care; therefore it may seeme, that when God hath once sowne the seede of grace, hee addes not a new influence of grace to it.

Answ. That parable is onely meant of the Preacher, who after hee hath sowne the seede, can doe no more, but commits the event to God; but the parable can no wayes be applied to God; for after that the seed is sowne by God, hee must give both the first and the latter raine, or else it will not fructifie: The Schoolemen say well, *ad singulos actus desideratur gratia*, unto every action that a man doth grace is required.

Prop.

Illust. 1.

*Gratia semel recepta
non potest amitti, respec-
tu patris, filii & spiri-
tus sancti.*

Illust. 2.

Man in his restitution receiving the grace of God, cannot lose it againe.

The certainty of the perseverance of the Saints in grace, is proved. First, in respect of God the Father. Secondly, in respect of God the Sonne. Thirdly, in respect of God the holy Ghost. First, in respect of God the Father, with whom there is no shadow of change; *and none can pull his sheepe out of his hands, Ioh. 10. 29.* Secondly, in respect of God the Sonne, the Apostle saith, *1 Cor. 6. that, his members agglutinantur Christo;* they are glewed to him. Thirdly, in respect of the holy Ghost, he is called *the earnest penny of our salvation, 2 Cor. 5.* he is not called the pledge of our salvation; for a pledge may be laid in pane, and may be taken up againe; but an earnest penny is a part of the bargaine and cannot be taken up againe.

There is a mutuall obligation betwixt God and man, which sheweth the perseverance of the Saints. We give a pledge to God, *2 Tim. 1. 12. I know whom I have beleevved, and I am perswaded that hee is able to keepe that which I have committed unto him;* so, God giveth the earnest penny of his Spirit to us; *Ephes. 1. 13. In whom also after that ye were sealed with the holy Spirit of promise, which is the earnest of our inheritance;* although we have the possession of both, yet the keeping of both is committed to God who is a faithfull keeper, so that now the child of God, cannot fall away againe, not onely in respect of the event, but also for the continuance of their Faith.

Quest. When a man falls into any notorious sinne, as murder, or adultery; whether is his faith lost or not?

Answ. Not, for he fals not from his universall and first justification, whereby all his former sins were remitted to him, he fals only from the particular justification of

of that fact; this guilt of that fact which is particular, takes not away the first justification: here, *amittit jus ad rem, sed non jus in re*; hee loseth not the right of his former justification, but onely the use of it for the time; and when hee repents of that particular fact, hee gets not a new right to his first justification, but is restored againe to the use of it. When *Nebuchadnezzar* became madde, hee was cast out of his Kingdome and lived amongst the beasts; when he became sober againe and understanding, hee got not a new right againe to his Kingdome, but onely was restord to his possession: so when a man fals by sinne from God, when he repents hee gets not a new right to his justification, but onely he gets the right use of his former justification.

Quest. Whether is the child of God, quite cut off from Christ, when he commits any great sinne?

Ans. If we respect Gods part, hee is not cut off: for justification upon Gods part, implieth not any qualitie in man, but his free favour in pardoning; so that the question is not, what man deserved; but, what God doth in justifying man? *It is he who justifieth the ungodly, Rom. 4.5.* But if we respect mans part in sinning, and according to his feeling before he repent, hee is cut off; but not respecting Gods first justification. A woman commits adultery, shee deserves to be repudiate from her husband, yet the marriage is never dissolved upon her husbands part, untill he give her the bill of divorce. So the sinner when he falls into any great sinne, upon his part he deserves fully to be cast off; and yet hee is not cast off by God, because he hath not given him the bill of divorce; *demeritorie incurrit iram Dei, licet non efficitur*, he deserves the wrath of God, although the Lord powre not out his wrath upon him

Quest. What loseth he then by his fall?

Ans. Hee loseth not the habite of his faith, neither

Duplex iustificatio, universalis & particularis.

Peccator neque amittit habitum neque actum fidei, sed actus propter rem po re suspenditur.

ther the act of his faith, but onely this act of his faith is suspended for the time, *Act. 20. 9.* When *Eutyches* fell downe out of an upper loft, all that beheld him thought he had beene dead; yet when *Paul* embraced him in his armes, he said, *he is not dead*; the act of life was not extinguished here, but suspended. So when the child of God falleth into any notorious sinne, grace is not quite gone out of him. The incestuous *Corinthian* who had laine with his fathers wife, *1 Cor. 5. 1.* was to be excommunicated and cut off from the Church, *That his spirit might be saved, and the flesh destroyed*; he had the spirit all this time in him when he had fallen into this great sinne, and had not quite lost the grace of God: so that the child of God seemeth to be cut off for the time, and the holy spirit seemeth to be quenched in him, yet grace commeth in and bloweth up the sparkles, that were lurking all this time under the ashes of sinne: example of this we may see in *David*, lying so long both in murther and adultery.

Consequence.

Therefore these who hold that a man may lose his justifying faith, either altogether or for a time; and then by the grace of God working repentance in the heart of man, it may be restored to him againe; they mistake the nature of true faith, for that which is justifying faith, is a fountaine of living water springing up unto eternall life in man, *Ioh. 4.* Neither can it be totally taken from a man, and restored againe, for *Iude ver. 3.* faith, *that faith is but once given to the Saints.* *Peter* after his fall, went out and wept bitterly, *Math. 26.* *Deus hic non infudit novum habitum, sed suscitavit,* God infused not a new habite in *Peter*, but wakened up the habite that was sleeping in him; for *his seede remained still in him, 1 Ioh. 3.*

FINIS.



THE SECOND PART OF THE IMAGE of GOD in Man, in his Creation, Restauration, and Glorification.

CHAP. I.

Of the Passions of man in generall.



Passion, is a motion of the sensitive appetite, stirred up by the apprehension, either of good or evil in the imagination, which worketh some outward change in the body.

They are called *passions*, to put a difference betwixt them and the *faculties* of the Soule, which are naturally inbred in it; and betwixt the *habits* which are infused and acquired; but the *Passions*, although they be naturally inbred in the soule, yet they must be stirred up by outward objects. They are not like *habits*, which are alwayes alike and permanent, neither are they like bare *imaginationes* and *phantasies* drawne from the objects, and reserved in the memory: but they arise from a knowne object,

Prop.

Illust.

Tria insunt anime potentia, habitus, & passionis.

object laid up in the *imagination*, appearing to us either pleasant or hurtfull. They are wrought by an apprehension in the *imagination*, because the *imagination* stirreth up immediatly the *senses*, then the *understanding faculty* judgeth them to be true or false, and the *will* considereth them as good or evill. As the *understanding* judgeth them to be true or false, it stirreth not up the *appetite*, but as the *will* judgeth them to be good or evill; yet not absolutely, but as good or evill to us, or ours: and these *faculties* are rightly joyned together, for the *sensitive facultie* of it selfe, is blind; neither could it follow or decline any thing unlesse the *understanding faculty* directed it: so the *understanding faculty* were needelesse, unlesse it had these *passions* joyned with it, to prosecute the truth, and to shun the falsehood.

Quest. Whether are these *passions* placed in the sensitive part, or in the reasonable?

Answ. They are placed in the sensitive part, and not in the reasonable, because the reasonable doth not imploy any corporall organs in her actions, for when wee reason, there is no alteration in the body. But the *passions* appeare in the blood, by changing and altering of our countenance, and they are a middle betwixt the body and the minde, and have correspondency with both; Hence it was that God commanded his people, to abstaine from bloud, *Gen. 9. 4.* and that they should offer bloud in their sacrifices, *Heb. 9. 22.* that so the soule might answer for the soul which sinned, *Levit. 17. 11. 12.*

Although these *passions* be in the *sensitive part*, as in the subject, yet the *understanding* is the principall cause which moveth them. If there were a commotion amongst the common people, moved by some crafty *Achitophel*, the commotion is properly in the people as in the subject, but it is in the craftie *Achitophels* head as in the cause, who moveth the sedition. So these *passions* are

are in the *will* and *understanding*, as commanding and ruling them; but in the *sensitive part*, as in the proper subject. In beasts the *phantasie* sets the *sensitive appetite* on worke, but in man the *phantasie* apprehending the object, presents it to the *understanding*, which considers it either as true or false, and the *understanding* presents it to the *will*, and thence ariseth the prosecution of the good; or shunning of the evill in the sensitive appetite, with an alteration of the spirits in the body.

The *passions* of man ruled by reason.

We see by experience that these *passions* that draw nearest to reason, are soonest subdued; and these *passions* that are furthest from reason, are more hardly subdued. A man will sooner subdue his passions than a woman or a childe, because he hath more reason, and a man will sooner quite his anger, than his fleshly lusts; because they are all further from reason; and the Philosophers shew this by the example of a Horse or a Bull, they are sooner tamed, because they draw nearer to reason, but the fishes cannot be tamed, because they have no resemblance of reason.

Whether are the *passions* that anteverte the *will* ruled by reason or not? *Ans.* The *passions* which anteverte the *will* are not from the *will* and reason, neither are they altogether against the *will* and reason, but partly with the *will* and partly against the *will*. These *passions* which anteverte the *will*, do not excuse but extenuate the fact, *in tanto*, *sed non in toto*, they excuse the fact in a part, but not fully.

These *passions* excuse sinne, *in tanto*, *sed non in toto*; therefore it is a false division which the Church of Rome maketh of the passions of the soule. They say there are first *primo-primi motus* in the soule, which arise sodainly before reason thinke of them; these thoughts the *will* cannot

*Prop.
Illust.*

Quest.

Conseq.

Triplices motus in anima. primo primi motus, secundi primo-motus, secundi motus.

cannot reſſeſſe, becauſe they proceed from our naturall inclination; and are neither mortall nor veniall. Secondly, they ſay that there are *ſecundo primi motus*, which ariſe ſodainely after the firſt motions, theſe the will may reſſeſſe (they ſay) if ſhee take diligent heede to them: theſe they make veniall finnes. Thirdly, (ſay they) there are in the ſoule *ſecundi motus*, when the will gives the full conſent: they make theſe mortall finnes. But the firſt motions of all without conſent are finne, and damned in the laſt Commandement; and the motions which ariſe with conſent, are damned in the ſeventh commandement by Chriſt, *Mat. 5. 28. Hee that luſteth after a woman hath committed adultery with her already in his heart*; then the motions which ariſe without conſent, are damned in the laſt commandement.

Prop.

Theſe perturbations doe not extenuate finne ſo farre as ignorance doth.

Illuſt.

The perturbations are ruled by prudencie, but becauſe theſe perturbations follow not the light of reaſon, their finne is greater than the finne of ignorance, which is want of knowledge in the underſtanding: *The ſervant that knoweth his Maſters will and doth it not, ſhall be beaten with many ſtripes, Luke 12. 47.*

CHAP. II.

Of the diſiſion of the Paſſions.

Παθὲς ἐν διδυμῶν.
καὶ θυμικόν.
Of the paſſions in the
concupiſcible appetite.

ALl the paſſions may be reduced firſt, to the *concupiſcible* and *iraciſcible* faculties of the Soule. Secondly, there are as many paſſions in the ſoule as there are diſvers conſiderations of good and evill. Firſt, good and evill are conſidered abſolutely; then love and hatred have

have respect to these. Secondly, *good* and *evill* are considered, in the *good* which may be obtained; and in the *evill* which is imminent; the *good* which is looked for and may be obtained, that wee desire, and it is called *desiderium*. The *evill* if it be imminent hath no proper name, but is called abusively *abomination*, seu *fuga mali*. Thirdly, when either the *good* is obtained or the *evill* present; if the *good* be obtained, then it is called *gaudium*, joy: if the *evill* be present, then it is called *tristitia*, sadness: so that there are sixe passions in the *con-*
sciscible.

In the *irascible* appetite there are five. If the *good* be to come, and not obtained; either it is possible to obtaine it, or impossible; if it be possible to obtaine it, it stirres up two affections in the *irascible*: first, *hope*, which expecteth *bonum difficile*; that is, when goodnesse can hardly be obtained. It hath an eye to *good*; which distinguisheth it from *feare*; it hath an eye to future *good*, which distinguisheth it from *joy*, that enjoyeth the *present good*. *Hope* lookes to *good* hardly to be obtained, which distinguished it from *desire*, that is, of things easily to be obtained. If the *good* may be easily obtained, it stirres up *audaciam* boldnesse, this respects *evill*; but yet such *evill* which it thinkes it may overcome and it prosecuteth the meanes which tend to the attaining of the *good*; it respects *evill* by accident, hoping to shunne it. Secondly, if the *good* be thought impossible to be attained, then it workes *desperation*: this passion hath not an eye to *evill* as *evill* but by accident, because it seeth the *good* impossible to be attained. If the *evill* be imminent and not present, then it workes *feare*: If the *evill* be present and impossible to be elchewed, then it worketh *anger*, which hath no contrarie. Some of the Moralists reduce all these *passions* to two, *love* and *desire*; for whatsoever thing that is good

*Passio amoris a bono,
& passio odij a malo.*

Passio desiderij & abe-
minationis.

Passio gaudij & tristi-
tiae.

Of the passions in the
irascible appetite.

Passio spei & audacie.

Passio desperationis &
timoris.

Passio i.e.

is.

is either in our present possession, and this we *love*; or is absent and wished for, and this we *desire*; so that every good thing, we either possesse it, or *desire* to possesse it. Againe, these *passions* may be reduced to foure principall; for every *passion* is a motion to *good*; and in this kinde *hope* is the last; or a motion and turning from *evill*, and in this kinde *fear* is the last; or it is a rest and enjoying the good, and in this kinde *delight* is the last; or a restlesnesse in the object, and in this kinde *sadnesse* is the last.

*Tristitia dividitur in
misericordiam invidiam
angustiam penitentiam,
& zelum.*

*Timor est erubescencie
verecundie, stuporis
aut agonie.*

Prop.

Those who write of the *winds*, some make foure of them, some eight, some sixteene, some thirtie two; so these who write of the *passions*, some make more and some make lesse. Every one of these *passions* may be branched out againe into severall branches; as *sadnesse* hath under it; first *pittie*, which is a *griefe* of the *evill* which befalls others, as if it befell our selves. Secondly, *envie* which is a *sadnesse* that we conceive, for the good that befaileth others, wishing that it were our owne. Thirdly, *heavinessse*, which grieves the minde when it seeth no way to escape. Fourthly, *repentance*, which is a *sadnesse* for by-past sinnes. Fifthly, *zeale*, which is a *sadnesse* arising from the dishonour of that which wee love most. So the daughters of *fear* are; first *blushing* which is a *fear* arising from the losse of our good name, for some filthy thing presently done. Secondly, *shamefastnesse*, which is a *fear* arising for some *evill* to be committed. Thirdly, *astonishment*, which is the *fear* of some *evill* that suddenly befalls us not looked for. Fourthly, *agonie*, when we *fear* that which we no waies can eschew; and so may the rest of the *passions* be branched forth.

The *passions* which are disperfed in the *inferiour faculties*, are united after a more excellent manner in the *superiour*.

As

As seeing, hearing and smelling, are different in the organs of the body, and yet in the soule are united *eminenter*. So the *passions* in the *sensitive part*, are distinguished into the *irascible* and *concupiscible faculties*, and upon divers considerations arise divers *passions*, fixe in the one and five in the other, but in the will they are united *eminenter*, and have onely but two considerations either of good or evil.

The first *Adam* had these *passions* as they are *eminenter in voluntate*, for he had *prosecutionem boni, & aversionem mali*, pursuite of good, and a turning from evil: but he had not as yet distinct objects for them to work upon. Christ the second *Adam* had distinct objects to exercise his passions upon, by takeing the punishment of our sinnes upon him: but *Adam* had not *sadnesse*, *anger*, and such *actually*, but *potentially*. The Angels have joy, love and that *filial reverence*, whereby they offend not God but they have not *greefe*, *sorrow*, *fear* of punishment, and such passions. *Adam* had his passions without perturbation or turbation. Christ had his passions with turbation, but not with perturbation *Ioh 11. 33. hee was mightily troubled in the spirit and was troubled in himselfe* But we have our passions with perturbation.

Christ took our passions upon him as he tooke our nature.

As hee was *Ben adam; the son of a man* for us; so he was *Ben-enosh the sonne of a fraile man*, *Psal. 8. 5.* subject to passions and miseries, he tooke our *miserabiles passions*, but not *detestabiles*; he tooke not our sinfull passions upon him, as *despaire* or *boldnesse*; but he tooke all the rest; as in the *concupiscible appetite*; hee tooke our love upon him, our desire, our hatred of evil, our abomination or abhorring of sinne, our joy, our sadnesse. Again in the *irascible faculty*, hee tooke

M m

our

Illust.

A collation betwixt the innocent *Adam* and second *Adam* and the Angels.

Prop.

Illust.

our anger and feare upon him : but he tooke not *despaire* upon him, because he thought not the evill of punishment layde before him impossible to be overcome : he tooke not *audaciam* upon him, because it lookes to evill possibly to be eschewed : it looks directly to good, yet because it looks accidentally to *evill*, he could not take it upon him.

Illust. 2.

Christ when hee became man, was not ἀπαθής, without all affections, hee was not δυσπαθής, *impatiens affectionis*, he was not ἰδιοπαθής, for his affections were not proper to himselfe, but he was εὐπαθής, having his affections well ordered; he was ὁμοιοπαθής, having his affections like ours; hee was συμπαθής, for hee had a fellow-feeling of our infirmities; hee was μετριοπαθής, *Heb. 4. 15.* for hee had such a fellow-feeling, that hee can measure out to every one of his members, that which is fit for them to suffer.

Quest. How could Christ take our *passions* upon him, as our feare and sadnesse, seeing he was *comprehensor*, and beheld the glory of God in the highest measure of happiness?

Answ. By the singular dispensation and wisdom of God; for this happiness and glory was kept up, within the closet of the mind of Christ, that it came neither to his body nor sensuall part, and so hee might be fully happy and glorified in the *superior facultie* of the Soule, and yet this glory not to shew it selfe in his body, and *inferior faculties*, as it doth now in glory.

A collation betwixt
the second and old
Adam.

Christ's *passions* when he lived here, did not arise in him before reason directed them, they rose not *contra rationem*, aut *præter rationem*; contrary or besides reason. wherefore, *Iob. 11. 33.* it is said that Iesus τράπεζεν αὐτὸν, troubled or moved himselfe, at the death of *Lazarus*; for his reason commanded his sadnesse, *Math. 26. cæpit tristiari*, hee began to bee sad. Hierome saith well, *Passiones Christi*

Christi respectu principij semper sequuntur rationem, they alwaies follow reason when they arise, and as the Centurion, if hee had said to one of his souldiers; *Goe, and hee goeth and to another come and he commeth*; and to the third doe this, and hee doeth it, *Math. 8.9.* So Christs affections were directed by his reason, to goe and come at the commandement thereof. In his agonie they never disturbed his reason; for in his agony they were like a glasse; which hath pure and cleane water in it, stirre the glasse and there ariseth no mudde in it; but our passions anteverte reason, they trouble and blind reason, they are like the foule glasse, when we stirre it, presently it groweth dimme and the mudde ariseth. The flowers of *Egypt*, that are continually watered by the waters of *Nilus*, (which are grosse) yeeld not such pleasant smelles as other flowers doe: So our sinfull passions are not so pure and cleare, for the vapours and exhalations that arise out of them from originall sinne. Our passions are like the bearded Counsellors of *Rehoboam*, who drew away the King to his destruction, *1 King. 12.8* Secondly, the passions in Christ differed from ours, *quoad gradus*, for when once his reason commanded them to retreate and stay, they did proceed no further; therefore in Christ they might have rather beene called *propassiones* than *passiones*, because they were the forerunners and beginners of passions, and might be stayed at pleasure, and had no power to transport his reason.

Some things are neither to be prayed, *in ortu nec progressu*, in their rising nor proceeding, as hunger and thirst, which are not subject to reason. Some againe are to be prayed *in ortu*, but not *in progressu*, as just anger in man since the fall: hence the Apostle, *Ephes. 4.25.* saith, *be angry but sinne not*, that is, take heed that your anger continue not, for if it doe, it wil turn to

*Inter Christi passiones
nulla fuit contrarietas,
instabilitas, aut impor-
tunitas.*

sinne; it is like good Wine which is soone turned into Vinegar. Some passions are to be praised, both *in ortu et progressu*, and these were proper unto Christ.

There was no contrariety and contradiction amongst Christs passions. Secondly, there was no instability in them. Thirdly, there was no importunity in them. But since the fall, there is a great contrariety and contradiction amongst our passions, and great instabilitie, and great importunitie. *In Christo fuerunt pœnales sed non culpabiles, in nobis sunt pœnales sed et culpabiles: In Christ the passions were a punishment, but not a sinne; but in us they are both a punishment and sinne.* First, in their contrariety or contradiction; it is written in the life of *Anselme*, when he walked in the field hee saw a shepherds boy, who had taken a bird and had tyed a stone to her legge, and as the bird mounted up, the stone drew her downe againe; which moved *Anselme* to weepe, lamenting how men indeavoured to flee up to heaven, and yet are still borne downe to the earth by sinne. Mens passions now are like contrary winds or tides; covetous man that is given to adultery, is drawne by two wilde horses contrary-ways; for his covetousnesse bids him hold in, but his adultery bids him spend. Secondly, now our affections are instable, like the winds changing from this coast to that, like *Amnon* who now hated *Thamar* more than ever hee loved her before. Thirdly, now the affections importunate us, for sometimes they lie sicke as *Ahab* did, if they get not *Naboths* Vineyard, 1 King. 21. or like *Rachel* who cried to *Iacob*, Give mee children or else I die, Gen. 30. or like the horseleech which hath two daughters, that cry continually, Give, give, Prov. 30 15.

A collation betwixt
the old and renewed
Adam.

The regenerate man, is renewed in all his passions, as we may see in *Dauids* love, Psal. 119 97. *How doe I love thy law: In his hatred, I hate thy enemies with a perfect*

fect hatred, *Psal. 130. 22* In his desire, mine eyes are dimme for waiting how doe I long for thy salvation, *Psal. 35. 9*. In his feare, his judgements are terrible I tremble and quake. *Psal. 119. 120*. In his delight, thy testimonies are my delight, *Psal. 119. 16*. I rejoyce more in them, then in a rich spoile, *Psal. 119. 192* In his sorrow, mine eyes gush out with rivers of water, *Psal. 119. 136*, But the unregenerate, are renewed in none of these passions.

The affections of man since the fall are fearefull tormenters of him.

It is a greater iudgement to be given over to them, than when the people were given up to be slaine by Lyons, *2. King. 17. 25*. and it may seeme a greater judgement to be given over to these passions, than to bee excommunicate and given over to Sathan, for sundry that have been excommunicate haue beene reclaimed and called backe againe, *1. Cor. 5*. but very few of these who are given over to these passions are reclaimed.

It is a mercy of God when a man falls, that God hath not given him over to his sinfull appetite wholly, but haue some seed of grace working within him, which restraines him, that he worke not sin with greedinesse, and makes him long to bee at his first estate againe; as wee see in that incestuous *Corinthian, 1. Cor. 5*. when he had committed that beastly sinne in lying with his fathers wife, yet the Spirit that was lurking within him, stirred him up to repentance, and made him to long to be at his first estate of grace againe.

There is a notable apologue serving for this purpose, when *Vlysses* in his trauailes had left his men with *Circe* that Witch, she changed them all into diuers sorts of beasts: as into dogges, swine, Lyons, Tigers, Elephants. *Vlysses* when he returned, complained that *Circe* had done him wrong in turning his men into beasts, *Circe* replied that the benefite of speech was left unto them

Prop.
Illust.

Conseq.

them all, and so hee might demand of them, whether they would be changed into men againe. Hee began first with the Hogge, and demanded of him whether he would be a Man againe or not, he answered, that he was more contented with that sort of life then he was before; for when he was a man he was troubled with a thousand cares, and one grieve came continually after another; but now he had care for to fill the belly, and to lye downe in the dunghill and sleepe: and so hee demanded of all the rest about: but all of them refused to turne men againe, untill he came to the Elephant, who in his first estate had beene a Philosopher; he demanded of him, whether or not he would be a man againe; he answered that he would with all his heart, because he knew what was the difference betwixt a brutish and a reasonable life. The application of the apologue is this. These beastly creatures given over to their sensuall appetites, transformed and changed by Sathan into beasts, in their hearts they desire never to returne to a better estate, but to live still in their swinish pleasures, and to follow their sensuall appetites.

But these who have the Spirit of Grace in them, and are fallen into some haynous sin, having tasted of both the estates, like the Elephant they desire to be backe at their first estate againe.

*Theologia, & moralis
Philosophia differunt.*

Divinitie and morall Philosophy differ farre in shewing Man his sinfull passions; the moralists shew nothing but the out-side of these sinfull passions: they leave them without, like painted Sepulchers, but within full of rottennesse and dead mens bones, Math. 23. 27. They hold up ἑτεροδοχιον, a counterfeit glasse, which maketh her sinfull passions looke a great deale better than they are.

This counterfeit cure of the moralists curing the passions is not unfitly compared to a Barber; for a Barber doth

doth nothing to a Man but trimmes him, washes him, and shaves him; he goeth not like a skilfull Physitian to finde out the cause of his disease, but onely outwardly layes a playster to the sore, and the passions, *mendaciter subiiciunt se tantum rationi*; they neither shew the beginning, progresse nor remnant of their sinne. But *Divinitie* sheweth this first as in a cleare glasse, the ground of all our sinnefull passions. First, it lets us see in the bottome originall sinne the fountaine of all the rest, which the *moralist* knoweth not. Secondly, it lets us see the first motions of the heart (which are without consent) to be sin: and as in a cleare sun-shine wee see atomos, the little mores which are the least thing, that the eye of man can perceive: So the Law of God lets us see the first motions, arising from originall sinne, to be sinne before God. Thirdly, *Divinitie* lets us see, that unadvised anger is a sinne before God. Fourthly, it lets us see, that, *Hee who calshis brother raga, is to be punished by the Councell, Mat. 5.22.* Fifthly, it lets us see what a sinne the fact it selfe is. Sixtly, it lets us see that when the revenge is pardoned, yet remaine some dregges behind, that we remember not; therefore the Law saith, *Levit. 19.18. Tye shall neither revenge nor remember.* This the *moralist* cannot doe.

CHAP. III.

How the passions are cured by the morall vertues.

Prop.
Illust.

THE morall Philosophers cure the Passions by morall vertues onely.

There are eleven morall vertues, that cure these passions; which vertues attend them, as Pædagogues waite upon their pupilles, and they sing unto them as nurses do to their babes, *μὴ σπεῦδῃς, μὴ βῆ᾽, hast not, burst not forth*; These passions have their beginning in the appetite, and end in reason, but the vertues have their beginning in reason, and end in the sensitive appetite; therefore they may fitly rule the passions.

The eleven vertues, are *Liberality, Temperance, Magnificence, Magnanimity, modesty, Fortitude, Justice, meeknes, affability, urbanity or Courtesie*; and *Verity*: and as the eleven passions are reduced to foure, so are the eleven vertues reduced to foure, which are called the foure cardinall vertues: *Prudency, Temperance, Fortitude, and Justice*.

Prop.

These vertues cure the perturbations or passions, when they are either in excessse or defect, by drawing them to a mediocrity; and at last they attaine to their last happiness, being ruled by the heroicke vertues.

Illust.

The moralist maketh a double middle. First, when vertue is opposite to vice, and then the vice is to be corrected by the vertue; here the one extreame is the meane, which must rectifie the other extreame. Secondly, when the vertue is interposed betwixt two vices, then the vertue must mediate betwixt them.

Virtus media in extremo aut in medio.

Doctrine.

Here we may observe, that there is a greater difference betwixt the vertue and vice, than betwixt two vices; for there cannot be a middle betwixt vertue and vice, but there is middle betwixt two vices; this the Scripture sheweth

sheweth us, Revel. 3. 15. *I would yee were either hote or cold, but because yee are luke-warme, therefore I will spew you out of my mouth*; God will have no middle here betwixt truth and falsehood, therefore he abhorres more luke-warmnesse than coldnesse: coldnesse is not to be corrected by luke-warmnesse as the middle, but it must bee reduced to hotnesse.

But there is a middle betwixt *vice* and *vice*, and these two are corrected by the *vertue* in the middle.

Example in the *concupiscible appetite*, there are the *vices* of *Prodigality* in excesse, and the *vice* in defect is *avarice*; these two are to bee reduced to the middle *liberalitie* the *vertue*. So again in the *concupiscible appetite* there is *Morologia*, *scurrility*; Hos. 7. 3. *They make the Kings heart merry with their lies*; such was the jesting of the boyes at *Elisha*, 2 King. 2. 24. The other extremitie is *rusticitie* or *sullenesse*, such was that clowne *Nabal*, and these can abide no mirth. These two extremities are to be corrected, by *εὐπράγεια* * which is when a man sheweth himselfe pleasant without just offence to his neighbour; as when *Elias* jeasted at the *Idol Baal*, 1 Kin. 18. 27. So for a man to have too great a desire of *honour*, this is called *pride*. The other extremitie is, to be altogether averse from *honour*, this is called *pufillanimitie* or *basenesse* of minde; these must be moderated by the *vertue φιλοτιμία*, a moderate love of *honour*.

Example, 1 Tim. 3. 1. *Hee who desireth a Bishopricke desireth a good worke*, this is the middle; but when *Ammonius* the Monke cut off his right eare, that they should not make choyce of him to the ministry, this was the extremitie in defect. The other extremitie is, when presumptuously, men seeke this calling, as when the high Priests sought the Priesthood by bribes.

Quest. What sort of middle is this, when *vertue* moderates betwixt two *vices*?

Ans.

Est nomen, μεσογ.

Duplex medium, arith-
meticum seu medium
rei, et geometricum seu
medium personæ.

Different virtutes mo-
rales et theologicæ.

Duplex medium, 1. for-
male vel quantitatis ab-
solutæ. 2. materiale vel
proportionis.

Ans. There is a twofold middle; the first is called an *Arithmetical middle*, the second is called a *Geometrical middle*; the first is called, *medium rei*, the second is called *medium personæ seu rationis*.

Medium arithmeticum, or *medium rei*, keepeth always an equall proportion betwixt the two extremes; as when the *Israelites* gathered their *Manna*, they put it all in one heape, then every man got his *Gomer* measured out unto him, for they got all alike *Exod* 16. 19. 2 *Cor.* 8. 15. But *medium geometricum seu personæ, vel rationis*, draweth neerer the one extreme than the other, and giveth to the persons according to their conditions and estate, as it giveth strong meate to those that are strong, and milke to babes, *Heb.* 5. 13. So the vertue that is placed betwixt two vices, it keepes *Geometrical middle*, and stands not equally betwixt the two extremes, for *prodigalitie* commeth neerer to *liberality* than *avarice* doth.

Marke a difference betwixt *morall vertues* and *theological*; the *moral vertues* are the middle betwixt the two extremes; but in *Divinitie* if ye shall consider the *theological vertues* as they haue a respect to God, (and that infinite good) they cannot be a middle, for these which have a middle, faile either when they come short or exceede the middle: but wee cannot exceede, when wee looke to God who is infinite, for wee may come short there.

Object. But hope seemeth to bee a middle betwixt *presumption* and *despaire*, then in the *theological vertues* there may be a middle.

Ans. There is a double middle; the first is called *medium formale*, a formall middle; or, the middle of *quantitie*: and this respects the inward essence of the vertue, here no middle is found: the second is called a *material middle*, or a middle of proportion, and in this we may either exceed

exceed or come short, because of the eight circumstances that accompany every action ; which are comprehended under this technicall Verse.

Quis ? quid ? ubi ? quibus ? & cur ? quomodo ? quando ? quibuscum ;

That is, every action is tried by these circumstances :

Who ? what ? and why ? by what meanes ? and by whose ?

How ? when ? and where ? doe many things disclose.

As, who doth it ; what he doth ; where he doth it ; and by what instrument, &c. If we respect these circumstances, then a man may exceed or come short of religion.

Example, *εὐσεβεία*, true worship is the middle ; *ἀσεβεία*, and *δεισιδαιμονία* atheisme and superstition are the two extremities ; if we respect religion in it selfe secundum formale, as it is *medium quantitatis absoluta*, here we cannot exceed and be too religious, for religion it selfe is opposite to all defects of religion So hope, in respect of the inward forme of it, looking directly towards God, wee cannot exceed here, although we come short ; but respecting the matter of it, and weighing all circumstances in hope, a man may presume or despaire ; as who hopeth ; what he hopeth for : when hee hopeth : and such.

The matter may be cleared by another example when we consider *Iustice* as *Iustice*, we cannot exceed in *Iustice*, or be too just ; but considering *Iustice* in respect of circumstances, a Iudge may be either too just, *Eccles. 7. 16. noli esse nimium justus* ; be not too just ; and so exceede the middle : or he may be deficient in *Iustice*, having no respect of the poore in judgement, *these two are equally abomination before the Lord, Prov. 17. 15. to let the wicked goe, and condemne the innocent* ; the one in excesse ; and the other in defect. So, *Exod. 23. 4. Yee shall not have pittie upon the poore for his poverty.*

As

As these *passions* are cured by drawing them to the *vertues*, the mediocritie : so they are cured when all these *vertues* are joyned together, and ruled by the *Heroicke vertues*, and then the *moralists* hold that a man may attaine, *ad ultimum finem*, to true happinesse it selfe without any helpe of Gods grace, onely through the remnants of the Image of God remaining still in them yet after the fall.

When all these *passions* are cured by the *vertues*, the *moralists* make up a perfect Lady whom they paint forth to us after this sort, they say her forerunners are, *obedience*, *continencie* and *patience*; her attendants which attend her are many, as *security*, *hope*, *tranquillitie*, *joy*, *reverence*, *clemency*, *modesty*, and *mercy* : they describe her selfe this way; her head is *wisedom*, her eyes *prudencie*, her heart *love*, her spirits *charity*, her hand *liberality*, her breast *religion*, her thighes *justice*, her health *temperance*, and *fortitude* her strength.

But this Lady trimmed thus, is but a farded *Helena*, untill grace come in and sanctifie her. Wee see this betwixt *Diogenes* & *Plato*, & betwixt *Aristippus* and *Diogenes*, how every one of them discovered, that their *vertues* were but shewes of *vertues*. When *Diogenes* saw *Plato* delight in neatnesse and cleannesse, and to have his beds well dressed, he went and trod upon his beds, and he said *calco Platonis Fastum*, I tread upon *Plato's* pride. *Plato* replied, *sed majori Fastu*, with a greater pride. Againe, when *Plato* saw *Diogenes* goe with an old cloake full of holes, he said he saw his pride through the holes of his cloake. When *Diogenes* was dressing rootes for his dinner, *Aristippus* came in; *Diogenes* said unto him if *Aristippus* were content with such a dinner, he needed not to fawne upon Kings & flatter them. *Aristippus* replied, If *Diogenes* could use Kings, he needed not to eate of such rootes; thus we see how *Diogenes* taxed *Aristippus* pride and

and *Aristippus* againe *Diogenes* his counterfeit humilitie.

So wee see likewise their *vertues* to bee counterfeit *vertues*; for they counted this an *Heroicke vertue* to kill themselves, either for feare of shame as *Lucrecia* did, and *Cleopatra*; or for vaine-glory, as when *M. Curtius* leapt into the gulfe at *Rome*, in the time of a great pestilence, thinking there was no other remedy to take it away.

Quest. What are we to thinke of these passions ruled by the *morall vertues* in the heathen, whether were they sinne or not?

Ans. God liketh the workes of men two wayes. First, by a generall liking of them, because they proceed from the reliques of intire nature yet left in man, *Rom.* 2.14. *for by nature they did the things of the Law*, *1 Cor.* 11.14. *doth not nature it selfe teach you?*

Secondly, he liketh them according to his good pleasure, when he loved them as renewed in Christ. The workes of the Heathen which proceeded from the remnant light of nature were not done by them as renewed men; neither did they proceed from the corruption of nature, as when a man sinnes; but from the sparkle of naturall light, which he left in them. So if wee respect the worke it selfe, the good workes of the Gentiles are not sinnes, and in this sense it is said, *2 King.* 10.30. *Iehu did that which was good in the sight of the Lord.* So, *Gen.* 20.26 *thou didst this in the integritie of thy heart.*

But if wee consider these vertues according to the Gospell, then we must call them sinnes, because they proceeded not from faith; *For without faith it is impossible to please God*, *Heb.* 11.

Secondly, if we respect the end of their workes, they are sinnes, because they did them not for the glory of God, but for their owne prayse.

Thirdly, in respect of the subject of their good works, because

Complacētia Dei duplex
χρ' δίκονομίαν &
χρ' αἰδοξίαν.

Opera gentilium sine fide, peccata sunt.

Opera gentilium respectu finis sunt peccata.

because the persons were not renewed who did them. If the person be not renewed, his workes cannot be accepted before God. *Aurichalcum*, latten or copper, is called a false mettall, not because it is a false substance, but because it is false gold. So these workes of the heathen, are false *vertues*, because they proceed not from faith; but they are not simply false.

CHAP. III.

How the Stoickes cure the Passions.

THe *Stoickes* take another course to cure these *passions*; for they would root them out of the nature of man, as altogether sinfull. A man having the gout, one layeth a plaister to his feet, which so benumbed them that he can walke no more, here the physicke is worse than the disease. So the *Stoicks* when they feelee perturbations in the *passions*, they would pull them out; here the remedy is worse than the disease. As at the first, in *Athens* the thirtietyrants caused to bee put to death some wicked man; but afterward they began to kill good citizens; so the *Stoickes* at the first set themselves against the sinfull *passions*, and at last against the good Citizens, the best *passions*: for they would roote out of man the chiefe helps, which God hath placed in the soule, for the prosecuting of good, and declyning of evill: if there were not *passions* in the soule, then there should be no *vertues* to moderate them; for take away feare and hardnesse from fortitude, then fortitude were no more a vertue.

The passions are ascribed both to Christ and God, and therefore are not to be rooted out.

Christ himselfe tooke these *passions* upon him, therefore

fore they cannot bee sinne, *Luke 10. 21.* Hee was *angrie*, *Marke 3. 5.* He was *sad*, *Math. 26. 38.* and *rejoyced*, *Luke 10. 21.* They are sanctified by regeneration. The Apostle, *Rom. 1. 30.* condemnes the want of naturall affection, hee calls them *ασοργοι*, *without naturall affection.*

They are ascribed to God *ἀνδραγαθός*, therefore they cannot be sin. If the *Stoicks* should reade that there are Ilands and Countreys, as *Delos* and *Egypt*, which had never felt the violence of earthquakes, and which had continued immoveable, when all other parts of the world had beene shaken, would they beleieve it? Why should they then beleieve that there are men to be found voyd of all passions? They grant us this power, to tame Elephants, Tygers and Lyons; (and yet not to destroy them) why will they not allow us this power then, to suppress these *passions*, when they rise against reason? They must not then be rooted out but moderated: we must not take away diversitie of tunes in Musicke, but reduce them to good order, and so make up a harmonie.

CHAP. V.

How Christ cureth the Passions.

CHRIST taking our nature and *passions* upon him, it is hee that onely reduceth them to right order.

Christ rectifieth the *passions*, foure manner of wayes. First, he subdueth the *passions* that they arise not inordinately; *Esay 11. 5.* it is said, *Iustice shall be the girdle of his loynes*, to signifie that by justice all his sensuall affecti-

Prop.

Illust. 1.

Christus quatuor modis moderatur passiones, 1. subjugando.

Duplex cingendi modus: 1. sursum versus ad mammillas, 2. deorsum versus ad lumbos & renes.

Reconciliando.

Rectificando.

passions are suppressed. Againe, *Revel. 1. 13.* Christ is brought in, *with his girdle about his paps*; to signifie that Iesus Christ subdued, not onely his *sensitive faculties* but also the *intellectuall*, in his *will*, and *understanding*; and it was for this that the High Priest under the law was forbidden to weare his girdle, *about his sweating places*, *Ezek. 44. 18.* that is, about his middle, as the *Chalde Paraphrase* interpreteth it, not beneath, but about his pappes; to signifie the moderation of all his *passions*; It is a true axiome; *quod operatur Christus pro nobis, operatur in nobis; that which Christ doth for us, he doth in us.* He subdueth his owne passions, that He may subdue our *passions*.

Secondly, Christ reconciles the *passions*, which strive so one against another: *Iudg. 17. 6.* *when there was no King in Israel, every man might doe what hee pleased*; so these passions doe what they please, contradicting one another, till Christ come in to reconcile them. *Moses* when he saw two Hebrewes striving together, he sayd, *ye are brethren, why doe ye strive?* *Exod. 2. 13.* So when Christ seeth the *passions* striving one with another, Hee saith, *Yee are brethren, why doe yee strive?* *Acts 7. 24.*

Thirdly, Christ sets the *passions* upon their right objects, whereas before they were set upon the wrong objects, and he turnes these inordinate desires the right way. A man takes a bleeding at the nose, the way to stay the bloud is to divert the course of it, and open a veine in the arme. So the Lord draweth the passions from their wrong objects, and turnes them to another. *Mary Magdalen* was given to uncleane lust, the Lord diverted this sinfull passion, and she became penitent, and thirsted after grace, *Luk. 8. 3.* So hee turned the passions of *Saul* when he was a bloody murtherer, to thirst for grace, *Act. 9.* We know a womans appetite to be a false appetite, when shee desireth to eate raw flesh,

flesh, or coales, or such trash : and that shee is mending againe when her appetite is set upon wholsome meates. So when the passions are set upon wrong objects, then a man is in the estate of sinne : but when the passions are turned to the right objects, then a man becomes the child of God.

Fourthly, when Christ hath sent these passions upon the right object, hee settles them that they cannot bee mooved; for as the needle in the compasse trembleth still, till it bee directly settled towards the North pole; then it stands. So the affections are never settled, till they bee set upon the right object, and there he tyes them, that they start not away againe, *Psalme 86.9. David prayeth, knit my heart to thee, O Lord.* The beasts when they were brought to be made a sacrifice, were tyed with cords to the hornes of the Altar, *Psalm. 118. 27.* that they might not start away againe: So the Lord must tye the affections to the right objects that they start not away againe.

4
Immobiler permanendo.

The passions are either in the *concupiscible* or *irascible* part of the Soule. There be six passions in the *concupiscible appetite*; Love, hatred, desire, abomination, pleasure, sadnesse.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Passions in particular, in the concupiscible appetite.

Of Love.

[Love, is a passion or affection in the concupiscible appetite, that it may enjoy the thing which is esteem-

Amor est voluntarius quidam affectus, quoniam coniunctissime re quae bona iudicatur fruendi.

Prop.

Illust.

Illust. 2.

*Triplic: amor, emanans,
imperatus, & elicitus.*

esteemed to be good as neere as it can.

Man before the fall, loved God aboue all things and hisneighbour as himselfe.

God is the first good cause and the last good end: he is the first true cause, by giving knowledge to the understanding: he is the last good end, by rectifying the will; therefore the understanding never contents it selfe, untill it know God, and the will never rests til it come to the last good end; God is Δ to the *understanding*, and Ω to the *will*. He is mans chiefe good, therefore he is to be preferred to all things, both to our own selves, and to those things we count most of, beside our selves wherefore, *Luk. 14.* he saith; *He that loveth his life better than me, is not worthy of me.* So *Math. 10.* *He that loveth his father or mother better than me, is not worthy of me:* so hee that preferres his owne love before God; is not worthy of the love of God.

There are three sorts of love; *emanans*, or natural love; *imperatus*, or commanded love: *elicitus*, or love freely proceeding.

Naturall love is that love, whereby every thing hath an inclination naturally to the like, as heavie things naturally goe downe to the center of the earth: beasts are carried by sense and instinct to their objects, the Pismire in Summer layeth up provision against the Winter, *Prov. 6. 8.* This naturall instinct the Greekes call *ὀρεξις*. So man is carried to his object by love: & because he must love something, what better object could hee chuse to love than God?

Commanded love is that, whereby reason sheweth us some good thing to be loved, and then our will commandeth us to love the same. If wee had no more but reason, to shew it to us, and the will to command us, these wee enough to moove the affections to love God.

Love

Love, proceeding freely is that, when the affections make choyce of God freely; when as they consider his goodnesse that breeds *admiration* in them: when they doe consider his beauty, that breeds love in them, and his sweetnesse doth latisfie their whole desires; so that nothing is so worthy an object to bee beloved as God, who hath all these properties in him.

God loved us first, *Ioh. 3. 16.* therefore we are bound to love him againe.

There are three sorts of love.

First, the love that seekes his owne profite onely; as when a subject loves his Prince onely for his goods: such was the love of *Laban* to *Jacob*; here the Prince is not bound to love his subject againe; neither was *Jacob* bound to love *Laban* for this sort of love.

*Triplex amor, quarens
utile, lascivum, & purum.*

Secondly, the love that lookes to filthinesse and dishonestie, such was the love which *Putiphars* wife carried to *Ioseph* *Gen. 39. 9.* *Ioseph* was not bound to love *Putiphars* wife againe, in this sort of love.

The third sort of love is most pure and holy love, and in this love wee are bound to love backe againe. God loved us before wee loved him hee loved us freely and for no by-respect, therefore wee are bound to love him first and aboue all things.

The Part loves the being of the whole, better than it selfe; this is seene in the world the great man, and in man the little world: for the water in the great world ascends, that there should not bee *vacuum* or a vastnesse in the universe (for the elements touch one another.) as wee see when we poure water out of a narrow mouthed glasse, the water contrary to the nature of it, runneth up to the ayre, that there

Illust. 3.

may not bee a voyde place : it preferres the good of the whole, to the owne proper center : so in the little world man, the hand casts it selfe up to preserve the head. So God being all in all to us, we should hazard all for him.

Prop.

Man in innocencie loved God onely for himselfe.

Illust. 1.

Amor propter se, & propter aliud.

Some things wee love for themselves onely, some things we love not for themselves, but for another end. A sicke man loves a bitter potion, not for it selfe, but for another end, which is his health.

Some things we love both for themselves and for another end; as a man loves sweet wine for it selfe, because it is pleasant to his taste, then he understands also that it is good for his health, here he loves it not onely for it selfe, but for his healths sake. But Adam in innocencie loved God onely for himselfe.

Quest. Whether are we to love God more for the moe benefits he bestowes upon us or not?

2.2.4.24.471.3.

Ans. Thomas answers thus, God is to be beloved although hee should give nothing but correct us; as a good child loveth his father although he correct him: but when it is said, we are to love God for his benefits: for, notes not the finall cause here, but the motive: therefore Augustine saith well, *Non dilige ad premium, sed ipse Deus sit premium tuum*; love not for the rewards sake, but let God bee thy reward; it is a good thing for a man to thinke upon Gods benefits, that he may bee stirred up by them to love God, and love him onely for himselfe and for his benefits. Moses and Paul so loved God that they cared not to bee eternally cursed, rather than his glory should be blemished, *Exod. 32.33. Rom. 9.3.*

Super Iob. serm. 3.

Object. But when God promised, *Gen. 15.1, 2.* to be Abrahams great reward; Abraham said, *What wilt thou*

thou

thou give me seeing I goe childlesse? then the father of the faithfull might seeme to love God for his benefits, and not for himselfe.

Answ. The Text should not be read thus, *I am thy exceeding great reward*, but, *thy reward shall be exceeding great*, as if the Lord should say unto him; *thou wast not enriched by the spoile of the Kings, but I shall give thee a greater reward.* Abraham replies, *what reward is this thou canst give me seeing I goe childlesse?* Abraham had sown righteousness, and therefore should reape a faithfull reward, *Prov. 11. 18.* though he were not enriched by the King of Sodom, *Gen. 14. 22.* So that, Abraham loved God onely for himselfe in the first place; and he seekes a reward (succession of children) in the second place, and by this his Faith is strengthened, for he adheres to the promise of God, *Gen. 13. 15. 16.*

The first Adam loved not the creatures for themselves; neither loved he God for another end, but for himselfe; neither loved he God for himselfe and for another end, but onely for himselfe: therefore the Church, *Cant. 1. 4.* is commended, *quia amat in rectitudinibus*; because she loveth God directly for himselfe; But now men love the creatures onely for themselves, and herein they are Epicures. Some againe love God for the creatures, and these are mercenaries; but these who love God for himselfe, these are his true children; and herein Augustines saying is to be approved, who saith, *frainmur Deo, & utimur alijs*, we enjoy that which wee love for it selfe, but we use that which wee use to another end. But the naturall man would enjoy the creatures, and use God to another end.

Man in innocency loved God, *judicio particulari*, *hic et nunc*, above all things; that is, he knew Iehova to bee the true God, and so loved him. But since the fall, he loveth him, above all things *judicio universali*, for his

N n 3

will

A collation betwixt
the innocent, and old
Adam.

Coll. 2.

Duplex amor, 1. *judicio particulari*, 2. *judicio universali*.

wil oftentimes followeth not his judgment:thē he *loved* himselfe for God, but now he *loveth* all things for himselfe; this inordinate love of a mans selfe breeds contempt of God; but the ordinate *love*, inspired by God, teacheth us first to *love* God and then our selues, 1. *Ioh.* 4. 7. *Let us love one another, because love is of God*, where he sheweth us, that the *love* of our neighbours must proceed from God; therfore the love of our selves must begin also at God. It is true, *Iohn* saith, 1 *Ioh.* 4. 20. *If we love not our brother whom we see, how can we love God whom we see not?* not that the *love* of the regenerate begins first at our neighbour, but this is the most sensible note, to know whether we love God or not: this *love* is a *posteriori*, as the other is a *priori*.

Duplex amor, a posteriori, et a priori.

Object. But it may seeme that a man in corrupt nature, may *love* God better than himselfe, because some heathen haue given their lives for their country, and some for their friends?

Ans. This corrupt *love*, was but for themselves and for their owne vaine glory, and in this they love themselves better than any other thing.

We are bound saith Saint *Augustine*, to *love* some things *supra nos*; secondly, to *love* some thing, *quod nos sumus*; thirdly, to *love*, some things, *juxta nos*, fourthly to *love* some things, *infra nos*.

Coll. 3.

Lib. 1. de doct. Christ.
cap. 5. Gradus amoris
sunt, 1. amare supra nos
2 quod nos sumus 3.
juxta nos. 4. infra nos.

Man in his first estate, *loved* God above himselfe; in the second roome, his owne Soule; in the third place his neighbours soule; and last his owne Body. He was first bound to *love* himselfe, & then his neighbour: his own soule before his neighbours soule; his owne body before his neighbours body; for this is the rule under the Law, *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy selfe*, *Math.* 22. 39 The rule must bee before the thing ruled. It is not said, *Luk.* 3. 12. *he that hath a coate let him giue it to him who wants a coate;* but *he who hath two coates,*

coates, let him give one to him who wants a coate; but under the Gospell the rule of our love must be, as Christ loved us, so we must love our neighbours, *Ioh. 13. 4.* But man since the fall hath inverted this order mightily, he loves his owne body, better than his neighbours soule, than his owne soule, yea better than God; and oftentimes his hogges better than his owne soule, yea than God himselfe, as the *Gergesites* did, *Math. 8. 34.*

Quest. Alexander Hales moves the question, whether the Angels proceed thus in their manner of love; if God be he who is above them, whom they are bound to love above themselves; and in the second roome themselves, & *juxta se*, other Angels: what place must the soule of man come into, in their consideration? whether *juxta*, or *infra*, and what must be the estimation of the body of man in their love?

Hee answers, that the Angels of God doe love the soules of men now, *infra se*, but when we shall be *ισαγγελοι*, like unto the Angels of God, *Math. 22. 33.* then wee shall be loved of them in our soules, *juxta*, *sed non infra se*. And as touching our bodiesthey are beloved of them *infra se*, because the Angels (saith he) desire *primum premium*, & *secundum*, their first reward in God, the second reward for the keeping of man: they shall bee rewarded for their ministrie towards the bodyes and soules of men, for keeping them, when they shall give up their account and say, *behold here are we, and the children whom thou hast given us, Ioh. 17. 12.*

Man before his fall loved God with all his heart.

He loved nothing *supra Deum* he loved nothing in equall ballance with God, he loved nothing contrary to God, hee loved him with all his heart, soule, and strength, and Christ addeth *κατα δυνάμιν*, with the efficacie of the minde and the will, *Mat. 22. 37.* and the learned scribe, *Mark. 12. 31.* addeth a fit word *σύνετις*,

N n 4

with

Duplex premium angelorum; primum, & secundum.

Prop.

Illust.

Nihil amandum supra, juxta, contra, aut æquale Deo.

A collation betwixt
the innocent, and old
Adam.

Duplex amor, intensi-
vus, & appetitiuus.

A collation betwixt
the innocent, and re-
newed Adam.

with his whole understanding. By which diversity of words God lets us see, that man when he was created, loved God unfainedly, and that all the Fountaines or Springs within his soule praised him, *Psal. 87. 7.*

The first Adam loved God with all his heart; but since the fall he loves God *diviso corde*, *Hos. 10. 2.* and he loves something better than God, contrary to God, and equall with God. The Church of Rome makes a double perfection, *perfectio viae*, & *perfectio patriae*, or *perfectio finis*, & *perfectio ordinis*; they say there is not *perfectio patriae* found here; but *perfectio viae*, we may love God with all our heart this way (say they.) But this is false, for when we have done all things, wee must call our selves unprofitable servants, *Luk. 17. 10.*

Wee are to love God more than the creatures, yet it falleth out often, that wee love the creatures *intensive*, more than God; but the child of God loves not the creatures more *appetitive*. A man may more lament the death of his son, than the want of spirituall grace; and yet in his estimation and deliberation, he will be more sorry for the want of Gods grace, than for the want of his sonne.

The first Adam loved God with all his heart, both in quantity and quality; but the renewed Adam is measured by the soundnesse of the heart. Peter being asked of the measure of his love, *Ioh. 21. 15.* Lovest thou me more than these? he answered onely concerning the truth. For being asked of the quantity, he answered onely of the quality, *Lord thou knowest I love thee*; it is the quality thou delight'st in, and not the quantity. Hence it is, when the Scriptures speake of perfection, it is to bee understood of sinceritie: in one place they are said, to be of a perfect heart, and in another, of an upright heart. *1 Chron. 12. 33. 38.*

The love which the renewed man beares to God now,

is but a small measure of love, in respect of that which we shall have to God in the life to come: in the life to come, *our hope and faith shall cease*, 1 Cor. 13. Our faith and hope *ceasing*, our love must be doubled: for as when we shut one of our eyes, the sight must be doubled in the other eye, *vis gemina fortior*; so when faith and hope shall be shut up, our love shall be doubled: *Cum venerit quod perfectum est, abolebitur quod imperfectum est*, 1 Cor. 13. It is true, *Gratia perficit Naturam*, Grace perfects Nature; and so doth Glory, *quoad essentiam*, as touching the essence; *sed evacuat quoad imperfectiones*, it takes away all imperfections. Faith and Hope are but imperfections in the soule, comparing them with the estate in the life to come, they shall be abolished then, and onely love shall remaine, 1 Cor. 13. 8.

Man by naturall discourse, since the Fall, may take up that God is to be *beloved* above all things, although he cannot love him above all things.

That which all men commend in the second roome is better than that which many commend in the first roome. When the battaile was fought at *Thermopyla* against *Xerxes* King of *Persia*, if it had beene demanded of the Captaines severally who was the cheife cause of the victorie, this Captaine would have said it was hee: and this Captaine would have sayd it was hee: then if yee had asked them all in the second place, who fought next best to them, all of them, would have answered, *Themistocles*: therefore he won the field. So aske men severally in their first cogitations, why man should love God; some wil answer, because he is good to them: others, because he bestowes honours upon them: and so their love is resolved into worldly respects, and not into God. But shew them the instabilitie of riches, the vanitie of Honour, and such like, then all of them in their second cogitations, will be forced to graunt, that God is to be *beloved* for himselfe,

A collation betwixt
the renued and glori-
fied Adam.

Prop.

Illust.

The

*The Notes to know the love of God, since
the Fall.*

The markes to know whether we love God, are,

1

First, *Love* makes one soule to live as it were in two bodies, *Nam anima magis est ubi amat, quam ubi animat*; *The soule is more where it loves, than where it animates*: This made the Apostle to say, *Gal. 2. 20. I live not, but Christ lives in me.*

2

The second note is; that those who love dearly, rejoyce together and are grieved together. *Homer* describing *Agamemnon's* affliction, when he was forced to sacrifice his daughter *Iphygenia*, hee represents all his friends accompanying him unto the sacrifice, with a mournfull countenance: and at *Rome*, when any man was called in question, all his friends mourned with him. Therefore it was, that good *Vriah* would not take rest upon his bed, *when the Arke of the Lord was in the fields, 2. Sam. 11. 9.*

3

The third note is, that these who love, would wish to be changed and transformed one into another, but because this transformation cannot be without their destruction, they desire it as neere as they can. But our conjunction with God in Christ is more neere, without the destruction of our persons, *Ioh. 17. 23. I in them, and they in me*; and therefore we should love this conjunction, and most earnestly wish for it.

4

Forma realis & imaginaria.

The fourth note is, that the man which loveth another, not onely loves himselfe, but also his image or picture, and not onely his reall forme, but also his imaginari: they love them that are allyed, or are in kin to them, or like them in manners. So, hee who loveth God, hee loves his children also who are like him, and also their spirituall kinred and affinitie.

The

The fifth note of the *love* of God is; that those who *love* converse together, and are as little absent from one another as can be, they have the same delights and distasts. The presence of the party *beloved* fills the heart of the lover with contentment. So the children of God, their whole delight is to walke with God as *Enoch* did, *Gen.* 5. to be still in his presence: and if hee withdraw himselfe but a little from them, they long wonderfully for his presence againe.

The sixth note is, he that *loveth* transports himselfe often to the place where hee was accustomed to see his friend, hee delights in reading of his letters, and in handling the gages and monuments he hath left behind him. So the child of God to testifie his *love* to God, transports himselfe often to the place where he may find God in his sanctuary, amongst his Saints; hee delights in reading of his letters, (the Scriptures:) hee delights in eating and tasting these holy monuments and pledges (his Sacraments;) which the Lord hath left behind him, as tokens of his *love* untill he come againe.

The seventh note is, when there is any thing, that may seeme to preserve the memory of *love* more liuely in our soules, we embrace the invention here; wherein *Artemisia* Queene of *Caria*, shewed an act of wonderful passion, towards her husband *Manselm*; for death having taken him away, she not knowing how to pull the thornes of sorrow out of her soule, caused his body to be reduced to ashes, and mingled them in her drinke, meaning to make her body a living tombe, wherein the reliques of her husband might rest, from whom she could not endure to live separated. The child of God hath a comfortable and true conjunction with Christ, eating his flesh and drinking his blood, and the two can never be separated againe.

of

Of Adams love to his neighbour.

Prop.

As Adam loved God with all his heart, so he loved his neighbour as himselfe.

Illust.

He loved his owne soule better than his neighbours soule, he loved his owne body better then his neighbours body; but he loved his neighbours soule better than his owne body. We are to love our neighbours as our selves, we are to preferre the safetie of the soule to the safetie of the body, therefore our soule is called, *our darling*, *Psalms. 22.15.* which is most to be beloved.

Consequence. 1.

Cap. 23. Num. 19.

We may not follow the *Phisitians* then, who prescribe sometimes phisicke to their patients to be drunk, that they may recover their health. *NAVARRUS* holds that it is not a sin in the patient, that hee drinke till he be drunke for the recovery of his health.

Conseq. 2.

Although we are to preferre the safetie of the soule, to the safety of the body; yet we are not for the good of the soule to dismember the body, as *Origen* did: misinterpreting these words, *Math. 19. Many are made Eunuchs for the Kingdome of God*, taking them literally, when they are to bee understood metaphorically.

Conseq. 3.

Thom. 2. 2. quest. 66.
art. 3.

As we are not to dismember the body for the good of the soule, so we are not to whip the body for the good of the soule. A man cannot make a free choyce of that which is evill in it selfe, as the *Moralists* prove against the *Stoickes*: who did chuse povertie, although they knew it to bee evill in it selfe: but for a man to whip himselfe, it is evill in it selfe, for in this he usurps the magistrates authoritie.

The magistrates authoritie stands in these foure things: to kill the body: to mutilate the body: *Ex. 21. 24.*

Eye

Eye for eye, and tooth for tooth; to whip the body, *Deut.* 25.3. and to imprison the body, *Levit* 24.12. killing of the body takes away the life it selfe; cutting a member of the body takes away the perfection of the body; whipping of the body takes away the delight and rest of the body: imprisoning of the body takes away the liberty of it. Now as we may not kill our selves, cut a member from our selves, imprison our selves, (for all these belong to the Magistrate) so neither are wee to whip our selves.

Againe, it is not lawfull for a man to weaken his body by fasting. *1 Tim.* 5.33. it was not lawfull for *Timothy* to drinke water for the weakning of his body, therefore it is farre lesse lawfull for a man to whip his body. We read of *Baals* Priests who cut their flesh *2 King.* 18.28. but never of the Priests of the Lord, *Deut.* 14. We haue a warrant moderately to fast sometimes, that the body may bee more subject to the soule, *1 Cor.* 9.37. I chastise my body, and bring it under subjection. So, *Coloss.* 3.5. mortifie your members; but never to whip it. We are not to exceed our strength or to disable our selves, for Gods service: for God doth not desire the hurt of his creature who is about his service: hee will rather forbear some part of his service, than an ox or an asse shall want necessary food: much lesse will he haue a man to indanger himselfe, though it be in his service.

We are to preferre our owne temporary life to our neighbours.

If our neighbour bee equall of degree with us, then wee should preferre our owne life to his life, or if he be our inferiour, we should likewise preferre our owne life to his. But if he be our Soueraigne, we are more bound to save his life than our owne: as for the safetie of the Princes life, the subject is to give his life, *2 Sam.* 19.43. so for the safetie of the common wealth.

A

Prop.

Illust. 1.

A man may hazard his life for the safety of another mans life; who is in prison, perill of death, *Majus enim bonum proximi preferendum minori proprio, sed non aquali*; we are to preferre the greater good of our neighbour, to our owne good that is lesse; but not where there is equall. When my neighbour is in a certaine danger of death, and I but in a hazard; it is a greater good to save my neighbours life, than not to hazard my owne.

Conseq.

We are bound more to save our owne lives, than the lives of our equals: therefore that friendship which is so much commended by the heathen betwixt *Pylades* and *Orestes*, the one giving his life for the other, was not lawfull. So, of that betwixt *Damon* and *Pythias*, when the one would have given his life for the other.

Illust.

As we are to preferre our owne life to our neighbours life, so we are to preferre our selves in temporary things belonging to this life, to our neighbour.

Prop.

Ad quatuor in serviant temporaria, propter necessitatem, propter sufficientiam, propter utilitatem, & propter superfluitatem.

Temporary things serve either for our *necessity*, or for our *utility*, or for our *sufficiency*, or for our *superfluity*. For *necessity*, things serve for the maintenance of our life; *utility*, for our vocation; *sufficiencie*, for our delectation; *superfluity*, for wantonnesse and excessse.

In wishing temporary things, we should put our selves in the first degree, and our neighbour in the second; that which is out of superfluity, I should wish for his sufficiency; and out of my sufficiency, I desire his utility, to further him in his calling; and out of my utility, I should further him in his necessity, to preserve his life: that is, with things necessary to my calling I ought to relieve his life. But men now will not give of their superfluity, to entertaine their neighbours necessity and life: as *Nabal* would not give to *David*, 1 Sam. 25. 10. And the rich glutton to *Lazarus*, Luk. 16. out of their superfluity, to supply their necessity.

Quest.

Quest. Are wee bound to love all our neighbours alike?

Answ. Some answer that we are bound to love them all alike, *affectu, sed non effectu*, we are bound, say they, to love all alike in our internall affection, but we are not bound to helpe all alike; for wee are more bound to these who are neereſt to us, and to help them moſt with our goods.

But *Aquinas* ſheweth this to be falſe, and ſets downe this as a true poſition, that ſome of our neighbours are more to be loved than others, *tum affectu, tum effectu*. His reaſon is, becauſe the hatred of ſome of our neighbours, is a greater hatred, than the hatred of other of our neighbours; therefore we are more bound by the rule of charity, to love ſome of our neighbours (*quoad affectum internum*, in our internall affection) than other: as well as wee are bound more to helpe them *externo effectu*. This is cleare by the rule of contraries. The antecedent is proved, *He that curſeth his father or mother ſhall die the death, Levit. 20.* But the Law appoints no ſuch death to him who curſeth another of his neighbours; therefore it muſt bee a greater ſinne to curſe their Parents than other of their neighbours, or to wiſh them evill. Therefore we are more bound to love them in our affection, as wee are more bound to helpe them than others.

Quest. Whether are we bound to love thoſe more, in whom wee ſee more grace although they be ſtrangers to us: than thoſe of our kindred, in whom we ſee not ſo great meaſure of grace.

Answ. Wee are to love thoſe moſt, in whom we ſee moſt grace *objective*, that is, in reſpect of the bleſſednes that is deſired, becauſe they are neerer joyned to us in God. A center, out of which iſſueth many Lines; the further they are extended from the Center, they are the further

*Amor eſt tum in affectu,
tum in effectu.*

*Amor obſectum &
apprehenſum.*

further dis-united amongst themselves; and the neerer that they draw to the Center, they are the neerer united. So, those who are neereſt to God, ſhould be neereſt to us, and we ſhould wiſh to them the greateſt meaſure of happineſſe.

But thoſe who are neereſt to us in the fleſh, and in the Lord, *Phil. 2. 21.* ſhould be more deare to us *appre- tiative*, and in our eſtimation, although they have not ſuch meaſure of grace. And ſo Chriſt loved *Iohn* better than the reſt of his Diſciples, *Ioh. 13. 23.* becauſe he was both his couſin german, and had more grace in him: but he wiſhed not a greater meaſure of glory to him than to *Paul*, *objective*; For he that doth moſt his will, are his brother and ſiſter, *Math. 12. 50.*

Duplex ratio amoris, obiecti, & originis.

So that we come under a threefold conſideration of Chriſt here; for he is conſidered as God; as Media- tor God and man; and as man: Chriſt, as God, loved not *Iohn* better than the reſt; Chriſt, as Mediator, loved him not better; but Chriſt, as man, loved him better than the reſt.

We are more bound to love our Parents, than any o- ther of our neighbours, both in temporall and ſpirituall things, *1 Tim. 5. 4* If a widow have children, let them learn to requite their Parents: in the Syriacke it is, *rependere ſanus parentibus*. A man divideth his goods into three parts: firſt, ſo much he ſpends upon himſelfe, his wife, and ſervants: ſecondly, ſo much he gives to the poore: thirdly, ſo much he lends to his children, looking for intereſt backe againe. Againe, we are more bound to them, than thoſe of whom we have received greateſt be- nefits; yea, than him that hath delivered us from death: *Dijs & parentibus non poſſunt reddi equalia*. This is *ἀντιπελαργεῖν*, as the young Storkes uphold the old when they are flying. Hence comes *νόμος πελάργικος* that is, as the fathers have ſuſtained the children, ſo ſhould the chil- dren the fathers againe.

Ariſt. lib. 8. Ethic.

The

The Hebrewes say, What is the honor that the children owe unto their parents? They owe to them maintenance, and reverence; they should give them meat, drinke, and cloathing; they should leade them in, and leade them out. And they adde further, *we reade, Honour the Lord with thy substance*, and, *Honour thy father and mother*: thou art to honour God with thy substance, if thou haue any substance; but thou art to honour thy parents, whether thou haue any substance, or not; for if thou haue not, thou art bound to begge for thy parents: So saith R. Salomon, in his Glosse upon *Levit. 10. 3.*

Wee are to love our Parents more than our Children in giving them honor, for they are neerer to us than our Children, being the instruments of our *being*.

Arist. lib. Ethic.

Wee are to succour our Parents, in case of extreme necessity, rather than our children: *Filium subuenire parenti proprio, honestius est quam sibi ipsi*; It is a more honest thing to helpe the Parent, than a mans selfe; and there is a greater conjunction betwixt the father and the sonne in *esse absoluto*, than betwixt us and our children: and therefore in that case of necessity, he is more bound to helpe his father than his child.

Where there is not such a case of extreme necessity, wee are more bound to helpe his Child than his Parent; *The Children lay not up for the Parents, but the Parents for the Children*, 2. Cor. 12. 14. And the reason is, because the father is ioyned with the son, as the cause with the effect; *Sed causa influit in effectum*, The cause workes in the effect; so should the Parent communicate with his child.

Secondly, the father is ioyned with the sonne as with a part of himselfe, and comming from himselfe: which cannot be said of the child to the father.

Thirdly, the love of the father towards the child is

O O

elder,

Prop.

How a man is to pre-
ferre himselfe to his
neighbour in tempo-
rall things.

elder, and continueth longer ; for the fathers loue their children even from their Cradle : but the children love not their fathers, till they be come to the yeeres of discretion ; for the more old that love is, the more perfect it is

Wee are more bound to love our father than our mother : we are more bound to love our wives than our parents, because the man and the wife are one flesh ; and, *a man should leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife, Math. 19.* For reverence and honour, hee is more to honour his parents than his wife, but otherwise he is to supply her wants in temporary things before his fathers.

As we are to preferre our owne temporary life to our neighbours life, so also we are to preferre our owne spirituall life to the life of our superiors or equals.

Our temporary life, should not be so deare to us as his spirituall life, and wee ought to imitate Christ, who gave his life for the spirituall life of his children, *1 Ioh. 3. 16.*

Quest. But what is the spirituall necessity of our neighbour, for the which we are bound to give our temporary life ?

*Triplex necessitas, gra-
vis, non gravis, et ex-
trema.*

Ans. There is a threefold necessity : first that which is *not an urgent necessity* : secondly, that which is *an urgent necessity* : Thirdly, that which is an *extreme necessity*.

First, when the necessity is not great, and when my neighbour can provide for his spirituall life, without the hazard of my temporary life : in this case I am not bound to give my temporary life for his spirituall life.

Secondly, if the necessity be such, that he cannot without great difficulty save his spirituall life, in this case I ought to hazard my temporary life for his spirituall life

Thirdly, if his spirituall life be in extreme necessity ;
for

for then I am to lay downe my temporary life for him.

Here we see that pastors who are the shepheards of the soules of the people, are bound to watch over their people committed to their charge, and with losse of their owne lives to succour them in their absolute extremity, *Ioh. 10. 11. The good shepheard giveth his life for the sheep, but the hireling fleeth.*

Wee are not to give our temporary life for the spirituall life of our neighbour, but in case of extreme necessity, therefore that case which *Navarrus* propounds in his cases of popish conscience, is not to be allowed. If a Christian should have a child borne to him amongst the Pagans, and the child were neere death; whether or no were a Preacher bound to baptize that child although hee knew certainly that the Pagans would kil him? *Navarrus* holds, that this child being in a spirituall imminent danger of eternall death for want of baptisme, the Preacher is bound to baptize him, although he knew it should cost him his life.

But there is no such necessity of baptisme, that the want of it can bring eternall death to the child; but onely the contempt of it; therefore this case of necessity is but an imaginary necessity, and if a man in this case would hazard himselfe, he were guilty of his owne death.

Although we are to preferre our owne salvation to the salvation of others, yet we may desire the deferring of it for a while for the good of others.

Phil. 1. 23. 24. It is good for me to be dissolved, but better for you that I remaine in this body: it was for this cause that *Ezekias* desired to live, that he might goe up to the house of the Lord and see Gods glory set up there, and the peoples salvation set forward, *Esay, 38. so Martinus said, Si adhuc Domine sum populo tuo necessarius, non recuso laborem: if I can be steadable yet Lord to thy people, I refuse not to undergoe any travell amongst them.*

Conseq. 1.

Conseq. 2.

Prop.

How we are to preferre our neighbour to our selves in spirituall things.

Illust.

Although it be lawfull for us to desire the deferring of our happinesse for a time, for the good of others : yet it is not lawfull for a man to desire the perpetuall delay of his blessednesse for the good of others.

Object. But *Paul* wished, that he might be *Anathema* for the people of God, *Rom. 9. 3.* and so *Moses* wished that hee might bee rased out of the Booke of life for the Iewes, *2 Exod. 32. 32.*

Answer. It was for Gods glory that they wished this, and not simply for the Iewes, because Gods glory was manifested in them.

Aliquid amatur objective, et appetitivè.

In the spirituall things which a man is bound to desire for himselfe and his neighbour, he is more bound to desire his owne salvation, *appetitivè*; as if it were necessarie either for mee or *Peter* to perish, I had rather *Peter* perished : but these who are more holier than I am and have greater graces, they are more to be beloved *objective*, in respect of the good that is desired, and I am more bound to seeke a higher degree of glory to him, than to my selfe; and herein I follow the will of God, because I should be content of that measure that he hath bestowed upon me.

We are to preferre our owne salvation to the salvation of others : therefore it is not lawfull to commit a sin, for the safety of our neighbour, *Math. 16. What availeth it a man to get the whole world, and he lose his owne soule? sinne is the losse of the soule.*

A collation betwixt the innocent, first, and old *Adam*.

Man before his fall loved his neighbour as himselfe : but the unregenerate now, they think it is love sufficient if they hate not their neighbour. Others (as the *Pharisees*) thinke that their love is sufficient, if they think well to their friend, and hate their enemies. There is a third sort who will have compassion upon their enemies if they submit themselves to them, but this may be found in generous beasts, as in the *Lyon*.

The

The regenerate man loves his neighbour as himselfe ; not onely him who is his next neighbour called *vicinus* or his doore neighbour, or him who is neere in friendship or blood to him : but him who is neere in nature to him, being his owne flesh : therefore the Apostle expounding these words, *Luk. 10. 27, Thou shalt love thy neighbour* : expounds *thy neighbour*, τὸν πλησίον, *Rom. 13. 8. any other man.*

A Collation betwixt
the old and renewed
Adam.

But the love of the unregenerate, extends not it selfe so farre, for he loves his friend, and hates his enemy : but Christ extends this *love* of our neighbour to our enemies also, *Mat. 5. 44.* and the Law expoundeth it so likewise : for in *Exo. 23. 4.* it is said, *Thou shalt love thine enemy* : but *Dent. 22. 1.* the same law being repeated calls him, *thy brother*. now neighbour & brother in the scripture are used in one sense : and it is to bee marked that when the two Hebrews strove together, *Moses calleth them brethren. Act. 7. 25. Ye are brethren, why doe you strive ?* So that our enemies are our brethren as Christ sheweth in the parable of the Samaritane, *Luke 10*

Quest. How are we to love our enemies ?

Ans. Our enemies are considered, First, as our private enemies : or as Gods enemies, and to his Church Secondly, wee must distinguish betwixt our owne private cause, and Gods cause. Thirdly, we must distinguish betwixt the persons of evill men, and the actions of evill men.

Wee are to love our enemies, although they have wronged us, and should love their persons : we are to pray against their sinnes, but not their persons, *2. Sam. 15. 31. Act. 42. 9.* Wee are bound to wish to our private enemies, things temporary, unlesse these things be hurtfull to them : but if they be enemies to the Church, we are not to supply their wants, unlesse we hope by these means to draw them to the Church.

But if the persons sinne unto death, 1 Iob. 5. 19. then we are to pray, not onely against their actions, but also against their persons; and because few have the spirit to discern these, wee should apply these imprecations used in the Psalmes, against the enemies of the Church in generall.

Quest. Whether is the love of God and of our neighbour, one sort of love or not?

Objectum amoris vel est formale, vel materiale.

Vno habitu charitatis diligimus, deum & proximum licet actu distinguantur.

Ans. It is one sort of love; the formall object of our love in this life is God, because all things are reduced to God by love; the materiall object of our love is our neighbour, here they are not two sorts, but one love: and as there is but *unus spiritus & varia dona*, one Spirit and diversity of gifts, 1 Cor. 12. so there are *duo praecepta & unus amor*, two precepts and one love.

The remedies to cure sinfull love since the fall.

That wee may cure our sinfull love, and set it upon the right object:

First, wee must turne our senses, that they be not *incentivum et fomentum amoris perversi*; that is, that our senses bee not the provokers and nourishment of perverse love. It is memorable which *Augustine* marks, that the two first corrupt loves began at the eye. First, the love of *Eva* beholding the forbidden fruit, which brought destruction to the soules of men. Secondly, when the Sonnes of God, saw the daughters of men to be faire, they went in to them, Gen. 6. 1. this sin brought on the deluge; it had beene a profitable lesson then for them, *if they had made a covenant with their eyes*, Iob 31. 1.

Secondly, it is a profitable helpe, to draw our affections from things beloved, to consider seriously, what arguments we may draw from the things which we love,

that

that wee may alienate our minds from them; and wee shall find more hurt by the things we set our love upon, than wee can find pleasure in them. If *David* when he look't upon *Bethsabe* with an adulterous eye, had remembered what fearefull consequence would have followed: as the torment of conscience, the defiling of his daughter *Tamar*, and of his concubines, and, that the sword should never depart from his house; *2 Sam. 11. 12.* and a thousand such inconveniences, hee would have said, this will be a deare bought sinne.

Thirdly, consider the hurts which this perverse love breeds, *He who loves sin hates his owne soule, Psal. 10. 5.*

Fourthly, let thy minde be busied upon lawfull objects, and idlenesse would bee eschued, it was idlenesse which brought the *Sodomites* to their sin, *Qui otio vacanti rem negotiosissimam incidunt*; these who are given to idlenesse fall into many troublesome businesses.

CHAP. VII.

Of Hatred.

Hatred is a turning of the concupiscible appetite from that which is evill, or esteemed evill.

Man in his first estate loved God with all his heart: but since the fall, he is become a hater of God, *Rom. 1. 30* and of his neighbour, *1 Ioh. 2. 9.* and of himselfe, *Psal. 10. 5.* How can God (who is absolutely good) be hated, seeing there is no evill in him?

Answ. God cannot be directly the object of our hatred: bonum in universali, cannot be hated; God is both truth and goodnesse; therefore he cannot be hated. The understanding lookes to truth, and the will to goodnesse; God is both truth and goodnesse; therefore hee

Odiū est quo voluntas resilit ab objecto disconvenienti, vel ut disconvenienti.

A collation betwixt the innocent, and old Adam.

Quest.

cannot be hated in himselfe, but in some particular respect; as men hate him, because he inflicteth the evill of punishment upon them, or because hee commandeth them something, which they thinke hard to doe; as restraining them in their pleasure or profit.

So the wicked they hate not the word as the word, but as it crosseth their lewd appetites, and curbes their desires, *Gal. 4. 6. Am I become your enemy because I tell you the truth?* The sheepe hates not the Wolfe, as it is a living creature; for then it should hate the Oxe also; but the Sheepe hates the Wolfe as hurtfull to it; and in this sense Men are said to be haters of God.

These who behold that infinite good, cannot hate him, but of necessity love him; therefore the sin of the devils was, the turning away of their sight from God, and the reflection of their understanding upon themselves, admiring their owne sublimity, remembering their subordination to God; this grieved them, wherby they were drowned with the conceite of their owne pride; whereupon their *delectation*, *adoration*, and *imitation* of God and goodnesse were interrupted. So long as they beheld the Majesty of God, they had delectation in his beauty, *adoration* of his majesty, and *imitation* of his exemplary goodnesse.

Quest. Whether is the *hating* of God, or the *ignorance* of God the greater sinne: it may seeme that the *hating* of God is the greater sinne; *Nam cuius oppositum est melius, ipsum est peius*, for that whose opposite is best, it must be worse it selfe; but the *love* of God is better than the *knowledge* of God: therefore the *hating* of God is a greater sinne, than the *ignorance* of God.

Ans. The *hatred* of God, and the *ignorance* of God, are considered two wayes; either as *hatred* includes *ignorance*, or as they are severally considered. As *hatred* includes *ignorance*, then *hatred* is a greater sinne than *igno-*

Diabolus tria amisit in lapsu, delectationem in pulchritudine Dei: adorationem maiestatis: & imitationem exemplaris bonitatis.

Arist. ethic. 8. c. 6.

rance,

rance, because he that *hates* God must be *ignorant* of him.

But if we consider them severally; then ignorance is to be distinguished into *ignorantia pura negationis*, and *ignorantia prava dispositionis*; and this latter ignorance, proceeding from a perverse disposition of the Soule which will not know God, as *Pharaoh* sayd, *Who is the Lord that I should know him, and obey his voyce? Exod. 5. 2.* must be a greater sin than hatred, for such ignorance is the cause of *hatred*; and in vices the cause must be worfe then the effect: but *perverse ignorance* is the cause of the *hatred* of God. Therefore this sort of ignorance, is a greater sinne than the *hating* of God.

We must not then understand the *axiome* according to the first sence here; for there is no contrarietie betwixt *hatred* and *ignorance*; because the one includes the other. But where they are severally considered, then the rule holds in these oppositions which are opposite in the same respect; as one contrary to another, one contradictory to another; if white be the most bright colour, then blacke must be the most darke colour: here the *axiome* holds, because there is a direct opposition in contrariety of the same kind. So, good is to be followed, good is not to be followed: this opposition holds in contradiction of the same thing.

But this rule will not hold betwixt a contrary and a contradictory joyned together, *secundum gradus perfectionis*: as, *love* is a greater vertue than *knowledge*; therefore *not to love* is a greater vice than *hatred*: this doth not follow; for *hatred* is a greater vice, than *not to love*.

Now, when the *hatred* of God, and the *ignorance* of God are compared together, with their opposites *love* & *knowledge*, *secundum oppositionem et comparative*, *love* and *hatred* are opposed contrarily; but *knowledge* and *ignorance*.

Duplex oppositio, contrarietatis & contradictionis.

Quæ opponuntur privative vel contradictorie magis opponuntur quàm quæ contrarie; scire & ignorare contradictorie opponuntur amare & odire contrarie.

A collation betwixt the second and renewed Adam.

Duplex perfectio graduum & partium.

Duplex odium secundum intensiorem et extensionem.

ignorance are opposed privately and contradictory. Now there is a greater opposition betwixt two contradictories, than betwixt two contraries; therefore the *ignorance* of God must be a greater sinne, then the hatred of God: and herethe Axiome holds. The misery of the damned (it is thought,) consists not so much in the want of the *love* of God, as the want of the sight of God.

The Lord Iesus Christ his *hatred* was a perfect *hatred* of sinne, both in *parts* and *degrees*: hee hated sinne to the full, both *intensively* and *extensively*; as he loved God with all his heart, strength and might, so hee *hated* sinne *intensively* to the full with all his strength and might, and also *extensively*; that is, hee hated all sorts of sinne with a perfect *hatred*, and cheifely those sinnes that were most opposite to the glory of God his father, as was *idolatrie*.

But the regenerate, hate sinne with the *perfection* of *parts*, but not of *degrees*, *Psal. 139.22. Doe I not hate them with a perfect hatred who hate thee*: that is onely a *perfection* on *parts*, but not in *degrees*.

Againe, they hate not sinne to the full *intensive*: for, *the good that they would doe, that they doe not, Rom. 7.15.* neither do they hate sinne to the full, *extensive*. *David* hated *Idolatrie*, but yet not to the full, when hee brought home the Arke of God from *Iearimoth* in the house of *Abinadab*, and set it up in the house of *Obed-Edom*, *2 Sam. 2. 10.* he tooke away the *Philistines* golden Myce, and the Hemorrhoides, *1 Sam. 6.4.* but yet hee set the Arke upon a new cart which he made himselfe (for the men of *Bethshemesh* had cut the *Philistines* cart, *1 Sam. 6. 14.*) which he ought not to have done: for the Arke should have beene carried upon the Priests shoulders, *Numb. 7.9*, and not upon a cart: heerein he followed the example of the *Philistines*: so *Iunius* expounds it.

Some

Some of the good Kings of *Judah* tooke away the *Idolles*, but yet the high places were not removed, *2 King.* 12.4. the reason of this is, because, *Idolatrie is a worke of the flesh*, *Gal.* 5.20. And we hate not the workes of the flesh perfectly.

The hatred of the regenerate is a perfect hatred in parts against sinne, although not in degrees. But the hatred of the wicked is but a faint hatred against idolatry of this or that sort.

The hatred of the wicked is not a perfect hatred against idolatry: therefore they labour to reconcile true & false religion: such were these in *Corinth*, who were both partakers of the cuppe of the Lord, and the cuppe of Divels, *1 Cor.* 10. and these who halted betwixt God and *Baal*, *1 King.* 18.21. So these who would agree us and the Church of *Rome*, making no difference in the fundamentall points of our religion; but, *what communion can there bee betwixt light and darknesse*: *2 Cor.* 6.14.

There were some who studie to reconcile the *Stoicks* and *Peripateticks*: but *Cicero* sayd, they cannot bee reconciled, *quia non agitur de finibus, sed de ipsa hereditate*: we controvert not with the church of *Rome* about landmarks, but for the inheritance it selfe.

In Christ there was a twofold hatred. First, the hatred of abomination. Secondly the hatred of enmitie the hatred of abomination was when Christ distasted the evill done against his Father, himselfe, or his members; hating this sinne as contrary to his goodnesse, and as hurtfull to his members. The hatred of enmitie is when Christ willethe the punishment of the person because of the evill he is defiled with: hee will have a man to be punished as a wicked man, but not as a man. As by the first sort he hated the sinne, so by the second hee hated the sinner.

A collation betwixt the renewed and old Adam.

Conseq.

A collation betwixt the second and old Adam.

Duplex odium, abominis, & inimicitie.

But

But the unregenerate, sometimes doe hate the person, but not the sinne; *Judah* bad bring foorth his daughter in law *Thamar* and burne her *Gen. 38 24.* when he was as guilty of the sin himselfe; in this he was not regenerate.

Some againe connive at the sinne, for the person; as *Eli*, who bore with the sinnes of his children because he loved them so well, *1 Sam. 2. 23.*

Some againe hate the person for the good found in them; as, *Odi Michaiam, I hate him, 1 King. 22. 8.* Some care not, if both the sinne and the person perish together. *Gobrias* willed *Darius* to kill him and his enemy together; *sed non probamus illud, pereat amicus cum inimico*, we approve not that, let a friend perish with a foe; but we should save the one, and kill the other. *Levit. 19. 17. Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart, but reprove him;* We should hate his sinne but love the person.

*Differunt odium, ira,
& invidia.*

*Ira est circa individua,
odium circa speciem.*

Hatred, Anger and Envy, differ; first, *anger* is particular, as we are *angry* with *Peter* or *Iohn* for some offence they have done us; but *hatred* is generall against the sinne it selfe.

Secondly, *anger* may bee cured by procelle of time, but *hatred* is incureable, for no time can cure it.

Thirdly, *anger* hath bounds, if one be angry at another, and see any calamity befall him, which exceedeth the limits of a common revenge, he hath pitie upon his enemy: but *hatred* is never satisfied.

Again, *hatred* differeth from *envy*; for *hatred* ariseth upon the conceit of the wrong done to us or ours, or generally to all mankind; whereas *envy* hath for the object, the felicities or prosperities of other men.

Secondly, *hatred* is also in brute beasts; but *envy* is onely found in man.

The remedies to cure sinfull hatred.

The remedies to cure this sinfull *hatred* are: first, consider that the man whom thou hatest most, may be helpfull to thee againe. *Ioseph* once most hated of his brethren, yet necessitie mooved them to love him againe. So the Elders of *Gilead* who did hate *Iephthah* and expelled him out of his fathers house, *Judg. 11. 7.* but when the time of tribulation came, he became their beloved head and Captaine.

Secondly, if we would make good use of our *hatred*, we must employ it against vice, and against these objects, the love and pursuite whereof may pollute the heart, and blemish the image of God which shineth in our soules.

Thirdly, if we should cure *hatred*, we must represent the miseries which doe commonly accompany the pursuites of envy; we must set before our eyes the shipwreck of so many famous persons, that have lost themselves upon this shelve, and wee must represent to our selves the crosses, paines, and torments which this wretched passion doth cause.

CHAP. VIII.

Of desire.

DESIRE, is a passion which we have to attaine to a good thing which we enjoy not, that wee imagine is fitting for us.

Desire differeth from love and pleasure; it differeth from love, for love is the first passion which wee have of any good thing, without respect whether it

Desiderium est voluntarius affectus, ut res que bona existimatur & deest, vel existat, vel possideatur.

Differt desiderium, ab amore & delectatione.

Prop.

Illust.

*Duplex desiderium, spiritus
ritualis, & naturalis
boni.*

A collation betwixt
the second and rene-
wed Adam.

*Triplex est desiderium,
naturale, rationale, &
spirituale.*

*Voluntas rationis du-
plex est, rationis ut ra-
tio est, & rationis ut
naturae est.*

it be present or absent: but *desire* is a passion for good that is absent; and *pleasure* is the contentment that wee have when we have gotten a thing.

Man in the first estate, his *desires* were rightly set and moderate.

His *desires* were either of *spirituall things*, or *naturall things*. In *spirituall things*, his *desires* were speedily carried to the right object God: for as heavy things the neerer that they draw to the center, the more speedily they are carried to the same, so *Adams desires* being so neere God the center, they were speedily carried unto him; and in *naturall things* his *desires* were few and moderate; for even as the Children of God, the neerer they draw to their end, they have the fewer *desires* of worldly things: so, *Adam* being so neere that heavenly glory, few and moderate were his *desires* of worldly things.

The *desires* of Christ were alwayes subordinate to the will of God his father: but the *desires* of the regenerate, they are many times not subordinate to the wil of God.

Object. But it may be sayd that Christs *desires* were not alwayes subordinate to the will of his father, when as he *desired* the cup to passe, which his father willed him to drinke, *Matb. 26. 39.*

Answ. There is a three-fold *desire*: first, a *naturall desire*: secondly, a *reasonable desire*: thirdly, a *spirituall desire*: every one of those by their order are subordinate to another, and there is no repugnancy amongst them.

A man hath Saint *Anthonies* fire in his hand, a Chirurgical comes to cut it off; the naturall *desire* shrinkes and puls backe the hand, because nature seekes the preservation of it selfe: but the reasonable *desire* saith, rather than the whole body shall be consumed, hee will command the Chirurgical to cut off the hand; here is no repug-

repugnancy betwixt the *naturall* and *reasonable desire*, but a subordination. In Feavers, wee *desire* to drinke, and yet we will not; and so in Apoplexies to sleepe, and yet we will not.

This will of reason made *Scevola* to hold his hand in the fire untill it burnt. A Martyr is carried to the stake to bee burnt, the *naturall desire* shrinkes, seeking the preservation of it selfe; but yet it submits it selfe, to the *spirituall desire*, which commeth on, and saith: rather than thou dishonour God, goe to the fire and be burnt; this *spirituall desire* made *Cranmer* to hold his hand in the fire till it burnt.

In Christ there are three *desires* or *wils*; his *divine will*; his *reasonable will*, and his *naturall will*. There was no repugnancy amongst these *wils*, for his *reasonable will*, absolutely willed that, which his *divine will* willed; and although his *naturall will* was different from his other two *wils*, declining the evill of punishment, and seeking the preservation of it selfe: yet there was no contrarietie here, for these which are contrarie, must be contrary *secundum idem, et circa idem*, according to the same object, and in the same respect; but, his *naturall will*, and his *divine will* the one willing that the cup should passe, and the other willing it should not passe, were in divers respects; for God willed Christ to die for the purging of the sins of men; but Christ as man willed the cup to passe; seeking the preservation of nature only.

Christs humane will was conforme to the will of the Godhead, in the thing willed formally; that is, when hee beheld this cup, as the middle to purchase mans salvation; but it was divers from it, considering the cup materially in it selfe, as it was a bitter cup.

Example when a Iudge wils a theefe to bee hanged, and the wife of this theefe wils him not to bee hanged, for her owne private weale; here is no contrarietie betwixt

In Christo tres fuerunt voluntates, divina, rationalis, & naturalis. Voluntates non fuerunt contrariae, licet volita fuerunt contraria.

Duplex est velle, formale, & materiale.

twixt the two wils. But if the wife of the theefe, should will her husband to live, as an enemy to the commonwealth, then her will should be contrary to the Iudges will.

This *naturall will* in Christ hindred not his divine and reasonable will; and it willed nothing but that which these wils willed it to will, for they had the absolute commandement over it: neither was there any strife betwixt them, as betwixt the flesh and the spirit in the regenerate, *Gal. 5.* but still a subordination.

Illust.

The subordination of the wils in Christ, may be illustrated by this comparison. Although the inferior spheares of the heavens, be carried another course than the highest spheres are, yet notwithstanding they hinder not the course of the highest sphere, but all their motions are moderate and temperate, by the motion of the highest sphere. So although this *naturall will* in Christ seemed to goe a divers course, from his *reasonable* and *divine will*; yet it was moderate by his *superior wils*, and did nothing but that which his *superior wils* willed it to will, *Esay 53.* *He offered himselfe because hee would, Ioh. 10.* *I lay downe my life*: so that every will kept that which was proper to it selfe. *Voluntas divina, iustitiam; voluntas rationis, obedientiam; voluntas carnis, naturam volebat*: that is, his *divine will*, willed justice; his *reasonable will*, willed obedience; and the wil of his flesh, willed the preservation of his nature.

Answ. How saith *Luke 22. 44.* that he being in his agonie hee prayed a long space that the cuppe might passe, then it might seeme, that there was a contrarietie betwixt his wils?

Answ. This strife was not properly betwixt his two wills, but betwixt his *naturall will* and death, which nature shunned as contrary to it: this fight wee see in children and in brute beasts; in children who have not the

Nulla erat contrarietas inter voluntates Christi, sed inter voluntatem & mortem.

the act of reason; this is no other thing then the feare of imminent evill.

Christ *desired* this cup to passe. There is a double desire or willing in the *will*: either an *absolute will*, or a *conditionall will*: *absolute*, as when I wish a thing without any condition: as, happines. *Conditionall*, when I will it with a condition: as, a man would not give his purse to the robbers, if he could escape death; hee wils this conditionally onely to escape the danger. So our Lord willed not absolutely to drinke this cuppe, but seeing that God his Father had determinate this way, that mans salvation should bee purchased, Christ would drinke this cup.

Duplex voluntas, absoluta & conditionalis.

In Christs *desires* there was no reluctation, but subordination: but in the regenerate, their desires are with some reluctation, and they are not fully subordinate. When Christ sayd to Peter, *They shall carry thee whither thou wouldest not*, Ioh. 21. 18. meaning what death he should die; there was some *sinfull* reluctation here, betwixt Peters *spirituall desire*; and his *naturall desire*; although hee gave his life in the end for the truth.

A collation betwixt the second, renewed and old Adam.

But the *wils* of the unregenerate, are no wayes subordinate to the will of God. When Christ saith, *Let this cuppe passe yet not my will be done but thine*, Luk. 22. 42. here is not a *correction* of Christs *desire*, but onely an *explication* of it. But when Peter gave his life for the truth there needed a *correction* of his *desire*, because there was some unwillingnes in him.

Voluntas indiger. explicatione, & subjectione.

But the wicked their *desires* have need of *subjection* to the will of God.

Conseq. 1.

Christs *naturall will* sought the preservation of it selfe, which his *divine wil* would not: hence it followeth that a man may *naturally* will that without sinne, which his *spirituall will* wils not.

P p

We

Conseq. 2.

We should learne by Christs example to subiect our wil to the *will* of God, and to seek the things of this life, but with condition.

Conseq. 3.

A col'ation betwixt
the renewed and old
Adam.

If Christ submitted his naturall will, to the *will* of the Father which was not sinfull, much more must wee learne to submit our *sinfull desires* to his *will*.

The *desires* of the regenerate are moderate; the *desire* of the *unregenerate* are immoderate. *Agur* prayeth, *Prov. 30. Da mihi lechem chukki, panem dimensum mei*, as the *Israelites*, had their *Manna* measured out to them in a gomer: *Exod. 16.* so *Agur* desires that God would give him the measure that is fit for him. They are content with that *σπουδαισιον*, *Luk. 12. 42.* which signifyeth a mans stint: where he alludeth to the care of governors of families or stewards, who doe allow to every one in the house their portions see *James 2. 15.* They having meate and cloth they are content, *1 Tim. 6. 8.* nature taught some men to be content with little, grace can teach them to be content with lesse.

The Prophet *Esay* in his fourteenth chapter and fourth verse, noting the insatiable desire which men have to riches calls *Babel gold-thirsty Babel*: and *Habac. 2. 6.* saith, *Woe be to you who load your selfe with thick clay*; meaning gold and riches. The desires of beasts are finite, but the desires of unregenerate men are infinite when they come to the measure what will suffice them.

The *Philosopher* saith, the cause of this, is *to live*, but not *to live well*; the beasts when they are satisfied for the present content themselves, neither seeke they any more: the *Lyon* when he hath killed the *Bull*, satisfieth his hunger, but hides not up the rest in the ground: neither doe the fowles lay up any thing, *Math. 6. 26.* onely creeping things and most imperfect lay up: as, the *Pismire* hardes up in Sommer against the Winter, *Prov. 6.*

but

but man is not satiate for hoording and treasuring up for the time to come: his desires are so infinite.

The ancient Philosophers compared the *first matter*, to an infamous strumpet, who is never gluttied with present pleasure but still doth meditate upon new embracings, for it still desireth new formes. But wee have more reason to compare our *desires* which are insatiable to this strumpet.

Quest. Whether are mans *desires* infinite or not?

Ans. They are not actually infinite, because nature tends alwayes to some finite thing, for no man desireth infinite meate; yet his desires are infinite by succession, because these bodily things which wee *desire* are not permanent, *Nam pereunte uno desiderio succedit alterum* One desire being gone, another comes in place of it: Christ saith, *He who drinkes of this water shal never thirst again*; So he that hath true desire after righteousness shall be satisfied; but he that thirsts after the things of this life, shall bee in a continuall thirst, like the Horse-leach which hath two daughters, crying continually, Give, give, Prov. 30. 15.

Duplex infinitas, actualis, & per successionem.

Leo Hebraei.

The remedies to cure these sinfull desires.

That we may cure these sinfull desires. First, wee must take heed that these desires of ours, be not suffered to gather strength, but we must choke them in the very beginning, and dash the heads of the young ones against the wal, Psal. 173. crush this Cocatrice egge in the beginning, lest it come to a Serpent, Esai. 30. 6. *In confinibus est arcendus hostis*, the enemy is to be beaten back while he is in the borders.

Secondly, we must thinke often how neere we are to death, and this wil restraine our covetous desires, *parum*

via & multum viatici, To have a short way and much provision, is a foolish thing.

Thirdly, to remedy our covetous *desires* we should marke, that there is no passion so much to bee detested as it, because this monstrous passion draweth no contentment from that which it gathereth together. Wee abhorre more the *Cantharides*, than Lyons, Tigers, or Beares; for they kill men and reape no fruite of their death, whereas the savage beasts when they kill any feedethemselves and satisfie their hunger: So these covetous desires when they have scraped much together they make no use of that which they have gathered.

Of the passion of abomination contrary to desire.

Abomination is a passion which is opposire to desire, for it is the same which makes us to abhorre or flee that which wee most distast; this was in Christ himselfe. *Luk.* That which is in high request with men, is in *abomination* before God: *abomination* and *hatred*, both abhorres evill, but *abomination* doth shunne evill in a higher degree than *hatred*, and hath a greater detestation of it. *Hatred* respects the evill present, *abomination* the evill to come.

CHAP. IX.

Of Pleasure or delight.

PLeasure, is a passion arising from the sweetnesse of the object which wee enjoy As the fabricke of the heaven makes the motion upon the two poles of

of the world: which are as the two points where it begins and ends, So all the passions of our soule depend upon pleasure and paine, which arise from the contentment or distast, which we receive from the objects.

As desire lookes to the thing to come, and love to the thing present: so pleasure looks to the *delight* in enjoying the thing.

God was the center of mans delight in the creation.

Some thing is in the *center*, *primo et per se*; as the earth by it selfe, and there it rests immooveable. Secondly, the metals in the earth are in the *center*, immooveable, but not *primo*, for there they are by the earth whereof they proceed. Thirdly a stone above the earth is in the *center*, but rests not there immooveably, Fourthly, some things are not in the *center*, as when iron is drawne up by the loadstone: so when a man rests in a shippe he is not in the center.

To make the application: Iesus Christ the second *Adam* is in the *center* (God) *primo & per se*, first and by himselfe, and rests there immoveably, therefore his delights must be the greatest. The Angels and the *glorified Spirits* are in the center, and rest there immooveably, but they are not there, *primo & per se*, therefore their delight is not so great as Christs. Man in his creation was in the *center*, but hee was there mutably, therefore his delight was not so great as the sight of the *glorified Spirits*.

But man unregenerate rests not at all in the *center*, he is like the yron drawne up by the loadstone which is not in the center: or like a man who rests in a shippe: therefore his delight must be most miserable. The soules of the wicked are sayd to be, *in a sling*, 1 Sam. 25. 21 *the soules of my Lords enemies shall be in a sling*: wee see in what a violent motion a stone when it is put in a sling, it is not then in the proper *center*; so the soule when it

Prop.

Illust.

Aliquid est in centro. 1. per se et immobiliter, 2. immobiliter, sed non per se, 3. mobiliter est in centro, 4. quod nullo modo est in centro.

A collation betwixt the second, innocent glorified, and old *Adam*.

Conseq.

A collation betwixt
the second and old
Adam.

*Triplex delectatio, pu-
ra, non pura, impura.*

Piccolb: de summo bono.

is turned from God, it never rests because it is out of the center. But when it returns to the center, then it rests and takes true *delight*; therefore *David* prayeth, *Psalm 43. returne my soule to thy rest: come from thy pleasures and rest on God.*

Therefore the rich man in the Gospel, *Luk. 12. 18.* when he had his barnes full, and then sayd, *soule take thy rest*, he put his soule out of the center, from true joy.

The *moralists* marke three sorts of *pleasure*, the first is called *pure joy*; the second not *pure joy*; the third *impure joy*: it is sayd, *Luk 10. 21.* that *Christ* *rejoyced in his Spirit*; this was pure and most excellent joy in *Christ's* understanding, and it had no griefe as contrary to it, beholding that comfortable object, *God*. Secondly this *pure joy* it bred in his understanding, it came into his will, and here the joy was mixed, being partly *pure*, and partly not *pure*; *pure* when it willed the salvation of man, partly not *pure* but mixed with griefe, when it willed the salvation of man, by drinking of that bitter cup. But descending from his understanding and will to the sensuall part, it was there *non pura*, because in his sensuall part he had no comfort: but it was never *impura*, neither in his will nor sensuall part: but now when he is in glory, as his joy is *pure* in his understanding, so it is altogether *pure* in his will and *inferior faculties*.

In corrupt man his joy begins not in his spirit, but onely in his brutish and sensitive part, and so ascending up to his will and understanding, makes it *impure* joy altogether.

Quest. It may be asked, how could *Christ* have the full measure of joy at the same time, and the full measure of *sadnesse*; seeing two contraries cannot be in the same subject at once, *in intensis gradibus* in the highest degree?

Leffius, de summo bono.

Ans. Good and evill are two contraries, so that how much

much the *love* of *goodnesse* increaseth, so much the detestation and hatred of *evil* decreaseth, but *sadnesse* and *delight* are not contraies, but divers. because they are exercised about divers objects; as *sweetnesse* and *bitternesse*, are not contrary but divers. *Sadnesse* ariseth not from *joy* but from *love*, and it lookes to another object than *joy* doth: but *good* and *evill* which are contraries, looke both to one object; for if I love a thing, I distaste all things contrary to it; but when I am sad for a thing I am not ioyfull for the contrary, but I love it; so that the contrarietie ariseth here in respect of *good* and *evill*, and not in respect of *joy* and *sadnesse*. So that these might be both in Christ together.

Secondly, it is answered, *joy* was in Christ in the highest degree, in his understanding and *will*, as beholding the divine essence immediately; *sadnesse* was in Christ in the highest degree; as carrying the punishment of our sinnes upon him: these two passions here were set upon divers objects: and therefore Christ might have had the full measure of *joy* and *sadnes* at the same time.

True joy or *delight* is onely in the *understanding*.

There are two sorts of delights, one in the sense or brutish, these are called *voluptates*, *pleasures*: the other are called *spiritual delights*, onely in the *understanding*, and these the most perfect *delights*.

Quest. Whether doth mans chiefe happinesse consist in these *delights* or not?

Answ. These delights which are not perfect cannot be a mans *chiefe happines*, but accompany his *happines*. For there are two conditions required in *chiefe happines* First, that it be not ordained for another end. Secondly that it have sufficient goodnesse of it selfe.

The first condition is not found in this *perfect delight*, because it is ordained for another end: that is, for *true happines* whom it accompanies: so likewise it is defective

Prop.

Illust.

Duplex delectatio, sensualis & spiritualis.

Due conditiones ad summum bonum requiruntur, 1. ut non sit propter aliud, 2. ut habeat sufficientiam in se.

in the second condition, for it hath not sufficient goodnesse of it selfe but from true happines: therefore mans chiefe felicity cannot consist in it.

Conseq 1.

True happines is not in the *delights* of the *senses*, therefore the *Epicures*, *Chiliasts*, *Turkes* and *Iewes*, who place their *chiefe felicitie* in worldly pleasures erred: *Salomon Eccles. 5.* when hee seemeth to place our *happinesse*, in these he speaketh in the person of the *Epicurean*.

Conseq. 2.

Our *chiefe happinesse* consists not in *pleasure*, therefore the *pleasure* of the *understanding*, if it be not from the Spirit of God, and abstract from the senses, must not be in the highest pitch of our *felicity*, which requires a spirituall delight, and joy in the holy Ghost.

A collation betwixt
the innocent, renewed
and old Adam.

The *first Adam*, his *delight* was in his *understanding*, but yet he placed not his *chiefe felicitie* in it, for it was onely a companion of his felicitie: and so it is in the *regenerate Adam*: but the *old Adam* his *chiefe delight* is in his sense, and therein he placeth his *true happinesse*. The delight of the regenerate is in his operation, and his delight is to doe the will of God: but the delights of unregenerate men and beasts are their last end, and all that they doe is for delight.

Duplex ordo inter operationes & delectationes brutorum, 1. respectu Dei, 2. respectu sensitivi appetitus,

There is a two fold order, betwixt the *operation* and *delectation* in beasts. First, in respect of God the author of nature. Secondly, in respect of the sensitive appetite. If we respect God the creator of them: God joyned these *delights*, with the *operations*, as we put sawcestorelish meate; but he did not appoint these *operations* for *pleasure*. If we respect the *desires* and *delights* in beasts themselves, who know no other good but the *sensuall good*, then all which they doe is for *delight*; so the unregenerate follow not God their creator and his first institution, to make delight serve to their *chiefe felicitie*; but all that they doe, they make it serve for their *pleasure and delight*.

Object.

object. But seeing beasts follow the instinct of nature, how comes it to passe that they keepe a contrary course to Gods institution, who appointed *delight* for *operation*, and not to make delight their last end?

Answer. God in the creation had a double *intention* or purpose; his *principall*, and *secondary purpose*: his *principall purpose* was, *ut individua & species propagentur & conserventur*; that particular things might be propagate, and their kinds preserved; and for this he appointed *delight* to serve for their *operations*, as hunger to give appetite to meate.

His *secondary purpose* was (respecting the beasts) by putting a naturall inclination in them *to doe*, that they might attaine *pleasure*.

Example, when the lawe is made, which proposeth rewards of *wel-doing*, the law of the first intention proposeth, that men should give themselves to *wel-doing*, and ordaines rewards onely for that; but in the second place as accessary, it intends, that he which is stirred up by rewards should seeke his reward for *wel-doing*: in the first he lookes to *wel-doing*, and then to the reward; in the second being stirred up by the reward he is encouraged to *doe well*.

So God in his first consideration lookes first to their doing, as the *chiefest* end, and then to *delight* as subordinate to it; the second consideration here is not contrary to the first. But God ordained not man in his first creation to make *pleasure* his last end, as he did in beasts, or his first end, as the wicked; but now the *Epicure* saith, *Let us eate, let us drinke, for to morrow we shall die*, *Esai. 22. 13. 1 Cor. 15. 32.*

Spirituall delights, are more pleasant than *sensuall delights*.

There is a neerer conjunction betwixt the soule and its delight, than is betwixt the sense & the sensitive object
For

*Duplex intentio fuit
Dei in creatiōe, pri-
maria & secundaria.*

Prop.

Illust.

*delectationes intellectu-
ales & sensuales; quum-
que modis differunt.*

1

For first, the understanding reacheth not onely to the accidents of things, but pearceth inwardly to the essence and substances themselves; the senses see onely the accidents of things, and therefore cannot bring in so great delight.

2

Secondly, a man takes pleasure in the knowledge which hee hath conceived in his understanding of a thing, although it bee most unpleasant to his sense. A Painter delights to conceive a Black-more in his minde and to paint him rightly, and yet he hath not so great a *delight* to looke upon him. So a *Carver* delights to fashion a Monster although he *delight* not to looke upon him. So a *Poet* delights to describe a flea or a gnatte, although he *delight* not to feele them: all these prove that the *intellectuall delights* are farre to be preferred to the *sensuall*.

3

Thirdly, the *delights* of *intellectuall things* are more permanent, and therefore breed a greater *delight* in man than the sensitive whose objects are evanishing.

4

Fourthly, because *corporall delights* are in the *sensitive part*, they have need to bee ruled by *reason*: but the *intellectuall* things are in *reason* it selfe, which is the rule; and therefore more moderate; and consequently breeds the greatest delight; as that Musicke which breeds the greatest harmony delights most.

5

A collation betwixt
the innocent, second
glorified, and old
Adam.

Lastly, *sensuall delights* may exceed measure, but the *intellectuall delights* cannot exceed measure.

In the *first Adam* the *delights* of his soule redounded to his body, neither took they away the *natural operations* of it; for he did eate, drinke, and sleepe. In the *glorified Adam* the joy of the soule shall redound to the body, that some thinke he shall have no use of the *baser senses*, but onely of his *noble senses*, seeing and hearing. But in the *old Adam* there redounds no glory from the soule to the body, for he is altogether sensuall,

The

The remedies to cure the sinfull delights.

That wee may cure these *delights*, First, we must consider, how hurtfull these *pleasures* are to the word of God, for they choake it as wel as thorny cares do, *Luk.* 8. These who are lovers of *pleasure* are in greatest danger.

Secondly, that we be not taken up with *pleasures*, let us remember that which *Valerius Maximus* bringeth out of the Philosopher, saying that it was a most profitable precept of the Philosopher, that we should looke upon *pleasures* going away, wearied, deformed, and full of repentance: we should look upon the sting and taile of these *Mermaides*, and not upon their beautifull faces: therefore the Apostle setteth before us, *The shape of this world passing away*, *1 Cor.* 7. Looke not upon them as they are comming, but as they are going. *Putiphares* wife, *Gen.* 39. and *Amnon*, *2 Sam.* 13. 3, 9. beheld them as they were comming with sweetnesse and solace; but *Joseph* and *Thamar* beheld them as they were departing with shame, griefe, and remorse.

Thirdly, *Augustine* when he speaketh of the Philosophers who placed their *chiefe happinesse* in *pleasure*, saith, that the rest of the Philosophers used to refute them, by a picture, in which *pleasure* sat as a Lady in her throne, and commanded every vertue to doe somewhat for her, and to quite something for her, so that by this sight it might appeare to them, how absurd a thing it was for them to place *felicity* in *pleasure*.

Fourthly, wee should chace from us the objects of *pleasures*, lest they be the cause of our ruine, and in this case we must follow the old wise men of *Troy*, who couelled *Priame* to send backe *Helena* to the *Grecians*, and not to suffer himselfe to be any longer abused with the charmes of her great beauty, for that keeping her with-

in

2

Lib 7, Oap. 7.

3

Lib. 5. de ciuit. Dei 3.
cap. 20.

4

Apud Apuleium.

Bodini theatrum natur.

in their citie was to entertaine the siege of a fatall and dangerous warre, and to nourish a fire which would consume them to ashes. So we must chace away these alluring *pleasures* which will bring destruction to us.

They shew that *pleasure* and *sensuall delights*, are the greatest enemies to the soule, by this *Apologue*: *Psyche* the daughter of *God & Nature*, had two sisters elder than her selfe, who were married before her; the eldest complained that she was kept close up in prison, and never had liberty to goe abroad; the second was also married, but she had more liberty than her eldest sister, for shee might goe abroad, but both of them envyed their youngest sister *Psyche*, (being most beautifull) that shee was married to one of the gods above, therefore they both conspired to draw her away from the love of her husband, showing her what pleasures and contentments, she might have here below, if shee would leave him: so she followed their direction and perswasion; but at last she fell in repentance, and resolved to turne to her first love againe.

The application of the apologue is this, that the soule hath first the *vegetative faculty*, which is the eldest sister, who is shut up within the body as a prison, that she cannot goe abroad; then she hath the *sensitive faculty*, the second sister which heares, and sees, and hath the intelligence abroad; both these envy the youngest sister the *understanding faculty*, therefore by *delights* and *sensuall pleasures*, they labour to draw their youngest sister from the contemplation of God, to whom shee was married, untill the soule by repentance returne unto God againe.

CHAP. X.

Of Sadnesse and griefe.

Sadnesse is a passion of the soule which ariseth from a discontentment that we have received from the objects, contrary to her inclination.

Sadnesse differeth from dolour or griefe, for Sadnesse is properly in the understanding, and that is called heaviness; but griefe is onely in the sensitive part, and it is common to men and beasts. Secondly, sadnesse is of things past, present, and to come, because it followeth the understanding that comprehendeth all these times; but griefe is onely of things present.

The first Adam before his fall had no sadnesse; because as yet he had not sinned: but the second Adam Iesus Christ, taking the punishment of our sinnes upon him, had great sadnesse, carrying the burden of the sinnes of all the elect, both past, present, and to come.

There was a double sadnesse in Christ: the first, was of passion, the second, of compassion, he was much grieved for the paines he sustained himselfe, then doluit; but much more for that which he had in compassion for us, for then condoluit. Wee in the state of corruption are more grieved for that which we suffer our selves, than we can be grieved for any other: but Christ was more grieved for us, that we were separate from God.

Againe, they marke, that Christ compatitur nobis, he had pity upon us, either by way of charity, as when he saw the people hungry in the wilderness he had compassion upon them. So when he wept for Ierusalem, Mat. 23. or by way of obligation, when he was bound by obligation to satisfie for us upon the Crosse.

Ob. Sadnesse is of these things which befall us against our

A Collation betwixt the innocent, and second Adam.

Duplex tristitia in Christo; passionis, & compassionis,

Christus compatitur nobis ratione charitatis & ratione justitie.

Duplex tristitia; absoluto, & respectu quodam.

A Collation betwixt the second and renewed Adam.

Tristitia exsurgit prater, contra, vel secundum rationis imperium.

Duplex facultas animæ, superior, & inferior.

Facultates superiores, sumuntur vel stricte, vel large.

our will, but nothing befell to Christ against his will, therefore *sadnesse* was in Christ.

Ans. A man may be *sad* for these things, which are not absolutely against his will, but in some respect; as the cuppe which Christ dranke, if we will respect Gods glory and mans salvation, he dranke it willingly; but respecting the cuppe it selfe, it was against his will, because of the paine.

Some *sadnesse* ariseth *prater rationis imperium*, besides the command of reason; as these *first motions* which upon a sudden doe surprise men. Secondly, there is a *sadnesse*, *contra iudicium rationis*, against the judgement of reason, which subdueth reason for a while, and this may be also in the children of God. Thirdly, there is a *sadnesse*, *secundum imperium rationis*, according to the command of reason, for his reason commands him to be *sad*; in the two first senses, Christ was not *sad*, but hee was *sad* in the third sense.

Bonaventure, interpreting these words of *Seneca*, *tristitia turbans non est in sapiente*, expounds it well; *tristitia perturbans non est in sapiente*: although *sadnesse* trouble a wise man, yet it perturbs him not; for a man not to be *sad* when he ought to be *sad*, *est durities et non sapientia*, it is hardnesse of heart and not wisdom; *rejoyce with those that rejoyce, and weepe with those that weepe*, *Rom. 12*. Christ himselfe had this passion, and although he was troubled with this passion, yet hee was not perturbed with it.

Quest. When Christ saith, *Math. 26. 38. My soule is heavy unto the death*; whether was this *sadnesse* in the superior facultie of the soule, or in the inferior?

Ans. If we take the superior faculties of the soule largely, then this *sadnesse* was as well in the superior as inferior faculties of the soule; but if we take them strictly, then this *sadnesse* was not in the superior faculties.

The

The *superior faculties* of the soule are taken *largely* both in the *understanding* and the *will*, when they looke not only to God immediately, but also to the meanes which leade to eternity; as to the sufferings, paines and griefe, which it is to undergoe before it come hither; they are taken *strictly*, looking onely to eternall things as eternall, and respecting onely God himselfe. When Christs soule beheld immediately God and mans salvation, then it was not *sad*, but when he beheld the means leading unto this salvation, here arose the *sadnesse*.

They cleare the matter further by this comparifon. A man that is leaprous, the Doctor prescribes him to drink some poison for his health: now in his understanding he conceiveth what a good thing his health is, and in that hee rejoyceth; there is no *sadnesse* in the understanding here, taking the understanding *strictly*; so hee wils his health, taking the will *strictly*, and there is no *sadnesse* in it neither; but when he wils his health by this physicke, and remembers that he must drinke this poyson; here comes in the *sadnesse*.

There was *griefe* and *sadnesse*, in Christs soule, both in the *superior* and *inferior faculties*; therefore these who hold that Christ suffered onely in his soule by *simpathy*, from the paines which arose from the body, & not immediatly in his soule; extenuate mightily our Lords sufferings; for the soule of Christ was immediately the object of the wrath of God, and therefore the Prophet *Esay* *cha* 55 9 calleth them *his deaths*, because he suffered the *first death*, and the equivalent of the *second death* for us.

The dignity of Christs person, 1. made him acceptable in the sight of God, 2. it made his sufferings to be meritorious, 3. his sufferings were meritorious for compensation in circumstances, but not in substance: therefore death it self could not be remitted to him, neither *griefe*, *borrow*, nor *sadnesse*, in the first two respects. But because
some

Conseq.

Some things were unbeseeming the person of Christ (as the torments of hel,) the compensation of this was supplied by the worthinesse of the person; yet he suffered the equivalent of it, in paine and smart, and this bred his sorrow.

Example, a man is owing a summe of money to his neighbour, either he payes him back againe in the same kind, as gold for gold, or by the equivalent, as silver for gold; and this is sufficient to discharge the summe. So Christ payed the equivalent of the paines of hell to God his Father.

If a man be owing his neighbour such a summe, either he must pay it, or goe to prison; to goe to the prison is not a part of the summe, for if he pay it before he goe to prison, hee hath satisfied the debt. So Christ suffering these paines for us, although he descended not really into hell to suffer, yet he payed the debt, and for this his soule was heavy even unto the death, *Math. 26.38.*

A collation betwixt
the renned and old
Adam.

The *sadnesse* of the regenerate is a *sadnesse* that hath respect to God, which bringeth salvation; but the *sorrow* of the worldlings brings death to them, *2 Cor. 7.10.* The *sadnesse* which is towards God brings repentance to salvation which is not to bee repented of: but the *sadnesse* of the world brings death.

Quest. Can godly sorrow make a man sad, seeing God is the most comfortable object?

Answ. The beholding of God in himselfe can bring no *sadnesse* to man, for he is a most comfortable object: but the beholding of sinne which hindreth us from the cleare sight of that object which is most comfortable, it is that which breedes the *sorrow* in the regenerate.

The

The remedies to cure Sadnesse.

To cure this passion of *sadnesse*: first, we must consider that it is sometimes set upon the wrong object: sometimes it is immoderately set upon the right object. When it is set upon the wrong object, it must be turned to the right object. We are not to comfort a man so long as the passion is set upon a wrong object, but we must doe as the saylers doe, who when they are in a wrong course, turne the ship another way.

Secondly, when the passion is set upon the right object, if the passion be in defect: then the passion must be more sharpened, as the sayles are to be hoysed up when it is too calme; but if the passion be too vehement, then it must be moderate; for if the wind bee too great, then the sayles must be pulled downe a little.

Secondly, reason must sharply censure this passion, and chide it, and say with *David*, *Psal. 43. Why art thou cast downe my soule*; for if reason speak but gently to this fullen passion, it will be more fullen: as *Eli's* insolent sons after the mild reproofe of their father were more insolent, *1 Sam. 2. 25.*

The Iewes tooke a wrong course to nourish this passion of *sadnesse* and to give way to it: first they hyred mourning women, *Amos 5. 16.* these were called *præfica* and *siticipines*, *quia apud sitos, id est, sepulchro conditos, caner. solebant*: secondly, they used in their burials, when those of older age were buried, to sound the dead sound with a Trumpet, or with a Cornet: and this the Poet approveth when he saith;

*Cum signum luctus cornu grave mugit
adunco, That is,*

Qq

On

Duplex obiectum tristitie, verum, & falsum.

Verum obiectum tristitie, vel est in defectu, vel excessu.

2

*On cornet pipes they play the mournfull sound,
When corpse of aged men are layde in ground.*

But when their little children died, they used to play upon a Whistle or some small pipe, which *Cælius Rodigin*, makes manifest thus;

*Tibia, cui teneros suctum deducere manes,
Lege Phrygum maesta.* That is,

*Whose use it was with musicke to convey,
The tender soules the Phrygian mournfull way.*

When *Iairus* his little daughter was dead, *Math. 9.23.* Christ thrust out the minstrels who played at her death. When they hired mourning women and minstrels to nourish this passion, they did as if a mother should hire a bawde to prostitute her daughter.

3.

When thou art in thy *griefe*, behold the joyes reserved for us in heaven, this will settle thy *griefe*: the *Thesalonians* mourned immoderately for the dead like heathen, *1 Thess. 4. 13.* because they remembred not that glorious resurrection.

4.

Remember Christs passion, the Prophet *Esay* saith, that it was, *with his stripes that we are healed, Esai. 53. 5.* The first stripe that Christ got in his passion was this sadnesse, *And hee began to bee sorrowfull, Math. 26. 38.* *My soule is heavy to the death*, and this breeds joy to us; remember also that Christ was annoynted with the oyle of gladnesse above his fellowes to make us glad, *Psal. 45.*

5.

Goe to the Preacher to whom the Lord hath given the tongue of the learned, *Esay 50. 4.* that he may speak a word in due season to the weary heart; the Preacher must

not comfort for *worldly sorrow*, but rather make them for this more sorrowfull : so when he seeth the sinner cast downe, he must then remit of his severity, and then begin to comfort him. It was the fault of the Church of *Corinth*, 1 *Cor.* 5. when they saw the incestuous *Corinthian* too much humbled for his fault, and like to be swallowed up with griefe, that they would remit nothing of the strictnesse of their censures; so the Primitive Church was too strict in their censures; continuing the penitents too long under them, which brought in Satisfaction afterward in the Church.

Let us use the remedy of the Sacraments : the Iewes used to give these who were carried to execution wine, applying that place, *Prov.* 30. to this purpose, *give wine to him that is of a sad heart*; when we see our selves as it were carried to execution, then a draught of this precious wine of Christs blood will refresh us; and make us looke cheerefull againe.

6

CHAP. XI.

Of the passions in the irascible part of the soule.

Of the passion of Hope.

There be five passions in the *Irascible* appetite; hope, despaire, feare, boldnesse, and anger.

Hope, is a passion of the soule, that we have of the impression of future good, which presents it selfe to our imagination, as difficult to obtaine, whereby we endeavour to pursue it, conceiving that wee are able to attaine unto it, and in the end to get the possession.

Hope differeth from desire, which extends it selfe to all kinde of good, without any apprehension of diffi-

Qq 2

culty;

culty ; and therefore *desire* belongeth to the *concupiscible appetite* ; whereas *hope* is subject to the *Irascible*, and respecteth the future good gotten with difficulty, for no man did ever *hope* for things which hee holdeth impossible to attaine unto.

Hope is considered here as a naturall vertue in the first *Adam*, and not as a theologicall or supernaturall vertue, as it is in us now, and it is placed in the soule, *ut operationem expeditam reddat*, that it may further man in his operation, 1 Cor. 9. 10. *hee that plougheth, plougheth in hope, and he that thresheth, should bee partaker of his hope.*

A Collation betwixt
the innocent and glorified
Adam.

Secunda secunda, q. 13
art. 3.

The first *Adam* had *hope* to enjoy the life to come, and to bee translated to a better estate, if hee continued in obedience ; this *hope* was naturall to him, and hee hoped without difficultie to obtaine the thing hoped for ; for as *Thomas* sheweth well, this difficulty of hardnesse to obtaine the thing hoped for, is not alwayes necessarily required in him that hopes ; *nam spes etiam versatur circa bonum facile* ; *Hope* may bee exercised about that which is easie to obtaine ; but the true reason wherefore *hope* is said to bee of things hardly obtained is this, because hee that *hopeth*, hath one above him who is more powerfull than hee is, who may performe that which hee hopeth for ; and herein stands the reason of this why it is said *hardly to bee obtained*, because wee hope, that that must bee performed by another, though it bee not hard to bee obtained in it selfe.

So the first *Adam*, hoped that God would performe that which he hoped for without any difficulty. It is true, our hope now is with great difficulty, and many wraftlings, therefore it is compared to an anchor which holds the shippe in a storme, Heb. 6. 16.

The

The *hope* in the glorified, although it be evacuate in the life to come touching the substance of our blessednesse, yet touching the adjuncts of this glory, they say we may have *faith*, and *hope* still: as the soules glorified beleeve the second comming of Christ, and they *hope* for the rising of the body, & the perfection of the Church. But when it is objected, how can *hope* and *vision* stand together, for faith and hope are of things not seene, *Heb. 11.* They answer, That they cannot stand together touching one object, and in the same respect; for they cease in the life to come, when the soule beholds God the most *absolute object*, but yet in respect of *secondary objects*, and things yet not accomplished, which the Saints beleeve shall be accomplished; relying upon the authority of him who hath promised, not seeing them yet by sight as they doe God himselte: in this respect they say, that *faith* and *hope* are not yet altogether abolished in the heavens.

The *hope* of the unregenerate, is but *somnium vigilantium*, a waking mans dreame: for as dreames in the night fill us with illusions, and vaine formes, which abuse us and make us imagine that we are rich in our extreamest povertie and greatest misery: So *hope* abusing the imagination of the unregenerate, fills their soules with vaine contentments.

Polanus in syntagmate.

Duplex objectum glorificatorum, absolutum & secundarium.

CHAP. XII.

Of Despaire.

D*espaire* is contrary to *Hope*. There are two kindes of oppositions in the passions of the soule; the first is found amongst these, that have contrary things for their objects, and that is

Q 9 3

onely

onely amongst the passions of the *concupiscible part*; as betwixt *love* and *hatred*, whereof the one regards the *good*, and the other the *evill*, which are two contraries and can never be in one subject together, at one time in the same respect. The second opposition is observed, betwixt these that regard the same object, but with divers considerations, and that is found amongst the *irascible passions*, whereof the one seekes the good of the object, & the other flees it, by reason of the difficulty which doth environ it. *Example*: *courage*, and *fear*, doe both regard an imminent danger, which presents it selfe to the imagination: but *courage* lookes upon it to encounter with it and vanquish it. *Fear* regards it to avoide it, and flee from it; and so *despaire* is contrary to *hope* after this manner: for the object of *hope* (which is a good, difficult to be obtained) drawes us upon the one side so farre as we imagine a power to obtaine: but *despaire* doth respect it on the other side, when we apprehend that by no meanes we can enjoy it, then we give over and *despaire*. This passion of *despaire* was neither in the *first*, nor *second Adam*.

Object. All paines of the damned ought to be suffered by Christ, but *despaire* is a paine of the damned; therefore it ought to have beene suffered by Christ.

*Desperatio non est pœna
sed adjunctum peccati.*

Ansiv. *Desperation* is not a paine or a cause of the paine properly, but an adjunct or consequent of the sinne in the sinner, that suffereth punishment, arising from an inward cause. Christ had no griefe of conscience which is an adjunct of sinne in the wicked, so neither had hee *despaire*.

*Comment. super Math.
cap.*

It is a shamelesse slander in those who charge *Calvine* as though he gave out that these words of Christ (*my God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me,*) were words of *despaire*: hee accurseth such hellish blasphemie, and sheweth that howsoever the flesh apprehended destroying

destroying evils, and *inferiour reason* sheweth no issue out of the same; yet there was ever a most sure resolved perswasion resting in his heart, that hee should undoubtedly prevaile against them, and overcome them.

Quest. Whether is *infidelity* and the *hating* of God a greater sinne than *despaire*, or not?

Answ. *Infidelity* and *hating* of God in themselves, are more hainous sinnes than *despaire*; for they are directly against God, who is in himselfe truth and goodnesse: but *despaire* is onely against God: because the wretched sinner cannot perceive his goodnesse to him, therefore it is not so great a sinne as the former.

Quest. Whether is *presumption* or *despaire* the greater sinne?

Answ. *Despaire* is a greater sinne than *presumption*, because it sins against the attribute of Gods *mercy*, which is Gods most glorious attribute towards man; for God inclines more to shew *mercy* than to punish: therefore when he punisheth, he is said *facere opus non suum*, *Esay* 28. 21. When he punisheth, *he punisheth to the third and fourth generation*; but *he sheweth mercy to the thousandth generation*, *Exod.* 20. 6. therefore it must be a greater sin to contemne his *mercy* than his *justice*.

Despaire makes a man contemne Gods *mercy*, and *presumption* his *justice*. As *despaire* is a turning from God; so *presumption* is an immoderate conversion to God: *presumption* makes a man think to obtaine *mercy* without repentance; but *despaire* makes him thinke it impossible to obtaine *mercy* though with repentance.

Desperation in men is either sudden, or longer advised. Again, it is either under the sense of Gods wrath as *Judas* was; or under the Crosse as many of the pagans; or under the rage of melancholly or frensie: therefore men that are to fight with this monster, let them resort to

*Differentia inter odium
& desperationem.*

*Differentia inter pra-
sumptionem, & despe-
rationem,*

the word of God, and take it to be his second, and with-
all use these remedies following.

The remedies to cure this passion.

That we may cure this passion of *despaire*; First, we must remember the great mercies of God: if we respect the dimensions in corporall things, and apply them to things spirituall, as the Apostle doth, *Ephes. 3. 18.* where he speaketh of the *breadth, length, depth, and height of the love of God which passeth all knowledge*, that we might be filled with all fulnesse of God. So let us apply these dimensions to the mercy of God, and wee shall finde it most comfortable. For the latitude and bredth of Gods mercy, let us remember that which *David* saith, *miseri-cordia tua plena est terra, Psal. 33. 5.* For the length of his mercy, let us remember that which the Virgin *Mary* singeth in her song, *Luk. 1. 50.* *And his mercy is from one generation to many generations, to them that feare him.* For the depth of his mercy, as it is a fearefull thing to looke into the gulph of our finnes as *Cain* did: So it is a comfortable thing to look into the depth of Gods mercy, that where sin hath abounded, grace may superabound, *Rom. 5. 20.* Then for the great height of Gods mercy, what can wee see next under God higher than the heavens? yet the Prophet saith, *Psal. 108. verse 5.* *Thy mercies are exalted above the heavens.* And for the indurance of his mercy *David* saith, *Psal. 100. verse 17.* that it is *ab aeterno in aeternum*. Concerning the multitude of his mercies some have sought to reduce them to seven, as *Peter* did, *Matthew chapter 18. verse 2.* but seeing Christ will us, not onely, *to forgive seven times, but seventy times seven times*; much more will he, *Math. 18. 22.*

Secondly, remember that although thy finnes were red

red like the scarlet, yet hee can make them white as the snow, *Esay. 1. 18.* Scarlet in the Hebrew it is called *twice* because it is twice dyed, and in the Greekes *διπασον*, because it is twice dipped: wee cannot wash this dye out of the scarlet againe: but although wee be dyed once, twice, thrice in sinne, by recidivations, and falling againe into sinne, yet the mercy of God is such that he can wash out all those finnes.

Thirdly, when God looks upon the finnes of his Saints through Christ; *he seeth no iniquitie in them, Num. 23. 25. he seeth no iniquitie in Iacob.* There is *speculum gibbum*, *sive sphericum*, a glasse made like a round sphere. 2. *Speculum concavum*, a hollow glasse, 3. *Speculum planum*, a plaine glasse. We see a thing in a plaine glasse, just as it is, neither more nor lesse: we see a thing in a hollow glasse more then it is, we see a thing in a round glasse, farre lesse then it is. When the Lord looks upon the finnes of the wicked, he seeth them just as they are: when *Sathan* looks upon the infirmities of the Saints, he seeth them more than they are: but when God looks upon the finnes of his Saints, hee seeth them lesse than they are, or not at all: *Ier. 50. 20. In those dayes and in that time, the iniquitie of Israel shall be sought for, and there shall be none; and the finnes of Iudah, and they shall not be found.*

CHAP. XIII.

Of Feare.

FEare, is a distresse and grieve of the soule, troubled by the imagination of some approaching evill: where-with a man is threatned without any appearance to bee able to avoyd it easily. It is called an approach-
ing

*Timor vel est naturalis,
humanus, mundanus,
servilis, initialis vel
filialis.*

ingevill, for when it is present, it is no more feare but heavinesse.

There be sixe sorts of feare: first, *naturall*, whereby every thing shunnes the destruction of it selfe, this is in a beast.

Secondly, *humane*, which ariseth of too much a desire to this life; *Iob 1. Skin for skin and all that a man hath, will he give for his life.*

Third, is *worldly*, when a man is affraid for the losse of his goods, credit, or such, *Iob. 12. Many of the rulers beleevd in him, but for feare of the Pharisees they did not confesse him, for they loved more the glory of men, than the glory of God;* and *Iohn* saith, *Revel. 21. the fearefull shall be cast out of the holy City*, that is, such fearefull as feare more the losse of temporary things, than the losse of Gods favour.

Fourth, *servile*, to avoid the punishment of sinne, yet they retaine still the love and liking of sinne; it is called *servile feare* because as the servant or hireling workes not for love of his master, but onely for feare of punishment; so the wicked feare God for feare of punishment, but not to love him. This *servile feare* is called *Esaus feare*. So it is called an *adulterous feare*, because, as the adulterous woman is afraid of her husband onely for feare of punishment; so a man in whom there is *servile feare*, hee feareth God onely for punishment.

Fift, *initiall*, that maketh a man cast from him the desire of sinning by reason of the love of God which he hath partly attained unto, and out of the consideration of the woefull consequents of sinne; with the right eye it beholds God, and with the left eye it beholds the punishment, & as the needle draweth in the threed after it, so this feare draweth in charity, and maketh a way for *filiall feare*, and it is a mids betwixt *servile* and *filiall feare*.

feare: but it is not such a mids as these meanes that mediate betwixt those that are of the same kinde, as the middle coulours are betwixt white and blacke, but as that which is imperfect, is a mids betwixt that which is perfect and that which is not.

Sixt, *filiall feare*, called *timor castus*, as the good wife feareth her husband onely out of love and not for feare so doth the childe of God. This feare is called *Isaacks feare*: These make the *feare of the Lord their treasure*, *Esay. 36. 6.* These sorts of *feares*, may be taken up after this sort, Some sort of feare is, *from the spirit and with the spirit*; as *initiall* and *filiall feare* are both from the spirit of sanctification, and with the spirit of sanctification: some feare is, *from the spirit, but not with the spirit*; as *servile feare*, *Ios. 24. I will send my feare before you.* Gods spirit workes this in men: but the spirit of sanctification is not joyned with it: as the morning is from the Sunne, and yet not with the Sunne. Againe, some feare is, *with the spirit, and not from the spirit*; as *naturall feare in man*, for the preservation of himselfe: this feare is not from the spirit of God, and yet it is found with the Spirit of sanctification, as in the children of God. Some feare is, *neither from the Spirit, nor with the spirit*, as, *humane and worldly feare*.

Filial feare excludes *servile feare*, *1 Ioh. 4. 18. perfect love thrusts out feare.* *Filial feare* respects first sin and offence of God, and in the second roome the punishment: but *servile feare* respects onely the punishment: the one of them are the children of the free-woman, the other are but *Hagars brats*, *Gal. 4. 24.*

Filiall feare and *servile* differ altogether: therefore the Schoolemen are mistaken, distinguishing more subtilly than truly betwixt *attrition* and *contrition* they call *attrition* an imperfect humiliation, as *Judas* repentance; they call *contrition* a perfect humiliation, as *Peters* re-
pen-

Duplex malum pena
& culpa.

Conseq.

pentance: and they hold that in mans conversion it is the same *feare* which remaines still, that he had before hee was converted, and it remaines in substance (say they) the same *feare*, and is changed onely in act, because it feares not as it did before, the punishment onely: and these two differ (say they) *secundum statum*, onely, as that which is imperfect from that which is perfect as a boy differeth from a man. But no *feare* which is *servile feare* can ever become a good *feare* Rom. 8. *We have not received the spirit of feare to bondage, but of freedom*: it must be a new sort of *feare* then different from this *servile feare*, which makes the Children of God stand in awe to offend him.

A collation betwixt
the innocent, second,
old and renewed *Adam*.

Man in his first estate, had not *mundane feare*, nor *servile feare*, he did nothing for feare of punishment but of love: he had not *initiall feare* in him, because that implies an imperfection; hee had not *naturall feare* in him *actually* because there was nothing to hurt him: he had onely that *filiall feare*, that reverence of God, not to offend him. The *second Adam* the Lord Iesus Christ, he had neither *worldly, servile nor initiall feare*, but he had *naturall* and *filial feare*, he had *natural feare* *actually* (which the first *Adam* had not) declining the hurtfull object which he saw before him.

The regenerate have not *servile feare*, or *mundane feare*: but *naturall, initiall*, and *filiall feare*. Man in his corrupt estate, hath neither *initiall* nor *filiall feare*, but *naturall, humane, worldly* and *servile feare*.

A collation betwixt
the glorified, renewed
and old *Adam*.

*Duplex timor filialis,
evitare malum & fa-
cere bonum.*

In the life to come, *naturall feare, humane feare, worldly, servile* and *initiall feare* shall cease; and only *filiall feare* shall remaine. *Filiall feare* in this life doth two things, first it escheweth evill for feare of offending God, and feare of being separate from him, which shall not remaine in the life to come, for then the Saints shall be so confirmed that they cannot sin. The second part

of

of *filiall feare* is to reverence God as our chiefe happinesse, and that shall remaine in the life to come, there shall be neither evill of punishment, nor evill of sinne; there shall be no evill of sinne there; therefore that part of *filiall feare* shall cease: neither shall there bee any feare of punishment there, but to reverence God as our chiefe happinesse: *Perficietur in patria, non abolebitur; non minuitur sed augetur reverentia timoris illis*: this feare shall be perfected in the life to come, but not abolished; this feare of reverence shall not bee diminished but augmented to the blessed. But *filiall feare* in the children of God here makes them to eschew evill both for offending of God, and for feare of being separate from him. But the unregenerate onely for feare of punishment, feare him.

The remedies to cure this passion.

That we may cure the sinfull passion of feare; First, many times we feare that which is not evill, but onely which hath a shew of evill, *Psal. 14. 5. They feared where there was no cause of feare: sapientius opinione laboramus, quam re*; We are more troubled oftentimes with the conceit of a thing, than with the thing it selfe: If the thing bee evill which we feare, yet it is not so great an evill as we take it to be, or perhaps that which we feare will not fall out; or if it fall out, we shall not be disturbed with it, before it fall out. The evill which thou fearest is either imaginary, momentany, contingent or uncertaine, whether it will fall out or not: *Seneca* saith, *Ne sis miser ante tempus, quaedam nos magis torquent, quam debeant; quaedam ante torquent, quam debeant; quaedam torquent, cum omnino non debeant*: that is, Bee not too miserable before hand: some things trouble us more than they ought to doe, some things trouble us before they ought;

Timor vel mali est, imaginarius, momentaneus, contingens, vel indeterminatus.

ought; and some things trouble us, which ought not at all: *rebus est demenda persona*; pull the maske off things, and then we shall not be so affraid of them.

2 Let the feare of the Lord possesse thy heart, and then all other feares will be cast out: when the *dictator* ruled in *Rome*, then all other officers ceased; so when this true feare of God possesseth the heart, then it will banish all other feare.

3 There are some, that feare neither God nor man, as the unjust Iudge, *Luk. 18. 2.* these are worse than the devill; for, *he feares and trembles, 1am. 2. 19.* There are some that feare both God and man; there are some who feare God and not man: and there are some, who feare man, and not God. The remedy to feare God, and to bee free of *servile feare*, is first, to looke upon Gods loue, and then to his justice, this will breed *filiall feare*, in thee: but if thou looke first upon his justice, and then upon his love, that breeds but *servile feare*: if thou looke first upon man, and then upon God, that will breed onely but a humane and worldly feare; if thou look first upon God and then upon man, this will breed *filiall feare*.

4 The greatest *servile feare* is, *superstitious feare*, therefore idols are called *terriculamenta*, *Esay. 45. 16.* all other prisoners sleepe in their fetters in the night, but these *superstitious wretches*, are affrighted in their sleepe, and sleepe not soundly: they may be compared to little children, who first blacke the faces of their fellows, and then are afraid of them: so they first set up these images, and then *superstitiously* worshipping them, are afraid of them: but the true remedie to cure this *superstitious feare* is, to learne in spirit and truth to worship the Lord, *Ioh. 4.*

5 The life is taken three manner of wayes in the Scriptures: 1 *naturally*, 2 *politically*, and 3 *theologically*.
Naturally,

*Triplex vita in homine,
physica politica, &
theologica.*

Naturally, when the soule and the body are joyned, and the soule quickens it. *Politically*. Eccles. 6. 8. *what hath the poore that knoweth to walke before the living*; the poor are as it were dead in respect of the rich who have the comfortable meanes to make them live well. *Theologically*, *the iust live by faith*, Habac. 2. 4. so Rom. 7. 8. and the commandement which was ordained to life; feare him least who can but take thy politicke life from thee, (thy goods :) feare him but in the second degree who can take thy naturall life from thee : but feare him most of all who can take thy spirituall life from thee, this is to kill the soule.

Of the passion of Boldnesse contrary to feare.

Boldnesse, is a passion of the soule, which fortifieth it against greatest miseries, hardest to be avoided, and incourageth it to pursue good things which are most painefull to obtaine. This passion is for the most part joyned with temeritie or rashnesse. When the saints of God stand forth for the defence of his Church or Gods glory: it is not boldnesse, but courage or fortitude.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Choler or Anger.

Anger, is a passion of the minde for wrong offered; it differeth from hatred; for anger seekes revenge *sub ratione iusti vindicativi*, it hath respect to justice and revenge, and it is a sudden passion: but the passion of hatred is a bad passion in us, it is *ira inveterata*. Augustine compares anger to a mote in a mans eye, but hatred to a balke or a beame.

Anger

A collation betwixt
the innocent, and se-
cond renewed, old
Adam.
Distinct. 13. q. ult

Anger is in God *eminenter*: in beasts it is but *umbrata*, and in man it is properly.

Bonaventure maketh foure sorts of anger; the first, which ariseth from a detestation of the sin, this he calleth *affectus pura detestationis*: that is, when one detests sinne purely, which might have beene in *Adam* himselfe before he fell, if he had beene angry with *Eva*, when shee inticed him to eate of the forbidden fruite. Secondly, when there ariseth a detestation of the sinne, with a certaine trouble in the sensuall part, yet without any perturbation of the minde, and this was in *Christ*. Thirdly, when not onely the inferiour faculties, but also the superiour are troubled: as in the children of God when they are angry against sinne, their zeale sometimes so disturbeth them, that it hindreth their reason for a while, but afterward it growes more cleare again: as when we lay *eye salve* to the eyes, the eyes for a while are dimmer, but afterward they see more clearly; so this zeale although it trouble reason for a while, yet afterward it becomes more cleare. Fourthly, it not onely disturbes the inferiour faculties, but also blindes reason, and puls out the eyes of it in the unregenerate, as the *Philistines* did *Sampsons* eyes, *Indg.* 16.

A collation betwixt
the old renewed and
and second Adam.

Sometimes man useth not reason at all, but like beasts follow *instinct*, as mad men and children; sometimes man useth reason, but his reason is so corrupt and depraved, that his corrupt reason and his perverser will makes his anger to be more sinfull, as *Absalons* hatred towards *Amnon*, which he kept two yeares within himselfe, but when he found opportunitee, he killed his brother, 2 *Sam.* 13. Thirdly reason may be rightly set, but yet the sensuall appetite so prevailes, that it overcomes the will, as in *David* when hee would have killed *Nabal*, 1 *Sam.* 25. Fourthly, reason may be right-ly

ly set and have the dominion, although anger bee not fully subdued, yet it prevailes not, as it falls out in the children of God when they are standing in the state of grace, *tergiveratur in his, licet non reluctetur*; it makes some shift in the Children of God, although it resist not altogether. Fifthly, when there is a full and totall subjection of anger, and this was in Christ.

There are two sorts of anger; the anger of zeale, and the anger of repentance; the anger of zeale is, a desire to punish sinne, as sinne in others, and that was in Christ when he whipt out the buyers & sellers out of the Temple, *Luk. 19. 45. the zeale of Gods house did eat him up. Psal. 69. 10.* The anger of repentance is, when one inflicts a punishment upon himselfe for his owne finnes, and is angry with himselfe for his owne sinne, this was not in Christ, but in the regenerate.

The regenerate seeke not a revenge, but to commit the revenge to God to whom vengeance belongs, *Gen 50. 19.* and if they have authoritie from God to punish, *non excedit modum*, it is not out of measure, *Gen. 50.* but the unregenerate being but private men, and having no authoritie, will have, *tooth for tooth, and eye for eye, Matth. 5. 18.* this is the Pharises revenge; and sometimes he comes to *Cains* revenge, *seven for one, Gen. 4. 25.* and sometimes to *Lameches* revenge, *seventy for one, Gen. 4. 24.* and sometimes to *Sampsons* revenge, *Judg. 16. 8, 29, 30. now let me be revenged for one of my eyes, three thousand for one.*

The regenerate are slow to anger and ready to forgive, but the unregenerate are ready to bee angry and slow to forgive, and if they bee brought from revenge, yet the dregges still remaine with them, and still they remember; therefore the Lord saith, *Lev. 19. 18. ye shall neither revenge nor remember.* The Iewes give an example of this: *Simeon* sent to borrow of *Reuben*, a

R r

hatchet;

A collation betwixt the second, and renewed Adam.
Duplex ira, zeli & resipiscentie.

Coll. 1.

Betwixt the renewed and old Adam.

Coll. 2.

hatchet; *Ruben* refuseth to lend it, *Ruben* sent the next day, to borrow a sickle from *Simeon*; he grants it, but withall he saith, loe here it is, I will not doe to *Reuben* as he did to me yesterday, although this be not *ultio* (as they say,) yet it is *retentio*.

Coll. 3.

Quadruplex retributio, perversitatis, fragilitatis, equitatis, & perfectionis.

To render *evill for good*, that is, *perversitatis*, perverse anger, such was that of *Iudas* in selling of Christ, *Mat.* 26. to render *evill for evill*, *est fragilitatis*, anger of infirmitie, as *Ioab* when hee killed *Abner*, for slaying of his brother *Hasacl*, 2 *Sam.* 3. 27. to render *good for good*, as *Ahasuerus* did to *Mordecai*, who honoured him, because he had discovered a treason plotted against him, this was *aquitatis*. To render *good for evill*, this is *perfectionis majoris*: *Blesse them that curse you*, *Mat.* 5.

To render *evill for evill* is naturall for a corrupt man, this is found in beasts; to render *good for good*, this is the Pharises righteousness, *Matth.* 5. 20. *Except your righteousness exceed the righteousness of the Pharises, yee cannot enter into the Kingdome of God*: a Christian must doe more than to render *good for good*. To render *evill for good*, this the devils doe; but to render *good for evill*, this the Children of God doe.

Coll. 4.

Quatuor moderantur iram, longanimitas, mansuetudo, facilitas ad ignoscendum, & clementia.

There are foure counsellors, which moderate and rule the anger of the regenerate, First, *longanimitas*, or long-suffering, which holdeth backe anger, lest it hasten to inflict the punishment. Second, *mansuetudo*, mildnesse, which moderates the anger that it exceed not in words. Third, *facilitas ad ignoscendum*, easinesse to forgive, which moderates anger that it last not too long. Fourth, *clementia*, meekenesse, which moderates the punishment. The unregenerate wanting these foure counsellors, their anger exceeds: first, they want *long-suffering*, and presently they are set in a rage: secondly, they want *mildnesse*, which should moderate their anger, that it exceed not in words: thirdly, they are

are ἀσπράτοι, *implacabiles*, Rom. 1. they cannot be pleased; lastly, they are *cruell* and cannot be satisfied in their punishment.

Quest. Whether is a man bound to remit the injurie done to him or not, when his neighbour desireth pardon of him?

Ans. Three things arise of an injurie done to us; first, *hatred* in our affection; secondly the signe of this anger is, when it appeareth in the countenance; thirdly, when we intend action by law for the wrong. Wee are bound to pardon the first, although our enemy sue it not of us; we are bound to pardon the second, when our enemy sues it of us; but we are not bound alwayes to pardon the third; for wee may in some cases, re-
 pare the wrong done to us by Law, without any rancour in our heart, or shew of anger in our countenance.

The Hebrewes say; if a man have offended his neighbour, he must goe and seeke reconciliation of him: but if he will not be reconciled, hee shall take three men with him, who shall intercede for him, and seeke reconciliation: but if hee yet will not pardon him, this is a great iniquitie to be so cruell, and not to pardon the offence, for it is the manner of the Israelites to be easily reconciled, and to pardon wrongs, as *Ioseph* was towards his brethren; then he leaves his neighbour inexcusable. But if his brother die before he have offered these things and be reconciled to him, hee shall take ten men, and goe to the place where his brother was buried whom he hath offended, and stand above the dead, and say before these ten men, *I have sinned against the Lord God of Israel, and againe this my brother N. to whom I did so and so.*

Christ makes sundry degrees of unjust anger, Mat. 5. *He that is angry with his brother, shall be guilty of juncement;*

Rr 2

ment;

Tria consequuntur injuriam, ira in affectione, ira in vultu, & reparatio per leges.

Tres gradus iræ, 1. iracelata, 2. rancore, 3. irrisio.

ment; he that calls his brother *Raca*, shall be guilty of the counsell; but he that calls his brother foole, shall bee guilty of hell fire; that is, of the greatest punishment in hell; These that call their brother *Raca*, or are angry with their brother, are guilty also of hell, although not in such a high degree; and according as the finnes grow, so doth the punishment. *Anger* without words, is to be punished by judgement; *anger* expressed by words, is to bee punished by the counsell; but *anger* joyned with words and contumelie, is to bee punished by hell.

Augustine saith, in primo est ira tantum; in secundo est ira & sermo; in tertio ira est & certa expressio irrisionis: that is, in the first there is but onely anger; in the second is anger joyned with words; in the third, anger expressed with a certaine gesture of mocking.

Tri genera injusta ira.
1. Fel. 3. πικροί, 3. Furor.

There are three sorts of unjust *anger* in the wicked: the first is, called *fel*, and these that are possessed with this anger are called by the Greekes εφύλοι, *qua est ira subito exandescens*, which is anger soone stirred up, and this comes from the humor, *bilis*, choler; as they are soone stirred up, so they are soone quenched. The second is called μῆνις, which ariseth of an induring anger, and these are called πικροί, bitter in their anger; this comes of *flava bilis*, of yellow choler and anger, this is more permanent in these. The third is called, *furor*, and these that are possessed with this, are called χαλεποί, this comes from *atrabilis*, blacke choler or melancholy, which cannot be satisfied but by the bloud of the enemy.

μακροθυμία est lenitas
ὀξύθυμία, who is sudden in anger.
δυμοειδής, who is bitter in his anger.

Some are soone *angry* and soone quenched, these are like flaxe, soone kindled and soone burnt out. Others long ere they are angry, & long ere they be pacified; like greene wood, long ere it be kindled, and long ere it bee quenched; but the worst of all are these, that are soone angry

angry and hardly quenched, these are most opposite to God, who is slow to anger and ready to forgive, *Psal. 103.* he is called *עֵרֵךְ אַפַּיִם* *erech appajim*, as yee would say, one who hath wide nostrils, for these who have widest nostrils are most patient, as these who have narrow nostrils are hasty.

The remedies to cure the passion of anger.

That we may settle this passion of anger; First, we are to consider the persons of these whom we have offended: we must give place to wrath, and not *intempestive incendium extinguere*, not to quench the fire unseasonably, for then we rather increase the anger, when we goe about in time of griefe to pacifie them. So *Iacob* gave place to the anger of his brother *Esau* for a while, by the counsell of *Rebecca*. *Seneca* saith, *Primam iram non audebimus oratione mulcere, surda est & timens, dabimus illi spacium, remedia in remissionibus morborum profunt*: that is, We goe not about to pacifie anger in the heate of it, wee give it leasure first to settle, wee cure not feavers in their height, but when they begin to remit.

Secondly, when others have offended us; that wee may quench our anger: First, *Bee angry but sinne not*, *Ephes. 4. 25.* Anger and sinne are not two twins, yet they are very like other; as flattery is very like to friendship, and can be very hardly distinguished from it; for men oftentimes thinke themselves to bee angry for Gods cause, when as it is their owne particular that mooves them. The disciples called for fire from heaven upon the *Samaritans*, *Luk. 9. 54.* one would have thought this to have beene holy anger and zeale that moved them for Gods glory, when as it was their own particular which moved them: so when the high Priest rent his cloathes *Mat. 26. 65.* We must learne then to distinguish these two, else our anger will be but sinfull anger.

R r 3

Thirdly,

Thirdly, Let not the Sun goe downe upon thy wrath: *Anger saith Salomon, Eccles. 7. 9. rests in the bosome of fooles*; it goeth to bed with them, riseth with them, continueth with them, and goeth oftentimes to the grave with them; the first day it may be easily cured; the second day more hardly; but the third day most hardly: *A threefold cord cannot easily bee broken, Eccles. 4. 12.*

Fourthly, Let reason rule thine *anger*, and command it; we ride not first, and then bridle our horse, but first we bridle our horse and then ride: bee not first *angry* and then thinke to bridle thy *anger* with reason, for then thou wil deceivethy selfe; but let reason first rule, and then be angry.

Fiftly, Remember that thy prayers cannot bee heard unlesse thou be first reconciled to thy neighbour, *Mat. 5. 24. Leave thy gift at the Altar, and be reconciled to him.* So, *1 Tim. 2. 4.* the Apostle willeth, *that men lift up holy hands without wrath.* So, *1 Pet. 3. 7.* the man and the wife must not jarre, *that their prayers be not hindered*; so thou canst not heare the word with profit in *anger*. Therefore the Apostle willeth us like new borne babes to drinke in the Word, *1 Pet. 2. 2.* so, wee cannot eat our passeover unlesse the leaven of malice and envy be cast out, *1 Cor. 5. 8. Let us not celebrate the feast with the old leaven of malice.*

Sixtly, remember Christs example; who when hee was reviled, reviled not againe, *Mark 15. 32.* learne to spread thy injuries before the Lord as *Ezekias* did when *Rabsherkab* railed against him, *2 King. 19. 14.*

Seventhly, Behold oftentimes the passion of Christ, and that will quench thine *anger*. The Israclites when they were stung with fiery serpents, *Numb. 21.* so soone as they lookt upon the brazen serpent, they were healed; so when wee are injured and wronged by our ene-

enemies, if we behold the passion of Christ with faith, it will quench the sting of our enemies *anger*.

Anger hath nothing oppositeto it, as the rest of the passions have, because it riseth of a present evill which we cannot shun. If it be present and wee may shun it, then there needes not a contrary passion. When the evill is not present, and joyned with difficulty if we may surmount it, then ariseth *courage*; if we cannot surmount it, then ariseth the contrary passion *fear*. If the evill be present and joyned with difficulty, then ariseth *anger*, because we cannot shun it; for if we can shun it, there can be no passion there.

Object. But *mildnesse* seemeth contrary to *anger*.

Answ. *Mildnesse* is not a passion but a vertue which moderates it, and is not contrary to it.

So much of the image of God in man; in his knowledge, will and affections, wherein especially the image of God consists. Wee come to his outward image of God, which is his dominion over the creatures.

CHAP. XV.

Of the second part of the image of God in man, in his dominion over the creatures.

M*An* before the fall was Lord over the creatures, and herein he resembled his Maker.

There is no creature that can use all the creatures but man; First, hee had dominion over the insensible creatures, as the elements, for no creature can use the fire but man; he can doe sundry things with the fire that no creature can doe; which argueth that hee was made Lord over it. The Lyon who is the King

R r 4

of

Prop.

Illust. 1.

of beasts, is afraid of the fire, and when hee seeth the light of it, he fleeth from it. 2. He had commandement over the living creatures, for as yet a little boy can leade a great Elephant, and a childe will drive a number of oxen before him; the relicts of Gods image in man makes them stand in awe of him yet.

Illust. 2.

There are sundry creatures that excell man in some things; as some excell him in smell, some in sight, and some in touch; but joyne them all together in man, hee excelleth them all: which sheweth that man was created Lord over the creatures.

Illust. 3.

Reason is onely found in man, by the which hee can subdue all the perturbations in beasts, *1am. 3. 7. All are tamed by man*; which they cannot doe by themselves: that sheweth that man was made Lord over them.

Illust. 4.

We count that one of the most excellent qualities in beasts, when they can counterfeite man neereſt; as the Elephant his reason; the birds his words; the Ape his gestures; which all shew that he was made Lord over them.

Illust. 5.

That which hath a shew of reason, & *diminute* in part onely, should obey him who hath reason perfectly, and understanding of all things: but beasts have onely some shew of reason, they know some particular things, but they have not a full and an universall knowledge of things, therefore they are naturally subject to man.

There is nothing swifter than the horse among beasts, and yet he carries man, the dogge though most fierce waits upon man; the Elephant for as great and terrible as he is, yet he serves to be a sport to man, in publike meetings he learnes to leap, kneele and dance; and other beasts serve to feed man: we eat the honey of the bees, we drinke the milke of cattell, therefore all the beasts are made subject to man.

Man was Lord over the creatures before the fall,
and

and they were ready to obey him, hence may be drawn these consequents.

It is lawfull for men to hunt after the beasts and to catch them now, because that way he recovers the right over them again, that he had at the beginning.

Arist. pol. 1.0.3.

Man was Lord over the creatures before the fall: therefore he could be afraid of none of them: we see that *Eva* was not afraid of the serpent, as *Moses* was when he fled from it, *Exod. 4.*

Man hath another sort of dominion over the living creatures, than that which he hath over the plants and herbs of the fields: for the dominion which he had over the living creatures was *per imperium rationis*, but he had dominion over the plants, *per solum earum usum*, onely by using them.

Man was made Lord over the creatures, therefore when by sinne he becomes a beast, like a dog or a hog; how farre then doth he abase himselfe from his first estate and dominion: *Plato* called this, *Fædam animarum incorporationem*, which some mistaking, thought that he held that the soules of men entred into beasts, but he meant onely that men became brutish and sensuall like beasts.

Quest. How were the beasts so farre distant from *Adam* gathered unto him, and how could they give homage to him, being so farre from him? *Augustine* holds that when the beasts were gathered together before man, that it was not by the authority which man had over them being so farre distant from him: but by the ministry of the Angels, or by the immediate power of God, as they were gathered in the Arke to *Noah*, *Gen. 7. 8. 9.* This seemes most probable.

Gen. 9. ad liter. cap. 4

Before the fall the beasts were subiect unto man: but since the fall he hath lost his dominion; they become enemies,

A collation betwixt the innocent and old *Adam*.

Lib. 8. cap. 8,

A collation betwixt
the second, renewed,
and old Adam.;

enemies unto him, they picke out his eyes, eate his flesh, lappe his bloud. Before the fall Gods image made them stand in awe of him. Man stands in awe of the Kings herald, because of his coate of armes, take off this coat of armes from him, and men carry no respect to him: The image of God is as it were the Lords coate of armes, which he put upon him, that made the creatures afraid of him. We have a notable example of this in the primitive Church, as *Eusebius* testifieth, when the Christians were cast naked to the wilde beasts: yee should have seene them stamping, raging, and staring against them, but durst not set upon them, the image of God so affrayed them: therefore the persecutors covered them with the skinnies of wilde beasts, to make them run upon them.

Christ when he was in the wildernesse with the beasts forty dayes and forty nights, they hurt him not, *Mark. 1.* So when the image of God is restored to man in holinesse, they begin willingly to serve him: but they are enemies to the unregenerate. The dogges that eate the flesh of *Iezabel*, *1 King. 9. 35.* yet they licke the sores of *Lazarus*, *Luk. 16. 21.* The ravens that picke out the eyes of these who are disobedient to their parents, *Prov. 30. 17.* yet they feed *Elias* in the wildernesse, *1 Kin. 17. 4. 6* The serpents sting the Israelites in the wildernesse, *Num. 21. 6.* yet the Viper when it leaps upon *Pauls* hand hurts him not, *Aet. 28. 3, 5.* The fish eate the bodies of the wicked in the sea: yet the Whale preserved *Jonas*, *Ion. 1. 17.* The Lyons that touch not *Daniel*: yet devour his accusers, *Daniel 6. 17.* It is true that there are some relicts of the image of God left, which make the beasts to stand in awe of him: therefore *Psal. 104.* it is said, *When men goe to rest, then the beasts come forth to hunt for their prey.* But these remanants of the image of God in the unregenerate, doe not so terrifie the beasts, as the image

image of God restored in the regenerate man doth.

Quest. What benefit should *Adam* have had of the creatures before the fall: for he had not neede of them *ad alimentum* for nourishment: he had not neede of them *ad indumentum* for cloathing: he had not need of them *ad laboris adiumentum*, to helpe him to labour in his worke, as we have now?

Answ. He had other uses of them, for they were the matter of the praising of God. We see now when Kings and Princes kepe Lyons, Eagles, Bears, Tigers, and such their subiects gather their greatnesse by this, and their soverainnty: much more did *Adam* before the fall gather the greatnesse and excellency of God, by the diversity of these creatures. Againe, by them he should have learned more experimentall knowledge of the qualities of the creatures: therefore it is said, *that God brought them before Adam that hee might see how he would call them*, Gen. 2.20.

As hee was Lord over the beasts before the fall, and they were peaceably subiect to him: so they were peaceable amongst themselves, and one of them devoured not another.

Wee see when the beasts were in the Arke, after the fall, the ravening beasts lived not upon flesh, but they agreed all together: which vively represents to us the first estate and condition of the creatures. And as it serveth for the credit of a Master of a familie, that not onely his servants obey him, but also that they agree amongst themselves: So the creatures not onely obeyed man before his fall, but also in feare of their Lord they agreed amongst themselves.

As man had dominion over the brutish creatures before his fall, so should there have beene some sort of dominion and subjection amongst men before the fall.

Mans

Prop.

Illust.

Prop.

Illust.

Mans estate before the fall was no better than the estate of the Angels but amongst the Angels some are superiour and some inferiour, for there are degrees amongst the Angels. *Colos. 1. 16.* There should have bin a willing subjection of the wife to the husband: so then there should have bin a subjection of children towards their parents.

Prop.

There was no servile subjection of man to man before the fall but voluntary.

Illust.

The relickes we see of this after the fall, when as man had beasts a long time subject to him, but not men servilely. The first Fathers were shepherds a long time before they were Kings, to suppress and hold men under: the first King that ever we reade of in the scripture, was *Nimrod*, which was more than 2000. yecres after the creation.

Prop.

Servile and unwilling subiection came in after the fall.

Illust.

Homo tripliciter consideratur, 1. respectu dei, 2. respectu brutorum, 3. respectu aliorum hominum.

Quintuplex servus, 1. nature, 2. affectionum, 3. fortune, 4. belli, 5. ex pacto.

Man is considered three wayes: first as he hath a respect unto God, and in this respect all men are servants it was mans chiefe felicity to serve God. Secondly, as he is considered with the beasts, in which respect he was Lord over them, for they were made for him. Thirdly, as he is considered with other men: and in this respect, some now are servants, and some are free. First, now by nature some are servants, as the dull and blockish, unto them that are of quicker wit and understanding. Secondly, these who have commandment over their *affections* now, are morally Lords over these that cannot command their *affections*. Thirdly, there are *servi fortune*, as when the poore serve the rich. Fourthly, there are *servi belli*, as these that are taken slaves in the wars. Fifthly, these who are servants *ex pacto* that sell themselves.

Servile subiection was contrary to the first estate of

of man: therefore every one ought to seeke freedome, providing he may have it with lawfull meanes, that so he may draw neerer to this first estate. hence it was that God would have such servants, who refused their liberty at the seven yeeres end. *Exod. 21. 6.* marked with a note of infamie, boaring them through the eare: This curse to be a servant was laid, first upon a disobedient sonne *Cham*, and wee see to this day, that the *Moors Chams* posterity, are sold like slaues yet. When men may not have their liberty now by lawfull means, they should not shake off the yoke of servitude; this was the fault of sundry servants in the Apostles dayes, who thought because they were the Lords free-men, they might shake off the yoke of their masters: but the Apostle teacheth them another lesson, *1 Tim. 6. 1.* *Whosoever servants are under the yoke, let them have a due respect to their masters, lest the name of God and the word come to contempt.*

Quest. But seeing all men are sinners now, why are not all men slaves?

Ans. If God would deale in justice with us now, all should bee slaves, but God hath mitigated this to some to the end that common wealthes and families might stand.

Adam gave names to the creatures, as their Lord, and in signe of their subjection.

Therefore none should impose names to children but the fathers who have superiority over them, no not the mother. Yee see when *Rachel* called her sonne *Benoni*, *Jacob* called him *Benjamin*, *Gen. 35. 18.* Hence they gather well, that Christ as man had not a father, because his mother is commanded to give him the name, *Esay. 7.* *וְקָרָאתָ עַל בְּנֵי מִימָהּ וְעַל בְּנֵי מִימָהּ* *et tu femina vocabis*, in the feminine gender.

Object But *Hagar* gave her sonne a name, *Gen. 16. 11.* and

Prop.

Conseq.

and yet hee had a father; then it may seeme that the mother may likewise impose the name to the childe.

Answ. She gave this name at the commandement of the Angell, which *Abraham* afterwards confirmed, otherwise she had no power to give it.

Conseq.

Therefore these fathers who give this power to others, to impose names to their children: resigne the first part of their authority over their children, which God hath put in their hands.

Prop.

This dominion which *Adam* had over the creatures, was not an absolute dominion.

Illust.

Dominium dei in creaturis, est absolutum, immediatum, et liberum: dominium hominis est conditionatum & liberum.

God hath *dominium merum, immediatum, & liberum*: hee hath absolute, free, or immediate dominion over the creatures: Man had onely but *dominium conditionatum*: such a dominion that was not an absolute and simple dominion, to use them at his pleasure.

They who had their inheritance in Israel, had not an absolute and immediate dominion, for it was *Emanuel's land*, *Esay 8.8.* God had the absolute dominion: but theirs was *conditionatum*; for they might not sell their inheritance to whom they pleased, neither might they alienate their lands perpetually; but onely mortgage them to the yere of the Iubilee, *Lev. 25.13.* So the Levites had not *merum dominium* of the tythes, but *conditionatum*, *Levit. 23. 4.* For none of their children who were leproous might eate of them, neither might a stranger eate of them, neither might they sell them to others. *Caleb* had the property of *Hebron*, and yet it is said to bee given to the Levites; it was *Caleb's* by right of propriety, but it was the Priests because they dwelt there, and had the use of the ground.

So *Adam* before his fall, he was but *μικροτοκα, dei usufructuarius*, the tenant of God, but God was the immedi-

ate Lord, *qui habebat directum dominium, et ad omnes usus*, he had the supream dominion and absolute use over all the creatures.

Adam had not *nudum usum* of the creatures, but hee was *usu-fructuarius*. The Lawyers illustrate the matter by this example; if thou get the use of ones garden thou mayest gather roses, hearbs, flowers to thy owne use, but thou canst not sell them to others to make benefit of them. But if thou be *usu-fructuarius*, then thou mayest make benefit of them, and sell the fruite to others.

Another example, If one leave in his latter Will to thee the use of his flock, thou mayest use his flock for dunging of thy ground; but thou mayest neither sheare the sheep, nor milke them; for that pertaines to them for whom it is left: but if he leaue the *usu-fructum*, then thou mayest use both the milke and the wooll.

Man in his first estate had not onely *nudum usum*, but *usu-fructum*, hee had not onely a bare use of them for maintenance, but hee was Lord over them. He had not onely power *uti ijs*, *sed frui ijs*; not onely to use them but also to inioy them: & they distinguish these two: *aliud est dare alicui usum*; that is, it is one thing to give a man the use of a thing, and another thing to give him it unto use: he who giveth the use of a thing, giveth not the dominion over it: but hee who giveth it unto use gives also dominion.

A man may have *nudum usum, et illicitum rei*; as when a thiefe takes a mans horse.

Secondly; a man may have *nudum usum, sed licitum, et utilem*; as when a man hires a horse.

Thirdly, a man may have *nudum usum, et licitum, sed non utilem*; as when the servant of a banker changeth money for his Master, all the commodity is his masters.

Fourthly, a man may have *usum licitum, utilem, et pro-*

Illust. 2.

Duplex usus creaturarum, *nudus usus, et usu-fructuarius*.

Duplex potestas, *utendi et fruendi*.
Distinguuntur hæc, *dare usum et dare in usum*.

Illust. 3.

Usus rei multiplex: 1. *nudus et illicitus*, 2. *illicitus et utilis*, 3. *licitus sed non utilis*, 4. *usus utilis et proprietas subordinata*, 5. *dominium directum et altum*.

proprietatem sed subordinatam: as he who holds his lands in fealty.

Fiftly, he who hath the propriety, & *dominium directum*: this is called *dominium altum*, this supream dominion, Adam had not this supream dominion, but subordinate to God, Christ is called *the Lord of the Sabbath*, Mat. 12. 8. and man is called, *Lord of the Sabbath*, Mark. 2. 27. 28. how is Christ called *the Lord of the Sabbath*: As the supream and high Lord. Man is called *Lord of the Sabbath*, not as the supream, but as the subordinate Lord.

A collation betwixt the innocent and second Adam.

Duplex potestas, authoritativa, & subauthoritativa.

Duplex jus ad rem, & in re.

κτησις & χρῆσις, κτήσις & χρῆσις.

Duplex ius: in communi, & in proprio.

Duplex usus, iuris, & facti.

The first Adam had all things subiect to him, but by subordination: but the second Adam had them, by a more excellent manner from God his Father, *eminenter*, by way of excellency. Psal. 2. I wil give thee the ends of the earth for a possession.

Secondly, the first Adam had *jus ad rem*, *jus in re*, hee had not onely the right to the things, but also the use of them But the second Adam had *jus ad rem sed non in re*, for the most part; that is, he had the right to them, but the use of few of them for the most part.

Quest. Had Christ nothing in propriety to himselfe, had hee but onely the naked use of things?

Ans. There are sundry sorts of rights. First, that which many have right to in common, as the Levites in Israel had right in common to the tythes: but Barnabas a Levite who dwelt in Cyprus, out of Judea had his possessions proper to himselfe, Acts 4. So the Church of Ierusalem had their goods in common.

Secondly, there is, *usus juris et usus facti*: the use of propriety, & the naked use of things: the *naked use* is, when a man hath onely the naked use, that he may neither sell it, nor give it to others: the *use of propriety* is, when he may both use it himself and give the use of it to others, When

When a man hires a house, then hee hath onely the *bare use* of it, because hee cannot let it out to another, but when he hath a Lease of it, then he hath *usum juris*, and may then let it to another.

Thirdly, there is a *right of charity* and a *right of property*: a man coming into a vineyard, he may eat as many of the grapes as he pleaseth to satisfie his hunger, *Dent. 23. 24.* this is the *right of charity*: but hee may carry none away with him; this is the *right of property*. So the Disciples when they were hungry upon the Sabbath, *pulled the eares of corne, Matth. 12. 2.* This was the *right of charity*, but they carried none away with them, because they had not the *right of property*; and in this sense it is that *Salomon, Prov. 3. 27.* calls the poore *baggage to be*, the Lords of thy goods: *withhold not thy goods from the owners thereof*, that is, from the poore; the poore in their necessity have the use of thy goods. That axiome is true then, *Ius charitatis manet semper, sed non pro semper, habent enim ius utendi, non pro omni tempore sed tempore necessitatis*; that is, Charity remaineth alwayes, but we are not at all times to give our goods; there is a time to give them, not all times, but in the time of necessity; and in this sense is that of *Luke* to be understood, *Luke 6. 30. Give to every one that asks of you*; that is, who in extreame necessity asks of you.

Duplex ius, charitatis, & proprietatis.

Christ had not *ius in communi*, with the Disciples, in the bagge, *Ioh. 12.* For these that have a *common right*, one of them cannot give without the consent of the rest; but Christ had a *proper right* to the bagge, and commanded *Indas* to use it for the benefit of the poore, *Ioh. 13. 29.*

Of the right that Christ as man had to the creatures.

Secondly, Christ had not a bare & a *naked use* of things, but also he had the *use of property* in some things, as the clothes which he wore, and the money which he spent;

S f

he

he had not onely the *naked use* to weare them, but also the *property* of them, for he might have given them to others: it is true, he had but *nudum usum* of the house which he dwelt in, *Luk. 9. 58.* The Foxes have holes, but the Sonne of man, hath not a hole wherein to hide his head, for he had not the property of any house.

Thirdly, he had not onely *jus charitatis* to things, but also the *right of property*; neither had he these things as almes, for that which a man laboureth for is not called almes, *solus titulus recipiendi, ratione naturalis necessitatis facit mendicium*, the onely title of receiving in respect of naturall necessity, makes a begger: when it is sought and given in this manner, then it is almes.

Now that the second Adam had not his maintenance given him, by way of almes, it is proved thus; first he had the ends of the earth given him for a possession, *Psal. 2.* and all things were put under his feet, *Psal. 8.* he sent for the mans colt, *Luk. 19. 30.* Which sheweth that he had right over all the creatures.

Again, it is proved thus, If wee sowe to you spirituall things, ought yee not to give us temporall things? *1 Cor. 9. 11.* but Iesus Christ sowed spirituall things to them, therefore temporall things were his by right of property.

Thirdly, it is said, Who feedes the flocke and eateth not of the milke of it? *1 Cor. 9. 7.* as the shepheard and souldier have the right of property to their wages, so had Christ.

Fourthly, Christ saith *Luk. 10.* Goe into whatsoeuer house yee come to, and eat that which is set before you: the Disciples had not onely *jus gratitudinis*, the right of thankfulness; but also *jus juris*, the right of property: Christ had this right seeing he preached the Gospell. When Paul tooke no stipend from the Corinthians, *2 Cor. 11. 8. recessit à jure suo*, hee went from his right:

Duplex jus gratitudinis, & juris.

right: therefore others had this right of property, and so had Christ.

Object. But Christ willed his Disciples to leave all for his cause, *Mat. 10. 37.* and he set himselfe as an example before them of poverty: therefore he did renounce all right of things.

Answer. Wee renounce all things two wayes either in our affection, or in deed: they renounced all in affection but not in deed.

Duplex abnegatio rerū in affectu, & in effectu.

Secondly, there are two sorts of poverty; *materiall* poverty, and *formall* poverty. Christ left all things both moveable and immoveable in his affection, *formally*: but not *materially*: *formall* poverty is this, when in our affection we are ready to renounce all for Christ; but *materiall* poverty is, when we are actually called to the renouncing of all.

Duplex paupertas: materialis, & formalis.

Object. *Mark. 10. 21.* Christ commanded the young man, to sell all and follow him, if hee would be perfect: therefore it may seeme that *materiall* poverty, is required of him that would be most absolutely perfect, and that Christ made choyce of this sort of poverty himselfe.

Answer. Wee must distinguish betwixt these two; first, to leave all, and to follow Christ: Secondly, that hee who trusts in his riches should sell all,

The first part of this speech belongs to the matter it selfe, and the second to the person: the first is common to all, because all are bound to leave all for Christ in affection; but the second part belongs onely to this young man, who was so well conceited of himselfe, trusting in his riches, that he should sell all, and should give of that which hee sold to the poore: not that hee should give all to the poore when he sold it, but give of that which he sold to the poore; *non dare omnia, sed de omnibus, 2 Cor. 8. 9.*

Prior ut scholastici loquuntur, facta est ad rem, posterior ad hominem, non simplex.

Quest. But why bids he him sell all ?

Ans^w. Because he had such confidence in his riches, for they hindered him from following of Christ; therefore hee bids him quite all actually ; which precept binds not others, it being particular to him.

Object. But Christ sayes, *if thou wilt bee perfect, goe and sell all*, then this seemes to be the pitch of perfection to renounce all : and is more than that which the law requires.

Ans^w. Christ speakes not here of any perfection, above the perfection of the Law ; but of true perfection which is above imaginary perfection : as if hee should say : thou imaginest thou art perfect, and thinkest that thou hast kept the whole Law, if it be so, yet one thing is resting to thee, *sell all* : thus wee see how Christ applies himselfe to his conceit here.

Object. But it may be said that this young man spake not out of an ambitious conceit, for the text saith that Christ loved him.

Ans^w. The event sheweth that hee spake but out of the ambition of his heart, and the words of Christ shew this also, *Mark. 10. 24. How hard a thing is it for a rich man to enter into the Kingdome of God* : and where it is said Christ loved him, *verse. 21.* The Greeke word *ἡγάπησεν*, signifieth friendly to speake to him, and to deale gently with him ; but Christ liked him not in the estate that hee was in, for hee went away trusting still in his riches, and loving them better than Christ.

Conseq.

Christ and his Disciples renounced not all kind of right of those things which they had ; therefore that observation of the glosse, upon the tenth of *Marke* is false. Some have money, and love it ; some want money and love it ; but these are most perfect who neither have it, nor love it : and to this they apply that of the Apostle, *Galat.*

Gal. 6.14. I am crucified to the world and the world to me; as though a man could not be crucified to the world, unlesse he renounce it all, and goe a begging.

Thus the Church of *Rome* serveth God with will-worship, which hee never required at their hand, *Esay. 1.12.* By their vowes of poverty, chastity and obedience: this they make one of their counsels, of Evangelicke perfection.

So much of Gods Image in man: both inwardly in his soule, and outwardly in his dominion & superiority over all interiour creatures: it rests to speake of three consequents proper to this image. 1. Wherefore Gods image was placed in man. 2. This image being placed in man whether it was naturall unto him, or supernaturall. 3. The benefit he reapeth by this Image: which was his society with the Angels.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the end wherefore God placed this image in Man.

God placed this image in man, to keepe a perpetuall society betwixt man and him.

Similitude and likenesse are a great cause of love: *Adam* loved *Evah* when hee saw her first, because shee was like unto him, As a man when hee lookes into a glasse, hee loveth his image because it is like to him but *dissimilitude* breeds hatred. A man loves not a serpent or a Toade, because they are most unlike him, *David* marvelles that God should looke upon man, *Psal. 8.* but in the end he brings in his *similitude* in Christ, or else he would hate us.

Secondly, God placed this image in man, as a marke

of his possession; therefore the Fathers called him *nummum Dei*; for even as Princes set their image upon their coyne, so did the Lord set his image upon man; therefore miserable are these, who adulterate this coyne, and blot out this Image of God: he deserveth now to be arraigned as a traitour before God.

A collation betwixt
the innocent and old
Adam.

Man in innocency was like unto God, but now he is become like unto the beasts of the field, *Psal. 49.* now God may justly exprobrate unto him, *Behold man is become like one of us.* There was a great change in *Naomi* when she came to *Bethlehem*; shee was not then *Naomi* beautifull, but *Mara* bitternesse: there is a greater change now in man when he is false from his first estate, and lost this holy image.

Conseq.

Man was made to the image of God, therefore no man should lift his hand against him, *Gen. 9.* no Prince will suffer his image to be defaced, much lesse will God. There arose a sedition at *Antioch* for that *Theodosius* the Emperour exacted a new kind of tribute upon the people; in that commotion the people brake downe the Image of the Emperesse *Placilla*, (who was lately dead.) The Emperour in a great rage sent his forces against the City to sacke it. When the Herald came, and told this to the Citizens, one *Macedonius* a Monke indued with heavenly wisdom, sent unto the Herald an answer after this manner;

Theodoret. lib. 5. cap.
21.

“Tell the Emperour these words, that he is not onely
“an Emperour, but also a man, therefore let him not
“onely looke upon his Empire, but also upon himselfe:
“for he being a man commands also these who are men:
“let him not then use men so barbarously, who are
“made to the image of God. He is angry & that justly,
“that the brazen image of his wife was thus contume-
“liously used, & shall not the King of heaven be angry,
“to see his glorious image in man contumeliously han-
dled.

"dled; Oh what a difference is there betwixt the reasonable soule, and the brazen image; We for this image are able to set up an hundred, but he is not able to set up a haire of these men againe if he kill them.

These words being told the Emperor, hee suppressed his anger and drew backe his forces: if men would take this course, and ponder it deeply in their heart, they would not be so ready to breake downe this image of God by their bloody cruelty.

CHAP. XVII.

Whether the Image of God in Adam was naturall or supernaturall?

THE second consequent of the image of God being placed in man, is, concerning the nature of it.

There are two things which principally wee and the Church of Rome controvert about, touching the image of God. The first is, *conditio natura*, the condition of nature: the second is, *conditio iustitie*, concernig mans righteousness.

The Church of Rome holds, that there was concupiscence in the nature of man, being created in his pure naturalls, but it was not a sinne (say they) or a punishment of sin as it is now, but a defect following the condition of nature; and they say that it was not from God but besides his intention. And they goe about to cleare the matter by this comparison: when a Smith makes a sword of yron, he is not the cause of the rust in the yron, but rust followeth as a consequent in the yron: but if this rebellion flow from the condition of nature, how can God be free from the cause of sin, who is the author of nature?

Duplex conditio imaginis Dei, natura, & iustitie.

Bellarmin. lib. 7. cap. 28.

*Triplex dissimilitudo
comparationis.*

Their comparifon then taken from the Smith and the iron is altogether impertinent : first, the smith made not the yron, as God made man, therefore he cannot bee sayd to be the cause of the rust of yron, as God making man, concupifcence necessarily followes him according to their position

Secondly, the rust doth not necessarily follow the yron, neither is the yron the cause of it, but some externall things : they make concupifcence necessary to follow the body.

Thirdly, the Smith if he could, he would make such a sword that should take no rust ; but God (according to their judgement) made man such that concupifcence did necessarily follow.

That there was no
concupifcence in man
before the fall.

Before the fall there was no reluctation nor strife betwixt the superiour and inferiour faculties in man ; and therefore no concupifcence : our reasons are these.

First, our first parents were not ashamed when they were naked, *Gen. 2.* but after that *Adam* had sinned and saw himselfe naked, hee fled from the presence of God and hid himselfe even for very shame ; it is the rebellion betwixt the superiour and inferiour faculties that makes men ashamed.

Secondly, in Iesus Christ the *second Adam*, there was no rebellion, and yet he was like to us in all things sinne excepted, taking our nature upon him, and the essentiall properties of it. As to bee tempted, *Mat. 4. 1. Iesus was carried by the Spirit into the desert to bee tempted ;* So to feare, *Hebr. 5. 7. he was heard in that which hee feared.* So to be angry, *Mark. 3. 5. Hee looked round about on them angerly :* So forgetfulnesse of his office by reason of the agonie astonishing his senses ; *Father, if it bee possible, let this cup passe from me, Mat. 26. 39.* Wherefore if this strife, betwixt the
superiour

superiour and inferiour faculties, was the consequent of nature in our whole estate, then Christ should not have beene blamelesse, which is blasphemy: for *concupiscence is sin*, Rom, 7.7.

Thirdly, if there had been rebellion, betwixt the *superiour* and *inferiour faculties* before the fall; then man in his whole estate had not beene happy for *Paul* in respect of this concupiscence, is forced to cry out, Rom. 7. 11. *O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver mee from this body of death?* and originall iustice had not beene such an excellent gift in that estate, but only a restraint, to restraints this concupiscence that it bursted not forth.

Fourthly, if this rebellion flow from nature, how can God be free from sinne who is the authour of nature? *qui est causa causæ, est causa causati, in essentialiter subordinatis*, he who is the cause of a cause, is likewise the cause of the effect in things essentially subordinate: but God is the author of mans nature and concupiscence: therefore according to their position, he must bee the author of sinne: this is blasphemie.

The Church of *Rome* holds, that this *holinesse* was a *supernaturall* thing to man, and not naturall in his first creation: and they goe about to shew the matter by these comparisons.

They say, mans righteousness in his innocent estate, was like a garland set upon a virgines head; the garland is no part of the virgins body, and although the garland be removed, yet she remains still a virgin. So this *originall righteousness*, they make it as it were a garland, which being taken away from man, no naturall thing is blemished in him.

Secondly, they compare it to *Sampsons* lockes, which when they were cut off, nothing was taken from *Sampsons* nature.

Of mans originall justice, according to the Church of *Rome*.

Third-

Duplex homo, nudus
& spoliatus.

Perer. lib. 5. in Gen.
disput. de excellent. pag.
118.

Thirdly, they compare it to a bridle in a horse mouth, which is no part of the horse, nor naturall to him, but serves to bridle the horse and keepe him in. So say they, this originall *righteousnesse*, was no naturall thing in man before the fall, but served onely as a bridle to restraine concupiscence; and they put a difference betwixt a naked man and a robbed man. Man before his fall (say they) he was naked, but God did cast his cloake of *supernaturall righteousness* about him to cover him: but since the fall (say they) hee is not *homo nudus sed spoliatus*, a naked man, but spoyled of the graces of God.

Hence is that division made by the Iesuites of the estate of man: the first estate (saith he) is of man considered without grace or sinne, (as they terme it) in his *pure naturals*; the second estate is of man in his *pure naturals*, cloathed with supernaturall righteousness: the third estate is of man *degenerate* and sinfull: the fourth estate, is of man *regenerate*; and the last is of man *glorified*. But to consider a man both voyde of grace and sinne, such a man was never, nor never shall be; neither did the Iewish or Christian Church, ever divide the estate of man thus.

The Iewish Church taketh up the estate of man in these three; the first they call *Adam, ratione creationis*, because hee was made out of the red earth: the second they call *Enosh*, man subiect to all miseries: the third they call *Ish*, man restored to blessednesse and happinesse.

The orthodoxe christian Church, divides the estate of man thus: the first estate, is *gratia collatio*, the bestowing of grace: the second is, *collata amissio* the losse of that grace bestowed: the third is, *instauratio amissa*, the restoring of lost grace; and the fourth is, *confirmatio instaurata*, the confirmation of restored grace.

Wee

We will shew that his *originall righteousness*, was *naturall* to man, and not *supernaturall*: where we must consider: that nature is taken five wayes:

First, a thing is *naturall* by creation, as the soule and the body are *naturall* to man, because they give a being to him.

Secondly, for that which floweth essentially and naturally from a thing, as the faculties from the soule.

Thirdly, for that which cleaveth most surely to nature, as sinne doth to the soule now.

Fourthly, for that which beautifieth nature and helps it, as grace doth.

Fifthly, for that which by generation is propagated to the posteritie, as originall corruption.

Originall justice was not naturall to man in the first sense, for it was no part of his essence. It was not naturall to him in the second sense, for it flowed not from the understanding essentially, as the faculties of the soule doe; but it was naturall to him in the third sense, because hee was created in holinesse, and was the subject of holinesse: it was naturall to him in the fourth sense, because it made his nature perfect: It was naturall to him in the fifth sense, for he should have transmitted it to his posteritie by generation, if he had stood in holinesse, as man doth sinne now, which is come in place of it.

Originall righteousness to the first *Adam* was naturall, to the renewed *Adam*, grace is *supernaturall*; to the old *Adam*, it is against his nature, so long as hee continues in sinne.

Our reasons proving, that *originall righteousness*, was *naturall* to *Adam*, and not *supernaturall*, are these.

First, as are the reliques of the image of God in man since

Of mans originall justice, according to the reformed Church.

A collation betwixt the innocent, renewed, and old *Adam*.

Reason 1.

since the fall, such was the image of God in man before the fall: but the remnants of the Image of God in man since the fall, are naturall, *Rom. 2. 13. For by nature they doe the things contained in the Law, 2 Cor. 11. Doth not nature teach you this?* therefore the image of God in man before the fall was naturall.

Reason 2.

Secondly, *supernaturall gifts* are not hereditary, nor propagate by generation, no more than a colt (to use their owne similitude) is brought forth with a bridle in his teeth: but man before the fall, should have begotten children in his image in *originall justice*: therefore *originall justice* was not *supernaturall* to him.

Reason 3.

Thirdly, *by nature we are now the children of wrath; Ephes. 2. 3.* therefore *originall justice* should not have beene *supernaturall* to man, but *naturall* by the rule of contraries.

De grat. prim. hom. cap. 5.

Bellarmino, although he grant that there might have beene a man, created as well without grace as sinne; yet hee is inforced to acknowledge, that this point of erroneous doctrine, did never generally prevaile in the Roman Church: for there were some (saith hee) excellently learned, that thought as wee doe; that man must either be in the estate of grace, or sinne; and that there is not a middle estate: and that *originall righteousness* was required to the integrity of nature, and consequently that being lost, nature was corrupted and deprived of all naturall and morall rectitude. So that man after the fall of *Adam*, can doe nothing morally good, or that truly can bee named a vertue, till he be renewed by grace; as likewise *Adam* before his fall was not able to doe any thing morally good by natures power, without the assistance of speciall grace from God.

But we must hold for our part, this to be the ground of

of no smaller error which the Church of Rome layeth ; that man in his *pure naturals*, was voyde both of grace and sinne ; this is the ground of many other errors which they maintaine.

First, that *concupiscence* is naturall to man, following alwayes his creation.

Secondly, that naturall gifts both in men and diuels remaine unblemished since the fall.

Thirdly, that the corruption of nature consists not in any corrupt qualitie, but onely in the losse of supernaturall grace.

Fourthly, that death is not an effect of sinne properly, but it is from nature, and it is onely accidentally from sin ; because sin removes that bridle of originall righteousness, which held backe death.

Fifthly, that concupiscence is not sinne in the regenerate.

Sixtly, that man now after his fall, is in the same estate wherein hee was before the fall in his *pure naturals* : for *Adams* sinne hath diminished nothing from that which is naturall : and the body, (they say) since the fall is no more passible, than it was before in the *pure naturals*. So (they say) the minde of man being considered by it selfe, without this supernaturall holinesse, is no more weakened by the fall, than it was before the fall in things naturall.

Seventhly, that man hath free will left in him after his fall : which grounds are all false. Here we must doe as *Elisha* did when hee cured the waters of *Iericho*, *2 King. 3*. he went to the spring heads, and there cast in salt : so must we goe to this, as one of the springs from whence many errors in popery proceed, and cure it first.

This popish platforme of mans estate before his fall, is taken

taken from the schooles of Philosophie, but not from *Moses* and the Prophets. The Philosophers were ignorant of the nature of man in his whole estate, so were they ignorant of his fall; and therefore they tooke up man in a middle estate. So these Sophists following the Philosophers, and not the Scriptures, as though they had never heard of mans creation, nor yet of his fall; imagine him to be a middle sort of man, such a man as never was, neither in his whole estate, nor after his fall: but they ought to have remembred that of the Apostle, *Colos. 2.8. Take heed lest any spoyle you by Philosophie.*

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the consequents of Gods image in man; in his societie with the Angels.

THe third consequent that followeth upon the image of God being placed in man in his creation, is concerning the societie and fellowship that he had with the Angels so long as hee stood in innocency.

Adam in his first estate was little inferiour to the Angels.

It shall bee the greatest perfection of man in glory, that hee shall bee like the Angels of God, and bee loved of them, as they love one another. So it was mans great happinesse before the fall, that hee conversed with the Angels, and they loved him.

The Angels did neither minister unto, nor keepe the *first Adam* before his fall, they onely loved him. The Angels ministred to Christ the *second Adam*, and loved him, but did not keepe him. The Angels minister now to the *renewed Adam*, they love him and keepe him; but they

Prop.

Illust.

A collation betwixt the innocent, second, renewed, and old *Adam*.

they neither minister to the wicked, love them, nor keepe them.

First, the Angels neither did minister to *Adam* before his fall, nor did they keepe him, because hee was in no danger, onely they loved him: they ministred to Iesus Christ, but they did not keepe him, for he was *comprehensor*, as well as *viator*. Christ is the head of the Angels, therefore hee is not kept by them: but they minister to the elect, and keepe them by Christ; which priviledge *Adam* had not of them before his fall.

Object. It may seeme that they did keepe Christ, *Psal.* 91. *they shall keepe thee in all thy wayes.*

Ans. This is to be understood *de Christo mystico*, of Christ in his members; that is, they shall keepe thy members in all their wayes. But this part of the *Psalm* was misapplyed by the Divell to Christ in proper person, *Matth.* 4. for the Angels keepe not Christ, but minister to him: but they both keepe and minister to his members the elect.

Object. But it may be sayd, that the elect have greater priviledges then, than Christ hath, seeing they both keepe them, and minister to them.

Ans. This argueth not any prerogative that the Saints have above Christ, but onely their weakenesse and wants, that they have need of the Angels to preserve them, as young children stand in need of nurses to waite upon them.

Object. It may seeme that Angels are not ministring spirits, in respect of the elect, but in respect of Christ; because the Angell, *Revel.* 19. 22. calls himselfe, not our servant, but, *our fellow servant*. So the Angels are not called the servants of the kingdomes, but, *The Princes of the Kingdomes*, *Dan.* 12. Thirdly, the Apostle proves Christ to be God, *Heb.* 2. because the Angels are servants to him. A shepheard is not the servant of his

his sheepe, although hee keeps them; but his Masters servant. So although the Angels keepe us, yet they seeme not to be our ministers but Christs.

Ans. The Scripture, *Heb. 1.* calls them ministring spirits, sent for them that are elect; and although they be more excellent creatures in themselves, than the elect; yet in Christ, and by Christ, they become ministring spirits to us. Christ himselfe is not ashamed to call himselfe a servant to the elect, *Mat. 20. I came not to be served, but to serve: why may not then the Angels be sayd, to be ministers to the elect?*

Object. It is a Maxime in Phylosophy, that the end is more excellent than the meanes tending to the end: but the safety of man is the end: and the Angels are the meanes, therefore it may seeme that man is more excellent than the Angels.

Ans. The end considered as the end, is alwayes more excellent than the meanes tending to the end, but not absolutely, touching the essence of the meanes; for these things that are the meanes may be more excellent in themselves. Example: The incarnation of Christ is more excellent than the redemption of man in it selfe, and yet it is institute for another end; so the Sun, Moon, and starres were institute to give influence to the inferiour bodies, herbes, trees and plants, and yet they are more excellent in themselves; but consider them as meanes tending to that end, they are inferiour to them.

The Angels neither love the wicked, nor minister to them, nor preserve them. But here we must marke, when we say they minister not to them, this is to be understood of their speciall and particular ministring, they attend them not, as they doe the elect; it is true, as God makes his Sunne to shine as well upon the unjust as the just, *Mat. 5. 45.* so the Angels may be ministers sometimes of outward things even to the wicked

wicked. Whosoever stept downe first into the poole of *Siloam*, *Ioh. 5. 8.* was cured whether good or bad: and the Angels brought downe *Manna* in the wildernesse, *Psal. 78. 25.* to the bad Israelites, as well as to the good: but they have not a particular care of the wicked as they have of the elect of God; they come not up and downe upon the Ladder, *Christ, Ioh. 1. 52.* to minister to them as they doe to the elect.

CHAP. XIX.

of Adams life before the fall, whether it was contemplative, or practicke?

Adams had beside the Image of God placed in him, two royall prerogatives above any man that ever was: the first was concerning his estate and condition of life, whether it was in action, or contemplation. The second concerning his mariage celebrated by God himselfe, in Paradise. Of the first prerogative is intreated here.

Mans life before the fall, was more contemplative than practicke.

As from the Sunne, first proceed bright beames, which lighting upon transparent bodies they cast a brightnesse or splendor by their reflex; and after their reflex, they cast shadowes. So from God that glorious Sunne, there proceeded first wisdom, which being reflexed upon the mind of *Adam* to cognosce and contemplate upon things; this contemplation, brought forth prudency, and at last arts, as the shadow of prudency. This wisdom or contemplation was in *cognoscibilibus*, in things to be knowne; but prudency was in *agibilibus*, in things to be done; arts are in *factibilibus*, in things to be done by the hands.

T t

Quest.

Prop.

Illust.

*Vita activa est prior in
via generationis, sed
vita contemplativa est
prior in via directionis.*

*Duplex bonitas; neces-
sitaris, & excellentiæ.*

*Duplex bonitas; abso-
luta & determinata.*

*Duplex consideratio vi-
tæ humanæ, respectu
mediorum, & finis.*

Quest. It may bee asked which of these two lives is to be preferred before another: it might seeme that *prudence* is to bee preferred before *wisdom*; for man is bound to love God above all, and to helpe his neighbour; these we get not by *contemplation* but by *action*. Again, it may seeme that the *contemplative life* is the best life, because in the *active life* there are many dangers and perils, but not so in the *contemplative*.

Answ. To cleare this point, wee must marke these assertions following.

First, when we compare these two *wisdom* and *prudence* together, either we respect the necessity of them, or the excellency of them. If wee respect the *necessity* of them; then no doubt, *prudence* is most fit for our estate now.

If wee marke the *excellency* of them, then wee must use this distinction; one thing is said to be better than another, either absolutely, or determinate to this or that particular: as, to have foure feet is good for a horse, but not absolutely good, for it is not good for a man. So to be a philosopher is determinately good for man, but not absolutely good; for it is not good for a horse. So *wisdom* and *prudence* conferred together, *wisdom* absolutely is better than *prudence*; but *prudence* in this case as we are now, is better for us.

Thirdly, if wee consider the end of mans life; then *contemplation* is better than *action*; but if wee consider the meanes tending to the end, then *action* is fitter for us, than *contemplation*. If wee consider the end, it is more excellent than the meanes; for all these practicall arts and operations which man doth, are ordained (as to their proper end;) to the *contemplation* of the understanding: and all the *contemplation* of the understanding is ordained for the metaphysickes: and all the know-
ledge

ledge which we have of the metaphysics: (in so farre as it precedes the knowledge which we have of God :) is ordained for the knowledge of God, as the last end ; *Ioh. 17. This is life eternall to know thee onely, Matth. 5. Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God:* therefore the *contemplative life*, being the last end, must bee most perfect in it selfe ; for it standeth in need of fewer helpes than the *practicke life* doth.

These two sorts of lives, are so necessary both for this life, and for the life to come, and are so straitly lincked, that we must labour to joyne them together.

The *active life*, without the *contemplative life*, is a most imperfect life, like the fruit pulled from the tree ; so the *contemplative life*, without the *active*, is a most imperfect life ; but joyne them both together, they make a perfect *Argus*, having his eyes looking up and downe.

These two sorts of lives are well compared to the two great lights in heaven, the Sun and Moone : first, as the Moone hath her light from the Sunne, so hath *prudency* her light from *wisedome*. Secondly, as the Sunne rules the day, and the Moone the night ; so *wisedome* rules our heavenly life ; and *prudency* our earthly life. Thirdly, as the moone is neerer to us than the Sunne, so is *prudency* in this estate neerer to us than *wisedome*.

Prudency and *wisedome*, the *active* and *contemplative life*, should be joyned together: therefore these *onagri*, or wilde asses, the Hermites ; who give themselves onely to *contemplation* and withdraw themselves from the society of men, never joyning action to their *contemplation* ; mistake altogether the end wherefore man was placed here.

When *Elias* was in the wildernesse, the Angel came to him and said ; what dost thou here? So the Lord will say one day to these unprofitable members (that are in the

Prop.

Illust.

Consequence 1.

Church and Common-wealth) what do ye in the Wildernesse; The Philosopher could say, that hee was either a God or a beast that could live in the Wildernesse; this their *contemplative life* hath pride for the father, and idlenesse for the mother.

The *contemplative life*, is the most excellent life, therefore that life that drawes neereſt to it, muſt be the beſt. There are three ſorts of lives, the *active life*, the *effective life*, and the *voluptuary*. The *active life* conſiſts in managing and ruling things by prudence; this was *Dauids* life, and it comes neereſt to the *contemplative life*. The *effective life* conſiſts in dreſſing of the ground, in huſbandry, and ſuch; this was *Vzziahs* life: therefore, 2 *King. 15*. He is called *vir agri*, becauſe he delighted in tillage; and this is further removed from the *contemplative life*, than the *active life*. The *voluptuary life* was that in *Salomon*, when he gave himſelfe to pleaſure and delights, ſo the life of *Sardanapalus* King of *Aſſyria*; and this is furtheſt from the *contemplative life*. *Adam* had the *contemplative life* chiefly, he had the *Active* and *effective life*; but he had not that *voluptuary* or ſinfull life, delighting in pleaſure.

Triplex vita, activa, effectiva, & voluptuaria.

A collation betwixt the innocent, old, and glorified *Adam*.

Actiones internæ quarum finis contemplatio, manebunt in vita futura, ut dilectio, amor: actiones externæ quarum finis eſt actio, non manebunt, quales ſunt virtutes morales quæ diriguntur ad finem, (ſcilicet contemplationem) at non verſantur circa finem, quia hoc proprium eſt contemplationis.

The *firſt Adam* his life was *contemplative, active, and effective*. The *old Adam* his life is *voluptuary*, for the end of all his actions is pleaſure. The *glorified Adam*, his life is *contemplative* and *active* onely, and in this conſiſts his laſt happineſſe.

In the life to come, the *glorified Adam* ſhall have all ſorts of perfection in him. Firſt, his deſire ſhall be perfected in his *being* (every thing naturally deſires the being and preſervation of it ſelfe) for hee ſhall be perpetually. Secondly, his *deſire* ſhall be fulfilled in theſe things that are common to him and other living creatures, which is *delight*; his delights and pleaſure ſhall be ſpirituall altogether, and theſe farre exceed corporall

porall delights; because men are contented to suffer many corporall torments for spirituall delights. Thirdly, his desire shall be fulfilled in his *reasonable desires*; which is, to rule his *active and civill life*; In his *active life*, so to live vertuously, that hee cannot make defection to evil: in this civill life, for all that a man desires in this life is honour, a good name and riches; the desires of all these shall be perfected in the life to come; for honour, *wee shall reigne with him, Revel. 20.* For a good name, none shall have place to accuse or revile them there; for riches, *Psal. 111. Riches and glory are in his house.* Fourthly, his desire shall be fulfilled in his *intellectuall knowledge*, because then hee shall attaine to the full perfection of these things, that he desires to know; and this shall bee the perfection of his *contemplative life*; in beholding God, which is the complement of all his other desires, and they all ayme at this.

Object. But it may be said that mans desire shall not be fulfilled in the life to come by beholding God: for the soules in glory long for their bodies againe, and have not their full rest till they enjoy them.

Ans. The soules in glory desire no greater measure of joy, than to behold God, who is the end and object of their blessednesse. But they desire a greater perfection in respect of themselves; because they doe not so totally and fully enjoy that which they desire to possesse. A man sitting at a table furnished with variety of dishes, hee desires no more dishes than are at the table, yet hee desires to have a better stomacke: so the soules in glory desire no greater measure of blessednesse than to behold God; but respecting the longing they have for their bodies, they are not come to the fullnesse of their blessednesse till they be joyned together againe.

Quadruplex desiderium; commune, animale, rationale, & intellectuale.

Duplex desiderium; ex parte appetibilis, & ex parte appetentis.

Quest. Whether shall the soule after the resurrection, being joyned with the body againe, enjoy greater happinesse, than it had without the body in heaven?

Answ. In respect of the object which is God, it shall have no greater happinesse; but in respect of it selfe, it shall have greater joy, both extensive, because it shall rejoyce in the glory of the body, and intensive, because in the conjunction with the body, the operation therefore shall be more forcible, when soule and body are joyned together.

Duplex gaudium; exten-
sivum, & intensi-
vum.

Picalhom. lib. 10. E-
t hic. Sex conditiones vi-
tae humanae, metaphora
sumpta a carcere, a mon-
stro, a mundo, a navi, a
curru, & ab aere.

The *Academicke*s make fixe conditions of the life of man whereunto it is resembled, which they set out to us by six metaphors. The first is in the conjunction of the soule and the body; and herein they take the comparison from a man in a *Prison*, and in this estate man had need of spurres to stirre him up, that he may come out of prison.

The second Condition of mans life is in consisting of contrary faculties; and in this estate they compare him to a *Monster*, halfe man and halfe beast, the sensuall part fighting against the reasonable; here we must take heed *ne pars fera voret humanam*, lest the brutish part overcome the reasonable.

The third condition makes him an absolute man, and then he is called the *little world*, or *epilogus mundi*, the compend of the world; and so hee should labour to keepe all things in a just frame.

The fourth condition, as he is ayming towards his end, and so he is compared to a *shippe* in the midst of the Sea, sayling towards the haven; reason is the ship; the windes, waves, and rockes, are the many hazards we are exposed to in this life; the oares are his affections and desires; and when the eye is set upon eternall happinesse, this is like the pole which directs the ship.

The fift condition is then, when as the soule is puri-

fied

fied by vertue, and elevated above the owne nature, then it is compared to a *chariot*, which resembles the whole constitution of the soule joyned to the body; the Coach-man is reason; the horses which draw the coach are two, one white and another blacke; the white horse is the irascible appetite, the blacke is the concupiscible appetite; the spurres which spurre these horses forward, are, desire of honour, and feare of shame.

The sixt condition is, when the soule by contemplation ascends to God, then it is compared to a *fowle* mounting upward, then it is no longer considered as yoaked in the coach, for now the horses are loosed, & *auriga sistens eos ad praecep, tribuit eis nectar & ambrosiam*; that is, the coachman loosing the horses, brings them to the manger, and gives them nectar and ambrosia to eat and drinke; for when the soule is taken up with this contemplation, beholding the chiefe Good, then the appetite is satisfied with milke and honey as the Scripture calls it. As nurses taking pleasure and delight to feed their babes, when they have stilled them, they lay them up to sleepe, and then they take delight to feed themselves: so, when the sensible faculty shall be satisfied, then shall our great delight be in contemplation to behold the face of God and that eternall glory: whereupon is resolved that position laid downe in the beginning, that mans chiefe felicity in his life before the fall, was chiefly in contemplation, and so shall it be in glory: although action in love doe flow from it, as the fruit from the tree.

CHAP. XX.

Of Adams conjunct life, or his marriage.

THe second royall prerogative bestowed upon *Adam* in Paradise, was, that he had his marriage immediately celebrated by God.

God made the woman of the man. Hee made not paires of males and females in mankind, as hee did of the rest of living creatures; but he made the one of the other, first to shew them the neere conjunction which is betwixt them; secondly, hee made the woman of the man, that he might be her head, and the fountaine of all man-kinde, which chiefly belonged to his dignity: thirdly, she was made of him, that she might obey and honour him; *Christ* saith, *Mark. 2. 27.* the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath; therefore as man was made Lord over the Sabbath, so hee was made Lord over the woman.

This subjection of the woman to the man, was shewed by the veile which was put upon the womans head when she was married, *Gen. 24. 65.* In the *first of Numbers* when the husband accused the wife of adultery she was commanded to stand bareheaded before the Priest, as not being now under her husbands subjection, untill she was cleared of this blot.

Secondly, this subjection is notably set out in that heavenly order, *1 Cor. 11. 3.* *God is Christs head, and Christ is the mans head, and the man is the womans head.*

Thirdly, this subjection is likewise shewed by that dreame of *Ioseph*, *Gen. 37.* Where the father is compared to the Sunne, the wife to the Moone, and the children to the starres.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, the *Persians* had this sovereignty over their wives, they had a proverbiall kind of speech which was, *and they shall speake the language of their owne people*; that is, they shall live after the manner of their owne country, and have commandement over their wives, *Esth. 1. 20. vejit tenu jecar*, they put her in the masculine gender, to signifie their ready obedience; for when the Hebrewes will commend a thing in women as well done, they put them in the masculine gender: and againe, when they will discommend men, they put them in the feminine gender; because now they have committed abomination with idols.

Since the fall, this heavenly order is mightily inverted, when the woman claymes sovereignty over the man, and will not bee subject to him: as she seekes superiority over her husband; so if she could, she would pull Christ out of his place, and God the Father out of his.

This inverting of natures order, hath ever a curse joyned with it, when such effect superiority. *Plutarch* hath a very good apologue for this: the members of the body of the Serpent (saith hee) fell at variance among themselves; the taile complained that the head had alwayes the government, and desired that it might rule the body; the simple head was content, but what became of it when the tayle tooke the guiding of the head and the rest of the body: it pulled the head and the body, through the brambles and briars, and had almost spoyled the whole body. So let us remember that apologue of the bramble, *Judg. 9*. When it got the ruling of the trees of the field, what became of them, a fire came out from it and burnt them.

In some case the Lord hath granted as great power to the woman over the man, as he hath granted to the man

A collation betwixt
the innocent, and
old Adam.

man over the woman, as in the mutuall use of their bodies: and in this case he is as well subject to his wife, as he is her Lord: but in other things the man hath the superiority over the woman.

Quest. Seeing the woman hath as great right over the body of the man, as the man hath over her body, how is it that *Rachel* with her mandrakes perswaded her husband to lye with her? *Gen.* 30. 15. It might seeme shee had not such a right to claime this of her husband?

Ans. In this polygamie, there was some cause of exception, because a man had two wives at once, and that of Christ may be fitly applied here, *One man cannot serve two masters*, *Mat.* 6. 24.

God made the woman of the rib of *Adam*.

She was not made of the eye as the Hebrewes say, that she should not be wandring and unstable like *Dinah*, *Gen.* 34. 1. Neither was she made of the eare, that she should not be *auscultatrix* a hearkener like *Sarah*, *Gen.* 18. 10. 14. he made her not of the foot, that shee should not be troden upon like the Serpent: But hee made her of the rib, that she might be his collaterall, to eat of his morsels, drinke of his cup, and sleepe in his bosome, *2 Samuel*, 12. 3.

Quest. When God tooke this rib out of *Adams* side, whether had *Adam* a rib moe than enough; or when it was taken out whether wanted he a rib? To say that he wanted a rib, would imply an imperfection; to say that he had a rib moe than enough, would imply superfluitie in *Adam*; which in the estate of innocencie cannot be granted.

Ans. *Adam* must not bee considered as other men, but as he who represented whole mankind; and therefore he having a rib moe than other men have, who are but singular men, yet he had not a rib moe than enough.

The

Prop.
Illust.

Non ut individuum sed ut species.

The seed which is in the body of man, is no superfluitie in man, because it serveth for the continuation of his kinde; So this rib was no superfluous thing in *Adam*, although he had a rib more than the rest of mankind. We count it now a superfluous thing, when a man hath more fingers than ten, so to have more ribs than twenty-four.

Againe, if we say it was one of his ordinary ribs, it will not follow, that there was any defect, when this rib was taken out: for wee may safely hold, that God put in a new rib in place of it: for when *Moses* saith, that God shut up the flesh in place of it, it will not follow that he closed it up onely with flesh, but also with a rib, as *Adam* himselfe afterward shewed, *Gen. 2, 23.* *She is flesh of my flesh, and bone of my bones.*

Quest. But how could so little a matter as a bone, become the whole body of a woman, was this the extending or rarifying of the bone, as wee see yce rarified into water: or was it by adding new matter to the bone?

Thomas answers, that this could not be by rarification of the bone, for then the body of *Eva* should not have beene solid enough, but it was as he holds, by addition of new matter. As the five loaves which fed so many thousands in the wilderness. *Mat. 14. 17.* was not by rarifying and extending them, but onely by adding to them.

Quest. Whet here was the matter which was added to the rib, first turned into a rib, and then made a woman, or was she immediately made a woman of this rib, and the matter added to the rib?

Ans. It seemeth more probable, that the womans body was made of this matter and the rib, without any new conversion of this matter into a rib; neither need wee to grant two conversions or changes. Therefore the

Secunda secunda art. 3.

the schoolmen say well, *non sunt multiplicanda miracula*: it is not probable, that all this matter was changed into a rib, and then it grew up into a body.

Quest. Why is she then rather sayd to be made of the rib, then of the matter added to the rib?

Ans. Because principally and chiefly, God chose that rib, to make the woman of it, and then hee added the rest of the matter: although there was much more added to the five loaves (which fed the people in the wilderness) than the substance of the five loaves; yet they are sayd to bee filled with the five loaves, because God tooke them first & chiefly for this miracle, by adding the rest of the substance miraculously for feeding of the people.

But wee must marke here a difference, betwixt that which was added to the five loaves, and this which was added to the rib of the man; for in that which was miraculously added to the loaves, there was not a third thing made up of them: but of this rib and the matter added to it, the woman was made.

God made them two, one flesh.

First, *Adam* is created *one*; secondly, *two* are made out of *one*; thirdly, *two* are made *one* againe, by consent and conjunction: these three are the workes of God: but when they are dissolved againe and made *two* by adultery, this is the worke of the devell.

There are three things betwixt the man and the wife; first, *union*: secondly, *communion*: thirdly, *communicating*.

By *union* they are made one flesh.

By *communion*, the man is not his owne, but his wives, the wife is not her owne, but her husbands.

Communicating, is of their goods: *Plato* willed that in his common-wealth, *meum et tuum*, should not be

Prop.

Illust.

Adam primò factus est unus, deinde duo, tertio unus, quarto duo.

Illust. 2.

Trialligamenta inter maritum & uxorem, unio, communicatio, & communicatio.

be heard betwixt the man and the wife: but all should be called the husbands: for as wine mixed with water, although there be much water, and little wine, yet it is called wine: So although the wife bring much substance to the house, and the husband but little; yet all should be called the husbands. So that which is the husbands, must not be reserved for himselfe alone, but make it *meo-tuum*, common with the wife. The wife participates of his substance, she is bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh: so his name, he is *ish* and she is *isha*. So among the Romanes, it was a proverbe, *When thou art called Cajus, I shall be called Caia*: therefore shee should be partaker of his goods.

Quest. How is the man and the wife one?

Ans. They are not one, *hypostatically*: as Christ God and man: they are not one, *mystically*: as Christ and his Church are one: they are not one, *physically*; as the foure Elements make up the body: they are not one *artificially*, as the stones and Timber make up a house: but this *unity* or *conjunction* is partly *naturall*, partly *morall*, and partly *divine*: the naturall part is, that they two are made one flesh: the morall part is, that they should be alike in manners and condition; and the divine part is the conformitie in religion.

Quest. How is it that the Apostle applyeth these words, (1 Corintb. 6. 16. *And they two shall bee one flesh.*) to the Whore and the Harlot, which is spoken of marriage here?

Ans. There are two things in marriage, the *materiall* part, and the *formall*: the *materiall* part is the conjunction of the bodies, the *formall* part is the conjunction of the hearts, and the blessing of God upon them. The Whore and the Harlot are one flesh, *materially*, but not *formally*, and thus is the Apostle to be understood.

And

*Meum et tuum, meum
mibi, tuum tibi, meo-
tuum, tue-meum.*

*Unitas vel hypostatica,
physica, artificialis seu
naturalis, et divina.*

*Dux sunt partes matri-
monij: materialis, &
formalis.*

That digamie is unlawful.

Duplex digamia, directa, & indirecta.

Duplex jns, divinum, & humanum.

What the Church of Rome holds concerning Digamy.

And they two shall be one flesh, Mat. 19.

This takes away *digamie*: There are two sorts of *digamy*, *direct* and *indirect*. He is called *digamus* properly, who hath two wives at one time, for this is *direct digamie*. *Indirect digamy* againe, is, when one wife being put away unjustly, he marries another, and of this sort of *digamie*, the Apostle speaks, *1 Timothy 5.9. She must be the wife of one husband*: by the Law of God, she might not divorce from her first husband; but it was permitted amongst the Iewes, & commanded amongst the Gentiles. She was but the wife of the second husband *jure humano*, by humane law: but she was the wife of the first husband still, *jure divino*, by the Law of God, and shee might not marry another so long as hee lived: if she cast him off, and married another then she was the wife of two husbands.

The Church of *Rome* makes them *Digamos*, who marry one wife after another, although the first be dead or lawfully repudiate; and such they debarre to be Priests *quia imperfecte representant personam Christi*, because they represent Christs person imperfectly; for they say, Christ in virginity, married his Church a Virgin: therefore a Priest being once married, and marrying againe the second time, marries not in virginity, neither can he a type of Christ, and his Church. They hold moreover, that a man once being married, if his Wife dye, him they seclude not from the Priesthood: but if a man marry a woman that hath beene married before, him they seclude from the Priesthood. So if hee have married a divorced woman him they count *digamos*.

But all these grounds they have drawne from the ceremoniall Law: for the high Priest vnder the Law, might not marry a widow, a whore, nor a divorced woman: he might not marry a widow, because he got

not

not her *first love*: he might not marry a *divorced woman*, because hee got not her *just love*, *Levit 21.7.14*. Hee might not marry a *whore*, because hee got not her *onely love*. So Christ will have of his Church, her first love, her just love, and onely love: That which was typicall to the high Priest vnder the Law, is it lawfull for them to make a rule of it under the Gospell?

So from the ceremoniall Law they have ordained, that none who hath any blemish in his body may be a Priest; such they make irregular, and not capable of the Priesthood.

So they make *defectus natalitium* an irregularity, that no bastard can be a Priest, all borrowed from the ceremoniall law.

And they two shall be one flesh, Mat. 19.

This condemnes *polygamy* as well as *digamy*, for after marriage the man hath no more power over his body, but his wife, neither hath the wife power over her own body, but her husband: but it was never lawfull for the wife to have moe husbands at once: therefore it was never lawfull for the man to have more wives at once. A concubine among the Hebrewes is called *פלוני אשת פלוני* *dividere virum*, because when hee is marryed to more, he is divided among them. Hence the Greeke word *παλλαξ*, and the Latine *pellex* which we call a concubine, or halfe wife.

To prove that *Polygamie* is unlawfull, wee will confirme it by two places of Scripture: the first is out of *Levit. 18.18*. *Yee shall not take a woman to her sister: that is, yee shall not take moe at once*. That this verse is meant of *monogamie* is proved by analogie with the 16. verse, where it is said, *thou shalt not uncover the nakednesse of thy sister in Law*. Again, the text would be too farre strained if it were otherwise interpreted, for the Scripture calls second wives in *polygamie*, *vexers* or *enviers*

Conseq. 2.

That Polygamie is unlawfull.

enviers as here: and the Greeke ἀντιζέλωτος, as *Penninah* is called the adversary of *Anna*, the other wife of *Elkanah*, *1 Sam. 1. 6.* So *Adah* and *Zillah*, the wives of *Lamech*, *Gen. 4. 23.* Thirdly, because *digamy* and *polygamy* should no wayes be discharged in all the Scriptures if not here except to the King, *Dent. 17. 16.* which were contrary to the Scriptures: and this Christ maketh manifest, *Mat. 19. 5.* and *Paul, 1 Cor. 6. 16.*

The *Karram* among the Iewes, called by the Greekes ἀγαγνῶσοι (these followed the literall sense of the Scriptures, and therefore were called *Domini verbum*;) they followed this interpretation. But the *Pharisees* (in Christs time) interpreted the words thus, *Thou shalt not take a wife and her sister, so long as she liveth*: but after shee is dead ye may marry her sister, for (say they) as two brethren may marry one wife, *Deuteronomie 25. 5.* so may one man marry two sisters, one successively after another.

But this was onely a pharisaicall glosse contrary to the command of God: for when the Lord commanded one brother to raise up seed to another, that was onely to his eldest brother, and therefore that place of *Deuteronomie*, *If brethren dwell together, and one of them want seed: UNUS* is to be understood, *Primus* or *primogenitus*, for none of the brethren had this priviledge but the eldest brother, he was a type of Christ, that was the first borne among many brethren, *Rom. 8. 29.* If seed had beene raised up to any of the rest of the brethren, it had bin incest, *Lev. 18.*

The second place to prove that *polygamy* is unlawfull, is out of *Deuteronomie 17. 17.* *The King shall not multiply wives.*

The *Pharisees* who gave way to the sinnes of the people, interpreted the Law thus: *The King shall not multiply wives*; that is, *he shall not have too many wives*; for they

they say *David* had eight wives, and yet this was no *polygamy* in him; they adde further, that it was lawfull for the King to have eightene wives, as witnesseth *R. Salomon* and *Lyra*. But they say *Salomon* trangressed this commandement, in multiplying wives.

In this same place of *Deuteronomie*, it is said: *the King shall not multiply gold and silver*. Now say they, as the King might exceed other men in riches: why then was it simply discharged him to have many wives?

To this wee answere, that when the Lord makes his covenant, it binds him equally, *Who sits upon the Throne, and him who drawes the water, or hewes the wood, Deuteronomy 29. 11*. The King hath greater priviledges, in honours and dignities then other men have: but hee hath not greater power to sinne, for hee is forbidden to multiply gold and silver: and that is, to seeke for more than may serve for his dignity and place: but hee might never multiply wives more then others: for the Law stands immoveable, *Gen. 2, And they two shall be one flesh*.

Obiect. But the Lord said to *David*, *I have given thy masters wives into thy bosome, 2 Sam. 12. 8*. Therefore a man might marry moe wives.

Answ. God gives things two manner of wayes. Sometimes he gives them by a genrall dispensation and gift: and by this gift a man hath not a right to the thing, unlesse hee get it confirmed by another right: and the things which God permits in this sense, may bee sayd to bee his gifts. As hee gave *Nebuchadnezzar* power over the Nations: but by this gift *Nebuchadnezzar* had no right, for God onely permitted him to tyrannize over them. But when God confirmes this first gift to a man: then he gives it *ex bene placito* according to his good pleasure, as he gave *Eva* to *Adam*, at the beginning.

Dona a Deo dupliciter dantur. 1. generaliter, & permissivè. 2. ex bene placito.

God gave *Sauls* wives to *David* by the first gift, onely by permission: but he had never this gift confirmed, therefore no *polygamie* is lawfull.

Quest. But what shall wee thinke of this *polygamie* of the fathers?

*Adulterium proprie et
largè sumptum.*

Answ. Wee cannot hold it to bee adultery, taking adultery properly: for if it had beene adultery in the proper signification: God who reproved *David* for his adultery so often, would not have suffered this sin unreproved: but our Divines make it a sinne lesse than adultery, and more than fornication.

Yet taking adultery largely, it may be called adultery, *Hosea. 9. 16. They shall commit adultery and shall, not increase:* this seemes to be spoken of the *polygamists*, and not of the adulterers: for it were no punishment for the adulterer to want children: but the *Polygamists* did chuse many wives of set purpose, that they might multiply children. So that *polygamy* in the largest sense, may be called adultery. Incest is sometimes called fornication, *1 Corinth 5.* The lesse sinne is there put for the greater sinne: so when *polygamie* is called adultery in the Scriptures, the more sin is put for the lesse, yet it is not properly adultery, because God permitted it for the time, that his Church might increase.

Quest. But how came it that the Prophets did not reprove this sinne?

*Quadruplex vitium;
persona, gentis, vocatio-
nis, & sæculi.*

Answ. There is in a Countrey a fourfold sin: the first is called *vitium persona*, the sinne of the person, that they reprooved, which was the sin of a particular man.

Secondly, *vitium gentis*, the sinne of a whole nation that sin they reprooved: as the Prophets reproved the Jewes for their stiffneckednesse and hypocrisie.

Thirdly, ther is *vitium vocationis*, the sin of a mans calling, as *Rahab* is called a *Taverner* by *Ios. 2. 1.* But *James* calls her a *Harlot*, *James 2. 25.* This sin they reproved.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, there is *vitium seculi*, when the sinne overspreads all, & is universally received as *polygamy* among the Iewes: and this ye shall find the prophets seldome to have reprov'd.

Quest. Whether had the Iewes any dispensation of God in this their *polygamie*?

Answ. Some hold that God gave them a dispensation: and to prove this, first they say that some Lawes are *stable*, as the ordinances of the Church, which every man may not alter. Secondly, some lawes are *immoveable*, as the Lawes given by God himselfe in his second Table, cannot be dispensed with, but by God himselfe who gave them. Thirdly, some Lawes are *incommutable*, which cannot be changed by God himself, without a stain of his holinesse.

Lex sancta, vel est stabilis, immobilis, vel incommutabilis,

They say, that these lawes of the second table which God had made, flow not necessarily from him, as his justice and holinesse doe, but freely: for these he wills, or not wills, without any stain of his holinesse. As for example: *God is to be loved*, therefore a man may not marry his brothers wife, this doth not follow necessarily in the strictest signification: but the precepts of the first table cannot bee dispensed with by God, without a stain of his holinesse. As for example *God is to be beloved*, therefore, he cannot dispence that one should hate him: *sine intrinseca repugnantia*.

They say, that God dispensed with the fathers in *polygamy*, because God is above the Law, which is given betwixt creature and creature, which in that respect is immoveable, although God himselfe may change it. But hee is not above the eternall law: because hee is not above himselfe; therefore hee cannot dispence with that law which is repugnant to his eternity and glory; and these are the precepts of the first table. But seeing *polygamy* is in the second table, God might

dispenſe with it, without any ſtaine of his holineſſe.

Againe, when it is demanded of theſe men, what ſcripture they can bring for this diſpenſation: They anſwer that God himſelfe ſaith to *Abraham*, *Gen. 21. Hearken unto Sarah, in whatſoever ſhe ſaith to thee*: by this admonition, *Abraham* was mooved to caſt out *Hagar* and her ſonne: although this might have ſeemed contrary to the law of nature, therefore the Text ſaith, *this ſeemed hard to Abraham*. So when God ſaith to *Abraham*, *Hearken unto Sarah, in whatſoever ſhee ſaith to thee*: and *Sarah* bade him take his owne hand-maide, *Gen. 16. 1.* then *Sarah* was Gods mouth to him in that point alſo.

Anſw. Theſe words, *Hearken unto Sarah in all that ſhe ſaith*; are not to bee vnderſtood in whatſoever ſhee ſaith; but in all that ſhee ſaith concerning *Hagar* and her ſonne, in that he was to hearken to her. Againe, *Abraham* tooke *Hagar* before he got this direction for to hearken to *Sarah*: ſo that this place can be no warrant for a diſpenſation to the Patriarchs in their polygamy. it was onely a permiſſion which God yeelded unto for the time, as hee granted them a bill of divorce for the hardneſſe of their hearts: but God cannot diſpenſe with any of his lawes, neither in the firſt nor ſecond Tables, they are ſo neere joyned together, that thoſe which breake the one, doe breake the other alſo.

Queſt. Why did not God puniſh this ſinne in the fathers?

Anſw. God doth three things concerning ſin. Firſt he pardons ſinne: ſecondly, he puniſheth ſinne, thirdly, he paſſeth by ſinne, *Rom. 3. 23.* By the forgivenesse of ſinnes, that paſſed by.

A ſinne actually forgiven, and a ſinne paſſed by, differ. A ſinne is actually pardoned in the elect comming to know.

*Triafacit Deus peccato-
ribus, remittit peccatum,
punit peccatum, & præ-
terit peccatum.*

knowledge, when they have remorse for their sinne; and finde the benefit of the pardon of the sinne in particular. But God passeth by a sinne, when the sinner in particular knoweth not this sinne to bee a sinne which hee commits; and yet the remission of this sinne is concluded within the remission of the rest of their sinnes. The fathers when they got a remission of the rest of their sinnes in the blood of Christ, they got also the remission of the sinne of *polygamie*, which was their sinne of ignorance; and therefore they were to offer a sacrifice for the sinnes of ignorance, *Levit. 4. 15. 17.* and among the rest for this *polygamie*.

Quest. How differed concubines then from other wives? First, they were not solemnly married as the other wives, neither was there any solemne contract betwixt them as betwixt the man and the wife; they had not dowrie; their sonnes did not inherit; yet when they were married, the Scripture calls them *wives*; *Judg. 19. 1, 2*, after that *Absolon knew Davids concubines*, *2 Samuel 16. David shut them up, and hee knew them no more, but he closed them up to the day of their death, and they lived in widowhood*; whence *Lyr* gathereth well, that these concubines were wives.

Againe, to prove that *polygamie* is sinne, and unlawfull, it is confirmed by Christs words; when hee reduced marriage to the first institution againe, *Math. 19. Whosoever puts away his wife, and marrieth another, commits whoredome*, much more he who keepes his wife, and takes another to her, commits whoredome. The Apostle, *1 Cor. 7.* giveth the like authority to the wife over the husband, as he giveth to the man over the wife: as it was never lawfull for the wife to have moe husbands at once, therefore it was not lawfull for a man from the beginning, to have moe wives at once.

Prop.

Illust.

*Triplex est conjunctio,
naturalis, politica, &
spiritualis,*

This neere conjunction betwixt man and the wife, is called *cleaving to her. Gen. 2.*

Christ when he expoundes these words, hee saith, *προσκολληθησεται agglutinatur uxori*, hee is glewed to his wife: for as glew joynest two things together, and makes them one: so should love be a glewing of their hearts together: *amor coniugalis debet esse reciprocus*, the glew must take hold on both sides, or else the conjunction will not last long. There is a threefold conjunction; first, *naturall*: secondly, *polytike*, and thirdly, *spirituall*, the first is common to us with the beasts, the second with the heathen and the third proper onely to the Christian: this third must be the chiefe *ingredient*, this is that which they say, *Nuptia inchoantur in cælis, perficiuntur in terris*, Marriages are begun in heaven, and perfected upon the earth: then *thalamus erit pro templo, & thorus pro altari*, that is, the wedding chamber shall be for the Church, and the marriage bed for the Altar.

The woman was made a helper to the man.

Prop.

Illust.

*Tria adiumenta confert
uxor viro suo. 1. in re-
ligione.*

This helpe stands in three things. First, in *religion*; *1 Pet. 3. 7. Take heed that yee jarre not, least Satan hinder your prayers*, he is speaking to the man & the wife here: such a helper was *Priscilla* to *Aquila*, *Acts 18*, *Iobs*. wife was not a helper to him in his religion, who bade him curse God and dye: *Iob 2*. nor *Michol* to *David*, when she scorned him as hee was dancing before the Arke, *2 Samuel 6*. she was a hinderance to him in his religion. So *Salomons* wives, when they drew him to Idolatry, *1 King. 11*. were not helpers to him in his religion.

*Triplex conjunctio; car-
nalis spiritualis, & spi-
ritus, & carnis.*

Paul notes three sorts of conjunction, *1 Corinth. 6. 16*. the first is in the *flesh* onely, as betwixt a man and a whore, or a harlot: the second in the *spirit* onely, as betwixt Christ and his members; the third, in the

the flesh and the spirit, when two faithfull are married together: such will helpe one another in religion.

Secondly, she must helpe him in his labours, a wasting woman is compared to the ivie, it seemes to uphold the tree, and in the meane time suckes out the juyce of it. A foolish woman overthrowes her house *Proverbs* 14.1. but a vertuous woman is compared to a fruitfull Vine, *Psalm* 128.

2. in laboribus.

Thirdly, now after the fall, shee must helpe in his griefes. *Ezek.* 24.16. she is called, *the delight of his eyes*, so *Proverbs* 5.19. shee is called *his hind or Roe*: shee must not bee like a drop of raine, or as a smoake in the house, continually to molest and trouble it, *Prov.* 19.13.

3. in doloribus.

She was made a helper like to himselfe?

The similitude betwixt the man and the wife, consists in three things. First; they must be like in *piety*, for this, see before in the former proposition.

Secondly, they must be like in degrees, there would not be too great inequality betwixt the persons who marry: but some make the inequality in their owne estimation, where there is none at all.

That apologue in the 2 *King* 14. 9. sheweth this well. The Thistle of Lebanon sent to the Cedar of Lebanon to make a marriage with it, but the beasts of the field treade downe the Thistle But there was not so great oddes betwixt the ten tribes and the two tribes as betwixt the base Thistle, and the tall Cedar of Lebanon: this came onely from the high conceit which they had of themselves.

The Jewes have another apologue, very fit for this purpose. They say that the Moon upon a time sought to marry with the Sunne, the Sun said that the Moon could be no match to him; for he ruled the day and the yeare, hee nourished all things with his heate, hee

Prop.

Illust.

Triplex similitudo uxori ad virum.

1 in pietate.

2 gradibus dignitatis.

ruled the heart of man, the most excellent part of the body, and by his heate hee breedes the gold, the most excellent of the metals. But the Moone replied, that there was not so great oddes; for if the Sunne ruled the day, She ruled the night; if the Sunne ruled the yeare, she ruled the moneths: if hee nourished things with his heate, yet hee scorched and burned many of them: and if it were not for the moysture which they receive of her in the night, they would quickly perish; if he ruled the heart of man, she rules the braine of man; if he breed the gold, she breedes the silver: therefore there is not so great oddes betwixt the Sunne and the Moone, but they may marry together.

3. In atate.

Thirdly, the man and the woman must bee like in age. The mother of *Dionysius* the tyrant, being very old, desired her sonneto cause a young man to marry her: he answered; *I can doe any thing, but I cannot inforce nature: Naomi said, Ruth 1. I am too old to marry againe.*

Among the *Spartanes*, there was a set time for their marriage: and they had *pænam ô-φραν* upon these who had deferred their marriage too long: their punishment was, that they were never suffered to marry. Where these three respects before mentioned (to wit, religion, degrees, and age) are not observed in marriage; oftentimes the conjunction of them, is like the coupling of *Sampsons* foxe-tayles, *Iudg. 15.* which had a fire-brand bound betwixt every of them; so these that are unequally yoked, the firebrand of Gods wrath falls betwixt them sometimes.

Prop.

Before the fall, *it was not good for man to bee alone,*
Gen. 2.

Illust.

It is good for man notto be alone, for the propagation of mankind: but it is good for man to be alone, in respect of that, *quod bonum utile vocamus*, that is, when he

hee hath the gift of God to abstaine, for the kingdome of God, *Matth. 19.* that hee may the more exercise himselfe in these holy duties of prayer, and other religious exercises.

Here we must marke, that there is a twofold good; to wit, the *good of expediencie*, and *morall good*. *Morall good* is opposite to sinne, but not *expedient good*. When *Paul* saith, *it is not good to marry*, his meaning is, that it is not expedient good at that time to marry, not that hee would make it a sinne; for he saith also, if he marry, he sinnes not.

In respect of circumstances, at that time it was better not to marry, this is onely *bonum secundum quid*, respectively good in respect of the persecutions that were that time risen in the Church under the persecuting Emperours.

Virginity is not a vertue of it selfe, and no more acceptable before God, than *marriage* is.

This is proved by two reasons: the first is, that all vertues by repentance may be restored to man. But virginity cannot be restored by repentance, therefore virginity is not a vertue.

All vertues in time and place are commanded, but virginity is left free; and onely *Paul* gives his advise in it, *1 Cor. 7.* Therefore it is not a vertue.

Gerson useth a third reason thus, All vertues are *con-nexa*, coupled together; and he who hath one of them is capable of them all; but married folkes who have other vertues, are not capable of virginity; therefore virginity is not a vertue.

But this reason holds not, because all vertues are coupled together that are perfect vertues: but these that are imperfect vertues, are not alwayes coupled together. The perfect vertues are *prudence*, *temperancy*, *fortitude* and *justice*, he that hath one of these hath all the rest, but

Duplex bonum; expedientia, & morale.

Prop.

That Virginity is not a vertue, and therefore not to be vowed.

Reason 1.

Reason 2.

Reason 3.

Virtutes, vel sunt perfectæ, vel imperfectæ.

but a man may have one of the inferiour vertues, and not have the rest, as the Church of *Ephesus* had *patience*, and suffered many things for Christ, yet she fell from her first love, *Revel. 2.*

Object. But the Apostle saith, *1 Corinth. 7. The unmarried pleaseth the Lord*, therefore Virginitie is a vertue.

Ans. We please God two wayes; first, onely by his Sonne *Christ* as the cause; secondly, we please God in that calling, that God hath called us to; if wee have the gift of continency, then we please him in the unmarried life; if we have not the gift, then we please him in marriage, *1 Tim. 2. 15. Women shall be saved through bearing of children*; that is, they please God, when they are called to that estate, to live in wedlocke, and to bring up their children in his feare; then they testifie that they are in Christ; so that we please God as well in the one estate as in the other.

Quest. But seeing Virginitie is not a vertue, what will ye make it then?

Ans. There is a twofold good; First, that which is good in it selfe; Secondly, that which is good for another end; *fasting* is not a thing that is good in it selfe; for a man is not accepted before God that he fasts; it is but good for another end, that is, when he fasts that he may be the more religiously disposed. So *virginitie* is not a thing that is good in it selfe, but good for another end, that is, when a man lives a single life, having the gift of Chastitie, that hee may be the more fit to serve God.

Virginitie is no more acceptable before God than marriage; therefore the Church of *Rome* preferring *virginitie* so farre above marriage, is strangely deluded: for they glossing that parable of the sower, *Mat. 13.* say that *Virginitie* bringeth out a hundred fold; *Widowhood* fixtie fold; and *marriage*, but thirty fold.

Again

Dupliciter placemus
Deo; in Christo, &
in officio: seu causali-
ter & consequenter.

Duplex bonum, per se,
& ad aliquid.

Againe they say, *quod conjugium pertinet ad veniam; virginitas ad gloriam; & fornicatio ad pœnam*, that is, marriage hath need of pardon; virginity deserves glorie, and fornication punishment.

Thirdly, they say, that there are three crownes; one for martyrs; a second for virgins; and the third for Doctors. To these (say they) there are three enemies opposite: the *flesh*, the *world*, and the *Divell*; the virgines overcome the *flesh*; the martyres overcome the *world*; and the Doctors overcome the *Divell*, by teaching the people, and drawing them out of his tyranny; but they ordaine no crowne for the married estate; and thus they make the ordinances of God prescribed in his Word, and established by himselfe, to bee of none effect.

Soli Deo gloria.

FINIS.

Sancti Mart. apud Sulpitium lib. 3.

Pontificij tres coronas statuunt, martyrum, virginum, & doctorum: cui tres opponuntur inimici, caro, mundus, Diabolus.

Ans. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840.

Das Verzeichnis
der in der
Kartei befindlichen
Personen ist
nach dem
Geburtsort
geordnet.

...the ... of ...

[illegible]

5110

21213